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It is a rare privilege to review the priorities and achievements of an organization 
over a century. Understanding the past is essential for managing the present 
and preparing for the future. The International Labour Organization (ILO) and 
its constituents – governments, employers, and workers – have collaborated 
for 100 years to promote social justice and peace. The decades have been turbu-
lent. Reconstruction has followed destruction, yet imbalances between poverty 
and prosperity have persisted. New challenges have arisen once old ones were 
resolved. Navigating between deeply entrenched interests, often in contradiction, 
has required special skills. Through the work of the ILO, tripartite cooperation 
and social dialogue have become the accepted method to meet basic human 
needs, contributing to economic growth and guaranteeing the freedoms and 
rights of nations and of people. 
Through the joint decisions of governments and representatives of the 
employers and workers, the ILO has helped lay the basis for contemporary inter-
national labour and social legislation. It has sought to establish humane working 
conditions, balancing this goal with the rights and interests of workers and 
employers alike. The ILO’s basic aims were set out in the ILO Constitution of 1919. 
The Philadelphia Declaration of 1944 confirmed the ILO as one of the indispen-
sable actors of the multilateral system. The Organization’s agenda is guided by 
international labour standards and policies to promote these standards on the 
ground, in an infinite variety of national and local circumstances. 
This agenda has been put in practice in programmes for world employment, for 
fundamental rights at work, for setting decent work as a target for the Sustainable 
Development Goals of the United Nations, and for demonstrating that global markets 
can function in a fair way. Most recently, the ILO’s aims were reaffirmed by the Cen-
tenary Declaration for the Future of Work, adopted by the International Labour Con-
ference in 2019 and most recently by the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
The decisions taken in 1919 gave the orientations for tripartite cooperation 
and established its practice. Fortunately, the founders of the ILO did not lack 
ambition and vision. They set in motion an organization that simultaneously 
addressed fundamental labour rights, such as freedom of association, equality, 
the abolition of child labour and forced labour as well as the elimination of all 
types of discrimination, and all aspects of social and labour policy. The Organiza-
tion’s methods have shaped the ways in which nations and people, individually 
and collectively, pursue and achieve economic and social security. 
The goals of peace and prosperity through social justice are not easy to 
realize. Yet history has demonstrated that they can be achieved at the workplace 
and industry level as well as in countries aspiring to sovereignty or engaged in 
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nation building. The tripartite formula of the ILO provides universal guidance 
based on exchanges and negotiations between those directly concerned. The 
actors in turn have the responsibility to apply common standards in daily reality. 
Daniel Maul, the author of this book, gives us a rich analytical overview of 
the ILO’s history. A century is a long stretch of time. The period has seen political 
upheavals, the demise of imperial rule, democratization, and the recognition of 
independence and the rights of nations and individuals. Together with techno-
logical and structural change, these events have deeply transformed our socie-
ties, as well as the work that constructs them.
There is no one single story of the ILO. Many narratives spring from individ-
ual and collective experiences of workers, employers, and governments, and 
the ties of solidarity and common experience cut across national borders. These 
 narratives are complemented by the perspectives of ILO officials and all those 
who have engaged with the ILO around the world. All have their own views on 
what the ILO has achieved. Naturally, these views do not always converge. 
This book draws strength from research done from an external academic per-
spective. There is a growing scholarly interest in the multilateral system, global 
governance, and international organizations. This has informed an increasing 
amount of research on the ILO by historians and social scientists, which has con-
tributed to this book. What makes the ILO particularly interesting for research-
ers is the link to the real world through employers’ and workers’ representatives. 
More recently, the role of civil society has further encouraged analysis of the ILO’s 
synergies with cooperatives, social reform networks, human rights advocates, 
and other groups. Daniel Maul shows how the goals and principles of the ILO 
have shaped political and academic debate and how the ILO’s research, technical 
cooperation, and the setting and supervision of international labour standards 
have contributed to social reform in many countries. 
In the course of a century, the ILO has become a universal organization, with 
187 member States. Its challenge is to cover, equally universally, all the evolving 
aspects of work. While its tripartite governance structure has remained constant, 
the ILO has reached out to increasingly diverse groups of workers, seeking to 
improve their living and working conditions and to help them assert their rights 
and gain protection. It has explored ways to adapt management methods, includ-
ing negotiations and bargaining, so that the needs of workers and employers in 
all economic sectors are addressed.
The early years highlighted industrial and agricultural work and seafaring. 
However, commercial, clerical, and intellectual work also became a focus in 
the first decade of the ILO’s existence. With decolonization and the thrust for 
development, the scope of activity expanded to various types of informal work, 
most recently domestic work. Addressing work in widely different situations, 
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including some forms that we may not yet fully comprehend, remains an essen-
tial task of the ILO.
Setbacks and political tensions are inevitable in any story such as this. While 
it is useful to learn from successes, we should study the failures with equal care. 
The process of tripartite cooperation and social dialogue does not stop. Each 
solution achieved through negotiated settlements and new labour and social 
legislation is followed by new contradictions and new settlements. Herein lies 
the fascination of labour relations: they are part of the dynamics of life that 
touch workers, businesses, social institutions and, in the end, all components 
of humanity. The fact that each achievement is challenged and revisited is how 
social progress is wrought.  
This said, the basic rights on which rests the dignity of workers, employ-
ers and nations should not be subject to the fluctuations of growth and income 
levels. The rights to equal opportunity, association, negotiation, social security, 
and occupational safety and health are not negotiable. Beyond the floor set by 
international labour law and practice, various forms of negotiations and collab-
oration demonstrate that social dialogue is not a zero-sum game and that it can 
deliver benefits for all. If this were not so, the ILO could not function. 
Daniel Maul constantly draws our attention to the moments in history, often 
in times of war and crisis, where the ILO successfully adapted its methods, 
reached out to potential allies, and took courageous decisions. Remaining at the 
forefront of global social policy – with regard to both policy debate and concrete 
action – is the main challenge for the ILO at the outset of its second century. 
History not only shows us what can be achieved, it also makes us realize 
the cost of our failures. When the world has faced economic and political crises, 
it has too often been reluctant, or incapable, of honouring the goal of social 
justice. Transformations of the economy and of work require sustained action 
to strengthen the social infrastructure of all countries. New threats arising from 
climate change and evolving methods of work organization demand immediate 
and effective action. 
At the same time, the basic promises of decent work are still beyond the reach 
of large numbers of working people. The need for social justice and peace is as 
great today as at any point in the last century. The lessons from the last 100 years 
deserve careful consideration and study. This book offers an analytical account 
of the creativeness of the ILO and its constituents. Combining the strength of its 
principles with the imagination of workers, employers, and governments is the 
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Introduction
The social factor must take precedence over the economic factor; it must regulate and guide it 
in the highest cause of justice.
Albert Thomas, 19311
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is a fascinating object of study for 
historians from more than one point of view. Born in 1919 out of the political 
and social turmoil of the First World War and its aftermath, it is today one of the 
oldest organizations of the United Nations system. Its unique tripartite struc-
ture, in which decisions are taken by representatives of governments, employers 
and workers, adds to its distinctive status. But that is not all, and it may not 
even be half, of the explanation of why the ILO is such a rich resource. The main 
reason is that the ILO opens up windows through which we catch a view of a 
vast field of themes that have dominated the twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries. A study of the ILO offers a longitudinal perspective on the conditions 
under which people have been working; the changing modes of production and 
the response by workers and governments; the struggles for social justice both 
within nations and in their relationships with other nations; and, finally, the 
answers that states have found, or tried to find, during the past hundred years 
to the social problems of their day, in the wider context of international cooper-
ation and competition.
While the ILO as an organization is at the heart of this book, the institutional 
aspect is but one important part of a larger story, in which the  numerous aspects 
of people’s work experiences and the quest for labour and social rights have 
been reflected in the Organization’s history. In this sense, the ILO’s attempts 
to create “global social policy” are at the core of this analysis. It provides a 
perspective on the ways in which the Organization, over a hundred years, has 
sought to influence the debates on this issue. It examines the ILO’s practical 
contributions to improving the conditions of work and to promoting social 
policies that have gone beyond the strict confines of the labour environment – 
above all, but not only – through the definition and adoption of international 
labour standards.
In the following account, the ILO appears in a dual role: On the one hand, 
from the times of its first Director, Albert Thomas, the ILO’s permanent secretar-
iat, the International Labour Office (the Office for short), has been an actor in its 
1 ILO, The International Labour Organisation. The First Decade. Preface by Albert Thomas 
 (Geneva: ILO, 1931), 12.
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own right in the field of global social policy. On the other, the ILO has provided 
an arena for direct and open debates among the representatives of governments, 
workers and employers. In this latter regard, the story of the ILO mirrors the con-
tinuous interest of governments, trade unions, business groups and a variety of 
other actors. They have had manifold and varied motives for engaging with the 
transnational dimension of social policy and using the Organization to debate 
matters of social justice, development, the alleviation of poverty, social mobility, 
and the distribution of wealth in an international context. These actors have often 
followed intertwined humanitarian, economic, political and geopolitical, as well 
as ideological rationales. This has involved contests for power and influence as 
well as a constant struggle to define what the ILO should truly be and what pur-
poses it should serve.
Against this background, the story that this account will tell evolves around 
three central questions. Whose organization was and is the ILO? What char-
acterizes the ILO as an international organization? And finally, in light of the 
importance attributed to the ambiguous goal of “social justice” both within and 
among its member States: what has been the ILO’s specific contribution to the 
social justice debates that have spanned an entire century – from the meeting 
rooms at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to the exploration of the future of 
work in our day? These three questions form the narrative that runs throughout 
this study.
Whose Organization?
Despite its universalist approach, the ILO has never represented the world of 
work in all its dimensions and aspects. Struggles with inclusion and exclusion, 
and with the question what kind of workers and what kinds of work are within 
or outside of the ILO’s mandate, have been part of the Organization from its very 
beginnings. It is crucial to recognize that the boundaries of the ILO’s scope of 
action are continuously shifting, because then we can use the ILO as a prism, 
through which we can see the inequalities, injustices, and power struggles, as 
well as the profound socio-economic transformations that take place in the world 
surrounding the Organization.
The question of “whose organization” the ILO is has always had many facets. 
What activities qualify to be treated as “work” within the scope of the Organi-
zation? Who has the primary claim on the ILO’s attention, work and resources? 
The debates have covered dichotomies such as industrialized vs. developing 
countries, market vs. planned economies, formal vs. informal sector, men vs. 
women, industrial vs. rural labour, migrants vs. nationals, production vs. service 
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economy, blue vs. white collar work, and Fordist vs. post-Fordist  production. 
The conjunctures of inclusion and exclusion and the dynamics behind the 
ILO’s work have been fluctuating, depending on specific political, social, and 
economic  contexts. In this sense the question of who or what should be rep-
resented in the ILO’s meeting rooms, in its work programmes and its research 
activities, has always reflected the struggle of ideologies – East vs. West, North 
vs. South, imperial vs. colonial, Keynesian vs. neoliberal. It has equally been 
affected by shifting conceptions of gender roles and changing perceptions of 
race at the national and international levels. These considerations provided the 
background for including colonial and indigenous labour within the sphere of 
standard-setting. They accompanied the discussions on equal pay for men and 
women, on development, and the ILO’s exploration of the so-called informal 
economy.
To read the ILO’s history as one of constant expansion, however, would miss 
the point. None of these new paths were uncontested at the time, and they were 
accompanied by demands for a re-focusing and prioritizing of the Organization’s 
activities. The same has been true for the ILO’s repeated endeavours to expand its 
mandate beyond the field of labour policy into the broader social and, in particu-
lar, economic areas.
What and, above all, who has driven these discussions? The questions of who 
was in charge, and who set the direction are instructive to the understanding of 
the workings of the Organization. The ILO has never been – as some might have 
wished – the “enchanted palace” of internationalist ideals, to borrow from Mark 
Mazower’s assessment of the hidden imperial roots of the United Nations (UN).2 
It has rather served as both a mirror and a vessel for power relations within the 
international system at any given time. As this account will show, the particular 
treatment of colonial labour matters in the interwar years clearly reflected the 
dominant position that the imperial powers, especially Great Britain and France, 
occupied within the ILO at the time. Similarly, the strong influence of the United 
States as the Western superpower can be traced all over – from the debates on 
human rights during the 1950s, through the venture into technical cooperation 
and the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
Through which channels have influence and power manifested themselves? The 
questions of who pays the bills obviously plays an important role. The with-
drawal of the United States from the ILO from 1977 to 1980 put this on full display, 
inasmuch as it deprived the Organization of US membership contributions, which 
2 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the 
United Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
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accounted for a quarter of the ILO’s regular budget. Money, however, is not the 
only way how states exert influence or “hegemony”.3 Recruitment within the ILO 
and the design of its programmes of work come into play. In turn, in many fields 
of the ILO’s activities the primacy of national prerogatives of powerful states 
becomes tangible.
At the same time, power relations within international organizations are 
seldom static; mainly they constitute rather fluid and dynamic structures. Claims 
to hegemony never remain unchallenged, as several debates during the ILO’s 
history, and in particular those on human rights, have shown. Lest we forget, tri-
partism and the participation of trade union and business representatives serve 
as a corrective to the influence of states – although the extent to which they do 
so is relative, as is the degree to which the International Labour Office itself has 
influenced debates and decisions.
An International Organization among International 
Organizations?
What defines the ILO as an international organization? Its story cannot be told 
in isolation from the wider history of internationalism and international organi-
zations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Organization’s roots can 
be traced back to the crossroads of (social) liberal and Socialist aspirations in 
the nineteenth century. Like the League of Nations, the other great experiment 
in international governance rising from the ashes of the First World War, the ILO 
was a supreme expression of liberal traditions of internationalist thought and 
action. At the same time, it incorporated the central aims of the Second (Socialist) 
International (1889–1916) and the international trade union movement, which 
was an important – if not the most important – driver behind the ILO’s found-
ing.4 As an organization, the ILO would help to merge those traditions to become 
the standard bearer of a new social liberal branch of internationalism, defined 
and re-defined in an ever shifting political and social environment. The most dra-
matic challenges to the ILO’s social liberal principles came both from inside and 
3 Robert W. Cox, “Labor and Hegemony”, International Organization 31, no. 3 (1977): 385–424.
4 Sandrine Kott, “From Transnational Reformist Network to International Organization: The 
International Association for Labour Legislation and the International Labour Organization, 
1900–1930s”, in Shaping the Transnational Sphere. Experts, Networks and Issues from the 1840s to 
the 1930s, ed. Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, and Jakob Vogel (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2015), 239–259; John W. Follows, Antecedents of the International Labour Organization (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1951).
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outside the Organization with the allure of fascism and communism. Still, the 
ILO has always served in less dramatic ways as a sounding board for alternative 
ideas of internationalism. It provided room for those ideas on a regional level – 
for example, pan-Americanism and pan-Africanism – and it provided space for 
expressions of solidarity among groups of states or transnational movements, 
such as the countries of the global South or indigenous internationalism in the 
post-1945 era.5
What distinguishes the ILO from the bulk of international organizations 
whose activities today cover nearly all dimensions of people’s lives? Is it all that 
different? In some ways the ILO has arguably been an international organization 
among others from its inception. This is particularly true regarding its relationship 
with governments and the world of nation states that founded and sustained the 
system of international organizations throughout the twentieth century.6 The ILO 
was born at the historical moment when three empires – the  Austro-Hungarian, 
Ottoman and Russian – collapsed, giving way to a new political landscape where 
the nation state became the standard international actor. The demise of Euro-
pean colonial empires after 1945 led to a further strengthening of the principle of 
national sovereignty in international affairs. As much as any other international 
organization, by definition the ILO is first and foremost dependent on the states 
that constitute its membership.
The ILO has been an international organization among international organi-
zations in another sense. Emerging from the Paris Peace Conference, it started its 
work as part of the League of Nations system. In 1946, it became the first “special-
ized agency” of the United Nations. The ILO has thus been from its beginnings 
institutionally linked to the wider family of international organizations. Even 
though it has at all times kept a degree of autonomy within this family, competi-
tion and cooperation in this network of institutions, as well as with other regional 
and sectoral organizations outside this framework, have always defined features 
of the ILO’s work.7 The history of the Office, too, cannot be separated from a 
broader internationalist milieu of governmental and non-governmental actors. 
Many of the dynamics behind the ILO’s actions is due to its position within this 
5 Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, eds., Internationalisms: A Twentieth Century History (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
6 Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia, PA: University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 2013).
7 For the history of international organizations in a long-term perspective, see Mark Mazower, 
Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New York: Penguin Press, 2012); Bob Reinalda, Rou-
tledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day (London: Routledge, 
2009).
6   Introduction
broader network which is composed of parts of the United Nations family as well 
as of transnational actors such as the cooperative movement or organizations 
dealing with children’s welfare, social insurance, health issues and the rights of 
migrant and domestic workers.
From the beginning, the International Labour Office was part of this broader 
network and its officials, especially its Director (later Director-General), played a 
central role. Albert Thomas perceived of the Organization as an important instru-
ment in maintaining peace in Europe after the First World War. He saw the ILO 
as well positioned to fulfil a role in securing peace, both within societies and 
among nations, based on international labour standards and by bringing polit-
ical issues down to the level of “technical”, labour-related problems in order to 
initiate contact and cooperation. His successors have by and large maintained 
Thomas’ proactive stance to the role of international bureaucracies.
The unique position of the ILO within the international framework is due 
first and foremost to its tripartite structure. Its institutional make-up, in which 
governments, employers (the representatives of business interests), and workers 
(trade unions) share in the decision-making process shapes the ILO’s work and 
its organizational “ideology”. Tripartism has played an important yet ambiguous 
part in the history of the ILO’s venture into new fields of action. It has worked as 
a powerful tool for inclusion and expansion in the ILO and opened a space for 
the representation of societal interests from the world of work. Yet, to the degree 
that tripartism is based on the concept of formal (industrial) employment, it has 
sometimes been an obstacle to including other groups of working people outside 
this norm within the scope of the Organization. On the whole, however, the tri-
partism which the ILO has fostered on the international level and actively sought 
to put in practice “on the ground” is the ILO’s signature characteristic and asset 
within the sphere of international organizations.
An Organization for Social Justice
The ILO has been constructed around the idea of social justice. While the term 
itself may have had different connotations over the years, it has remained a 
guiding principle in the ILO’s work. However, the exact meaning in terms of con-
crete policies is as controversial as ever. There has never been a clear definition, 
let alone a stable consensus, on what social justice entails; nor has there been 
agreement on the means by which it could (or should) be attained. Perhaps the 
very fact that social justice evokes quite different understandings of its content 
and implications has served to make the term a point of reference in the ILO’s 
work for 100 years.
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The first paragraph of the preamble of the ILO’s Constitution, written in the 
aftermath of the First World War, asserts that “peace can be established only if 
it is based upon social justice”.8 While references to social justice as a means for 
the establishment and maintenance of a lasting peace, both within and among 
nations, were frequent during the very first days of the Organization, the 1944 Dec-
laration of Philadelphia connected it to the idea of individual rights. Written in the 
final phase of another World War, in which the ILO sided with the cause of liberal 
democracy, the Philadelphia Declaration also defined social justice as a precondi-
tion for the stability of democratic government. The most recent prominent appear-
ance of the term can be found in the Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globali-
zation of 2008, usually referred to as the “Social Justice Declaration”. Social justice 
now features as a “universal aspiration”, under pressure from market imperatives 
and rapid technological change. The Declaration defines the term indirectly, ex 
negativo, as the need to remedy “income inequality, continuing high levels of 
unemployment and poverty, vulnerability of economies to external shocks, and 
the growth of both unprotected work and the informal economy, which impact on 
the employment relationship and the protections it can offer”.9 What social justice 
could mean in a more positive sense, whether, for instance, it involves redistribu-
tive elements on the national as well as the international levels, is as open to inter-
pretation and controversy as at any earlier time in the ILO’s history.
While there has never been a clear-cut concept of social justice at the heart 
of the ILO’s work, there are distinctive recurring motives. One of them, present 
from the start in the ILO’s work for social justice, was built on the assumption 
that the ILO was able, through standard-setting and other means, to help ensure 
social cohesion within open market economies. Founded against the background 
of political and social revolution, a major impetus for the ILO’s establishment – 
and even for the attempts of social reform preceding its founding – was to rein in 
the excessive forces of capitalism without removing the capitalist system itself. 
The preferred means to achieve this was state regulation, whether through legis-
lation, social policy, or economic and social planning.
By its calls on governments to take preventive action, the founders of the ILO 
tried to subdue the socially (and politically) destructive tendencies of unfettered 
capitalism. In this sense, the ILO, more than any other international institution, 
was part of and affected by the “great transformation” observed by Karl Polanyi 
8 “Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and 
such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice … ”. ILO, Constitution of the 
International Labour Organisation (Paris, 1919).
9 ILO, Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, Adopted by the International Labour 
Conference at its Ninety-seventh Session, Geneva, 10 June 2008 (Geneva: ILO, 2008), 5.
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in the middle of the twentieth century.10 In the same year that Polanyi published 
his book, 1944, the ILO would in Philadelphia for the first time explicitly pro-
claim an overarching social objective for all, particularly regarding economic 
and financial policies. The thought that the ILO had a mandate to pursue such a 
social objective had been there from the start. From this perspective, it was only 
recently, in the course of the “neoliberal turn” starting in the late 1970s, that the 
basic assumptions behind this quest were radically challenged, while the myth of 
self-regulatory markets, deconstructed by Polanyi, was restored.
In this regard, the story of the ILO opens two particularly panoramic windows 
on the history of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Firstly, it offers a view 
on the conjunctures of economic thought and the history of capitalism and cap-
italism’s varieties, its adherents, and its opponents. The ILO is an appropriate 
place to analyse the different ways how open economies have been organized and 
the equally manifold ways in which the social challenges and disruptions accom-
panying the capitalist mode of production have been addressed by various actors. 
Secondly, the ILO has been a major participant in an on-going debate on the 
boundaries of the “social realm” and, consequently, on what exactly constitutes 
“social policy”. This study will repeatedly show the ILO as a major force in the 
struggles to apply concretely the outcomes of these debates, frequently through 
outwardly technical matters of occupational safety and health or working time. 
Very often they touch on such fundamental issues as the share which the state 
and the individual, respectively, should assume with regard to social protection 
or the regulation of productive versus “reproductive” (care and domestic) work.
The ILO’s quest for social justice has always been marked by a dual approach, 
where the national and international levels are complementary and interdepend-
ent. The Organization promoted labour legislation and social policy measures that 
would benefit workers and thus strengthen social cohesion within societies, and 
this goal was to be achieved through the adoption and implementation of inter-
national labour standards. The 190 Conventions and over 200 Recommendations 
that the ILO has adopted have expressed the strategic objective of ensuring that 
progressive social legislation at the national level would not turn into a compet-
itive disadvantage in the international environment. International labour stand-
ards and the often controversial discussions surrounding their adoption testify 
to the struggles over the boundaries of social policy mentioned before, which are 
mirrored in the ILO’s other activities, from research to technical  cooperation.
Decolonization and the growing weight of the developing countries gave a 
new direction to the debate. In the eyes of many governments from the global 
10 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1944).
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South, ILO standards were transformed from a means to achieve social justice 
across national borders into a protectionist tool used by the rich industrialized 
countries to maintain the inequalities of the international system. In this perspec-
tive, social justice needed to be established between nations first. For this, the ILO 
was above all expected to provide practical help. As the Social Justice Declaration 
of 2008 revealed, developments usually summarized under the term “globaliza-
tion” have added another dimension to the debate. Against the background of 
a rising tide of right-wing populism, which combines criticism of globalization 
with illiberal and openly xenophobic policy proposals, the on-going debate about 
the state of the world has also brought back onto the agenda the link (or the lack 
thereof) between social justice and democracy.
Histories of the ILO
For a long time, historical studies on the ILO were few and far between. Except for 
research from political scientists and scholars in international relations,11 Antony 
Alcock’s account, published in the wake of the ILO’s fiftieth anniversary (1969), 
was the only monograph available that dealt with the organization from an explic-
itly historical point of view.12 This situation has changed radically in recent years. 
Many of the gaps in research that Jasmien van Daele (2008) and the authors of 
a pioneering ILO Histories anthology (2010) identified a decade ago have been 
filled.13 Many articles and contributions have discovered the ILO’s activities as a 
fruitful field of study. Three anthologies, coordinated by the ILO, have  contributed 
to this development: Globalizing Social Rights (2013),14 The ILO from Geneva to the 
11 Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State. Functionalism and International Organization (Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964); Viktor-Yves Ghébali, The International Labour Organ-
isation: A Case Study on the Evolution of UN Specialised Agencies (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1989); Robert W. Cox, “ILO–Limited Monarchy”, in The Anatomy of Influence. Decision Making 
in International Organizations, ed. Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1973), 102–138.
12 Antony Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization (New York: Octagon Books, 
1971).
13 Jasmien Van Daele, “The International Labour Organization in Past and Present Research”, 
International Review of Social History 53, no. 3 (2008): 485–511; Jasmien Van Daele et al., eds., 
ILO Histories. Essays on the International Labour Organization and Its Impact on the World During 
the Twentieth Century (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010); Magaly Rodríguez García, “Conclusion: The ILO’s 
Impact on the World” in ILO Histories, ed. Van Daele et al., 461–478.
14 Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux, eds., Globalizing Social Rights. The International Labour Or-
ganization and Beyond (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Geneva: ILO, 2013).
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Pacific Rim (2015)15 and Women’s ILO (2018)16 assemble contributions that cover a 
wealth of thematic areas: from unemployment to  nutritional standards and food 
policy, maritime to domestic labour, and women’s representation at the ILO to chil-
dren’s welfare. In parallel, numerous articles have been published that address 
certain aspects of the ILO’s work, regional activities, or its interaction with other 
international actors.17 Scholars like Sandrine Kott18 have played an important role 
in this recent research, well on display in the 2018 special issue of Le mouvement 
social about “La justice sociale dans un monde global”, which covers 100 years of 
15 Jill M. Jensen and Nelson Lichtenstein, eds., The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim: West 
Meets East (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Geneva: ILO, 2015).
16 Eileen Boris, Dorothea Hoehtker, and Susan Zimmermann, eds., Women’s ILO: Transnational 
Networks, Global Labour Standards and Gender Equality, 1919 to the Present, Studies in Global 
Social History (Leiden: Brill; Geneva: ILO, 2018). 
17 Amalia Ribi Forclaz, “A New Target for International Social Reform: The International Labour 
Organization and Working and Living Conditions in Agriculture in the Inter-War Years”, Contempo-
rary European History 20, no. 3 (2011): 307–329; Christophe Verbruggen, “Intellectual Workers and 
Their Search for a Place within the ILO during the Interwar Period”, in ILO Histories, ed. Van Daele 
et al. 271–292; Jill Jensen, “From Geneva to the Americas: The International Labor Organization 
and Inter-American Social Security Standards, 1936–1948”, International Labor and Working-Class 
History 80, no. 1 (2011): 215–240; Norberto Osvaldo Ferreras, “Europe–Geneva–America: The First 
International Conference of American States Members of the International Labour Organization”, 
in Beyond Geopolitics: New Histories of Latin America at the League of Nations, ed. Alan McPher-
son (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2015), 83–96; Lorenzo Mechi, “Economic 
Regionalism and Social Stabilisation: The International Labour Organization and Western Eu-
rope in the Early Post-War Years”, International History Review 35, no. 4 (2013): 844–862; Patricia 
Clavin, “What’s in a Living Standard? Bringing Society and Economy Together in the ILO and the 
League of Nations Depression Delegation, 1938–1945”, in Globalizing Social Rights, ed. Kott and 
Droux, 233–248; Paul Weindling, “Social Medicine at the League of Nations Health Organisation 
and the International Labour Office Compared” in International Health  Organisations and Move-
ments, 1918–1939, ed. Paul Weindling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 134–153.
18 From the wealth of publications by Sandrine Kott, see: “Fighting the War or Preparing for 
Peace? The ILO during the Second World War”, Journal of Modern European History 12, no. 3 (2014): 
359–76; “From Transnational Reformist Network to International Organization: The Internation-
al Association for Labour Legislation and the International Labour Organization, 1900–1930s”, 
in Shaping the Transnational Sphere. Experts, Networks and Issues from the 1840s to the 1930s, 
ed. Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, and Jakob Vogel (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015), 239–58; 
“Towards a Social History of International Organisations: The ILO and the Internationalisation 
of Western Social Expertise (1919–1949)”, in Internationalism, Imperialism and the Formation of 
the Contemporary World. The Pasts of the Present, ed. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro 
Monteiro (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 35–57; “OIT, justice sociale et mondes commu-
nistes. Concurrences, émulations, convergences”, Le Mouvement Social 263, no. 2 (2018): 139–151.
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ILO history.19 The ILO has encouraged a variety of academic studies and published 
a number of books on the history of the Organization. In addition to contributions 
in English and French, an increasing amount of literature is available in other 
languages.20 Nonetheless, there certainly are some missing parts and unchartered 
territories. With regard to the post-1945 era, and in particular after the 1970s, as 
well as on some regional aspects (Africa, East and South-East Asia) research has 
only just begun to dig deeper. In other fields, too, there is still room and demand 
for further study, especially for the period after 1945.21 The trend, however, is clear: 
historians have discovered the ILO as a worthwhile field of study.
This renewed interest for the ILO seems to be part of a bigger phenome-
non. The significant rise in interest in international organizations was already 
noted in 2008 in the review articles on the recent historiography of the League 
of Nations22 and the United Nations.23 Debates on globalization have raised an 
19 La justice sociale dans un monde global. L’Organisation Internationale du Travail, Special 
Issue of Le Mouvement Social, 263, no. 2 (2018). Kott has not only covered many aspects of the 
ILO’s history herself but has helped and encouraged a new generation of ILO scholars to come 
forward. See Véronique Plata-Stenger, “Une voie sociale pour le développement. Le  Bureau 
 International du Travail et les débuts de la coopération technique (1919–1949)” (PhD diss., 
Université de Genève, 2016), Véronique Plata-Stenger, Social Reform, Modernization and tech-
nological  Diplomacy. The ILO Contribution to development (1930-1946), Series: Work in Global 
and Historical Perspective 8 (Oldenbourg: DeGruyter, forthcoming 2020); Olga Hidalgo-Weber, 
“Dimensions transnationales des politiques sociales britanniques: Le rôle de la Grande-Bretagne 
au sein de l’OIT, 1919–1946” (PhD diss., Université de Genève, 2015).
20 See, e.g., Theresa Wobbe, “Das Globalwerden der Menschenrechte in der ILO. Die Umdeu-
tung von Arbeitsrechten im Kontext weltgesellschaftlicher Strukturprobleme von den 1930er bis 
1950er Jahren”, in Menschenrechte in der Weltgesellschaft. Deutungswandel und Wirkungsweise 
eines globalen Leitwerts, ed. Bettina Heintz and Britta Leisering (Frankfurt am Main:  Campus 
 Verlag, 2015), 283–316; Cédric Guinand, Die Internationale Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) und die 
soziale Sicherheit in Europa (1942–1969) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2003); Isabelle Lespinet-Moret 
and  Vincent Viet, eds., L’Organisation internationale du travail: origine, développement, avenir 
(Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2011); Jean-Michel Bonvin, L’Organisation interna-
tionale du travail: Etude sur une agence productrice de normes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1998); Laura Caruso and Andrés Stagnaro, eds., Una historia regional de la OIT: Aportes 
sobre regulación y legislación del trabajo latinoamericano (La Plata: Universidad Nacional de La 
Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, 2017).
21 There is no comprehensive study of the ILO’s post-1945 technical assistance programmes. 
Other areas where research is still in its early stages are, for instance, the ILO’s treatment of auto-
mation and technological change and the debate on structural adjustment. There is also no work 
that covers the ILO’s efforts in the field of labour migration since its beginnings. 
22 Susan Pedersen, “Back to the League of Nations”, American Historical Review 112, no. 4 
(2007): 1091–1117; Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga, “New Histories of the United Nations”, Journal 
of World History 19, no. 3 (2008): 251–274.
23 Sluga and Clavin, Internationalisms: A Twentieth Century History. 
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interest in movements of people, goods, and ideas beyond national borders, and 
international organizations provide a “seductive and underutilized focus” for 
such transnational perspectives.24 Moreover, it is probably no coincidence that 
the interest in international institutions increases at the very moment when exist-
ing institutions of international cooperation are under growing pressure in the 
face of a resurge of nationalist policies and unilateralism in international affairs. 
Some of the “new histories” of the international organizations published in the 
2000s, above all those that addressed primarily US audiences, were influenced 
by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the bypassing of the United Nations in the han-
dling of the Iraq controversy by the George W. Bush administration.25 If we accept 
the premise that one source of inspiration behind the renewed interest in how 
international cooperation has functioned in the past is the perceived threat to its 
purpose in the present, then we can expect a whole range of fresh research in the 
coming years.
Yet there are more specific reasons why the ILO has lately garnered the atten-
tion of a growing number of historians. The topics the ILO addresses are of major 
concern in today’s world. The debate on the social dimension of globalization 
and the impact of trade liberalization on working conditions, the internation-
alization of production, and the accompanying trend towards deregulation and 
labour market flexibility have heightened the interest in an organization founded 
to contain the effects of an earlier phase of global capitalism. In the same sense, 
the financial crisis of 2008 and the rise of right-wing populism in many places 
around the world have sparked renewed interest in an organization that embod-
ied – through its Declaration of Philadelphia – the social and economic lessons 
of two World Wars, the crises years in between, and the subsequent recovery of 
liberal democracy based on the spirit of welfare reform. The attention to an organ-
ization that ever since has promoted a social objective for all policies, including 
economic policies that respect rights at work and the rule of law, further reso-
nates with the “social turn” that historiography on international human rights 
has recently taken.26
The following chapters are building on the abundant research on the ILO and 
its broader international context. The intention of this study goes beyond pre-
24 Amrith and Sluga, “New Histories of the United Nations”, 252.
25 Mazower, Governing the World, IX–XVI; Susan Pedersen has made a similar point on the 
scholarship on the League, in which the interwar years feature as another era of blossoming in-
ternationalism against an increasingly gloomy unilateral background of interstate relationships. 
Pedersen, “Back to the League”.
26 Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2018).
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senting a synthesis of the existing scholarly findings. It comes instead with its 
own aims and surely also with its biases. It starts from my own broader research 
interests, which have focused on the history of decolonization, internationalism 
at large, development aid, and human rights policies, as well as on the history 
of globalization discourses.27 These perspectives have unquestionably influenced 
the way in which I portray the ILO in this book.
The following story of the ILO’s hundred years is organized quite pragmati-
cally, in a chronological order. Most of the narratives described above, however, 
run through the entire history of the ILO. Some are more visible than others, 
but they all provide the red threads of this study. Following a short introduction 
of the pre-history of the ILO, the analysis moves through four major periods. 
From the inter-war years, it proceeds to the period of the ILO’s “second founding” 
during and immediately after the Second World War with the 1944 Declaration 
of Philadelphia at the heart of events. The history of the ILO since the Second 
World War is organized along several sometimes overlapping time lines: The first 
period, defined by the Cold War and decolonization and subsumed under the 
headings of “Human Rights” and “Development”, runs from 1948, which saw 
both the arrival of a new Director-General, David Morse, and the launch of the 
ILO’s technical cooperation activities, to 1976 and the highly publicized World 
Employment  Conference. The second period, which finally locates the ILO in the 
transition to the post–Cold War era and the looming age of globalization, starts 
with the end of the “Morse-era” in 1970 and extends to the 1998 Declaration of 
the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which can be regarded as the 
ILO’s answer to the systemic changes mentioned before. To the end of the book, 
I  venture into  the  most recent period and suggest possible lines along which 
future accounts of the ILO might be written. 
27 Daniel Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization: The International Labour 
Organization, 1940–70 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Geneva: ILO, 2012); “The Interna-
tional Labour Organization and the Struggle against Forced Labour from 1919 to the Present”, 
Labor History 48, no. 4 (2007): 477–500; “ ‘Help Them Move the ILO Way’: The International 
Labor Organization and the Modernization Discourse in the Era of Decolonization and the 
Cold War”, Diplomatic History 33, no. 3 (2009): 387–404; “The ILO, Asia and the Beginnings 
of Technical  Assistance, 1945–60”, in The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim, ed. Jensen and 
Lichtenstein, 110–33; “The International Labour Organization and the Globalization of Human 
Rights, 1944–1970”, in Human Rights in the Twentieth Century, ed. Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2010), 301–320.
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Antecedents
Universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice.
ILO Constitution
The frequent references in the early days of the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO) to its peace-building function point to a simple historical fact: The ILO 
was “a daughter of the war”.28 Its creation at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 
was in many ways a direct consequence of four years of bloodshed and of the 
revolutions and the social, economic, and political turmoil that had followed the 
First World War. However, too close a focus on the circumstances of the ILO’s 
foundation easily obscures the fact that the roots of the Organization go back 
much deeper in time. When the members of the Commission on International 
Labour Legislation met in Paris in February 1919, entrusted with a mandate by 
the victorious allied countries to shape the features of the future ILO, they built 
on almost half a century of discussions on international social policy. Against 
the background of accelerating industrialization and the massive expansion of 
global trade, social reformers and trade unionists from countries in Europe and 
North America had entered a debate on how to best control the undesired effects 
of these driving forces of industrial capitalism.
Early Traditions
The first ones to introduce the idea of international labour standards into the 
public debate in Europe in the early nineteenth century were philanthropic entre-
preneurs, whose primary interest lay in the material and moral betterment of the 
working classes. Robert Owen, a Welsh industrialist and utopian socialist who had 
experimented with building egalitarian communities of workers at his Scottish 
textile mill at New Lanark, sought to improve working conditions, especially with 
regard to child labour and working time, on national level through international 
agreements. His ideas were picked up and introduced in the political debate by 
others, such as the English cotton mill owner Charles Hindley, who clearly saw in 
international labour laws a means to prevent economic  disadvantage for socially 
28 Bruno Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918–1924, Studies in 
the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014), 79.
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progressive nations such as Great Britain, or a little later the Swiss-Alsatian man-
ufacturer Daniel Legrand.29
When governments first started to regulate minimum work ages for chil-
dren, to introduce state-led systems of factory inspection, and to initiate social 
insurance schemes that protected workers against the hazards of accidents, old 
age, or unemployment, they had not only humanitarian but also political and 
economic reasons to do so. A central aim of the Bismarckian social legislation 
initiated in Germany during the 1880s was to quell the revolutionary potential of 
the labour movement and to integrate workers into the new nation. At the same 
time, regulations directed against the exploitation of workers and social benefits 
were introduced by most Western European governments during the second half 
of the nineteenth century, and they followed an economic rationale. In countries 
that embraced the free trade doctrine, the protection of workers by the state was 
seen as a means to cushion the potentially socially and politically hazardous 
effects of international competition between open economies. Even parts of the 
labour movement were in favor of a combination of strong “labour compacts” 
and free trade.30 The attempt to harmonize social standards internationally in 
order to avoid competition by means of lowering these standards –the “race to 
the bottom” – was seen at least by some as a logical next step.31
Around the turn of the century, governments took the initiative to harmo-
nize labour legislation on an international scale. In some cases, they tried to 
arrange for multilateral treaties governing particular social and labour issues. For 
example, in 1890, the German government convened a group of European states 
in Berlin in a first attempt, although ultimately unsuccessful, to establish inter-
national regulations concerning women’s and children’s work. Smaller countries 
like Switzerland32 were in the forefront of even more far-reaching initiatives in 
order to position themselves in the international diplomatic arena.33 Some gov-
ernments, like those of France and Italy, chose to conclude bilateral agreements 
29 Follows, Antecedents of the International Labour Organization, 1–57.
30 Michael Huberman, Odd Couple: International Trade and Labor Standards in History, Yale 
 Series in Economic and Financial History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012).
31 Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations, 169–170.
32 Switzerland could, in addition, draw on its experience of regulating economic competition 
between its cantons.
33 Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann, eds., The Mechanics of Internationalism. Culture, 
Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War (London: Oxford University Press and 
German Historical Institute, 2001); Madeleine Herren, Hintertüren zur Macht: Internationalismus 
und modernisierungsorientierte Außenpolitik in Belgien, der Schweiz und den USA (Munich: Old-
enbourg, 2000).
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that guaranteed labour migrants equal access to social benefits in both countries 
in 1904.34
A second source of inspiration for international social policy measures was 
the socialist labour movement, loosely united in Second International founded in 
1889. Although the Second International was deeply divided between a Marxist 
(revolutionary) and a reformist wing for most of its existence, it provided impor-
tant impulses to the debate. In countries with the strongest labour movements – 
Germany, France, England, Switzerland, and Belgium – opinions initially differed 
widely on whether an improvement of working conditions could be achieved 
by legislative means. However, around the 1890s the merits of such a strategy 
became obvious.35 Especially those parts of the socialist movement and their 
trade union allies, which were prepared to work within the existing capitalist 
system and supported the introduction of social legislation on the national level, 
were more open to cooperation with other political forces in order to push govern-
ments to harmonize this legislation internationally. However, by and large, the 
main focus of trade unions remained a national one.36
It was during the same time that international labour law became the concern 
of a growing transnational network of mostly liberal social reformers  – in the 
main lawyers, political economists, and others – who called for the state to use its 
power of intervention. Labour law was promoted both as a philanthropic under-
taking and as a body of scientific knowledge and scientific methods by which 
social progress could be achieved through peaceful means. Reformers built upon 
and indeed entertained symbiotic relationships with the equally expanding 
field of social statistics, which provided the necessary data and helped to create 
 categories like “unemployment” as a precondition for the creation of models for 
successful intervention.37
An important venue for this approach and the major testing ground for some 
of the ideas and practices that later came to characterize the ILO was the Inter-
national Association for Labour Legislation (IALL), founded in 1900. The IALL 
34 Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations,167.
35 Van Daele, “Engineering Social Peace: Networks, Ideas and the Founding of the International 
Labour Organization”, International Review of Social History 50 (2005): 435–466, here 439–442; 
Follows, Antecedents of the International Labour Organization, 70–119.
36 Michel Dreyfus, “The Emergence of an International Trade Union Organization (1902–1919)”, 
in The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ed. Anthony Carew et al. (Bern: Peter 
Lang, 2000), 27–71.
37 The broader background was provided by what the historian Lutz Raphael has called the 
“scientization of the social”. Lutz Raphael, “Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als meth-
odische und konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts”, 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft 22, no. 2 (1996): 165–93.
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constituted, first and foremost, an umbrella organization for the different groups 
of reformers united by the common goal of transforming society by means of legal 
intervention. Social liberals like the Belgian law professor Ernest Mahaim or the 
German political economist Lujo Brentano were most influential. But the associa-
tion also appealed to representatives of the social Christian (Catholic) doctrine as 
well as to the reformist wing of the Second International and parts of the interna-
tional trade union movement.38
The IALL was in many respects a typical representative of late nineteenth- 
century internationalism. It was no coincidence that the association was founded 
in the wake of the Paris World Fair of 1900, an exposition that was in itself a 
quintessential expression of the internationalist spirit of the age, situated as it 
was between the ideals of peace, progress, and cooperation among states and 
peoples on the one hand side and a world of competing empires and nation states 
on the other.39 Equally characteristic was the specific mixture of private initiative 
and government involvement that defined the work of the IALL and that could 
be found in similar constellations in other internationalist undertakings of the 
age such as the International Red Cross movement.40 Even though the IALL was 
a private association and its members consisted mainly of academics – univer-
sity professors at law and economics faculties – the nation state was its primary 
point of reference from the start. The IALL and its permanent secretariat, the 
International Labour Office, founded 1901 in Basel, were financed through the 
contributions of its national sections. The members of these sections also occu-
pied the double role of experts and representatives of their respective countries. 
Civil servants from the fledgling social administrations of European countries – 
such as Arthur Fontaine, French Director of the Office du Travail from 1899 to 
1920 – played a prominent role.41 This added weight to national sections from 
major industrial countries, like the German Gesellschaft für Soziale Reform or the 
American Association for Labor Legislation, and made the IALL a place where 
different models of social reform competed with each other. Most importantly, 
the association’s major aim and its raison d’être – the international dissemina-
38 Van Daele, “Engineering Social Peace”, 442–446; Kott, “From Transnational Reformist Net-
work to International Organization”; Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 
239–246; Bruno Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 86–89.
39 Geyer and Paulmann, The Mechanics of Internationalism. Culture, Society, and Politics from 
the 1840s to the First World War; Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, eds., Competing 
Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880–1930 (New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2007); Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism.
40 John F. Hutchinson, “Rethinking the Origins of the Red Cross”, Bulletin for the History of 
Medicine 63, no. 4 (1989): 557–578.
41 On Fontaine, see Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 87–88.
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tion and application of labor law  – rested upon the ability of the association 
to convince national governments to take action at home and internationally. 
In order to achieve this goal, the Basel Office maintained relations between its 
national sections and among reformers in a broader sense, collected information, 
and promoted the study and harmonization of labour law through its own publi-
cations. Its work overlapped with several other international institutions, such as 
the Permanent Committee for Social Insurance or the International Association 
for the Prevention of Unemployment, as well as social statistics associations in 
many countries. They all belonged to the same broad reformist internationalist 
milieu and provided the input for the IALL’s work.
At the heart of the IALL’s activities lay the effort to establish international 
labour conventions. Before 1914, the Association was successful in two cases, 
chosen deliberately for their symbolic value and because they touched on issues 
that already commanded a high level of agreement. The first one was a conven-
tion prohibiting the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches, 
adopted in 1906, which brought the long struggle against one of the most infa-
mous industrial poisons to a conclusion. It stood for the broader fight against 
hazardous conditions at the workplace, which was regarded as emblematic for 
an unregulated exploitative capitalism and which had long mobilized the labour 
movement and public opinion in many countries.
The other example, a convention on the prohibition of night work for women, 
could count on broad support, because it appealed to liberal and conservative 
governments alike. In addition, it could count on the support of the socialist 
movement, which, during the 1890s, had also come around in favour of special 
protection for women workers. After the breakthrough in these two areas, further 
conventions were envisaged. In 1913, a new conference discussed an instrument 
that would have prohibited night work for children under the age of fourteen. 
Another planned convention concerned the reduction of working hours for 
women and young persons to 10 hours a day, thus addressing demands of the 
trade union movement.42 However, before a diplomatic conference scheduled for 
September 1914 could adopt these new instruments, the war broke out.43
Conventions were not the only legacy the IALL left to the ILO. Significant 
personal lines of continuity connected the IALL and the ILO. A majority of the 
members of the Commission on International Labour Legislation (Labour Com-
mission) at the Peace Conference in Paris that would work on the contours of the 
42 Stephan Bauer, “International Labor Legislation and the Society of Nations”, Bulletin of the 
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919, 
No. 254, 134.
43 Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations, 162–177, here 169.
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future ILO knew each other through the IALL. Some of its protagonists would 
later work for the ILO: Arthur Fontaine, as Chairman of the ILO’s Governing Body 
from 1919 to 1931, and Albert Thomas, the ILO’s first Director, were but two prom-
inent examples. Maybe an even more important asset that the IALL passed on to 
the ILO was the mechanisms it had developed and tested for the creation of inter-
national social legislation in cooperation with national governments. Hard won 
experiences in identifying and promoting issues that would win the support of a 
critical mass of governments in adopting international standards and in getting 
those standards implemented provided a valuable body of information both to 
the Labour Commission in Paris and the later ILO. This was particularly relevant 
with a view to the setbacks which the IALL had suffered with regard to the con-
ventions on white phosphorus and on the night work of women. Although they 
were relatively uncontroversial, some nations were reluctant and others simply 
not willing to implement them. But it was no small accomplishment that the IALL 
had benefitted from the growing participation of reformist trade unionists and a 
number of progressive industrialists, which broadened the association’s political 
influence and made it appear, especially in the years before the war, as “both an 
epistemic community and a tripartite organization in the making”.44
The First World War
At the beginning of the First World War, the initiative shifted. Now, the interna-
tional trade union movement began to take on a much more important role in the 
promotion of international social policy.45 While trade unionists in many Euro-
pean countries had taken an active part within the IALL’s national sections in the 
years preceding the war, the same could hardly be said about the international 
trade union movement as such. Its most important representation was the Inter-
national Secretariat, founded in 1901 and located in Berlin, which was renamed 
International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) in 1913.46 The International 
 Secretariat was a rather loose association of mainly socialist and syndicalist 
national trade union federations. While it was generally appreciative of the IALL’s 
work and the concept of international social policy in general, it did not support 
it directly. One of the reasons for the lack of support was the mainly middle-class, 
44 Kott, “From Transnational Reformist Network to International Organization”, 244.
45 Reiner Tosstorff, “The International Trade Union Movement and the Foundation of the Inter-
national Labour Organization”, International Review of Social History 50, no. 3 (2005): 399–433.
46 On the IFTU, see Geert van Goethem, The Amsterdam International: The World of the Inte-
national Fedeation of Trade Unions (IFTU), 1913–1945 (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006).
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bourgeois, and politically liberal character of the IALL. Even more important was 
that many of the IFTU’s members, in particular the powerful German Trade Union 
Federation, opted for a division of labour between trade union and political 
work, the latter being regarded as the realm of the Socialist International and the 
national Socialist Parties. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), which joined 
the IFTU in 1909, in turn represented yet another, “voluntarist”, concept of trade 
unionism and was highly apprehensive of any kind of involvement with state or 
political party politics. There were many reasons, why the IALL and the IFTU kept 
at friendly distance from each other. That changed with the outbreak of the war.47
The first effect of the war was that the IFTU split along national lines, and the 
trade union federations sided with their respective governments, with the fed-
erations from neutral countries from Scandinavia or Switzerland torn between 
the two sides of the conflict. While the IFTU’s secretariat remained in Berlin, 
the associations from the Allied countries began to build up parallel structures. 
Against this background, the idea of international social policy and the project 
of establishing an international organization to pursue it on behalf of workers’ 
interests moved on top of the agenda for a post-war settlement. The reasons were 
manifold: The necessities of war production and the aim to mobilize the support 
of the workers’ movement for the war and to avoid strikes and social unrest put 
trade unions in a position of relative strength. In many countries, reformist trade 
union leaders and socialist politicians moved into responsible positions. In Great 
Britain, George Barnes, a former trade unionist and Labour politician, became 
Minister of Pensions in the government of David Lloyd George. In France, Albert 
Thomas, a reformist socialist and disciple of Jean Jaurès, became Minister of 
Artillery and Munitions. On the side of the Central Powers, trade unionists like 
Carl Legien, head of the Social Democrat Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften 
Deutschlands48 and President of the IFTU, and his Austrian counterpart closed 
ranks with their governments at war.49
Common to all was the expectation that workers’ participation in the war came 
at a price, and that labour would want to be heard in return during the negotiations 
of a future peace treaty. In 1916, trade union representatives from the Entente coun-
tries of France, Great Britain, and Italy, as well as from German- occupied Belgium, 
met in Leeds in order to discuss labour’s demands for a future peace order.50
47 Dreyfus, “The Emergence of an International Trade Union Organization (1902–1919)”.
48 The Generalkommission was the predecessor to the Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschafts-
bund, which was founded after the end of the war.




The Leeds Programme was the first international trade union document that 
publicly endorsed both the concept of international labour legislation and the 
work of the IALL. It contained a list of measures for international regulation with 
regard to freedom of association, social insurance, hours of work, factory inspec-
tion, occupational health, and labour migration. The Leeds Programme also 
proposed the establishment of an international commission that would prepare 
a governmental conference to carry out this programme and to strengthen the 
role of the IALL’s Basel Office, with the declared goal of putting it in a position 
where it could effectively monitor the adherence of governments to the agreed-
upon standards. Intended partly as a challenge to the German-led IFTU office in 
Berlin, the Leeds Programme caused an immediate reaction from Legien, who 
tried to regain control. Within a couple of months after Leeds, in February 1917, 
trade union federations from the Central Powers came up with a counterproposal, 
which essentially confirmed the international social policy parts of the Leeds 
document but argued for a significantly strengthened Basel International Labour 
Office, with permanent IFTU representation. This would have put the interna-
tional trade union movement in a supervisory role with regard to the creation and 
implementation of international labour legislation. It also would have given this 
legislation a more binding character, since it would have obliged governments to 
directly apply the standards adopted by government conferences.
These proposals set the stage for the international trade union movement to 
push, once the war was over, for international labour legislation and a strengthened 
International Labour Office in Basel to oversee and put in effect this  legislation. 
When it came to the implementation of this programme however, the situation 
had already changed significantly. Firstly, the American entry into the  war in 
April 1917 gave more importance to the AFL’s views on international trade union 
matters. Within the Allied camp, it soon became clear that the Americans were 
not only skeptical of the socialist leanings of most of the other IFTU members, 
but they strongly opposed all proposals that placed too much emphasis on state 
intervention. Later on in the year, the Bolshevik takeover in Russia threatened 
trade union unity from yet another angle, when it brought the anti- capitalist and 
revolutionary option to the fore. During the last year of the war, and the closer the 
conflict came to a close, governments once again began to reassert their primacy 
in negotiating peace and constructing the international order of the post-war era. 
Against this background, trade unions remained observant but increasingly took 
a back seat in the discussions of international social policy.51
51 Ibid.
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The Labour Commission in Paris
When the war entered its last year, the preparations for the peace began in 
earnest. On 8 January 1918, President Woodrow Wilson addressed Congress on 
the war aims of the United States. In the last of his “Fourteen Points”, in which 
Wilson outlined his ideas of a durable peace based on a new diplomacy, he called 
for a “general association of nations“ to be formed as part of a future peace treaty. 
Although Wilson did not make any specific mention of labour or social issues, 
other governments’ considerations about a future “League of Nations” soon con-
nected it to the ongoing debate on the place of international social policy in the 
post-war order. When the hostilities eventually ceased in November 1918, the 
preparations for the creation of an international labour organization were already 
well under way.52
France, which had been first in creating a committee as early as 1917 to work 
on proposals for the social policy clauses of a future peace treaty, was among 
those who tried to bring their ideas in line with Wilson’s principles. However, the 
work of the committee, in which members of the French IALL section occupied 
the key positions, was still ongoing when the armistice was declared in November 
1918.53 The Germans, by contrast, who had shown no particular interest in the 
matter for a long time, were quick to incorporate social policy demands into their 
peace agenda once the liberal government of Max von Baden had taken over in 
the face of a looming German military breakdown.54
Among the major war powers, however, it was in Britain that planning was 
by far the most advanced. This was one of the reasons why the British delegation 
became the decisive force behind the creation of an international labour commis-
sion and of many of the major features of the future ILO. The British government 
had two major reasons to be supportive of an international organization. First, as 
Europe’s leading industrial power, it had a genuine interest in international social 
52 On the preparations for the League of Nations see Mazower, Governing the World, 116–153.
53 In France, committees were set up to deal with the questions of labour conditions, wages, 
food rationing, etc. Representatives of the Confédération générale du travail (General Federation 
of Labour–CGT) and management participated in these commissions. In reaction to a wave of 
strikes in the armament industry in the winter of 1916–1917, Albert Thomas, Minister of Artillery 
and Munitions and later the first Director of the ILO, issued, among other measures, a decree to 
set up state-led joint arbitration commissions to solve industrial conflicts. Petra Weber, Gescheit-
erte Sozialpartnerschaft  – Gefährdete Republik? Industrielle Beziehungen, Arbeitskämpfe und 
der Sozialstaat. Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich (1918–1933/39) (Munich: Oldenbourg, 
2010), 140.
54 Tosstorff, “The International Trade Union Movement and the Foundation of the International 
Labour Organization”, 415.
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legislation. In order to maintain its high standard once economic competition 
was restored, it was necessary that standards were applied to other competitors 
as well. The second reason was political. As in other leading nations, in Britain, 
the trade union movement had been closely incorporated into the war effort. 
Through the so-called Whitley councils, industry-based bipartite institutions had 
been created during the war, in which employers’ and workers’ representatives 
met on an equal footing.55 There was a broad political consensus that the contri-
bution which the trade union movement had made during the war would have to 
be rewarded in the post-war period by meeting some of its demands.
Against this backdrop, a small group of British officials began to work on 
a proposal for the future labour organization which would be presented at 
the peace negotiations. Three individuals became of particular importance in 
this regard, two of which would later serve as heads of the ILO: Harold Butler 
(ILO Director, 1931–1938), then an official in the Ministry of Labour who was 
working on plans for the state’s long-term labour policies; and Edward Phelan 
(ILO  Director-General, 1941–1948), an Irishman and member of the Intelligence 
Section of the Ministry of Labour, who was tasked with monitoring trends in the 
labour sector.56 The third official was Malcolm Delevigne of the Home Office, who 
had been a representative of the British government at several IALL conferences 
and was in close contact with other IALL members. It was mainly Phelan who 
authored various memoranda that would become the main bases for debate in 
Paris. Since the other powers were far behind in their preparations, the British 
draft gained additional weight. In its latest version, which had already incorpo-
rated the results of consultations with other Allied powers, two items stood out: 
The British draft strongly argued for the establishment of an international labour 
organization rather than the IALL model of only occasional conferences and in 
contrast to the alternative idea of merely incorporating a set of labour standards 
in the overall peace treaty. Another important proposal was that the new organ-
ization would be tripartite and would thus bring together governments, trade 
unions and employers to decide together on the adoption of international labour 
standards.57
When the delegates to the Paris Peace Conference took up their work on 18 
January 1919, they placed “international labour legislation” on the agenda of 
55 Olga Hidalgo-Weber, “Social and Political Networks and the Creation of the ILO: The Role of 
British Actors”, in Globalizing Social Rights, ed. Kott and Droux, 17–31.
56 ILO, Edward Phelan and the ILO: The Life and Views of an International Social Actor (Geneva: 
ILO, 2009).
57 Hidalgo-Weber, “Social and Political Networks and the Creation of the ILO: The Role of Brit-
ish Actors.”
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their first meeting. Great Britain proposed to set up a special commission to work 
out a binding agreement on the creation of a future organization as part of the 
peace treaty. An agreement was reached after the United States pointed out that 
it wanted the new organization to become part of the League of Nations, which 
was yet to be founded during the peace talks. Only two weeks later, on 31 January 
1919, the members of the commission were appointed, and the next day it took 
up its work.
The Labour Commission conferred for about two months (1 February–24 
March 1919). Its 15 members, who were appointed both as national represent-
atives and as experts, comprised two delegates each from the Big Four  – the 
United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy – as well as Japan and Belgium.58 
The remaining three seats were granted to Cuba and two other European coun-
tries of “chief industrial importance” – the newly established Czechoslovakia and 
Poland. Most of the members of the commission were social reformist academ-
ics, a majority of whom were lawyers with liberal or moderate socialist political 
leanings. Almost all of the members had been linked in one way or another to 
the IALL. The Commission also included a handful of politicians or higher civil 
servants like Arthur Fontaine, but counted only two trade unionists  – Samuel 
Gompers, the president of the AFL, and Leon Jouhaux, the leader of the French 
CGT – and a single employers’ representative among its members and advisers.59 
Gompers’ position, however, was elevated by the fact that he was elected chair-
man. His choice was first and foremost a gesture to Wilson and the United States, 
but it was surely also meant as an attempt to neutralize his opposition to the very 
task that the Commission was set to accomplish in the minds of the overwhelm-
ing majority of its members and the governments that had nominated them: the 
creation of a permanent tripartite organization that would define, adopt, and 
promote international labour legislation. Even though Gompers, in the end, went 
along with the majority opinion, the main dividing line in the Commission ran 
between the chairman and the rest of its members, with occasionally shifting 
alliances on various questions of detail. Instrumental as brokers of compromises 
between the varying camps were the two Belgian delegates, the social scientist 
and jurist Ernest Mahaim, and the reformist socialist Emil Vandervelde.60 Another 
key player was the second US delegate, the historian and director of research of 
the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, James T. Shotwell. Before the war, Shotwell 
58 Van Daele, “Engineering Social Peace”, 449.
59 This representative was Henry Mauris Robinson, a banker from California and a member of 
the US Council of National Defense; however, Robinson hardly attended any of the meetings. H. B. 
Butler, Confident Morning (London: Faber and Faber, 1950), 165; ILO, Edward Phelan and the ILO.
60 Van Daele, “Engineering Social Peace”.
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had been associated with the US section of the IALL, and he helped to ease the 
frictions between Gompers and the other members. He would become a lifelong 
supporter of the ILO.61
Gompers’ opposition to an organization in which governments would gain 
a major influence shaped the discussion on the question of representation 
within the envisaged tripartite framework. The British memorandum proposed to 
give governments a double representation vis-à-vis that of workers and employers 
(2-1-1). Gompers, who predicted that, under such an arrangement, governments 
and employers combined would outvote workers, pleaded for equal representa-
tion (1-1-1). The British view prevailed by a slim margin, because the majority of 
the Commission, in line with the IALL tradition, thought that strong government 
representation was inevitable if the future organization’s decisions should carry 
any weight. In practice, most agreed, it would be the national governments that, 
in the end, would have to implement these decisions in practical politics.62
Much of the substance of the discussion concerned the legal status of the 
future organization’s labour standards. The core question was: How binding would 
those standards be for the governments? Would the organization function as a 
“world parliament of labour” whose decisions on labour standards would become 
national law without additional intermediary steps. This solution, favoured by 
the French, British, and Italian delegations, would have been a revolutionary one 
and a fundamental break with the pre-war practice. The compromise that was 
found after long debate was based on the distinction between  voluntarily ratified 
Conventions, which became binding only after their ratification, and non-binding 
Recommendations. The ratification of Conventions would come with an obliga-
tion to translate them into national law and to periodically report on the progress 
made towards their application. The other form of standards, the Recommenda-
tions, were in turn designed as non-binding guidelines, which may or may not be 
linked to a Convention. The US delegates, which opposed binding instruments, 
found themselves once again in a minority position, this time not only because of 
Gompers’ anti-statist inclinations, but also because of the political structure of the 
United States as a federal republic, where social legislation was predominantly 
the domain of its individual states. This issue has remained a stumbling block in 
the US relationship with norm-creating  international institutions, including the 
61 Harold Josephson, James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America (Rutherford, 
NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1974).
62 On this and other discussions in the Labour Commission, see Alcock, History of the Inter-
national Labor Organization; James T. Shotwell, “The International Labor Organization as an 
Alternative to Violent Revolution” Annals of the American Academy of polical and Social Science 
(1933): 18–25; Van Daele, “Engineering Social Peace”.
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ILO, ever since. In the end, the compromise that was found allowed the United 
States and other federal states to treat Conventions like Recommendations for 
the purpose of legislation by their individual states.63 The shared aim to secure 
the states’ participation in the new organization and, accordingly, to refrain from 
building hurdles that were too high for them to join also influenced the debate 
on the question of sanctions. The compromises reached with regard to the filing 
of complaints and the use of economic sanctions against countries that did not 
fulfil their commitments were all of a relatively mild nature. After all, ratification 
of Conventions remained entirely voluntary, and if governments did not live up to 
their commitments after ratification, the ILO did not command any means other 
than persuasion to ensure their compliance.64
A politically controversial issue was the question of membership in the 
organization, which was closely connected to the yet to be defined relationship 
of the ILO to a future League of Nations. For an organization that would primarily 
exist to establish international labour standards, universality of membership – at 
least that of the major industrial powers – had to be an important goal. However, 
at the time when this issue was discussed in the Commission, several questions 
regarding League of Nations membership were still unresolved. The most impor-
tant problems in this regard concerned Germany (and the other defeated nations) 
and Japan. It soon became clear that Germany and Austria would not be immedi-
ately admitted to the League. The socialist members of the Labour Commission, 
in particular, were highly critical of this attitude towards the new republican gov-
ernments of these countries, whose trade unions were ready to rejoin their war-
time opponents. Excluding the two major Central European industrial powers 
would have seriously compromised the significance of the new organization.
Many of the members of the Labour Commission therefore pleaded for imme-
diate German membership. The Japanese case was a further argument for sep-
arating the discussion on ILO membership from that about the membership in 
the League. Japan was an emerging industrial power and had entered the nego-
tiations in Paris with the declared aim to inscribe the principle of racial equal-
ity in the peace treaty. When it found its proposal rejected by a coalition of the 
Europeans and Americans, with Wilson as the major obstacle, its government 
63 See Daniel P. Moynihan, “The United States and the International Labor Organisation, 1889-
1934”, PhD diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, MA, 1960; James T. Shotwell, 
The Origins of the International Labour Organization (New York, 1934).
64 Until 1946, Article 33 of the Constitution provided that member States could take “economic 
measures” against each other, upon recommendation by an independent commission of inquiry. 
See Bernhard Boockmann, “The Ratification of ILO Conventions: A Failure Time Analysis”, in 
ZEW Discussion Papers, ed. ZEW – Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (2000) .
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considered to not join the new international organizations. This would have been 
a serious blow with regard to the ILO, especially for British dominions like Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, which considered Japan as a direct competitor in Asia. 
In light of this situation, it was not surprising that a majority of the Commission 
voted to separate League and ILO membership.65
When this and most other issues of form and structure had been resolved, the 
Commission turned to the vital question of a Labour Charter and a set of items that 
a new organization should prioritize with regard to its initial Conventions and Rec-
ommendations. Next to the various British drafts, the input for this Charter came 
from different sources. One was the IALL, which had started to collect support 
from the states even before the outbreak of the war for the creation of labour 
standards in specific areas. Another source was the international trade union 
movement’s declarations of Leeds (1916) and Berne (1917). Another trade union 
conference in Berne in February 1919, which took place in  parallel to the meetings 
of the Commission, confirmed the major demands of these documents. In fact, 
one of the motivations of the Entente powers for including trade unionists and 
their demands in the work of the Labour Commission was to prevent the trade 
unions – including those from Germany and Austria – from holding a parallel 
trade union conference at the time of the peace negotiations.66
The decision about the principles that should be incorporated in the final 
document lay with the Labour Commission. For the trade unions, they clearly 
were of capital importance, because without a statement of core principles, the 
Constitution would merely consist of procedures without any content. For some 
government representatives, these claims rather belonged to the realm of rhet-
oric. After lengthy discussion and consultations among its members and the 
respective state governments, the Commission finally came up with nine core 
principles and a preamble, which reflected both the tradition of international 
social legislation of the nineteenth century and the caesura of the war.
The preamble opened with the proclamation that “universal and lasting 
peace can be established only if it is based on social justice”. The subsequent text 
did not contain a more specific definition of what social justice entailed. The first 
of the following set of principles, however, gave an indication, when it asserted 
that “labour is not merely a commodity”. In a nutshell, this phrase incapsulated 
the liberal social premises on which the ILO rested. “Labour is not a commod-
ity” was part of a minimum consensus among the ILO’s founders, who realized 
65 Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 31.
66 Tosstorff, “The International Trade Union Movement and the Foundation of the International 
Labour Organization”, 418–420.
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that the survival of open market economies ultimately depended on the gradual 
de-commodification of labour67 – a consensus enforced to a large degree by the 
revolutionary threat posed by the Russian October revolution.68 The second point 
proclaimed a “right of association for all lawful purposes” for not only workers 
but also for employers. This was a confirmation of basic trade union freedoms 
and a significant gesture towards the labour movement. Yet, the understanding 
of what exactly were regarded as “lawful purposes” was left to the discretion of 
national governments. What this point reflected, first and foremost, was the fact 
that certain trade union activities, in particular strikes, were far from being con-
sidered generally accepted means of action.
The next three points, which called for an eight-hour working day and a 
48-hour work week, a weekly rest time of at least 24 hours and wage policies 
that would allow workers to maintain a “reasonable” living standard were, by 
comparison, all responding to long-standing trade union demands. Point six, 
which called for the abolition of child labour and the “limitation on the labour 
of young persons” was following up directly on the pre-war activities of the IALL 
and brought to a conclusion the struggles of social reformers since the latter part 
of the nineteenth century. To a certain degree, this was also true for the eighth 
point, which called for equal treatment of migrant workers in their countries of 
residence; it created an international platform for an area in which hitherto only 
a number of bilateral agreements existed.69 The principle of “equal remunera-
tion for work of equal value” for men and women, by contrast, was a remarkable 
departure from the past and can be credited to the intense lobbying efforts from 
women’s rights groups around the Paris Peace Conference. Even though it was 
put in the most general terms possible, and therefore left much room for inter-
pretation with regard to its practical implications, the fact that the principle fea-
tured at all, was nothing less than revolutionary and provided a basis for future 
debates. Further indication for a change in the perception of the role of women 
67 The term “de-commodification” is of a more recent age. It goes back to Karl Polanyi and has 
been popularized in the 1990s by sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen. It refers to social entitle-
ments to reduce the exposure of workers to market forces and the resulting economy insecurity. 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1990).
68 On the origins of the term, see Paul O’Higgins, “  ‘Labour Is Not a Commodity’  – An Irish 
Contribution to International Labour Law”, Industrial Law Journal 26 (1997): 225–234; Stein Evju, 
“Labour is not a Commodity. Reappraising the Origins of the Maxim”, European Labour Law 
Journal 4 (2013): 222–229.
69 Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations, 167.
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was given by the last point, which called for the installation in all countries of 
public systems of labour inspection “in which women should take part”.70
All principles and the preamble were incorporated into part XIII of the Treaty 
of Versailles and included in all subsequent peace treaties. Altogether consist-
ing of 41 articles, these sections would later become the first ILO Constitution. 
Despite this major achievement, the final outcome of the Labour Commission’s 
work was not greeted with unanimous enthusiasm. The IFTU in particular, which 
reconstituted itself at a Congress in August 1919 in Amsterdam, was widely dis-
appointed with the way in which the Labour Commission had left future interna-
tional legislation to the discretion of the states at all stages of the process. The 
new “Amsterdam International” instead put emphasis on trade union unity and 
opened itself to German and Austrian membership.71 Some governments joined 
the chorus of skeptics: Germany, which saw itself humiliated by the conditions 
of peace imposed by the victors at Versailles, was equally resentful towards the 
Labour Commission’s decisions, in which it had had no say; nevertheless, it 
instantly tried to attain membership in the ILO. The most worrying voices came 
from the United States. Samuel Gompers had left Paris pledging to promote the 
new organization with all his authority back home. Yet, in light of the criticism of 
international rules potentially overriding national legislation, his defense of the 
ILO was at best half-hearted. What Gompers had sought to achieve was a Labour 
Charter, not an institution that would produce international legislation. At the 
same time, opposition to the outcome of the peace negotiations built up in Con-
gress, and the United States did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles.72
As a result, and despite the groundwork having been done, much of the road 
towards a functioning international organization remained uncharted. What 
seemed the fulfillment of a long-held ambition for some of the IALL members of 
the Commission was, from another perspective, still a distant and nebulous goal.
70 The League of Nations, Treaty of Versailles, opened for signature June 28, 1919. Part XIII, 
Section II: General Principles. Article 427 is reproduced, for example, in Gerry Rodgers et al., 
The International Labour Organization and the Quest for Social Justice, 1919–2009 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press; Geneva: International Labour Office, 2009), 250–251.
71 See van Goethem, The Amsterdam International.
72 Ibid., ch. 6: Isolationism or Leadership. The American Federation of Labor and the Interna-
tional Federation of Trade Unions; Moynihan, “The United States and the International Labor 
Organisation”.
Part I An Experiment in Social Justice: 1919–1939
Thus, inequality in labour conditions seems itself to mean a possibility of international 
discord, and it is our duty to try to find some solution. Both our Constitution and the nature of 
work therefore require us to try to introduce into the world certain of the conditions necessary 
for peace.
Albert Thomas in a letter to the Maison du Peuple, Brussels, 22 April 192973
73 Albert Thomas, International Social Policy, trans. Monica Curtis (Geneva: ILO, 1948), 140.
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1 Beginnings
After the Paris Peace Conference, the International Labour Organization (ILO) got 
down to work. Much of what happened during its first years was in many aspects 
unprecedented and unchartered territory. An international bureaucracy had to be 
built up from scratch, and the position of the ILO with regard to the scope of its 
work, and its position in the new world order emerging from the war, had yet to 
be defined. In order to secure the survival of the Organization in the volatile inter-
national environment of the post-war era, Albert Thomas, the ILO’s first Director, 
interpreted his role in a diplomatic and political, as well as in a technocratic, way. 
He set out to position the ILO within a broad network of social actors beyond its 
immediate tripartite constituents.
Despite the outwardly universal language of its Constitution, one question 
accompanied the ILO from the very first day: whose organization, exactly, would 
and could it be; and what kinds of workers and what forms of work would it rep-
resent? Both geographically and with regard to the problems it addressed, the ILO 
was far from being an organization that covered all the global realities of work but 
rather started from a clear European and industrial bias.
The Washington Conference
Events taking place in the months following the end of the Paris Peace Confer-
ence renewed the sense of urgency that had carried the foundation of the ILO. 
Revolution, civil strife, and the plight of hundreds of thousands of refugees had 
left vast parts of Europe a social and political powder keg. The Bolshevik takeover 
in Russia and like-minded revolutionary upheavals in Hungary, Germany, and 
other European countries provided a tangible alternative to social and political 
reform, stirring up fears of a complete political and economic meltdown. The 
demobilization of millions of soldiers, many of them mutilated and traumatized, 
and the return of staggering numbers of prisoners of war added to these fears. 
Massive unemployment, strikes, and social unrest became almost inevitable con-
sequences of the transition from a war to a peace economy. Against this backdrop, 
governments, trade unions, and employers from 42 nations now set out to imple-
ment the decisions of the peace conference and make the ILO become a reality.
The decision to hold the first Session of the International Labour Confer-
ence (ILC) in Washington, D.C., was motivated by the desire to secure the con-
tinued American interest in, and cooperation with, the ILO; this hope, however, 
was soon dashed. Upon their arrival in the capital of the United States in late 
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October 1919, the conveners quickly realized that they could hardly have found 
a less welcoming environment for the Organization’s constituting Conference. 
After his return from Paris, President Wilson had suffered a severe stroke, which 
further diminished his ability to influence the discussion. Only days before the 
meeting, the budget for the Conference was still not secure. Provisional offices 
could be found only after an intervention by the then Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In Congress, arriving European delegates were 
denounced as trouble-rousers, and when it was eventually decided to let the ILC 
take place, it did so only under the explicit condition that no US commitments as 
to future membership would be made.74
Figure 1: First International Labour Conference, Washington, D.C., United States, 1919.
The meeting eventually started on 29 October, with 40 delegations present. The 
most urgent matter to be settled was the unresolved status of the former Central 
Powers, Austria and Germany. The International Federation of Trade Unions 
(IFTU), with which the majority of the Workers’ representatives at the Washing-
ton Conference were affiliated, had made it a condition of their participation that 
the Organization would be open to all nations. The Supreme War Council, which 
was consulted by the government delegates from the Allied Powers, agreed that 
it would be up to the Conference to decide on the question of German and Aus-
74 Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 38.
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trian membership. It eventually did so by nearly unanimous vote, although this 
decision came too late to actually allow German and Austrian representatives to 
participate in the Conference. However, it paved the way for their future mem-
bership in the ILO – in sharp contrast to the League, which would deny Germany 
membership for another seven years.75
The Conference further confirmed the composition of the Governing Body as 
the executive organ of the ILO, with eight of the 12 government seats assigned to 
countries of “major industrial importance” – Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, 
Japan, Belgium, Switzerland, and Denmark (substituting for the United States) – 
and four seats allocated to Argentina, Spain, Poland, and Canada, respectively, 
as representatives of the “other” countries. Even though over half of the delega-
tions came from outside Europe, the composition of the Governing Body clearly 
reflected the existing power relations. A strong European bias permeated all 
groups – governments, workers, and employers alike, which drew some critical 
comments already in Washington. The election of Arthur Fontaine, who embod-
ied the traditions of the International Association for Labour Legislation (IALL) 
as the first Chairman of the Governing Body, in turn, reflected the strengthened 
position of France.76
Once the Governing Body had been established, it decided to elect not only its 
Chairman but also the Director of the International Labour Office. To the surprise 
of many observers, the choice fell on another Frenchman: Albert Thomas. From 
the beginning, Harold Butler had been regarded the frontrunner; as a British 
citizen, he seemed to have a natural claim to the position after the French had 
already been given the top post in the Governing Body. However, Butler, a govern-
ment official, lacked the connection to both the trade union and socialist move-
ments, as well as to the social reformist network around the IALL, which Thomas, 
whose name was brought forward by the Workers’ group, had in abundance.77
Albert Thomas had been a leading member of the French Socialist Party 
(SFIO) since 1905. As a representative of the party’s reformist wing, he had been a 
supporter of the Union Sacrée, joined the French war government under Raymond 
Poincaré in 1915, and became Minister for Artillery and Munitions one year later. 
75 Ibid., 38–39.
76 Ibid., 41–42.
77 Among the rich literature on Albert Thomas, on his ILO years, see in particular Denis Guérin, 
Albert Thomas au BIT, 1920–1932: De l’internationalisme à l’Europe, Euryopa Etudes (Geneva: 
Institut européen de l’Université de Genève, 1996); Jean-Michel Guieu, “Albert Thomas et la paix. 
Du socialisme normalien à l’action internationale au Bit”, Les cahiers Irice no. 2 (2008), 65–80. 
On his role in the war, Adeline Blaskiewicz-Maison, Albert Thomas. Le socialisme en guerre 1914–
1918 (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2016).
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In this position, which he held until 1917, he worked closely and mostly success-
fully with both industrialists and trade unions to secure wartime production. This 
was a valuable practical experience with tripartism. Although he had not been 
a member of the Labour Commission in Paris, nor in any other way involved in 
the creation of the ILO (he had not been present at the Washington, either), his 
candidacy was no coincidence. He was the very personification of class cooper-
ation: a moderate socialist, anti-revolutionary, close to the international trade 
union movement and the cooperative world, and, thanks to his wartime activi-
ties and his long-standing connection with the IALL, an acceptable candidate for 
most governments and employers as well. Still, as the British were not prepared 
to concede the position, a vote had to be taken, which Thomas won after two 
rounds and by a very narrow margin. That way, he started his first term as the 
first Director of the ILO, a post he would occupy until his death in 1932, from a 
somewhat weak position. Few might have imagined the great imprint he would 
leave on the Organization.78
An International Organization in the Making
Virtually everything was new when the International Labour Office started its 
work. Premises had to be found, staff had to be hired, and work had to be organ-
ized. To secure the survival of the fledgling organization, to stake out and, if pos-
sible, expand its areas of activity were the primary tasks during the ILO’s first 
decade.
The Governing Body confirmed Thomas as Director at its first regular meeting 
on 20 January 1920. Next, practical matters had to be settled. An immediate ques-
tion was where the Organization would take up its headquarters. Article 7 of the 
Treaty of Versailles had designated Geneva as the headquarters of the League 
of Nations. This implied that the ILO should be in the same place. In June 1920, 
the ILO rented its first premises in La Châtelaine (Pregny) on the northern side 
of Lake Geneva, before moving into a new building at the lake shore, built for 
that purpose in 1926. This building would become the ILO’s official headquar-
ters for almost 50 years (1926–1974) until the need for more space led to the con-
struction of the current Office building in Geneva. The old premises, with their 
78 In the second round, the appointment of a “provisional director” was put to the vote. The 
result was: “Mr. ALBERT THOMAS, 11 votes; Mr. Butler, 9 votes; blank votes, 1”. See ILO, Minutes 
of the Governing Body, 1st Session, Geneva, 1919, 3.
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 labour-themed murals, became the seat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and later of the World Trade Organization (WTO).79
Within a new post–world war order emerging from the peace conferences, the 
ILO found itself in a highly volatile environment. Not only had the United States 
declined to become a member, but an increasing group of countries in- and outside 
the Organization downright challenged the post-Versailles order. Consequently, it 
was crucial to tie the remaining allies closely to the Organization. Smaller nations 
appreciated the legitimacy they gained through participation in an international 
forum like the ILO. But neither France nor Great Britain, the two most important 
member countries, initially showed any enthusiasm for the new organization. 
On the contrary, the conservative government of Great Britain regarded the ILO 
with a great deal of scepticism, suspecting to compromise the sovereignty of its 
Empire.80 The relationship with France was not any easier, despite the strong 
position French nationals occupied at all levels of the Organization and the close 
relationship Thomas maintained with French government circles. In fact, con-
cerns that the ILO might encroach upon national sovereignty had grown strong 
in Paris, too, and the French government was initially in the forefront of countries 
that tried to restrict and curtail the ILO’s competences. French opposition to the 
ILO’s attempts to expand its standard-setting to agricultural work ultimately led 
Thomas to bring the case to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which, 
in 1922, confirmed the ILO’s competence in agricultural matters.81
This lent support to Thomas’ view that the ILO had to demonstrate its useful-
ness to governments in order to secure the success and even the survival of the 
organization. His strategy was both diplomatic and technocratic in nature. On 
the one hand, he continuously tried to promote the idea of international labour 
standards through direct contacts with political authorities, but also by creating 
broader networks that could help to influence public opinion and put some degree 
of pressure on national governments. He therefore tried to strengthen the reform-
ist trade unions and win the support of “modern” employers who had a certain 
awareness of social issues. Other groups whose support he courted included the 
cooperative movement, social reformist networks inside and outside academia, 
79 The buildings, which had served as a boarding school for young women before the Office 
moved there, today house the headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
80 Hidalgo-Weber, “Dimensions transnationales des politiques sociales britanniques”.
81 The International Court of Justice also decided in favour of expanding the ILO’s competences 
in other matters, for example with regard to questions of productivity in industry. See Nicolas 
Valticos, International Labour Law (Deventer: Kluwer, 1979), 39–41; on Thomas’ relationships 
with France, see Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism; Guieu, “Albert 
Thomas et la paix”, 75–76.
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civil society organizations, and religious groups, most prominently the Catholic 
trade unions and the Vatican itself.
A central issue during the extensive travels of Thomas and other ILO officials 
all across Europe, parts of Asia, the United States, and Latin America during the 
1920s was the slow pace of ratifications of the ILO’s Conventions. Thomas himself 
would in 1930 refer to his own role as that of a “traveling salesman of social 
policy”.82
Travel diplomacy alone, however, was not enough to secure the ILO’s sur-
vival. It needed to demonstrate its usefulness  – not through standard-setting 
alone, but also in providing its members with a comprehensive pool of informa-
tion and comparative analysis of social policy measures taken by different coun-
tries. In his own words, Thomas wanted the ILO to become nothing less than “the 
great clearing house for information on social questions world wide”.83 From the 
IALL and its Basel Office, the Organization had inherited mechanisms to collect 
and process data on working conditions and labour legislation which it institu-
tionalized and expanded during the interwar years under the umbrella of a spe-
cific Scientific (later Research) Division. It included a statistical unit, which over 
the years became a department. It has convened since 1923 regular International 
Conferences of Labour Statisticians. The ILO could thus provide to governments, 
trade unions, and employers’ organizations valuable statistical information, 
expert knowledge, and best practices, which they would not have been able to 
find elsewhere. This allowed for the first time a comparative analysis of interna-
tional social policy practices. Research was a necessary first step for the devel-
opment of new labour standards. It also had a diplomatic function since it gave 
an opportunity to reach out to non-members, such as the United States, Mexico 
(a  member since 1931), and Soviet Russia (later the Soviet Union), for which a 
separate “Russian Section” was created as early as 1920.84
When a deep economic crisis hit Europe and other parts of the world in the 
immediate aftermath of the First World War, the ILO could first demonstrate 
its capacity to help governments to better understand the social impact of the 
economic downturn and to provide information on measures taken in other coun-
82 On his travels in Europe, see Dorothea Hoehtker and Sandrine Kott, eds., À la rencontre de 
l’Europe au travail. Récits de voyages d’Albert Thomas (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne; Ge-
neva: ILO, 2015); Sylvie Massart, “Les Voyages d’Albert Thomas Directeur du BIT (1919–1932)”, 
Master’s thesis, Université Paris-I, Sorbonne, 1993. The quotation from Cabanes, The Great War 
and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 112.
83 Albert Thomas, Address to the Reichstag, Berlin, 29 March 1930.
84 Charles Prince, “The U.S.S.R. and International Organizations”, The American Journal of 
 International Law 36, no. 3 (July 1942): 425–445.
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tries to overcome its consequences. This also raised awareness of the transna-
tional character of the crisis and the unemployment problem.85 One example of 
this kind of work was the Technical Commission on Unemployment, established 
by the Washington Conference, which until 1924 undertook a broad investiga-
tion of the employment situation in ILO member States and some non- member 
countries (most prominently the United States). Reports on social insurance, 
working conditions, and living standards further enhanced the ILO’s reputation 
as a “social library” – a depository of publications in the social field and a “locus 
of expertise and authority on social regulation”.86
These activities belonged to the “technical functions” which the ILO had 
inherited from the IALL. They were particularly helpful in building and main-
taining a constituency among its smaller member States. Especially in Eastern 
and Central Europe, new nation states like Poland and Czechoslovakia, products 
of the Paris peace treaties and the dissolution of the defeated Austro-Hungarian, 
Russian, and German empires, looked for help to create unified social legisla-
tion out of different national traditions.87 Here, the ILO would also contribute 
to regional harmonization with regard to social policy and labour relations. A 
similar case could be made for the Nordic countries. While, for instance, trade 
unions in these countries had widely different approaches towards industrial 
conflict, the ILO provided a forum that helped to form a common model of the 
“Scandinavian class compromise”, which emphasized collective bargaining and 
agreements negotiated between labour and business.88 The ILO has triggered 
similar processes in other parts of the world through regional conferences, start-
ing in the Americas in 1936 and spreading to Asia, Africa, and Europe after the 
Second World War. With regard to the establishment of the principles and prac-
tices of social insurance, the ILO apparently laid the foundation for a Western 
European “Social Model” during these early years.89
Within the diplomatic-technocratic framework provided by the ILO, Germany 
occupied a special position. Admitted to the ILO and awarded a permanent seat 
in the Governing Body as a country of “major industrial importance” by the 1919 
85 Olivier Feiertag, “Reguler la mondialisation: Albert Thomas, les débuts du BIT et la crise 
économique mondiale de 1920–1923”, Les cahiers Irice, no. 2 (2008), 127–155.
86 Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 125.
87 Natali Stegmann, “The ILO and East Central Europe. Insights into the Early Polish and Czech-
oslovak Interwar Years”, Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Studia Territorialia no. 1 (2017), 11–34.
88 Pauli Kettunen, “The ILO as a Forum for Developing and Demonstrating a Nordic Model”, in 
Globalizing Social Rights, ed. Kott and Droux, 210–230.
89 Sandrine Kott, “Constructing a European Social Model: The Fight for Social Insurance in the 
Inter-War Period”, in ILO Histories, ed. Van Daele et al., 173–196.
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Conference in Washington, D.C., Germany assumed an important role in the ILO 
from the start. Thomas, who spoke German, actively fostered this cooperation. 
In 1921, the ILO branch office in Berlin became the first one outside the former 
Allied countries. The next step was to fill strategic positions with officials from 
the German Ministry of Labour and other social institutions, in order to promote 
the internationalization of the “German model” of social insurance.90
For the government of the Weimar Republic, the cooperation with the ILO 
was important from a diplomatic point of view as well. Social policy had long 
served the German state as a “powerful affirmative instrument of national iden-
tity and international reputation”, but the promotion of its “social model” – and 
in particular of its advanced system of social insurance – through the ILO offered 
Germany alternative diplomatic capital in a time of national weakness.91
The importance attached by the Office to strengthening relations with the ILO 
member States was reflected in the network of correspondents and branch offices 
created during the 1920s. The functions of these correspondents were both dip-
lomatic and technical. They were supposed to maintain contacts with national 
labour ministries, trade unions, and employers’ organizations and also to gather 
information and statistical data for the ILO on the social policy in a given country 
or region. The persons deemed to qualify for the post of a national correspondent 
normally had a close connection to the relevant government circles. They were 
often academics with good political contacts or former members of the govern-
ment or social administration. The spread of correspondent offices was a good 
indicator for the geographical and political emphasis of the ILO’s work during 
the early period. The first offices were opened already in 1920, initially in the cap-
itals of the Allied Powers (London, Paris, Rome, and Washington, D.C.), followed 
by Berlin and Vienna. Outside of Europe and North America, the ILO was much 
slower in casting its net of contacts. Branch offices were set up in Tokyo and Delhi 
90 Friedrich Rietzmann headed the industrial safety section from 1921 onwards. Andreas Gries-
er, who was the head of the social insurance department at the Ministry of Labour in Berlin, 
participated as an expert on the Commission on Social Insurance as of 1926 and was a regular 
member of the German delegation to the ILC in the 1920s. As Sandrine Kott has shown in vari-
ous places, German officials were instrumental, for example, in the “internationalization of the 
German social insurance system”. See “Dynamiques de l’internationalisation: l’Allemagne et 
l’Organisation internationale du Travail (1919–1940)”, Critique internationale 52 (2011), 69–84. In 
a broader context, see also Kott, “Towards a Social History of International Organizations: The 
ILO and the Internationalisation of Western Social Expertise” (1919–1949), in Internationalism, 
Imperialism and the Formation of the Contemporary World. The Pasts of the Present, ed. Miguel 
Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 33–58.
91 My own translation from the French “puissant instrument d’affirmation de l’identité nationale et 
de rayonnement international de Allemagne”, in Kott, “Dynamiques de l’internationalisation”, 72.
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as well as in Rio de Janeiro in the 1920s, but in other parts of the world, it would 
take a decade or more (and in sub-Saharan Africa until 1959) before the first ILO 
offices were established.
The most important task faced by the ILO in order to become operational 
was to build an international bureaucracy from scratch and without a blueprint. 
Between 1920 and 1925, the number of employees at the Geneva headquarters 
grew to roughly 250. Where, how, and according to which criteria where these 
people recruited? When the ILO and the League started their work, little experi-
ence was available on how to create a body of committed international civil serv-
ants that would carry out the daily work. The secretariats of nineteenth-century 
international institutions had only rarely exceeded a handful of permanent staff 
members. Only a small portion of the first generation of ILO staff could be directly 
transferred from the Basel office or the national sections of the IALL.92
Albert Thomas’ first decision after taking up his mandate was to appoint 
Harold Butler as his Deputy and Edward Phelan as head of the Diplomatic Divi-
sion, responsible for the ILO’s relation with its constituents. For some of the other 
senior posts he relied heavily on his own networks, mostly built before the war, 
but also during his time as a member of the French government. Most govern-
ments, however, were initially reluctant, in particular after the massive losses of 
young men to the First World War, to let the ILO draw from the ranks of their 
own national administrations, and France was no exception. Younger recruits 
sometimes came directly from universities, often on a recommendation of their 
academic institutions, with reform-oriented institutes like the London School of 
Economics assuming a special role.93
From 1921 onwards, the ILO established an examination system similar to 
the one commonly used at the national level for careers in public administra-
tion. The criteria of selection were mainly twofold: in addition to education and 
expertise, the question of nationality featured prominently. Early recruitment 
clearly reflected the power relations within the Organization’s membership. 
Although the ILO’s staff in 1921 comprised citizens of 19 countries, a majority was 
of British, French, or Swiss nationality. The ILO leadership was from the start 
dedicated to creating a sense of cohesion among its staff and to fostering commit-
ment to the Organization’s objectives. Internationalism and loyalty to the ILO’s 
goals, however, did not equal cosmopolitanism. On the contrary, inasmuch as the 
post-First World War order was built on the concept of the nation state, the ILO 
92 Véronique Plata-Stenger: “Europe, the ILO and the Wider World (1919–1954)”, in European 




was looking for staff members who were firmly rooted in their respective national 
places of origin. Far from being detached from the world of nation states, interna-
tional organizations were, on the contrary, to a large extent the supreme manifes-
tation of the very principle of the nation state. International civil servants were 
supposed to have a clear understanding of the mechanisms of this world.94 The 
ILO itself, despite its tripartite structure, reflected the shifting nature of interna-
tionalism which became more state-centred after Versailles.95 In those early days, 
when good relationships to governments were essential, the potential of interna-
tional officials fulfilling a quasi-diplomatic role vis-à-vis their own countries of 
origin virtually became a matter of life or death for the Organization.
The Invention of Tripartism
With its tripartite structure and practice, the ILO, in particular in its early years, 
became a laboratory for an essentially new format of cooperation between 
workers’ and employers’ organizations. Tripartite cooperation, or tripartism for 
short, was a mostly untested idea when it was introduced into the debate, prior to 
the establishment of the ILO, by the authors of the British proposal to the Labour 
Commission in Paris.96
Some countries had introduced mechanisms and institutions for coopera-
tion between governments, trade unions, and employers during the First World 
War. As part of the Union Sacrée in France and the Burgfrieden in Germany, 
governments had been eager to secure the political allegiances of the greater 
part of the trade union movement, and they had been mostly successful. Yet, 
the corporatist arrangements made during the war were mainly ad hoc provi-
sions,97 imposed by governments, often against the resistance of the two other 
parties, and their continuation in peace time was highly contested. This was 
the case not only for business representatives, who usually resented the social-
94 Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism, 45–78.
95 Kott, “From Transnational Reformist Network to International Organization”, 246–253.
96 A good discussion of the origins of tripartism can be found in the unpublished work of Kari 
Tapiola, “A Wild Dream. A Century of Tripartite Cooperation and Social Dialogue”, (2017). For a 
concise overview, see Claire La Hovary, “A Challenging Ménage à Trois? Tripartism in the Inter-
national Labour Organization”, International Organizations Law Review 12, no. 1 (2015): 204–236.
97 Even before the war, trade unions and industry leaders were already consulted in sever-
al countries on both social legislation and conflict resolution. The very creation of the British 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) in 1868 had aimed at a better coordination of the workers’ various 
views on social policy. In Europe, in particular, trade unions had close links to labour parties, 
which in turn was reflected in social reforms and the spread of parliamentarism.
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ist undertones of the measures, but also for some trade unions. For many of 
them, the idea of tripartism gave governments an undue voice in labour rela-
tions, something of which the American Federation of Labour (AFL) was highly 
critical.98 As a matter of fact, in hardly any of the ILO’s member countries did 
the tripartite cooperation established in the new organization reflect the reality 
on the ground. Nor were trade unions fully recognized everywhere. Their legal 
status varied widely even in the highly industrialized countries of Europe and 
North America.99
Tripartism, then, rather than being a recognized practice adopted by the ILO 
on the basis of national experiences, has to be seen as something developed and 
practised first on the international level before being promoted as a model in 
the ILO’s member States.100 For the ILO, the tripartite principle became another 
tool to secure its own survival, to anchor the Organization in various national 
environments, and to gain additional access to public opinion within its member 
States.101 At the same time, and from a diplomatic point of view, Albert Thomas 
considered that the strengthening of the Office’s ties within the tripartite network 
of constituents was vital – not least in light of the often lukewarm support by 
governments during the Organization’s early years.
This was particularly true with regard to the international trade union move-
ment which had refounded itself in July 1919 in Amsterdam and became known as 
the “Amsterdam International”. Despite the considerable disappointment among 
the IFTU about the results of the Paris Peace Conference, discontent about the 
general features of the new organization soon gave way to a more pragmatic 
stance. The main reason for this change was that, although the IFTU was not 
officially given the representative monopoly in the Workers’ group that it had 
originally claimed, it dominated the group during the entire interwar period to a 
degree that would have made non-cooperation absurd.102
Much of the Amsterdam International’s openness to the ILO had to do with 
the personality and the previous trade union links of Albert Thomas, whose elec-
tion at the Washington Conference of 1919 could be regarded as a major success 
98 A systematic overview: Marcel van der Linden, “Trade Unions” in Handbook Global History 
of Work. ed. Karin Hofmeester and Marcel van der Linden (Berlin: DeGruyter Oldenbourg, 2018), 
551–570.
99 Ibid.
100 On the highly diverse situation in the Nordic countries, see Kettunen, “The ILO as a Forum 
for Developing and Demonstrating a Nordic Model”, in Globalizing Social Rights, ed. Kott and 
Droux, 210–230.
101 There are no records of Albert Thomas having attended or even promoted tripartite meetings 
during his travels, but usually met with trade union and employers’ representatives separately.
102 On the IFTU, see van Goethem, The Amsterdam International.
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by the IFTU. Especially during the early days of the ILO, the Amsterdam Interna-
tional entered into a close cooperative relation with the Director of the ILO, which 
formed a key element in Thomas’ strategy to secure the Organization’s survival. 
The trade unions were supportive of the ILO’s major projects, that is, the advance-
ment of international social legislation and the expansion of the Organization’s 
competences beyond a narrow social mandate. The ILO Director attended, in an 
informal but plainly visible capacity, the IFTU’s congresses as well as the meet-
ings of some of its national affiliates, and he occasionally mediated conflicts 
between members or between the IFTU and federations outside of its framework 
(such as the AFL). He also entertained close personal contacts with the Interna-
tional’s Dutch Secretary, Jan Oudegeest. To some Thomas on occasions appeared 
to be acting as a “de-facto additional member of the IFTU leadership”.103
Yet, in some cases, conflicts arose, for example when Thomas courted IFTU 
competitors like the Christian trade union movement or entertained official rela-
tions – considered at times too cordial by IFTU leadership – with countries that 
suppressed trade union activities, such as Fascist Italy or Spain under the dicta-
torship of Primo de Rivera.104
Albert Thomas’ overall approach was pragmatic, guided by the conviction 
that the collaboration with governments of whatever political orientation was the 
first step to get international labour standards ratified. Occasional turbulences 
could not distract from the fact that the relationship between the leadership of 
the ILO and the most important international trade union federation was some-
times even symbiotic. Although this close and personal cooperation did not 
continue with Thomas’ successor, Harold Butler, who took a much more neutral 
stand towards the ILO’s constituents, the trade unions maintained a privileged 
position.105
The cooperation with the employers was different from the very beginning. 
The International Organisation of Industrial Employers, soon to be renamed Inter-
national Organisation of Employers (IOE), was founded in 1920 for the purpose 
of representing the world of business and coordinating the views of employers in 
the ILO, in an attempt to match at least partly the unity that existed among the 
Workers’ group. An international association that united business interests had 
existed before the war, and there was also a continuity when it came to the people 
103 Reiner Tosstorff, “Albert Thomas, the ILO and the IFTU. A Case of Mutual Benefit?”, in ILO 
Histories, ed. Van Daele et al., 91–114.
104 The travel diaries on Thomas’ visit to Italy 1925, 1928, 1930, 1932, and to Spain 1928; Hoe-
htker and Kott, À la rencontre de l’Europe au travail. Récits de voyages d’Albert Thomas, 215–255, 
255–273.
105 Tosstorff, “Albert Thomas, the ILO and the IFTU: A Case of Mutual Benefit?”, 111–112.
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involved. Some of the protagonists of the IOE in the interwar years – such as the 
Belgian Jules Lecocq, the French Robert Pinot, or the Italian Gino Olivetti – had 
known each other from earlier attempts to organize employers’ interests on the 
international level. Yet, it was the British proposal to set up the ILO as a tripartite 
organization that brought this international association into being. The existence 
of the ILO and the employers’ participation in the Organization was and remained 
the raison d’être of the IOE.106
By and large, in 1919, the employers’ attitude towards the ILO was scepti-
cal. Many perceived of the ILO as “an unsolicited gift”. At the same time, they 
acknowledged the potential of a cooperation with the trade unions in order to 
keep what they saw as the regulatory zeal of governments under control.107 The 
employers felt that in welcoming them, the ILO’s arms were not as open as they 
had expected, given the recognition that the Organization’s structure gave them 
formally an equal position with the trade unions. Many employers soon com-
plained that the environment of the new Organization was hostile towards the 
representatives of business. From the beginning, the Employers’ group found 
itself accused of obstructionism. Employers may not have been the “brake” in the 
machinery of the ILO, as Thomas’ oft-quoted dictum would have it (in opposition 
to the workers, whom he saw in the role of the “motor” or “locomotive”108), but 
they did work as a corrective to all ambitions to expand the ILO’s mandate. Until 
the Second World War, the employers regularly voted against the budget propos-
als. They expressed a clear preference for the adoption of non-binding Recom-
mendations on almost all questions concerning standard-setting that were put 
on the agenda of the Conference, and they took generally a defensive position 
whenever the debate turned to “new topics” to be explored by the ILO. This was 
even true in cases in which employers had taken a more positive approach on 
the national level, such as in the discussion on “public works” programmes in 
106 Marieke Louis, “Building a Transnational Business Community. Insights from the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation”, unpublished working paper for the ILO Century Project, 4–8.
107 This cooperation manifested itself at the International Labour Conference of 1919, where 
Workers and Employers started deliberating first in groups and often between themselves. At 
the first Session of the Governing Body, it led to the election – by majority vote – of both Arthur 
Fontaine and Albert Thomas. Jean-Jacques Oechslin, The International Organisation of Employ-
ers. Three-Quarters of a Century in the Service of the Enterprise (1920–1998) (Geneva: IOE, 2001).
108 An actual reference for this often quoted comparison could not be traced. The closest one 
gets to it is taken from Oechslin, The International Organisation of Employers, 36, who refers to 
a speech of 1928 in which Albert Thomas likened the ILO to a train of which the employers were 
“the brakemen”. “This may indeed be your role”, he told the employers. “But you have climbed 
aboard a train and a train … goes inexorably towards a destination. A little more slowly, a little 
faster, but inexorably we shall proceed towards social justice and peace.”
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the 1930s. One of their main concerns was that the ILO would promote measures 
which could become an incentive for governments and workers to team up in 
favour of more regulation and state intervention in the economy. As the Danish 
employer delegate Hans Christian Oersted pointed out in 1927, employers saw 
it as their “duty not to compromise the economy of their countries by making 
unconsidered concessions to workers’ claims”.109
The problem with the employers’ position within the ILO architecture was 
from the beginning political and structural, and it could not be solved through 
a search for some kind of a formal balance. The objective of standard-setting 
even before the ILO existed had been to improve the situation of workers. Labour 
standards were not designed to deal with, let alone advance, the interests of the 
business community. Consequently, what could be seen as an overall defensive 
and even at times obstructionist attitude by the Employers’ group was an una-
voidable consequence of the very idea of international social legislation which 
the ILO was built upon. After all, the employers’ organizations had their roots 
in a desire to counter the demands that were expressed especially by the Second 
International. Later on, once social legislation started being put in place, the 
employers realized the need for coordinating their positions.110
On closer examination, the employers’ approach to the ILO was considerably 
more differentiated and complex. The first generation of employers’ represent-
atives, some of whom had been members of the IALL, had a genuine interest in 
international social legislation as a means to reduce unfair competition and to 
diminish the risk of social unrest. From this perspective, the ILO seemed to be the 
right place to look for non-confrontational and negotiated solutions to the social 
question. Employers voted in favour of Conventions on unemployment or sick-
ness insurance. They preferred instruments on social insurance coverage for acci-
dents rather than on work-related illnesses where the financial obligation could 
be less well controlled. They voted for standards to protect women’s work (for 
instance, maternity conventions) since there was a common understanding of the 
primary role of women as mothers.111 The majority of them even voted in favour 
of the first ILO Convention on the reduction of working hours (the principle of 
the eight-hour workday) in 1919, although this attitude was tied to the specific 
context of the Washington Conference and was later replaced by strong and per-
109 Louis, “Building a Transnational Business Community”, 6.
110 Ibid., 10–12.
111 Isabelle Lespinet-Moret, “Promouvoir la santé au travail comme droit social (1919–1940)?”, 
Le Mouvement Social 263, no. 2 (2018): 61–76.
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sistent opposition against any other attempts to such regulations.112 In the first 
two decades, the IOE did not actually have a mandate to coordinate the positions 
of the individual Employer delegates, and certainly not to the same degree as the 
IFTU with the Workers.113
Especially in the early days, the political position of the members of the IOE 
was mostly liberal-conservative, and they saw the ILO as a bulwark against the 
Bolshevik threat. While parts of the business community equally perceived of the 
ILO as a threat to their interests, the IOE learned to appreciate the ILO as a valua-
ble source of information about social legislation in other countries, which they 
could pass on to their members. The ILO also served as a kind of early warning 
system that would help employers to anticipate trends in international social leg-
islation. This seemed useful to strengthen their “vigilance” and give them a better 
chance to “nip it in the bud”.114 Last but not least, the IOE had its own genuine 
interest in an association with the ILO, inasmuch as its very legitimacy rested on 
its position as a “privileged channel of information between the ILO and national 
business organizations”.115 However, in the perception of the ILO leadership and 
its allies, both among governments and trade unions, the employers increasingly 
assumed less the role of a partner than that of an obstacle to be overcome.116
Despite these tensions, Albert Thomas showed genuine concern about ques-
tions of management and the broader issues regarding economic and industrial 
organization. An early example of this was his interest in “scientific manage-
ment”, which as a term combined ideas of economic planning within a capital-
ist order and the Taylorist organization of industrial production. Thomas shared 
with many socialists and social democrats of his era a fascination with Taylorism 
which started to spread in Europe, especially in car manufacturing, after the 
war.117 From his perspective, scientific management offered an opportunity to 
build up expertise in a field from which the ILO had been largely excluded due 
to the resistance of employers and most governments. Scientific management 
opened up a space to pursue a broader vision of social and labour problems and 
112 Ingrid Liebeskind Sauthier, “Modern Unemployment: From the Creation of the Concept 
to the International Labour Office’s First Standards”, in Globalizing Social Rights, ed. Kott and 
Droux, 67–84.
113 Louis, “Building a Transnational Business Community”, 10–12.
114 Quoted from a strategic paper of the IOE, 1928; see ibid., 6.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 For the German case and the German Social Democrats’ fascination with Taylorist princi-
ples, see Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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to keep the ILO in touch with economic discussions in the League of Nations and 
elsewhere.
In the early 1920s, Thomas started a cooperation with the US Twentieth 
Century Fund and its President, Edward A. Filene. Filene, a progressive philan-
thropist businessman who had long promoted scientific management as a means 
to both rationalize industrial production and mitigate social conflict, was mostly 
interested in the economic planning aspect. He saw the cooperation with the 
ILO as a way to access the Organization’s broad network of governmental and 
non-governmental actors. For the ILO, in turn, the cooperation offered opportuni-
ties both in terms of funding and outreach. The major outcome of this cooperation 
was the establishment, in 1926, of the International Management Institute (IMI), 
with Paul Devinat, an ILO chef de service, as its Director.118 The IMI was funded 
by the Twentieth Century Fund and staffed mainly from the ranks of the ILO. For 
Thomas, the IMI would serve as a spearhead in the international movement for 
scientific management, with the ILO bringing a social aspect to the debate.119 
After 1930, the Institute was built up as an “international clearing-house of mod-
ernizing ideas linking Taylorist experts to reformist networks”.120 At the same 
time, the Twentieth Century Fund, together with the Ford Motor Company, spon-
sored a study on living standards by the ILO.121
When the economic crisis hit after 1930, the IMI’s emphasis on social and 
economic planning first seemed to gain in relevance. Yet, the IMI proved to be 
short-lived. Eventually, the Twentieth Century Fund lost interest, and, in 1934, 
the Institute had to close its doors due to a lack of funding. The IMI nevertheless 
had helped the ILO to build up expertise and earn some recognition. Part of its 
work was continued during the 1930s in the Office’s newly established Economic 
Planning Section. At the same time, the ILO had gained recognition for its eco-
nomic expertise, tangible, for example, in its work with the League’s Economic 
and Financial Section.122 Thus, the IMI episode had effects that proved useful in 
the longer run.123
118 Thomas Cayet, “The ILO and the IMI: A Strategy of Influence on the Edges of the League of 
Nations, 1925–1934”, in ILO Histories, ed. Van Daele et al., 251–270.
119 Another result was the introduction of simultaneous interpretation at the 1927 Conference, 
which was financed by Filene.
120 Cayet, “The ILO and the IMI”, 263.
121 Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 78–84.
122 Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 
1920–1946 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 11–46.
123 Cayet, “The ILO and the IMI”.
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Casting a Wider Net
The ILO’s attempts to broaden its influence exceeded the tripartite framework 
also in other aspects. During its early years, it was constantly seeking to mobilize 
public opinion within the member countries. As a result, the ILO acted as part 
of a broader international network. Its relationship with the League of Nations 
was marked by a mix of cooperation and competition.124 Although the ILO was 
jealously trying to secure its autonomy with regard to the League, both organiza-
tions found fields of common interest in areas like health policies or living stand-
ards which led to mutually beneficial joint actions. Equally important, the ILO’s 
interactions with the international milieu surrounding the League of Nations in 
Geneva and with internationalist circles of lawyers, pacifists, and social reform-
ers elsewhere provided additional sources of support that helped to secure its 
position.125
In parallel, the ILO itself became an umbrella for organizations whose activi-
ties and interests partly overlapped with its agenda. Here, the ILO often played an 
active role in fostering and sometimes even initiating ostensibly private initiatives 
that were deemed to carry the potential of supporting its goals. Obvious partners 
in these endeavours could be found among the international associations that 
had preceded the ILO in its work, in particular the IALL. However, there was a 
problem with this cooperation. The foundation of the ILO had drained most of 
these associations of both their public funding and their personnel. In the case 
of the IALL, the ILO had taken over its library and most of its archives. Many 
prominent members of both the Basel Office and the IALL’s national sections 
were appointed to positions in the ILO. For example, Sophy Sanger, a leading 
member of the British IALL branch, became head of the ILO’s Labour Legislation 
Section.126 The ILO established an equally symbiotic relationship with the Inter-
124 Magaly Rodríguez García, Davide Rodogno and Liat Kozma, eds., The League of Nations’ 
Work on Social Issues. Visions, Endeavours and Experiments (New York: United Nations Depart-
ment of Public Information, 2016).
125 On the Geneva international milieu, see Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism, 
45–78. On the broader internationalist environment during the interwar years, see also Daniel 
Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012); and Daniel Laqua, Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Move-
ments between the World Wars, International Library of Twentieth Century History (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2011).
126 However, Sanger only stayed for three years and left the Office after disagreements with 
Thomas, as in the early days the reality of gender equality in the Office did not yet match the 
progressive principles of the Constitution. See Olga Hidalgo-Weber, “Femmes britanniques et 
pratiques internationales de justice sociale dans la première moitié du XXe siècle”, in “La jus-
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national Association for the Fight against Unemployment, which merged with the 
IALL in 1924 to become the International Association for Social Progress (IASP). 
The influence of these associations did not disappear in the shadow of the ILO, 
because Albert Thomas saw their national sections as valuable allies in reach-
ing out to the public. These national sections also represented an opportunity 
to maintain a dialogue with social reformers in countries that were not members 
of the ILO, most importantly the United States. The ILO, therefore, actively sup-
ported the IASP, which served as an intermediary and conducted research on the 
impact of ILO Conventions. For the same purpose, the ILO promoted the foun-
dation of non-governmental organizations that supported its own agenda. An 
example was the International Association for Social Insurance (1927), in which 
two senior ILO officials – Oswald Stein of Czechoslovakia and Adrien Tixier of 
France – played a major role as experts.127
From the beginning, the ILO showed a keen interest in the international 
cooperative movement. It opened its own cooperative branch, set up an Inter-
national Committee on Inter-Cooperative Relations, and sought to join forces 
with the movement’s main umbrella organization, the International Cooperative 
Alliance  (ICA). To Thomas – who had been linked to the cooperative movement 
before the war – and some of his close collaborators, the cooperative principle 
was not only a mode of production. It was a social laboratory that would eventu-
ally bring about better living conditions for workers, a more humane and dem-
ocratic organization of the economy at large, and ultimately peace within soci-
eties and on the international level.128 As early as 1920, the ILO took a decision 
to establish firm relationships with what Thomas saw as a “mass movement” 
and a “movement of ideas”, capable of providing solutions to “almost all general 
problems of labour”.129 From this point of view, cooperatives were a means to 
pursue a “révolution silencieuse”130 which would be beneficial especially in a 
number of areas, ranging from housing to consumption, and from insurance 
through agriculture to fisheries. In the wake of the economic downturn following 
the First World War, cooperatives became also to be seen as institutions that were 
tice sociale dans un monde global. L’Organisation internationale du travail (1919–2019)”, special 
issue, Le Mouvement Social 263, no. 2 (2018): 77–92; here 80–81.
127 Kott, “From Transnational Reformist Network to International Organization”, 251.
128 Hagen Henry, “The Contribution of the ILO to the Formation of Public International Cooper-
ative Law”, in Globalizing Social Rights, ed. Kott and Droux, 98–114; Claudia Sanchez Bajo, “Work 
and Cooperatives: A Century of ILO Interaction with the Cooperative Movement”, in Cooperatives 
and the World of Work, ed. Bruno Roelants et al. (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
129 Sanchez Bajo, “Work and Cooperatives”.
130 Marine Dhermy-Mairal, “L’unification du mouvement coopératif au BIT: la ‘revolution silen-
cieuse’ d’Albert Thomas (1919–1932)”, Le Mouvement Social 263 (Jan. 2018): 15–29.
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relatively robust in times of cyclical depression. According to his travel diaries, 
Albert Thomas always sought meetings and collaboration with the cooperative 
movement during his official visits to Europe (and also to the Soviet Union in 
1928).131 In 1921, the ILO hired Georges Fauquet, a French leader of the consumer 
cooperative movement, as head of the ILO’s cooperative branch. In the following 
years, Fauquet, who had worked under Thomas in the Ministry of Artillery and 
Munitions during the war, would personify the close relationship with the coop-
erative movement.132
From the beginning, the ILO saw itself as part of the wider liberal internation-
alist milieu, which had been energized by the founding of the League of Nations. 
In this respect, an important medium to gain wider public support was the Union 
internationale des associations pour la Société des Nations (UIASDN), an umbrella 
organization for the national League of Nations Associations. Despite its ambig-
uous relationship with the League, the ILO tried to mobilize the wider network of 
civil society groups, international lawyers, and pacifists of various shades that 
supported and promoted the League both in Geneva and within its member States. 
Notwithstanding their rivalries and occasional turf wars, for Thomas, the League 
and the ILO were complementary instruments for peace. As a member of the 
central committee of the French Ligue des droits de l’homme, he had been instru-
mental in the foundation of the French League of Nations Association (Association 
française pour la Société des Nations) in 1918. Once in Geneva, Thomas used both 
the French Association and the UIASDN to boost public support for the organiza-
tion. During the 1920s, the UIASDN and its French president, Théodore Ruyssen, 
issued resolutions that were addressed to its national sections and asked them 
to influence their governments in favour of the ratification of ILO Conventions.133 
Some national sections became tools for the promotion of the Organization, too. 
In Britain, the League of Nations Union (LNU) was the ILO’s key ally, second only 
to the trade unions. The LNU, which had over 100.000 members during the mid-
1920s, gained the support of liberal internationalists like Alfred Zimmern and 
Leonard Woolf, as well as prominent conservatives like Robert Cecil and Austen 
Chamberlain. To secure the support of the most important ILO member State of 
the time was regarded as one of the main assets.134
From the late 1920s onwards, the ILO entertained a relationship of a similar 
kind with the Institute for Pacific Relations (IPR), an American-based interna-
131 Hoehtker and Kott, À la rencontre de l’Europe au travail. Recits de voyages d’Albert Thomas.
132 Fauquet maintained close relationships with the ICA (and became a leading member of the 
organization after his time at the ILO).
133 Guieu, “Albert Thomas et la paix”, 76–80.
134 Ibid.
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tional NGO which acted as a think tank on problems shared by countries of the 
Pacific Rim. Through its contacts with the IPR, the ILO gained further access to 
the Institute’s wide net of contacts, which extended from liberal international-
ists in the United States to affiliates and contacts in countries such as Japan and 
the Soviet Union. The IPR contact would prove extremely helpful, particularly 
during the Second World War, when the ILO relocated to Canada and relied on 
the support of the United States, which was facilitated by the Institute’s close 
relations to the Roosevelt administration.135
A major institutional contact with these networks was provided from 1926 
onwards through the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conven-
tions and Recommandations (CEACR),136 which was a crucial feature of the devel-
oping supervisory mechanism for standards. Within half a decade, it had become 
clear that the ILC could not deal with the increasing number of reports on ratified 
Conventions without some kind of a preparatory mechanism that would assist 
the Office and the Conference. As of 1927, a report summarizing the information 
provided by national governments was prepared by a committee of independent 
experts. Their task was to review the annual reports of the various national gov-
ernments on the implementation of ratified standards. The members of the Expert 
Committee, who were appointed by the Governing Body, were mostly internation-
ally renowned jurists and other experts in labour law, like Paul Tschoffen from 
Belgium or William Rappard from Switzerland.137 While the mandate adopted by 
the Governing Body did not limit the Committee’s membership to jurists alone, 
in practice, it became the most prestigious body of legal expertise in the ILO. Its 
members played a significant part in clarifying and establishing international 
labour law in all member States. Through the different national legal traditions 
and political systems they represented, the experts also fulfilled a role as transla-
tors and emissaries for the ILO within their own national and regional contexts.138 
135 Paul F. Hooper, “The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Origins of Asian and Pacific Stud-
ies”, Pacific Affairs 61, no. 1 (1988), 98–121.
136 Guy Fiti Sinclair, To Reform the World: International Organizations and the Making of Mod-
ern States, The History and Theory of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2017), ch.1.: From Standard-Setting to Technical Assistance.
137 Membres et réunions de la Commission d’experts pour l’application des conventions et 
recommandations et décisions du Conseil d’administration 1927–1939. The list of members and 
meetings was made available to me through the ILO Archives.
138 On the ILO’s relationship with international jurists, see Dzovinar Kévonian, “Les juristes 
et l’Organisation internationale du Travail 1919–1939. Processus de légitimation et institution-
nalisation des relations internationales”, Journal of the History of International Law 12, no. 
3 (2010): 227–266; see also the research project “Laying the Foundations. The League of Na-
tions and International Law, 1919–1945” Københavns Universitet, and its various  publications: 
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The high rank and independent status of its members also made it difficult to 
dismiss or ignore the Committee’s findings. The success of the Committee, which 
has arguably remained one of the most effective instruments for the monitoring 
of international standards, has set a precedent for the ILO, which would in the 
future use committees of independent experts also with regard to several other 
controversial issues, such as forced labour or freedom of association.139
Another prime example of the ways the ILO, under Albert Thomas’ leader-
ship, broadened its appeal beyond its tripartite framework was its relationship 
with the Catholic Church. Thomas had shown an early interest in the Catholic 
social doctrine, which had long played a strong role in the French social reform-
ist milieu. He saw the Holy See as a key ally in building good relations not only 
with various governments and the Christian trade union federations but also with 
some members of the Employers’ group, who were committed Catholics. Pope 
Pius XI generally encouraged Catholic laymen to get involved in all aspects of 
social life both nationally and internationally, and despite his socialist back-
ground, Thomas could encounter a certain degree of responsiveness.140
Despite the importance of Christian – and especially Catholic – trade union-
ism, the Vatican, as a state entity, did not have any organizational link to, or rep-
resentation of, trade unions and employers. Consequently, it did not fit in the 
tripartite structure of the ILO. Thomas circumvented this problem by creating a 
new position within the ILO, occupied by a representative of the Catholic Church 
who would act as a special advisor to the Director on social and religious matters. 
Based on an unofficial agreement between the ILO and the Vatican, this post was 
filled for the first time in 1926 with the Jesuit priest André Arnou. The institution 
of a special ecclesiastical advisor to the Director-General has been maintained to 
www. internationallaw.ku.dk. For a history of the establishment of the Committee, see Kari 
Tapiola, “The ILO System of Supervision on the Application of Conventions and Recommenda-
tions: A Lasting Paradigm”, in Protecting Labour Rights as Human Rights: Present and Future 
of International Supervision, Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the 80th Anni-
versary of the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommen-
dations, Geneva, 24–25 November 2006, ed. George P. Politakis (Geneva: International Labour 
Office, 2006), 29–36.
139 Bob Reinalda, “Organization Theory and the Autonomy of the International Labour Organ-
ization: Two Classical Studies still Going Strong”, in Autonomous Policy Making by International 
Organizations, ed. Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek, 42–62; here 49–52.
140 Zaragori, “Missions et l’Organisation internationale du Travail (OIT)”; Liliosa Azara, “The 
Holy See and the International Labour Organization: The Origins of a Special Relationship”, in 
Christian Democrat Internationalism. Its Action in Europe and Worldwide from post-World War II 
until the 1990s. Volume II: The Development (1945–1979). The Role of Parties, Movements, People, 
ed. Jean-Dominique Durand (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013), 42–56.
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the present day, and seven Jesuits have so far held the position. The nature of the 
ILO’s relationship with the Catholic Church has obviously fluctuated over time, 
but, on more than one occasion, it has served as a broker of ILO politics in the 
Catholic world.141
Standard-setting in the 1920s
From its inception, the ILO started working on what was – according to the mandate 
issued at Versailles – the Organization’s most important task: the elaboration and 
adoption of international labour standards. The questions were: what kinds of 
problems would these standards address, and which would be their primary target 
groups? Restricted by both traditions and its mandate, the ILO initially focused on 
(male) industrial labour based on regular employment contracts. Most other forms 
of labour, and, in fact, the work of a great majority of the world’s population, lay 
outside the scope of the Organization. At the same time, the boundaries of the 
ILO’s normative actions were constantly contested and extended. This process was 
driven by the interplay of two forces: on one side stood the International Labour 
Office under Albert Thomas’ leadership and its allies within the tripartite struc-
ture of the Organization; on the other side were groups from outside, which sought 
access to the ILO in order to make their voices heard and to find recognition for 
their demands. Standard-setting during the 1920s reflected the struggle between 
the protective tradition present, for example, in the fields of women’s work and in 
particular with regard to children and youth on the one hand and an ever broad-
ening understanding of the ILO’s “social mandate” on the other.
Four of the six Conventions adopted by the first ILC continued the protec-
tive tradition of the IALL’s pre-war standards and dealt with women’s night work, 
maternity protection, minimum age in industry, and night work of young persons. 
However, the other two Conventions, on hours of work and unemployment, were 
more ambitious in scope and also an indicator of the future path of the ILO, its 
141 See, for example, on the role of the Catholic Church in the context of the ILO’s Andean In-
dian Programme of the 1950s Aurélien Zaragori, “L’OIT, Le Saint-Siege et les milieux catholiques 
africains et latinoamericains dans les années 1950 et 1960”, Le Mouvement Social 263 (2018), 
123–138. In an audience with Pope John XXIII, Director-General David Morse sought the support 
as a “soldier in your army losing my battle” against conservative clerics resisting the programme 
(Oral History Interview David A. Morse, Harry S. Truman Library/OHIM-C 248). On another oc-
casion Director-General David Morse sought the help of Pope John XXIII and Pius XII in order 
to overcome Cold War impasses vis-à-vis the American trade unions during the 1960s, and the 
Catholic Church played a role in the controversy surrounding the independent trade union Soli-
darnosc in Poland in the 1980s at the time of Pope John Paul II.
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drive for enlarged areas of competence, and the power relations within the newly 
established tripartite structure.
The ILO’s first Convention dealt with the regulation of working hours.142 This 
had significant symbolic value, although legislation on this issue had already 
been adopted in many countries. It also marked the start of a general debate on 
working time that essentially continued for the following hundred years. From 
the trade unions’ perspective, the eight-hour working day was seen as a litmus 
test for the fulfilment of wartime promises. The limitation of working time had 
been the central claim of the labour movement since its beginnings, in addition 
to the demand of a living wage. Shorter working days would significantly improve 
workers’ lives by giving them more time for physical recreation and family and 
leisure time. Most importantly, reduced working hours would offer new oppor-
tunities for political participation and further education and thus open the road 
for individual and collective advancement. It was, in this sense, also a highly 
symbolic issue, in particular from the point of view of the reformist parts of the 
workers’ movement. Moderate socialist and Christian workers showed the same 
dedication to the limitation of working time in order to prove that their non- 
revolutionary gradualist strategy would ultimately be successful.143
Against this backdrop, the Workers’ group of the ILO could indeed see the 
results of the Washington Conference as a victory, even if it was not a complete 
one. The wording of the Hours of Work Convention and some of its provisions – 
both agriculture and wholesale commerce were omitted from the arrangements – 
reflected the demand of employers for more flexibility.144 Working hours and 
related issues, such as paid leave, leisure time, and night work regulations, 
remained on the agenda of the ILO throughout the interwar years. During the 
1930s, these questions were increasingly debated in a Keynesian framework, in 
which the reduction of working hours was promoted by some analysts as a means 
to fight unemployment.145
142 Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919 (No. 1) For a general debate on working hours, 
see Gerry Rodgers et al., The ILO and the Quest for Social Justice (Geneva: ILO, 2009), 110–111; 
Alcock, History of the International Labour Organization, 42–43.
143 Lex Heerma van Voss, “The International Federation of Trade Unions and the Attempt to 
Maintain the Eight-Hour Working Day 1919–1929”, in Internationalism in the Labour Movement, 
1870–1940, ed. Marcel van der Linden and Frits van Hoolthon (Leiden: Brill 1988); Gary Cross, 
“Les Trois Huits: Labor Movements, International Reform, and the Origins of the Eight Hour Day, 
1919–1924”, French Historical Studies 14, no. 2 (1985): 240–268.
144 Although the eight-hour day constituted the symbolic aim, the Convention itself focused on 
the 48-hour week, including a weekly rest day and room for a second day off (Saturday). With 
regard to the eight-hour target, it contained much more flexibility.
145 See Chapter 2.
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By contrast, a discussion of unemployment within a broader social and eco-
nomic framework was still a distant goal at the Washington Conference.146 But 
since it was to many the most pressing problem of the immediate post-war years, 
it was subject to a Convention and a Recommendation. They called for the estab-
lishment of free public employment services and the payment of unemployment 
insurance benefits to all workers, including foreign workers. At the Washing-
ton Conference, some delegates already thought that the ILO should extend its 
mandate beyond the struggle against the mere social consequences of unemploy-
ment and deal with the root causes of the problem and thus with economic, finan-
cial, and trade policies.147 In the end, however, and even though the Convention 
established the basis for the Organization to work as a clearing house for unem-
ployment policies in the future, the broader economic dimension of unemploy-
ment was not regarded to be within the scope of the ILO’s mandate.148
Women
During its first decades, the ILO’s standard-setting constantly oscillated between 
the nineteenth-century protective tradition and expanding notions of social 
policy. One of the key issues which challenged the limits of the protective frame-
work was the situation of women in the world of work. Arguably, women’s work 
and the feminist fight for the inclusion of women and their fair representation 
in the ILO have been the most important and long-lasting struggle within the 
larger story of ILO standard-setting. During the interwar years, the Organization 
responded to those claims by adopting four women-specific protective labour 
standards based on the prevailing conceptions of gender difference. However, 
these norms were met with opposition from feminists, especially from Northern 
Europe and the United States, who argued for full legal equality between men 
and women in the workplace. It would take until the 1930s and the aftermath of 
146 Liebeskind Sauthier, “Modern Unemployment”, 74–83.
147 Some governments and trade unions, for instance, promoted the foundation of a permanent 
commission to oversee the equitable international distribution of raw materials as a means to 
revitalize production and to avoid unemployment. A majority of governments, however, resist-
ed this idea as an infringement on national sovereignty. Countries rich in raw materials were 
particularly unenthusiastic, and the proposal was defeated by a clear majority. A year later, the 
Council of the League of Nations decided that this question lay outside the competence of the 
ILO. See Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 45.
148 There were only small hints of this aspect in an accompanying Recommendation to the 
economic dimension of the problem, which mentioned that public works programmes were to 
be reserved for times of unemployment.
Women   57
the Great Depression for their protests to slowly gain some ground. Even then, 
governments, trade unions, and employers favoured to an overwhelming degree 
protective legislation aimed specifically at women.
It is only recently that the active part which women played in the Organi-
zation from the very outset has received more attention.149 Women’s organiza-
tions showed a keen interest in the Organization. They spoke on behalf of women 
workers who had entered employment in unprecedented numbers in many coun-
tries as a consequence of the First World War, and they wanted to make their 
voices heard. Feminist organizations, representing women who had just won the 
right to vote in a number of European countries, lobbied national governments 
at the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference in 1919 to secure 
female participation in the new Organization and to establish women’s work as a 
central field of its activities. In Washington, about 200 women from 19 countries 
attended the first International Congress of Women Workers (ICWW), in order to 
develop a common strategy for the first Session of the ILC.150
Women, however, did not speak with one voice, and the idea of what social 
justice meant for women diverged according to the social and cultural frame of ref-
erence. Some women, like Betzy Kjelsberg, a women’s rights activist and Norwe-
gian government delegate to the ILC from 1923 to 1935, saw their fight for equality 
in the workplace as part of a bigger struggle for full equality with men. Thus, they 
were largely against women-only protective legislation. Conservatives and Chris-
tian women’s associations, on the other hand, embraced protective legislation. 
The latter also found support among many women trade unionists, often social-
ists, who prioritized the objective of better working conditions for women through 
special legislation. Many of them had supported the 1906 IALL convention on 
women’s night work, which was protective in nature, and which again came up 
for discussion in Washington. In 1919, these ideological and strategic differences 
within the women’s movement particularly limited the ability of legal equality 
feminists to influence the decision-making process in any significant way. This 
was even more tragic given the difficult economic conditions in Europe and the 
return of millions of soldiers from the trenches caused fears of mass unemploy-
ment, which in turn fueled a general objection against women’s work.151
149 See, for example, Boris, Hoehtker, and Zimmermann, eds., Women’s ILO.
150 Dorothy Sue Cobble, “The Other ILO Founders: 1919 and Its Legacies”, in Women’s ILO, ed. 
Boris, Hoehtker, and Zimmermann, 27–49; Ulla Wikander, “Demands on the ILO by Internation-
ally Organized Women in 1919”, in ILO Histories, ed. Van Daele et al., 67–90.
151 Wikander, “Demands on the ILO by Internationally Organized Women in 1919”.
58   1 Beginnings
Figure 2: The Norwegian government delegate Betzy Kjelsberg (centre) with technical advisers. 
Kjelsberg was the first and only woman delegate with voting rights when she attended the third 
Session of the ILC in 1921.
The two Conventions that dealt specifically with women`s employment were, for 
most part, an expression of the protective mainstream thinking. For legal equal-
ity feminists the Night Work (Women) Convention (No. 4) was the quintessential 
expression of the attempt to perpetuate a social order through ILO standard- setting 
which gave men priority in access to jobs and relegated women to the role of 
housewife and mother.152 By contrast, the Maternity Protection Convention (No. 3) 
had wider support among women’s organizations, because it also contained pro-
visions for compulsory benefits that went beyond the merely protective frame. 
The protection of women workers during pregnancy and after childbirth has been 
the least controversial area of protective standard-setting for women, and it has 
152 Nora Natchkova and Céline Schoeni, “The ILO, Feminists and Expert Networks: The Chal-
lenges of a Protective Policy”, in Globalizing Social Rights, ed. Kott and Droux, 49–66, here 53; 
see also Brigitte Studer, Regina Wecker, and Gaby Sutter eds., Die “schutzbedürftige Frau”. Zur 
Konstruktion von Geschlecht durch Mutterschaftsversicherung, Nachtarbeitsverbot und Sonder-
schutzgesetzgebung (Zurich: Chronos, 2001).
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remained to this day the only women-specific feature in the ILO’s  standard-setting. 
Throughout the interwar years, the ILO continued its predominantly protective 
standard- setting. It adopted mainly conventions with gender-specific orientation, 
for example with regard to underground work, or it included women- specific par-
agraphs in gender-neutral Conventions.153 The debate continued into the 1930s, 
especially after the world economic crisis starting in 1929 exacerbated the situa-
tion and narrowed down women’s access to skilled jobs. At the same time, new 
feminist groups like Open Door International, founded in 1929, renewed the cam-
paign for gender equality centred on the issue of equal pay.154
Closely related to the debates on women’s position in the world of work was 
the question of female representation in the ILO. Early attempts to have women 
represented on equal terms with men in the tripartite political bodies of the ILO 
came to naught. Not one of the 40 national delegations in Washington in 1919 con-
tained a female delegate with voting rights. Instead, the 23 women present were 
advisers or assistants to male delegates. While some of them interpreted their role 
quite actively – like the Japanese feminist and scholar Tanaka Taka, whose unau-
thorized speech at the Conference on behalf of low-income women provoked a 
scandal in Japan – most women remained marginalized.155 Yet, women advisers 
like Margaret Bondfield from Great Britain managed to have an impact on Con-
ventions through their work in the committees. Still, during the entire interwar 
period, only 4% of all delegates to the ILC were women. During the same period, 
the employers’ delegations did not include a single woman.156
At the International Labour Office itself, the situation was not much differ-
ent, even though women were initially better represented in the ILO than in the 
League of Nations’ Secretariat, due to their relatively strong position within the 
153 The Old-Age Insurance (Industry, etc.) Convention, 1933 (No. 35) contained a passage to the 
effect that pensions had to include a fixed sum, regardless of the time covered by the insurance. 
This worked particularly to the benefit of women, since they were more likely to receive lower 
wages and work for shorter periods because of maternity. Unemployment Provision Convention, 
1934 (No. 44), in comparison, allows for the exemption of domestic work (predominantly fe-
male).
154 On Open Door International, see Francoise Thébaud, “Difficult Inroads, Unexpected Re-
sults: The Correspondence Committee on Women’s Work in the 1930s”, in Women’s ILO, ed. Boris, 
Hoehtker, and Zimmermann, 50–74.
155 Dorothy Sue Cobble, “Japan and the 1919 ILO Debates over Rights, Representations and 
Global Labour Standards”, in The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim, ed. Jensen and Lichten-
stein, 55–79.
156 Natchkova and Schoeni, “The ILO, Feminists and Expert Networks: The Challenges of a 
Protective Policy”; Marieke Louis, “Women’s Representation at the ILO: A Hundred Years of Mar-
ginalization”, in Women’s ILO, ed. Boris, Hoehtker, and Zimmermann, 202–225.
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pre-war international network of social reformers around the IALL. Still, only a 
very small number of these women worked in senior positions. If they did, they 
were typically positioned in areas deemed to be “female” domains, dealing, for 
example, with children and young persons. The world economic crisis provided 
an impulse for the establishment, in 1932, of a Correspondence Committee on 
Women’s Work, whose primary task was the collection of information on the situ-
ation of women workers in the ILO’s member States. Although it provided a valid 
“solidarity network”,157 the predominance of Christian groups in the Committee, 
many of which were opposed to women’s employment in the first place, reflected 
the protective paradigm. The Committee’s activities thus formed a “fragile back-
bone” for the ILO’s work for women in the 1930s.158 The opening of an ILO Divi-
sion for Women and Young Workers in 1933, led by the French socialist feminist 
Marguerite Thibert, however, already pointed in a different direction. In “balanc-
ing conflicting visions of women’s equality” Thibert’s small division prepared the 
ground for future work. Most importantly, it produced the first comprehensive 
report on the working conditions of women in 40 member States, which provided 
a point of reference for legal equality activists, and established a basis for the ILO 
to move beyond the protective approach in later years.159
Children and Youth
The topic of child labour, by contrast, which was also mainly treated from a pro-
tective point of view, drew much less controversy. Legislative action directed 
towards the well-being of children had long worked as a door opener for broader 
humanitarian and social projects, and it seemed particularly well suited to mobi-
lize public support for the ILO’s work. During the second half of the nineteenth 
century, a new understanding of childhood and the protection of children from 
hazardous living conditions had gained increasingly currency.160 Against this 
backdrop, the fight against the exploitation of children and for minimum age 
157 Thébaud, “Difficult Inroads, Unexpected Results”, 50–74.
158 Ibid.
159 Thibert’s division was understaffed compared to other divisions, but she still managed to 
compile the first legislative summary: Le statut legal des travailleuses – a 750-page-long descrip-
tion of working conditions of women in 40 countries, including various aspects, such as equal 
pay, unemployment, and the right to work.
160 Joëlle Droux, “From Inter-Agency Competition to Transnational Cooperation: The ILO Con-
tribution to Child Welfare Issues During the Inter-War Years”, in Globalizing Social Rights, ed. 
Kott and Droux, 262–279.
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regulations carried enormous symbolical weight and rallied reform movements 
across political dividing lines. Here, the ILO could build on the preparatory work 
of the IALL, which had taken up the issue of minimum age in industry already 
before the war. In this respect, Convention No. 5 that set the minimum age for 
starting work in industry at 14 years, adopted by the first ILC in 1919, was seen as 
a landmark success of a decade-long struggle. During the interwar years, the ILO 
adopted altogether 15 more Conventions and Recommendations that dealt with 
the protection of children and young persons from various angles.161
Paradoxically, these Conventions on minimum age clearly demonstrated the 
ILO’s limitations. Many countries refrained from ratifying those Conventions, 
not primarily because they favoured child labour at an earlier age, but because 
compulsory education in their countries ended at the age of 12. Consequently, 
the adopted instruments would have created a gap of two years until the ado-
lescents would have been allowed to take up employment. In order to overcome 
this hurdle, a more comprehensive approach to the whole issue was needed, but 
matters of education lay clearly outside the competence of the ILO. This was one 
of the reasons why in the beginning the ILO did not prioritize child protection in 
its work. Instead, it sought an alliance with early NGOs like the Save the Children 
International Union (SCIU) and the International Association for Child Protec-
tion (IACP). By working with these transnational voluntary organizations, the 
ILO tried both to assert its own competence and, at the same time, to neutral-
ize “powerful and potential rival networks”, a pattern that would repeat itself 
in other fields. This was all the more important with regard to child protection 
after the IACP developed closer ties with the League of Nations’ social section 
in the course of the 1920s. With the SCIU – which turned in the 1930s from its 
beginnings as a provider of emergency aid into an organization advocating child 
welfare in a more comprehensive social policy sense – the ILO entered, in particu-
lar in Central and Eastern Europe, into a symbiotic working relationship, with the 
SCIU which became “an efficient spokesman” for ILO standards.162
During the 1930s, the focus of this network started to shift from children to 
young workers. The issue of youth protection was regarded a particularly press-
ing one, as young workers had belonged to the most vulnerable groups since the 
years of the economic crisis. Following traditional theories of youth protection, 
some saw the integration of young people into the labour market as the best means 
to save them from sliding into delinquency and moral decay. Others attached a 
161 Among the Conventions were the Minimum Age (Industry) Convention (No. 5) of 1919, the 
Minimum Age (Agriculture) Convention (No. 10) of 1921, and Minimum Age (non-industrial em-
ployment) Convention (No. 33) from 1932.
162 Droux, “From Inter-Agency Competition to Transnational Cooperation”.
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political mission to the task, based on the observation that young people, per-
manently cut off from the labour market, were an easy prey for anti-democratic 
movements. This led to a series of Conventions and Recommendations between 
1935 and 1939, including a Recommendation on youth unemployment. It triggered 
a controversial discussion about the degree to which the state should take on a 
more decidedly interventionist role and even use to a certain degree coercion to 
overcome the problem. The debate centred on the use of work camps as a means to 
get young people out of unemployment as practised in Nazi Germany and Fascist 
Italy; however, work camps for young people also existed in some democratic 
countries, most prominently in the United States where they were as key element 
of the New Deal. In 1935, when a Recommendation on youth unemployment was 
adopted by the ILC, the US delegation, represented by the renowned child welfare 
activist Grace Abbott, succeeded to have work camps included in the provisions. 
Concerns that such schemes could well degenerate into political indoctrination 
and military mobilization were, however, not easily dispelled.163
War Veterans, Disabled Workers, Refugees
The ILO’s early activities regarding the protection of three other groups of workers 
were directly related to the immediate historical background against which the 
Organization had been founded. The first of them concerned disabled workers. 
The occupation with disabled men originated from the Organization’s efforts to 
address the large-scale problems of physically mutilated war veterans. In charge 
of disabled veterans’ affairs at the ILO, the Frenchman Adrien Tixier was instru-
mental in the work with associations supporting disabled veterans of the First 
World War, having himself lost his left arm in one of the first battles of 1914.164 In 
1921, the Governing Body convened an advisory commission to study problems 
related to the employment of disabled former soldiers. Subsequently, in 1923, 
an ILO meeting of experts was held to study “methods of finding employment 
for disabled men”. The report of the meeting was the first in-depth international 
comparative study on the employment of persons with disabilities. Concern for 
war veterans spilled over into concern for the employment of all injured workers. 
Two years later, the Workmen’s Compensation (Minimum Scale) Recommenda-
163 Ibid.
164 On Tixier’s role see also Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, René Cassin and Human Rights: From 
the Great War to the Universal Declaration, Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2013), 52–58.
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tion, 1925 (No. 22), was adopted by the ILC and became the first international 
recognition of the vocational needs of persons with disabilities.165
The second group the ILO became involved with were refugees.166 The war, the 
Russian Revolutions, and the collapse of three empires (the Austro- Hungarian, 
Russian, and Ottoman) forced people to leave their homes on a hitherto unprecedented 
scale: Russians fleeing from revolution and civil war; Armenians who had escaped 
the genocide in Ottoman Turkey; Ruthenians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians who had 
become minorities in the newly created nation states of Eastern and Central Europe, 
which were striving for ethnic homogeneity. Together with Jews fleeing endemic per-
secution, they were on the move. In the host countries, themselves haunted by the war 
and economic crisis, they often encountered resentment and were perceived as a polit-
ical and social threat. The issue of employment soon moved to the centre of the debate.
It was under these circumstances that the League of Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen, who had from 1921 onwards 
organized help for Russians and Armenians, in particular, turned to the ILO for 
help. In 1924, he submitted a proposal to the League’s Council to transfer the ser-
vices of the High Commissioner to the ILO, which had both the permanent struc-
tures and the resources that he was lacking. In addition, the transfer of the refugee 
issue to the ILO was a way, from Nansen’s point of view to, to  “de-politicize” a 
highly controversial and politically complex problem. After some debate in the 
Governing Body in June 1924, the High Commissioner’s staff was transferred to the 
Office, where a small Refugee Service was created in January 1925. The Refugee 
Service, which formally remained part of the League, collaborated with the ILO’s 
Migrant Service and with the Organization’s national correspondents in a number 
of countries. The ILO set up a special committee to deal with refugee issues in 
1926. While this committee assumed the day-to-day responsibilities, the League 
retained the political management of refugee affairs. In all its work for refugees, 
the ILO inherited the strictly defined mandate of the High Commissioner, which 
meant that, in practice, it was dealing exclusively with Russians and Armenians 
and a number of Christian minorities from the former Ottoman territories.167
165 Gildas Brégain, “Un problème national, interallié ou international? La difficile gestion 
transnationale des mutilés de guerre (1917–1923)”, Revue d’histoire de la protection sociale 9, no. 
1 (2016): 110–132.
166 Dzovinar Kévonian, “Enjeux de catégorisations et migrations internationales. Le Bureau 
International du Travail et les réfugiés (1925–1929)”, Revue européene des migrations internation-
ales 21, no. 3 (2005): 95–124.
167 Edita Gzoyan, “The League of Nations and Armenian Refugees. The Formation of the Ar-
menian Diaspora in Syria”, Central and Eastern European Review 8 (2014); Kévonian, “Enjeux de 
catégorisations et migrations internationales”.
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The function of the ILO’s Refugee Service was to research and centralize 
employment offers, to carry out statistical research about the refugee popula-
tion, and to select refugees according to their qualifications for employment – 
a complex task, since it needed the cooperation of the host countries. Another 
important aim was to investigate resettlement possibilities, for instance in Latin 
America. Although Thomas insisted on the technical nature of the ILO’s work, 
the problems were numerous: the problematic legal status of the refugees; their 
need for visas; and the diversity of the refugee populations, with all age groups 
represented. The work produced mixed results. The ILO placed some 50,000 refu-
gees between 1925 and 1928, but many of them were settled in France, which was 
in need of migrant workers at the time, or in territories under French mandate 
(in fact, 52% of all placed refugees in 1925 and 1926). In Latin America, however, 
where Argentina was seen as the most promising destination, the efforts were 
unsuccessful for legal and financial reasons. States did not renew so-called 
Nansen passports for stateless persons; they tightened immigration controls; and 
employers refused to issue work contracts. Another problem was that, while the 
ILO was able to place industrial and, to a certain degree, agricultural workers, it 
was generally not in a position to find employment for white-collar workers, nor 
could it take action for people outside its mandate, such as children, old persons, 
and the disabled.168
Critical voices in the Governing Body accompanied the ILO’s work for  refugees 
from the start. Some insisted that it should continue to be regarded as provisional 
and temporary. States did not want the ILO to be engaged in resettlement issues, 
which they thought lay outside the Organization’s mandate. Since the problem 
could not be restricted easily to employment issues alone, in time, those voices 
grew in strength.169 Finally, in 1928, Thomas proposed to transfer the functions 
of the Refugee Service back to the High Commissioner at the League, which hap-
pened in 1929.170
The ILO’s work for refugees, although exceptional in character, highlighted a 
more general pattern with regard to the ILO’s strategy against unemployment – 
organized migration to countries with labour shortages. In this respect, the 
1920s refugee crises constituted a time of experimentation. Unemployment was 
increasingly seen as a question of structural imbalance between work offers and 
job seekers. Organized migration was justified with the need to maintain regu-
168 Kévonian, “Enjeux de catégorisations et migrations internationales”.
169 ILO, Minutes of the Governing Body, 38th Session, Geneva, 1928, 66, 67.
170 After Nansen died in 1930, the League of Nations created a regular organ, the Nansen 
 International Office for Refugees. Claudena Skran, Refugees in Interwar Europe. The Emergence 
of a Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
 Beyond the Industrial Bias   65
lated and protected labour markets and social systems in countries where a high 
concentration of refugees had led to wage dumping, increased burden on social 
systems (health care for refugees), competition among the poorest, and, eventu-
ally, grave social tensions.171
 Beyond the Industrial Bias: Seafarers, Agriculture, and  
Intellectual Labour
Most standard-setting during the interwar years was tailored to the needs of 
industrial workers. Other ILO activities, such as the research undertaken into 
living standards, tended to even further emphasize this bias. At the same time, 
the sole emphasis on the problems of industrial workers did not remain uncon-
tested. On the contrary, it was challenged both from above, that is, by the leader-
ship of the ILO, which constantly tried to widen and diversify its sphere of action, 
and from below, from those excluded from or marginalized by the ILO’s work.
A group of workers that acted as trailblazers in this respect were seafarers. 
Maritime labour was regarded, because of its thoroughly transnational character, 
as an area in which the ILO could make a valuable contribution to the improve-
ment of working conditions. Due to its special character, it was the only area of the 
Organization’s work that was subject to separate, maritime labour conferences, 
starting with the second – maritime – Session of the ILC in Genoa in 1920.172 The 
task to find common standards was, however, complicated by the huge differ-
ences in salaries and working conditions that separated European seafarers from 
their counterparts in South or South-East Asia or Africa. Neither the European 
governments nor shipowners or sea farer trade unions were too keen to tackle 
these differences along racial lines, for instance, when it came to the regulation of 
working hours. On the other hand, Asian seafarers criticized universal standards 
as a protectionist tool imposed by Western countries. Despite these controversies, 
171 On the wider implication of the ILO’s work in the field during the era, for example the de-
velopment of the very category “international migration”, see Yann Stricker, “‘International 
Migration’” between Empire and Nation. The Statistical Construction of an Ambiguous Global 
Category in the International Labour Office in the 1920s, Ethnicities, March (2019).
172 The Genoa Conference was the first ILC with the full machinery in place. Seafarers’ issues 
might have been singled out because they had been dropped from the nine points of the Labour 
Charter under article 427 in the original Constitution and had not been included in the Wash-
ington agenda, largely due to resistance of the US sailors’ union leader, Andrew Furuseth, who 
was initially a fierce opponent of the ILO. Later, Furuseth became an important supporter of the 
Organization. See Leon Fink, “A Sea of Difference: The ILO and the Search for Common Stand-
ards. 1919–1945”, in The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim, ed. Jensen and Lichtenstein, 15–32.
66   1 Beginnings
the ILO managed to adopt not less than 12 Conventions between 1920 and 1936, 
regulating mainly less controversial issues like minimum age, repatriation, or 
medical examination.173
The case of agricultural labour followed a different path. Whether, to what 
degree, and what kinds of workers in the huge and heterogeneous agricultural 
sector should fall within the scope of the ILO’s standard-setting were perma-
nent issues throughout the interwar period and basically remained so far into 
the post–Second World War era.174 The first two ILCs decided that some of the 
Conventions adopted – for instance, those relating to unemployment and the pro-
tection of women and children – should also apply to the agricultural workers. A 
French government intervention in 1921, which challenged the ILO’s competence, 
offered an opportunity for clarification. After the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice had settled the matter in favour of the ILO’s position, it also paved 
the way for a total of seven Conventions adopted before the Second World War.175 
Yet, neither the court’s decision nor the agricultural standards adopted, cover-
ing, for example, the right to freedom of association, minimum age, and sickness 
insurance, could conceal the fact that the ILO was moving on uncertain ground. 
There was already another agency in place, the International Institute of Agricul-
ture (IIA) in Rome, which claimed responsibility for all matters related to agricul-
ture. In 1922, the ILO and the IIA built a Mixed Advisory Agricultural Committee, 
which never became a strong voice in international agricultural discussions. The 
cooperation would soon also be overshadowed by the IIA’s transformation into a 
foreign policy instrument of the Italian Fascist government.176
A much more fundamental problem was hidden behind the very term “agri-
cultural labour” itself, because of the enormous diversity of agricultural labour 
and the equally vast variety of conditions – with regard to property, distribution 
of land, climate, social and cultural differences – under which this labour was 
performed throughout the world. To find common standards that would ade-
quately reflect this diversity was a giant task, and it was a real concern that this 
very diversity would render any standards practically meaningless. In addition, 
173 Today, there are 36 maritime Conventions, with the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention 
as a new legislative umbrella. On the ILO’s treatment of maritime labour, see Fink, “A Sea of 
Difference”.
174 Ribi Forclaz, “A New Target for International Social Reform”.
175 Alcock, History of the International Labour Organization, 55.
176 Guiseppe de Michelis, head of the IIA from 1925–1933, served for many years also as a del-
egate both in the League of Nations and the ILO. See Stefano Gallo, “Dictatorship and Interna-
tional Organizations: The ILO as a Test Ground for Fascism”, in Globalizing Social Rights, ed. Kott 
and Droux, 160–161.
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agricultural labour did not easily fit into the ILO’s tripartite structure, as agricul-
ture belonged to the least unionized parts of the world of work, and the leading 
trade union federations did not take a genuine interest in the matter, either. The 
lower status of agricultural labour was reflected in the limited resources dedi-
cated to it on the institutional level. As in most other areas, the world economic 
crisis marked a turning point for the ILO’s treatment of agricultural labour. The 
crisis put a spotlight on low living standards and dire working conditions in 
rural areas both inside and outside Europe, which had suffered immensely from 
the effects of the depression and, in particular, from the decline in demand and 
prices that followed. In 1936, the ILO called in a tripartite Permanent Agricultural 
Committee, which included representatives of agricultural employers and trade 
unions as well as experts in the field. Through its composition and its work, the 
Committee displayed, for the first time, what Amalia Ribi Forclaz has called an 
“understanding of global social problems in agriculture”, which laid the foun-
dation for the fuller integration of agricultural labour into the realm of the ILO’s 
work after the Second World War, with regard to both standard-setting and tech-
nical assistance.177
Similar to the case of agricultural labour, part of the problem faced by “intel-
lectual” or “white-collar” workers in seeking recognition as a group through the 
ILO was the very vagueness of these categories. The term “intellectual worker” 
included a kaleidoscope of professions, from artists, musicians, and writers 
through journalists to academics. “White-collar work” referred to middle man-
agement employees and clerks, but it was basically a catch-all term for those who 
were employed without performing manual labour in the narrower sense. Some 
of these sub-groups had long-standing transnational representations like the 
Association litteraire et artistique internationale, founded in 1878, or the Bureau 
central des associations de presse (1894). To find common ground for trade 
unions spanning all different categories was, therefore, not an easy task, as their 
primary stakes in a professional representation differed significantly. While some 
where interested in copyright law issues or standard contracts for freelance work, 
others, such as academics or salaried employees, were more concerned with clas-
sical trade union issues like wages or working time.
To become part of the ILO’s standard-setting framework was therefore 
the most important motive behind the founding of the Confédération inter-
nationale des travailleurs intellectuels (CITI) in 1923  – the first association 
that crossed professional boundaries. Thomas promoted this step, as the new 
association once again strengthened the ILO’s international network. The ILO 
177 Ribi Forclaz, “A New Target for International Social Reform”, 323.
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also had to find a mode of cooperation with the International Committee on 
Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC), an advisory organization for the League (and 
predecessor of the United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization, 
UNESCO) founded in 1922. A division of labour between the two institutions 
was relatively easy to establish, since the ICIC focused on intellectual work 
and the promotion of intercultural exchange, while the ILO and the CITI 
(which also cooperated with the ICIC) were interested primarily in the intel-
lectual worker as such.
While the ILO welcomed intellectual workers, fitting such a broad and amor-
phous group into an Organization with a strong industrial bias was challenging. 
This was reflected, for instance, in the creation of different subcommittees for 
“salaried employees” and a consultative commission for intellectual workers, 
which represented all other categories. More important than this division was 
the fact that the integration of intellectual workers raised questions about the 
broader meaning of intellectual work, the significance of “habitus”, professional 
cultures, and the tension between individualized work processes and the quest 
for collective representation.178
 Entering the Broader Social Field: Occupational  
Health, Housing, and Spare Time
While the ILO thus expanded its scope of action with regard to new groups of 
workers, it also took an interest in an ever-widening notion of what constituted 
genuine social policy issues. Some of the discussions ultimately led the ILO into 
areas that lay originally outside its immediate scope of competence. This was cer-
tainly not the case for the area of social insurance. During its first two decades, 
the ILO adopted conventions dealing with social insurance schemes covering 
old age, sickness, injury, and unemployment. These standards were based on 
the “German model” of contributory insurance schemes tied to the individual 
worker’s employment contract, and they reflected the ILO’s orientation towards 
industrial work. Only in the 1930s, under US influence, did broader ideas of social 
security begin to gain ground in the Organization.179
One of the most innovative areas of the ILO’s standard-setting work that 
opened the door to broader social questions was related to minimum wages. 
178 Verbruggen, “Intellectual Workers and Their Search for a Place within the ILO During the 
Interwar Period”.
179 Kott, “Constructing a European Social Model”, 181–193.
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Since the beginning, the provision of an “adequate living wage” had been listed 
among the ILO’s objectives and was seen as a means to avoid unfair competition 
on the basis of low wages. At a time when strong mechanisms of collective bar-
gaining were still few and far between, minimum wages were considered the best 
way to secure workers’ living standards and thus to promote both economic sta-
bility and social peace. Normative action, in this sense, followed both a protective 
and a “proto-Keynesian” rationale. In 1928, the ILC adopted the Minimum Wage- 
Fixing Machinery Convention (No. 26), which belongs to the most widely ratified 
of all ILO Conventions. The ILO’s research on living standards that accompanied 
normative action from the 1920s onwards was equally credited for its innovative 
nature and served as a yardstick for social policies.180 By defining abstract cat-
egories to measure living standards, the ILO contributed to  – and, in a sense, 
created – the preconditions for social and economic planning, including the field 
of development policies, which could thus start from a solid empirical basis. In 
the same way, the ILO’s research on living standards and its elaboration of social 
statistics helped to build a concept of social and economic rights during this early 
period.181
A supreme example of the broadening understanding of the ILO’s social 
mandate and the very notions of the boundaries of social and labour policies 
was the treatment of health issues. During the first years of its existence, the 
ILO and its industrial hygiene section were mainly concerned with matters 
of occupational health and safety and followed the path opened by the first 
international convention banning white phosphorus from 1906. In the course 
of the 1920s, however, the ILO developed a more inclusionary approach and 
increasingly framed industrial health issues with regard to their broader social 
context. But there were clear limits as to how far it could incorporate a com-
prehensive approach to occupational health in its standard-setting process. To 
define “occupational diseases” as diseases “contracted at work” was a difficult 
task, for the very reason that these diseases could not always be neatly isolated 
from the worker’s broader living conditions. While the ILO helped to create a list 
180 See Emmanuel Reynaud, The International Labour Organization and the Living Wage: A 
 Historical Perspective, Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 90 (Geneva: ILO, 2017).
181 Laure Piguet, “Establishing Social Justice through International Quantification: The In-
ternational Labour Organization and Labour Statistics (1919–1939)”, unpublished conference 
paper submitted at the conference Fair is fair. International Historical Perspectives on Social 
Justice, Padua, 2016; see also Laure Piguet, “La justice sociale par les statistiques? Le cas des 
accidents d’attelage des wagons de chemins de fer (1923–1931)”, Le Mouvement Social 2 (2018), 
31–43; Dzovinar Kévonian, “La légitimation par l’expertise: le Bureau international du travail et 
la statistique international”, Les cahiers Irice 2, no. 2 (2008): 81–106.
Wobbe, “Das Globalwerden der Menschenrechte in der ILO”.
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of recognized occupational diseases in 1925, standard-setting in this field inevi-
tably raised some delicate questions about responsibility and financial compen-
sation. Governments and employers were, therefore, often hesitant to commit 
to standards that might result in considerable costs for them. Luigi Carozzi, the 
head of the ILO’s Industrial Health Section, applied a cautious and multi-layered 
approach, including research and advocacy, to overcome this resistance. Under 
his guidance, the ILO chose a strategic cause, the struggle against silicosis – a 
respiratory disease typically related to the mining industry – and mobilized its 
international networks. In 1930, the ILO organized an international conference 
in Johannesburg, South Africa (the first-ever ILO Conference outside Europe), 
which produced results that built a platform allowing the inclusion of silicosis 
in the Workmen’s Compensation for Occupational Diseases Convention, 1934 
(No. 42).182
Early on, the ILO entered into cooperation with the League of Nations Health 
Organization (LNHO) and its Polish Director Ludwik Rajchman, who tried to estab-
lish “social medicine” as a paradigm in international health politics. Throughout 
the interwar period, the ILO and the LNHO cooperated on a series of committees 
and conferences, which examined the relationship between health and general 
living conditions, rural hygiene, and child welfare. Both organizations promoted 
innovative research on the effects of malnutrition on the working population, as 
well as on the positive effect of sunlight, and the health risks related to smoke 
and noise at the workplace. In the 1930s, at the height of the economic crisis, both 
organizations conducted surveys on the psychological effects of unemployment. 
The ILO’s cooperation with the LNHO reflected more than anything a renewed 
sense of concern with the socio-economic bases of health,183 which was a hallmark 
of this time period. It was one of the least conflict-ridden of the many partnerships 
the ILO entered into during its first decades.184
A similar point about the limits of the ILO’s social policy scope could be made 
about its treatment of housing, which, on the surface, was not less a part of workers’ 
welfare than public health or employment services. Many countries suffered from 
182 Lespinet-Moret, “Promouvoir la santé au travail?”; Thomas Cayet, Marie Thébaud-Sorger, 
and Paul-André Rosental, “How International Organisations Compete: Occupational Safety and 
Health at the ILO, a Diplomacy of Expertise”, Journal of Modern European History 7, no. 2 (2009): 
174–96.
183 Gerry Rodgers et al., The ILO and the Quest for Social Justice; Lespinet-Moret, “Promouvoir 
la santé au travail comme droit social?”.
184 When eugenics emerged as an increasingly powerful competitor during the latter part of the 
interwar period, both organizations shared a recognizable position as a common stronghold of 
the social medicine paradigm. See Weindling, “Social Medicine at the League of Nations Health 
Organization and the International Labour Office Compared”, 147–148.
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a severe housing crisis, with a great majority of workers in industrialized countries 
living in cramped and unhygienic conditions. Proactive public housing schemes, 
like those implemented in the “Red Vienna” of the 1920s, with houses built that 
provided living space for tens of thousands of people, were still an exception to 
the rule. For Albert Thomas and many others, housing clearly belonged within the 
scope of the ILO’s standard-setting, but all attempts to put it on the agenda of the 
ILC met with stiff resistance from governments and employers. For the employers, 
housing was a problem that had to be solved by private initiative; governments, 
for their part, resisted the adoption of an appropriate convention because it would 
have committed them to comprehensive and potentially costly public housing pro-
grammes. Due to the lack of political will and funding, much of the International 
Labour Office’s work in the field during the interwar period remained small-scale. 
The ILO saw itself compelled to use indirect channels to continue promoting its 
housing policies. For instance, housing was included in the Utilisation of Spare 
Time Recommendation of 1924 (No. 21), where it featured next to recreational 
activities and the fight against alcoholism. In addition, the ILO tried to mobilize 
public opinion by means of cooperation with  non-governmental organizations 
like the International Town Planning Federation. It also helped to launch an Inter-
national Housing Association (located in Frankfurt am Main, Germany), which 
was closely linked to the ILO in institutional terms. The networks created through 
these cooperations were intended to raise the awareness of both the problem and 
the preparedness of the ILO to provide solutions.185
Yet another area in which the ILO became very active during the interwar 
period was leisure time policy. The Utilisation of Spare Time Recommendation 
reflected the broad and comprehensive social reformist approach that the ILO took 
towards workers’ leisure time.186 The Recommendation was also in its wording 
a direct follow-up to the Hours of Work (Industry) Convention of 1919 and was 
connected to the debate on workers’ living standards. Rather than defining spare 
time as merely time spent off work, it perceived of leisure time as a tool to further 
class-crossing private consumption and workers’ individual development. In the 
Recommendation’s own words, “during such spare time workers have the oppor-
tunity of developing freely, according to their individual tastes, their physical, 
intellectual and moral powers”. As a consequence, “such development is of great 
value from the point of view of the progress of civilisation”. Spare time, in this 
broad understanding, fulfilled various material and immaterial, individual and 
185 Pierre-Yves Saunier, “Borderline Work: ILO Explorations onto the Housing Scene until 
1940”, in ILO Histories, ed. Van Daele et. al., 197–220.
186 Liebscher, Freude und Arbeit.
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societal goals. During leisure time, workers should be able to “do as they please”, 
but if spare time was “well-directed”, it could also help increase the workers’ pro-
ductivity and fulfill an economic function at the same time.187 During the interwar 
years, the ILO provided the most important international forum for debate on 
spare time policies. As will be shown later, this was also an area of work in which 
the ILO’s social liberal model competed with authoritarian models of spare time 
policy represented by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.188
How successful was the ILO’s work in the area of standard-setting during these 
early years? Measured by the numbers, the balance was mixed. During the inter-
war years the ratification rate with regard to all international labour standards 
rose steadily, but not in the same way for all standards.189 Of all the Conventions 
adopted, the Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention, 1925 
(No. 19), aimed at migrant workers, was the most successful with 35 ratifications, 
followed by the Medical Examination of Young Persons (Sea) Convention, 1921 
(No. 16), the Workmen’s Compensation (Occupational Diseases) Convention, 1925 
(No. 18), and the Marking of Weight (Packages Transported by Vessels) Conven-
tion, 1929 (No. 27), which all drew 34 ratifications.190
The relative success of some of these standards might be explained by their 
rather technical nature (as the lack of ratifications for other standards may be 
explained by their controversial or otherwise political character). In the case 
of the Equality of Treatment Convention, its adoption was due to the fact that 
it could build on bilateral agreements from the time before the First World War, 
regulating the treatment of labour migrants on a mutual basis between individual 
nations. It is still remarkable how uncontroversial the equal treatment of migrant 
workers and the international regulation of the issue was during this early period.
Numbers, in any case, have to be taken with a grain of salt. They alone 
might not tell the whole story with regard to “success” or “failure”. They might 
conceal both the revolutionary nature and the transformative power that some of 
the ILO’s standard-setting activities had, despite slow and low ratification. With 
regard to some of the standards for which this was the case (like the ones on the 
eight-hour working day, on unemployment insurance, or on women’s protection), 
187 Utilisation of Spare Time Recommendation, 1924 (No. 21).
188 Liebscher, Freude und Arbeit; see also the chapter 2 on “Fascism”, below.
189 Nicolas Valticos, “Fifty Years of Standard-Setting Activities by the International Labour 
 Organisation”, International Labour Review 135, no. 3–4 (1996), 393–414, here 408.
190 There were conditional ratifications, for example by France, since some countries did not 
want to fully ratify until other countries, such as Great Britain, had not done so. In all, there 
were 13 ratifications subject to such a condition. Francis Maupain, The Future of the International 
 Labour Organization in the Global Economy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), n. 50.
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the debates they encouraged on the international and national levels had long- 
lasting effects.
 The ILO and the World(s) of non-European Labour, 1919–1930
While the ILO’s mandate was not restricted to any region of the world or any polit-
ical or social environment, its work was deeply biased, both politically and geo-
graphically. Despite all proclamations to the contrary, for most of the interwar 
years, the Organization kept a pronounced European profile, with the greater part 
of its activities directed at workers in the industrially advanced countries of the 
West.
This bias was not immediately obvious from the composition of the ILO´s first 
Conference. Of the 40 delegations present in Washington, D.C., in 1919, less than 
half came from Europe and North America. Latin America alone accounted for 16 
participating nations, but also five Asian countries (China, India, Japan, Persia, 
and Thailand) and one from Africa (the British Dominion of South Africa) took 
part in the ILO’s inaugural Conference. During the interwar years, when more 
non-European countries such as Mexico, Afghanistan, Egypt, Liberia, and Ethio-
pia joined the Organization, their numerical weight increased further.
Numbers, however, did not equal influence. The European bias was above 
all reflected in the composition of the Governing Body. When it first met in 1919, 
not less than 20 of its 24 members came from European countries, with Japan, 
Argentina, and Canada as the only non-European Government members. Between 
1919 and 1922, the Workers’ and Employers’ groups in the Governing Body had no 
members from outside Europe (and Canada) at all.191 The financial and logistical 
difficulties of most non-European nations in sending full delegations to the ILC 
further constrained their ability to exert any influence. This was the case for coun-
tries like Liberia or Persia, but it was even true for economically advanced members 
such as New Zealand or some of the Latin American countries. They were often 
191 In the period from 1919 to 1930, the Workers’ and Employers’ groups of the Governing Body 
had only a few members from outside Europe and Canada, despite an amendment which already 
in 1922 increased the number of Governing Body members from 24 to 32 (16 Government, eight 
Employers’ and eight Workers’ delegates). In 1922, an Indian delegate joined the Workers’ group 
for many years as a deputy member. A South African delegate became a regular member of the 
Employers’ group where we find later also a deputy member from Argentina (1925) and Japan 
(1928). See ILOA, “List of Employers’ and Workers’ Members and Deputy Members of the Govern-
ing Body Since 1919 and Their Countries of Origin”.
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represented by their permanent representatives in Geneva, who had little specific 
knowledge of ILO matters.192
The lack of representation of the non-European world was also reflected at 
the level of the Office. Until way into the 1950s, there were very few staff members 
from Asia and Latin America and none from Africa. During the interwar years, the 
average ratio of European vis-à-vis non-European employees was 10:1. Given the 
aforementioned double role – experts and diplomats vis-à-vis their countries of 
origin – which these international bureaucrats were often supposed to fulfill, this 
was a clear indicator of the marginal position certain regions of the world occupied 
in the ILO’s realm during this period. The same was true for the network of corre-
spondents, which was highly developed in Europe, while no official representa-
tion at all existed, for example, in sub-Saharan Africa until the end of the 1950s.
The most substantial obstacle to the integration of the non-European world 
into the ILO’s framework was inextricably tied to standard-setting. In 1919, the 
Labour Commission in Paris had already admitted that the new Organization’s 
focus on industrial labour would make its labour standards not easily, if at all, 
applicable to the conditions in economically less advanced regions of the world. 
The formula found to deal with this situation and that was eventually incorpo-
rated in the ILO’s Constitution read:
In framing any Convention or Recommendation of general application the Conference shall 
have due regard to those countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect development 
of industrial organization, or other special circumstances make the industrial conditions 
substantially different and shall suggest the modifications, if any, which it considers may 
be required to meet the case of such countries.193
During the inaugural Conference, the paragraph was applied for the first time 
with regard to the Hours of Work Convention, for which some countries such as 
China and Persia were granted exceptions or special regulations (Japan: 57 hours 
per week; India: 60 hours per week). During the discussion which led to the adop-
tion of Convention No. 33 on the minimum age in non-industrial employment 
in 1932, employers and governments argued successfully against the workers’ 
 position, which favoured abolition of child labour without distinction, and came 
out instead in defence of a “gradual” approach to be applied in non-Western 
 countries.194
192 Jeremy Seekings, “The ILO and Welfare Reform in South Africa, Latin America, and the Car-
ibbean, 1919–1950”, in ILO Histories, ed. Van Daele et al., 145–72.
193 ILO, Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, art. 19 (3) (Paris, 1919).
194 Rodgers et al., The ILO and the Quest for Social Justice, 70, 101.
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The ILO’s position in this regard was ambivalent. It clearly acknowledged 
that, even in countries where industrialization was gaining ground, such as in 
India, the bulk of ILO standard-setting still affected only a tiny proportion of 
workers. With regard to the Organization’s standards, Harold Butler, who was the 
first ILO Director to visit India in 1938, appreciated that, while industrialization 
bred the same problems in India as in the West, the problems of industrialized 
countries, such as wages, working time, social insurance, and relations between 
workers and employers, were secondary to India’s more urgent problems of pop-
ulation growth, illiteracy, and health.195
The ILO was, at the same time, not indifferent to the world outside Europe, 
although with a clear hierarchy. In Latin America, in particular, the ILO tried to 
build up contacts and widen its geographical scope early on. From Albert Thomas’ 
perspective, the region provided a potentially fruitful field for ILO action. Like 
many of his contemporaries, he saw in Latin America a sort of “strategic reserve 
in the defence of democratic values  and social justice”, an outpost where Euro-
pean, and therefore universal, values were defended. In addition, many coun-
tries in the region started to industrialize in the period after the First World War. 
Their economies were dynamic and attracted labour migration from Europe and 
other places. Some, such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, or Mexico (which, 
however, became a member of the ILO only in 1931), had already implemented 
social legislation comparable to European schemes. Albert Thomas was there-
fore keen to convince Latin American countries to ratify ILO conventions and to 
send full delegations to the ILC. The ILO collected data on social developments 
in the region and hired Latin American staff to the International Labour Office. 
In 1925, Thomas went on a five-week-long trip across the Southern Cone, passing 
through Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile in order to make the work of the 
ILO better known.196 Despite these efforts, relationships between Latin America 
and the ILO only developed slowly. While parts of the political elites were sus-
picious of the “leftist” character of the Organization, a greater part of the Latin 
American labour movement, with its strong anarcho-syndicalist and communist 
currents, found the ILO model of class cooperation not very attractive, to say the 
least. In addition, the ILO competed with pan-Americanism as an alternative to 
an exclusively continental form of internationalism. The dominant role of the 
United States in this framework, and its position outside the ILO, made these two 
internationalisms hardly reconcilable during this period. Yet, the network the 
195 Plata-Stenger, “Une voie sociale pour le développement”, 191–205.
196 Ferreras, “Europe-Geneva-America: The First International Conference of American States 
Members of the International Labour Organization”.
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ILO steadily built up among social reformers, administrators, and parts of the 
trade unions raised the credibility of the Organization’s claims to universality. It 
would pay off a few years later, when the ILO, in the years of crisis under Albert 
Thomas’s successor, Harold Butler, would shift its attention away from Europe to 
the western hemisphere.197
The white British settler dominions of Australia and New Zealand shared some 
similarities with the Latin American countries in this respect. Australia’s social 
policy, in particular, was in many ways more advanced than the ILO conventions, 
but its governments and trade unions also showed a genuine interest in interna-
tional labour standards. Among the reasons for the appeal of the standards were 
the country’s highly restrictive immigration policies, epitomized by the slogan of 
“White Australia”. ILO conventions were seen as a means of protecting white Aus-
tralian workers against “unfair” competition by cheap Asian labour, particularly 
from China. Adherence to ILO policies also suited Australia’s self- perception as 
an outpost of European civilization in the Asia-Pacific region. However, in spite 
of their support of the Organization, Australia and New Zealand, with their vast 
distances from Europe, remained marginal in the ILO’s cosmos during the early 
decades.198
The situation in East Asia differed in some ways from those in Latin America 
and the Asian Pacific. Japan had been the only Asian country accepted among 
major powers at the Paris Peace Conference and assigned a permanent seat in 
the ILO’s Governing Body from its inception. The ILO’s early interest in Japan 
stemmed from many sources. Both politically and economically, it was the leading 
power in the East, and in order to secure Japan’s hegemonic position, the coun-
try’s elites initially showed a keen interest in international cooperation.199 In the 
economic field, although Japan’s industry was still in an infant state, the country 
had embarked on a rapid and highly ambitious programme of industrialization 
and economic expansion after the First World War.  State-directed economic plan-
ning in the Japanese industrialization model soon caught the attention of ILO 
officials. Moreover, Japan presented an interesting opportunity to promote ILO 
labour standards, as many advanced industrial countries increasingly felt Japa-
nese competition and accused it of “social dumping”. Poor working conditions 
197 Yannick Wehrli, “ILO and Latin America: A Bibliographical Synthesis”, unpublished work-
ing paper for the ILO Century Project (Geneva: ILO, 2017).
198 Marilyn Lake, “The ILO, Australia and the Asia-Pacific Region: New Solidarities or Inter-
nationalism in the National Interest”, in The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim, ed. Jensen and 
Lichtenstein.
199 Thomas W. Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914–1938 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaiʼi Press, 2008).
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in Japanese industry had already been a topic debated by the first ILC, and coun-
tries like Australia would repeatedly attack Japan’s low wages and social stand-
ards, which, in their view, constituted unfair competition. Japanese Workers’ 
delegates in return used the forum of the ILC to call attention to their country’s 
low standards.200 From the beginning, the ILO tried to intensify its contacts with 
Japan, and, as early as 1922, it opened a correspondent office in Tokyo. In 1928–
1929, Albert Thomas made the country the last and longest stop of his journey to 
the East, and ILO technical missions were sent to Japan in the following years.201
China, by contrast, although among the founding members of the Organiza-
tion, opened up much later to the ILO. A three-month ILO mission led by Pierre 
Henry, which investigated labour conditions in China in 1924, remained an excep-
200 Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism; Cobble, “Japan and the 1919 ILO Debates 
over Rights, Representations and Global Labour Standards”, 65–69.
201 Veronique Plata-Stenger, “L’OIT et le problème du sous-developpement en Asie dans l’entre-
deux-guerres”  Le Mouvement Social 263 (2018), 109–122.
Figure 3: Albert Thomas, first Director of the ILO (left), and ILO official Marius Viple during their 
visit to Japan in 1928.
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tion. During the 1920s, China sent only Government delegates to the annual ses-
sions of the ILC, and it provided very scarce information on its labour and social 
policy. Repeated calls from the ILC for China to accept additional ILO missions 
to investigate child labour and working conditions led to even stiffer resistance. 
This attitude changed only when the Nationalist (Nanjing) government assumed 
power in 1925. China gradually shifted to a more active and forthcoming policy, 
and it increasingly used the ILO as a venue for pursuing its foreign policy goals. 
The ratification of ILO standards thus became part of a strategy to enhance 
China’s international status, in particular after the start of the Sino-Japanese War 
in 1932 and Japan’s exit from the League and the ILO the following year. China 
was first elected to the Governing Body in 1934 and became a permanent member 
in 1944.202
India was yet another special case. Formally still a British colony, it became 
the only non- independent member of the ILO in 1919, and, in 1922, occupied one 
of the permanent seats in the Governing Body as a “country of major industrial 
importance”. The composition of its delegations and its overall standing within 
the ILO were undoubtedly determined by its status as a British colony. Its ratifi-
cation of certain international labour standards, as well as its non-ratification of 
others, always reflected to some degree the interests of British industry, which 
sought to exclude low-cost labour competition from India. Nevertheless, the very 
fact of India’s prominent presence at the ILO contributed to the legitimacy of an 
independent Indian position. It also provided a point of departure for being rec-
ognized – in addition to Japan – as a voice of the Asian continent in the interna-
tional arena at large.203 The ILO, much more so than the League, offered India 
an opportunity to assert an autonomous stand even before independence. In 
1928, the ILO opened a branch office in Delhi, the first in continental Asia, which 
further underscored India’s particular status. Membership in the ILO also had 
effects at the local level. It gave an incentive to both workers and employers to 
overcome intra-Indian divisions in an effort to build strong national representa-
tions.204 Yet, in the light of the fact that the number of workers in the industrial 
202 Chen Yifeng, “The International Labour Organization and Labour Governance in China 
1919–1949”, in China and ILO: Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Special Issue of Bul-
letin of Comparative Labour Relations 86, ed. Roger Blanpain, Ulla Liukkunen, and Chen Yifeng 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2014), 19–54; Aiqun Hu, China’s Social Insur-
ance in the 20th Century: A Global Historical Perspective (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
203 The first initiatives for an Asian Regional Conference were launched by India as early as 
the 1920s.
204 Gerry Rodgers, J. Krishnamurty, and Sabyasachi Bhattachary, “India and the ILO in Histori-
cal Perspective”, Economic and Political  Weekly XLVI no. 10 (2011).
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area was still very small, this remained little more than an “elite’s leisure” – an 
observation that could easily be applied, cum grano salis, to the situation of the 
great majority of ILO member States from Asia.205
If Asia remained in the backwaters of the ILO’s activities and interests 
throughout the interwar years, the Organization’s presence in Africa was by 
far weakest. Apart from the South African Union, which, due to its status as a 
“white” British Dominion and its relatively advanced industry, occupied a unique 
position, only two sub-Saharan African countries, Liberia and Ethiopia, were 
members of the Organization before the Second World War.206 As to the countries 
in North Africa, the situation was little different, except for Egypt, which devel-
oped early relationships with the ILO. In both cases, the ILO’s room for action was 
tightly restricted by the colonial status of the vast majority of African territories 
during the interwar years.207
A World Apart – Colonial Labour
Nowhere, then, was the European bias of the ILO more pronounced than in the 
field of colonial labour. When the ILO was founded, hundreds of millions of 
people, a significant part of the world’s population, lived and worked under the 
colonial domination of European powers. Yet, their problems hardly ever reached 
the agenda of the ILO’s meetings.
The reasons could be found in the nature of the international system that 
emerged from the First World War and the imperial nature of its most powerful 
protagonists. When the League of Nations was founded, the major European 
powers did not consider it a threat to their imperial ambitions but as a means to 
renew and stabilize their claims to colonial rule. British imperialists like Winston 
Churchill or Jan Smuts saw the League as a kind of extended Commonwealth, and 
thus as a tool to ideologically tighten the grip of the colonial powers on their impe-
rial subjects by evoking a legitimate international mandate to spread (European) 
205 Madeleine Herren, “Global Corporatism after the First World War  – the Indian Case”, in 
Globalizing Social Rights, ed. Kott and Droux; Rodgers, Krishnamurty, and Bhattachary, “India 
and the ILO in Historical Perspective”.
206 Jeremy Seekings, “The ILO and Welfare Reform in South Africa, Latin America and the Car-
ibbean, 1919–1950”, in ILO Histories, ed. Van Daele et al.; Daniel Maul, Luca Puddu, and Hakeem 
Ibikunle Tijani, “The International Labour Organization”, in General Labour History of Africa: 
Workers, Employers and Governments, 20th–21st Centuries, ed. Stefano Bellucci and Andreas Eck-
ert (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2019), 223–264.
207 On Egypt, see Plata-Stenger, “Une voie sociale pour le développement”, 301–303.
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civilization.208 The League’s mandate system changed little of substance in that 
respect: on the one hand, the creation and the work of the League’s Permanent 
Mandates Commission (PMC), in which the ILO also held a seat, formally placed 
the administration of the mandates – the former German and Ottoman posses-
sions in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Pacific – by the mandatary 
powers (the victors of the First World War) under international supervision. It tied 
the custody over those mandates to a catalogue of criteria, asked the powers to 
provide reports on the progress of the mandates towards ultimate independence, 
and added an element of accountability that was absent in the old-style colonial 
system. On the other hand, the PMC consisted almost exclusively of European 
members, the majority of which held colonial possessions themselves. The PMC’s 
composition and its limited competences virtually ensured that the mandate 
system would not interfere with the colonial powers’ discretionary authority over 
these territories.209
In the ILO, the situation was very similar. During the first two decades of 
its existence, the claim of the colonial powers to sovereignty over the affairs of 
their colonial subjects was essentially never disputed within the bodies of the 
Organization. The reasons for this were obvious: all major colonial powers held 
permanent seats on the ILO’s Governing Body. The initial absence of the United 
States and the Soviet Union, two powers potentially critical of (European) impe-
rialism, meant that the colonial powers encountered very little resistance in their 
attempts to keep their territorial possessions out of the international limelight.210
One of the most important decisions regarding the ILO’s constitutional treat-
ment of the colonies was taken at the Second Session of the ILC in 1920. The 
issue under debate was whether and how the provisions of international labour 
standards could be applied to overseas territories as stipulated in Article 35 of the 
ILO’s Constitution. This article, known as the “colonial clause”, gave the colo-
nial powers freedom to exempt their colonies from certain international labour 
standards, without these territories automatically falling outside the scope of ILO 
standard-setting in general. In practice, the “colonial clause” provided the colo-
nial powers with an effective means to ensure, up to the Second World War, that 
all initiatives aimed at larger-scale ILO involvement, let alone the implementa-
tion of ILO standards, would have very little impact.211
208 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace.
209 Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015).
210 Susan Zimmermann, “‘Special Circumstances’ in Geneva: The ILO and the World of 
Non-Metropolitan Labour in the Inter-War Years”, in ILO Histories, ed. Van Daele et al., 221–250.
211 Maul, Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization, 19.
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The exclusion of colonial issues from the ILO’s proceedings was further high-
lighted by the absence of direct representation from the colonies in the Organi-
zation’s meeting rooms. India was the only exception to the rule.212 In no other 
case prior to 1939 did metropolitan governments ever include a representative of 
a colonial territory in their delegations, although prominent figures from the col-
onies were sporadically called upon in an advisory capacity to help with the ILO’s 
standard-setting work.213 In the absence of direct representation from the colo-
nies during the annual sessions of the ILC, it was mainly up to the Workers’ group 
to place colonial issues on the agenda.214
In contrast to the situation after the Second World War, the few independ-
ent countries from Asia or Africa were rarely ever able to act on behalf of colo-
nial peoples, and they even had problems in sending complete delegations to 
the ILC. The small space given to the discussion of colonial labour issues during 
the interwar years was mirrored in the lack of resources committed to the study 
of colonial labour issues by the Office. A tiny Native Labour Section of only one 
to three persons accounted for all of the Office’s colonial work.215 Given this sit-
uation, when the ILO first became active on behalf of colonial labour, it did so 
under predominantly humanitarian premises. These efforts focused on the worst 
abuses of “native labour” in the colonies and centred on the problem of forced 
labour.216 The systematic use of forced labour in many parts of colonial Africa 
(and some parts of Asia) during the interwar years was the result of a complex 
interplay between the colonial powers’ aim to make their colonies more profit-
able (mise en valeur) and their parallel unwillingness to commit resources for a 
social infrastructure that would be capable of ameliorating the damaging effects 
of this policy.217 This reluctance was not based on financial considerations 
alone. According to the prevailing colonial doctrines of the time, it was seen as 
a mistake, for example, to promote a policy that provided the indigenous pop-
212 India was represented from the very beginning. However, up to 1929, its delegations were 
instructed by the British delegation. Afterwards, they became increasingly independent. On In-
dia’s early role, see Gerry Rodgers, “India, the ILO and the quest for social justice since 1919”. 
Economic and Political weekly. Mumbai: EPW Research Foundation. Vol. 46, no. 10 (March 2011), 
45–52.
213 See ILO, Social Policy in Dependent Territories (Geneva: ILO, 1944), 56ff., nn. 2, 3.
214 The best overview of the treatment of colonial issues in the ILO during the early years is 
provided by Zimmermann, “‘Special Circumstances’ in Geneva”, 221–250.
215 Ibid.
216 J.P. Daughton, “ILO Expertise and Colonial Violence in the Interwar Years”, in Globalizing 
Social Rights, ed. Kott and Droux, 85–97.
217 For the case of Kenya, see Opolot Okia, Communal Labor in Colonial Kenya: The Legitimiza-
tion of Coercion, 1912–1930 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
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ulation with an incentive to leave the rural areas and move permanently into 
“European” working conditions. Wherever the need for labour arose, short-term, 
migratory forms were favoured, and the social costs were left to be shouldered by 
the indigenous workers’ “natural environment” – the rural areas and the “tribal” 
structures from which they came and to which they were expected to return when 
their labour was no longer required. Until the Second World War, at least in the 
British Empire, the general policy was to prevent “stabilization” at the place of 
work and permanent migration to the cities. Labour shortages were often bridged 
by coercive measures, and private and public interest went frequently hand 
in hand in order to meet the demand in the labour force. The brutality of the 
recruitment methods and working conditions, and the socially disruptive effects 
that the mass recruitment of men of employable age inflicted on the indigenous 
communities, repeatedly caught the attention of the public in Europe and North 
America. As a result, the topic of forced labour pervaded all aspects of the con-
temporary debate on colonial policy. From the early 1920s onwards, the ILO and 
Albert Thomas acted as part of an “international colonial issue network” oppos-
ing forced labour in the colonies.218
When the League of Nations began preparations for a convention against 
slavery in 1924, the ILO seized the chance to use this as a lever for its own cam-
paigns. In the wake of the League’s debates on the Slavery Convention, which 
was passed in 1926, the ILO was given the task of conducting a study into possible 
steps “to prevent compulsory labour or forced labour from developing into con-
ditions analogous to slavery”.219 Its mandate was constrained, however, by the 
colonial powers’ unwillingness to expose their ruling practices to any significant 
degree of international scrutiny, and the ILO went a long way to accommodate 
them. The appointment of a non-tripartite Committee of Experts on Native Labour 
underpinned the patronizing character of this work. The Committee consisted 
mainly of colonial administrators and colonial economic interests.220
Four Conventions and a whole series of Recommendations which the ILO 
adopted between 1930 and 1939 as a result of this work addressed in one way or 
218 Daughton, “ILO Expertise and Colonial Violence”; Luis Rodríguez-Piñero, Indigenous Peo-
ples, Postcolonialism, and International Law: The ILO Regime (1919–1989) (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2005). For a summary of the debate, see Maul, “The International Labour Organi-
zation and the Struggle against Forced Labour”.
219 Alcock, History of the International Labour Organization, 85–87.
220 Among the members of the Commission were Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugard, British colo-
nial administrator and Governor-General of Nigeria (1914–1919); Albrecht Gohr from the Belgian 
Ministry of Colonies; Martial Marlin, former governor of various French colonies; and Albrecht 
Freiherr von Rechenberg, former Governor of German East Africa. Zimmermann, “Special Cir-
cumstances in Geneva”, 237.
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another the problem of forced labour. For the ILO colonial labour was a special 
form of labour – referred to as “native” or “indigenous” labour – to which applied 
separate standards. As a consequence, the ILO developed a special “native 
labour code” that was distinct from the International Labour Code comprising 
all ILO conventions.221 The discourse which culminated in the development of 
this special labour code underpinned this distinction. It rested on the widely 
shared assumption that colonial policies had to “educate” the native popula-
tion. The main area of controversy was the question of whether the abolition of 
forced labour and related phenomena helped or hindered the performance of this 
educational duty. Albert Thomas, who was arguing for far-reaching measures to 
abolish forced labour, saw the ILO’s role in “lift[ing] the chains that still bind 
the native so as to prepare him for the next educative step”222 – a position that 
was widely supported by the Workers’ group within the ILO. Among the colonial 
powers, however, only Great Britain supported the immediate abolition of forced 
labour for private purposes. In contrast, the French, Belgian, Dutch, Portuguese, 
and South African delegations were rather critical of the distinction between 
forced labour for public purposes and forced labour for private interests, as both 
seemed acceptable to them, at least for a transitional period.223
The Forced Labour Convention No. 29 of 1930 called for the abolition of forced 
labour “in all its forms” and permitted only transitional periods with regard to 
work performed for “public purposes”. However, provisions stipulating the con-
ditions that were not to be considered forced or compulsory labour (among them 
military service and forced labour as a consequence of a court conviction) pro-
vided loopholes for the colonial signatories. The Convention also exempted any 
work or service forming part of the “normal civic obligations of citizens” as well 
as of “minor communal services”. This offered further opportunities to make 
exceptions for certain coercive practices widely used in colonial Africa.224 Not-
withstanding their indisputable humanitarian achievements, the ILO Conven-
221 In addition to the 1930 Forced Labour Convention, ILO instruments dealing with recruit-
ment practices and working contracts – Recruitment of Indigenous Workers’ Convention, 1936 
(No. 50) and Contracts of Employment (Indigenous Workers) Convention, 1939 (No. 64) – tackled 
the problem of long-term contracts, the latter mostly aiming at widespread systems of inden-
tured labour.
222 Quoted in Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization, 24.
223 For a summary of this discussion, see Maul, “The International Labour Organization and 
the Struggle against Forced Labour”, 480–485; see also Alcock, History of the International Labor 
Organization, 81–93.
224 Despite these far-reaching concessions that all parts of the native labour code made to the 
demands of the colonial powers, very few of them, apart from Great Britain, were prepared to 
ratify the ILO instruments until the early1950s. See K.K. Norsky, The Influence of the International 
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tions on indigenous labour, which more or less explicitly dealt with forced labour, 
underlined that Africa and other parts of the colonial world were still deemed 
areas where a different set of rules applied. It would take the world economic 
crisis and its destabilizing effects on the economic, social, and political fabric 
of colonial empires, and ultimately the Second World War, to trigger changes in 
colonial social policy.
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2 Facing the Crisis
The disastrous crisis that hit the world economy in the wake of the 1929 New 
York stock market crash deeply affected the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) in a variety of ways. Confronted with a global economic downturn of an 
unprecedented dimension, Albert Thomas – who died at the height of the crisis 
in 1932 at age 53 – and his successor, Harold Butler, vigorously promoted the 
social and economic benefits of social legislation. Under Butler’s leadership, 
the ILO took a distinct economic turn, committed itself to a Keynesian pro-
gramme of reforms, and brought the fight against mass unemployment once 
again to the centre of all the Organization’s activities. The sense of urgency 
with which the ILO acted during this period was heightened by the presence 
of powerful authoritarian alternatives to the liberal model represented by the 
Organization. The mostly antagonistic stand of the Soviet Union towards the 
Organization and the withdrawal of Nazi Germany and (later) Fascist Italy from 
membership were reminders of the increasingly hostile environment in which 
the ILO operated.
Under Butler, the ILO answered this challenge with a geographical reorienta-
tion towards the western hemisphere. The entry of the United States in 1934 and 
the first Labour Conference of American member States of the ILO in Santiago 
de Chile in 1936 were important steps in this regard. Under Butler and his suc-
cessor from 1938, the American John Gilbert Winant, the United States rapidly 
turned from an outsider to one of the Organization’s most important supporters. 
The engagement with the United States and the intellectual and practical input 
received from the Roosevelt administration’s New Deal policies constituted a 
source of inspiration and gave new impetus to the political project of provid-
ing legitimacy to the (re-) organization, in the context of the crisis, of capitalist 
economies under liberal democratic premises. At the same time, the Organiza-
tion took steps to discard its narrow European focus, which, in the later part of 
the 1930s, resulted in a closer cooperation with Latin America, especially on 
issues like social insurance. It also affected other regions and spilled over onto 
the question of colonial labour. All these developments gave further leeway to 
expanding the ILO’s portfolio of activities beyond  standard-setting and to build-
ing a nucleus for developing into an agency of technical cooperation.
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 The World Economic Crisis and the ILO’s Keynesian Turn
For the great majority of people affected by the Great Depression, their personal 
crisis arrived brutally in the form of unemployment.225 At the peak of the crisis, in 
1932, about 25% of Americans and 32% of Germans were out of work. Similar sit-
uations existed in most other European and North American industrial societies. 
Welfare schemes, if they existed at all, were not in the least prepared to alleviate 
the effects of the crisis. For workers and their families everywhere, unemploy-
ment thus posed an immediate threat of poverty. The depression hit industry the 
hardest, but its repercussions were also felt in agriculture, where overproduction 
in the United States combined with Soviet price-dumping to finance Stalin’s five-
year plans. With the breakdown of international trade, this started a downward 
225 Dorothea Hoehtker, “The ILO’s Role in the Economic Debate (from 1919 to the 1990s)” (un-
published note for the IILS, ILO, Geneva, 2013); Stephen Hughes and Nigel Haworth, “A Shift in 
the Center of Gravity: The ILO under Harold Butler and John G. Winant”, in ILO Histories, ed. Van 
Daele et al., 293–312.
Figure 4: Chilean President Arturo Alessandri Palma and ILO Director Harold Butler (centre) 
leaving the inaugural session of the First American Regional Conference, Santiago de Chile, 1936.
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economic spiral. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that no consen-
sus existed on the right economic policies to deal with the crisis. Some govern-
ments began to experiment with Keynesian ideas of stimulating the economy by 
means of countercyclical spending; others – like the German government under 
Chancellor Heinrich Brüning – did the exact opposite, promoting austerity and 
cutting down on social programmes, which soon made the situation in the labour 
market only worse and led to disastrous social and political destabilization.226
The opinions on how to contend with mass unemployment also differed 
widely among the ILO’s constituents. The lack of consensus among trade unions 
and employers became particularly visible in the discussions preceding the adop-
tion of a “Convention concerning the Reduction of Hours of Work to Forty a Week” 
in 1935.227 While trade unions, however wholeheartedly, supported the 40-hour 
week as a means of distributing employment more equally and made the case for 
wage increases to stimulate consumption, employers were staunchly opposed to 
both. When the project for a Convention concerning a 40-hour work week had 
first been put on the agenda of the ILC in 1934, the employers had refused even to 
discuss the draft proposals prepared by the International Labour Office. Against 
this background its eventual adoption was a success for the workers. But the con-
tested nature of the question was clearly reflected by the fact that, although many 
governments supported the Convention in principle, almost none of them was 
prepared to ratify it. It took, therefore, until 1957 before it entered into force.
The discussion about working hours was but one example of the debates on 
the appropriate economic strategy to overcome mass unemployment. In this con-
troversy, the International Labour Office took a position that, over time, became 
increasingly more explicit. Attempts on the part of the ILO to gain recognition 
as a player in international economic and monetary debates were as old as the 
Organization itself. In the 1920s, the ILO had started to conduct research on the 
 connections between economic and social issues, in particular with regard to 
employment. Based on his own wartime experience, Albert Thomas had long 
been a proponent of international economic planning, and he always considered 
the separation of the economic and the social realms to be an artificial one. He had 
tried to make the ILO’s voice heard at international economic conferences, such 
226 Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed. European International History 1919–1933 (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2005), 640–42.
227 The preamble of Forty-Hour Week Convention, 1935 (No. 47) made a direct connection to the 
immediate economic and social context, by stating that “unemployment has become so wide-
spread and long continued that there are at the present time many millions of workers through-
out the world suffering hardship and privation for which they are not themselves responsible 
and from which they are justly entitled to be relieved”.
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as the World Economic Conference of 1927, organized by the League of Nations. 
However, while the Organization’s contributions were generally acknowledged, 
the ILO was invariably relegated to a subaltern position by the League’s Economic 
and Financial Section, which clearly saw the ILO as a competitor.228 Quite apart 
from this, Thomas had to reckon with strong resistance from within the Organiza-
tion’s own ranks: employers, in particular, and most governments were strongly 
opposed to the ILO expanding its competences into the economic field.229
The world economic crisis offered a chance to the ILO to renew its claim. In 
1930, Deputy Director Harold Butler pleaded to “take this opportunity of shifting 
our centre of gravity, so to speak, from the purely social to the economic sphere, 
by devoting the whole of our attention to the effects on the workers oft the world 
depression”.230 The next year, the Governing Body followed up on this appeal, 
offering a catalogue of measures to fight the crisis. It promoted, among other 
means, the reinforcement of public works, the coordination of labour migration, 
the extension of unemployment insurance schemes, and a limitation of the hours 
of work, which, taken together, amounted to a Keynesian programme of state-
led active employment creation and the stabilization of consumption through 
income security.231
Even if Keynesianism was still in its infancy in the early 1930s (Keynes’ 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money was only published in 1936), 
the ILO had, in fact, endorsed its basic ideas at an even earlier time. ILO econo-
mists like Percival W. Martin can be considered proto-Keynesians in the 1920s and 
1930s. They were part of a network of economists who had either worked directly 
with Keynes or shared his core ideas. Keynes’ approach compellingly asserted the 
positive interdependence between social and economic progress and promoted 
economic planning and state intervention within an open market setting. In 1931, 
Thomas had already referred directly to Keynes in his ILC report to justify public 
works as a remedy for the crisis. Later, the ILO’s relationship to Roosevelt’s New 
Deal administration further deepened this connection. During the 1930s, the ILO 
began to enter into a quasi-symbiotic relationship with Keynesianism. It became 
instrumental in spreading Keynes’ ideas, building an international epistemic 
community around them, and ultimately establishing Keynesianism as the new 
economic paradigm that was valid until far into the 1970s.232 At the same time, 
228 For a broader perspective, see Clavin, Securing the World Economy.
229 Hoehtker, “The ILO’s Role in the Economic Debate (from 1919 to the 1990s)”.
230 Quoted in Hughes and Haworth, “A Shift in the Centre of Gravity”, 301
231 Hughes and Haworth, “A Shift in the Center of Gravity”, 299–303.
232 In 1936, Abba Lerner, an American economist, published an article in the International La-
bour Review, in which he summarized the main arguments of the “General Theory”, which was 
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Keynesianism, as an economic theory based on the integration of economic and 
social policy, played an important role in making the ILO’s activities in the field 
acceptable. Moreover, it prepared and legitimized the expansion of these activi-
ties not only in the economic area but, in the following decades, also in the field 
of development policy.
In the 1930s, however, these developments were hardly predictable, and 
Keynesian ideas remained highly contested. Nevertheless, the promotion of a 
“scientific” way to organize the economy and the promotion of state-led eco-
nomic and social planning as tools to avoid the kind of employment crises that 
had followed the Great Depression became the ILO’s new trademark under Direc-
tor Harold Butler.233 In his reports to the ILC, Butler did not miss the chance to 
point to underconsumption as the most important reason for the persistence of 
the economic crisis. Butler would reorganize the ILO in a way that it would fit 
more closely the demands of this Keynesian framework. A new economic section 
was created, which engaged in research and the collection of relevant data, and 
which included several regional specialists. Butler thus fostered a process in 
which the International Labour Office developed into a highly differentiated body 
of expert-bureaucrats, with competences in a broad range of fields. In this way, 
the ILO built expertise and carried out landmark research in the fields of workers’ 
living conditions, wages, and family incomes – all under the new Keynesian para-
digm.234 To some degree, standard-setting also reflected a Keynesian turn during 
Butler’s time at the helm of the ILO. Conventions adopted included the aforemen-
tioned one on the 40-hour work week (1935), on holidays with pay (1936), and 
on various social insurance regulations (1933), all of which could also be read as 
parts of a programme intended to stimulate consumption during a time of crisis.
The most prominent part of this programme concerned unemployment insur-
ance. The concept had been part of a Recommendation, which had accompanied 
the Unemployment Convention of 1919, the latter stipulating especially the set-up 
of public employment agencies. In the 1930s, however, unemployment insurance 
acquired a new meaning as a way of maintaining purchasing power and thus 
stabilizing the economy in a time of economic downturn. Although some coun-
tries had already introduced voluntary or compulsory schemes directed mostly 
at industrial workers during the period, resentment against the  introduction of 
an important step in popularizing Keynes’ ideas. See Abba P. Lerner, “Mr. Keynes’ ‘General The-
ory of Employment, Interest and Money’”, International Labour Review 34, no. 4 (1936): 435–54.
233 Jaci Leigh Eisenberg, “Butler, Harold Beresford”, in IO Bio: Biographical Dictionary of 
 Secretaries-General of International Organizations, ed. Bob Reinalda, Kent J. Kille, and Jaci Leigh 
Eisenberg, www.ru.nl/fm/iobio.
234 Plata-Stenger, “Une voie sociale pour le développement”, 41–102.
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far-reaching unemployment insurance systems had not been overcome by far. 
Some argued that unemployment insurance diminished workers’ willingness 
to seek work, and employers often opposed unemployment schemes because 
of the increased cost of production and the detrimental effect on international 
competition. The ILO’s argument that unemployment insurance schemes would 
help to overcome the social and economic crisis did not catch on easily. An ILO 
Convention (No. 44) that required member States to provide benefits or allow-
ances for involuntarily unemployed workers was eventually adopted in 1934.235 
Although the instrument acknowledged the widely differing unemployment 
schemes in place and allowed substantial exceptions for such groups as agri-
cultural workers, public services, or young persons, it only attracted the bare 
minimum of two ratifications (Great Britain and Switzerland) before the outbreak 
of the Second World War.236
Arguably, the most innovative element emerging during the unemployment 
debate concerned the area of (international) public works. The use of public 
works to counter fluctuations in the private sector had been promoted before, 
but, in 1931, the ILO issued a report entitled “Unemployment and Public Works”, 
which lifted the discussion on a new intellectual level. It was in this context, 
and in Thomas’ reference to this report in 1931, that the connection to Keynesian 
thinking became most obvious.237 The report advertised public works as a way to 
counter the economic crisis. It not only included calls for national schemes but 
also featured an ambitious plan for public works that expressed an early form of 
a pan-European vision (in the construction of railways, electricity networks, and 
other infrastructure projects). These plans pursued the double aim of combat-
ing unemployment and, at the same time, contributing to European economic 
recovery. The issue of public works was also put on the agenda of the 1933 World 
Economic Conference, in which the ILO participated. Peacebuilding, too, was an 
objective here, as the ILO’s ideas included infrastructure projects in areas like 
electricity and transportation that would have promoted international cooper-
ation through their border-crossing character.238 In the same year, the League of 
Nations launched its own Committee on Public Works. These steps notwithstand-
ing, the discussion did not yield the results which the ILO had hoped for. In 1937, 
the ILC adopted two Recommendations that dealt with public works, on both the 
235 Unemployment Provision Convention, 1934 (No. 44).
236 Liebeskind Sauthier, “Modern Unemployment”, 82.
237 ILO, Unemployment and Public Works, Studies and Reports, Series C, No. 15. (Geneva: 1931).
238 Johan Schot and Vincent Lagendijk, “Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years: 
Building Europe on Motorways and Electricity Networks”, in Journal of Modern European 
 History 6, no. 2 (2008), 196–217.
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national and international levels. The International Labour Office interpreted 
these adoptions as an acknowledgement and a confirmation of the Organization’s 
competence in discussing matters that were predominantly economic in nature. 
However, this was as far as the Organization could get before the outbreak of the 
Second World War, which interrupted all plans for the implementation of inter-
national schemes.239
A third area in which the ILO tried to make its voice heard was international 
migration. This was another example of the Organization’s growing disposition 
for economic planning on a global scale. Except for the short episode of working 
for refugees in the late 1920s, the ILO had so far treated migrant workers mainly 
from a protective point of view. The depression led to a sharp decrease in migra-
tion flows; it fanned the flames of xenophobia and cut back on the acceptance 
of labour migrants even in countries such as France that hitherto had shown a 
great demand for workers.240 Against this background, and on the strength of its 
refugee work experience, the ILO tried to lift the debate out of its national frame-
work, carried out statistical research, and developed a plan for an international 
agency whose task was the management of migration streams by channelling, in a 
rational way, the flows of labour from areas with a surplus to those with demand. 
Very few governments, however, caught on to the idea of an international agency 
regulating access to national labour markets, and the scheme was not popular 
among the Workers’ group, either. Instead, a majority of European governments, 
and also Latin American countries and Australia, insisted on quotas on labour 
immigration.241
In this difficult environment, the ILC of 1939, in its last meeting before the 
war, adopted a Convention and two Recommendations dealing with “Migration 
for Employment”. The circumstances of this Conference could hardly have been 
less favourable for a generous accord on the international regulation of labour 
migration. While the economic considerations were still looming large, the 
migration issue was overshadowed by parallel debates on the acceptance of a 
massive number of German and other refugees fleeing from intensified Nazi per-
secution. An international conference in Evian, France, a year earlier, that had 
sought to find havens for Jewish refugees from Germany had exposed the reluc-
239 Public Works (International Co-operation) Recommendation, 1937 (No. 50); Public Works 
(National Planning) Recommendation, 1937 (No. 51).
240 On the issue of international migration, see Paul-André Rosental, “Géopolitique et Etat- 
providence. Le BIT et la politique mondiale des migrations dans l’entre-deux-guerres”, Annales 
HSS 61, no. 1 (2006): 99–134; W. R. Böhning, “The ILO and Contemporary International Economic 
Migration”, International Migration Review 10, no. 2 (1976), 147–156.
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tance of many governments to open their borders. Among other reasons, their 
reluctance was due to fears that the acceptance of the refugees would further 
aggravate the employment situations in their countries and strengthen xenopho-
bic sentiments.242
With this in mind, the very fact that the ILO adopted three standards dealing 
with migration had to be seen as a success. Still, at closer look, the wording of 
the instruments demonstrated the narrow limits of international action. The Con-
vention focused on recruitment and working conditions of labour migrants only, 
and, while the Recommendations also included some paragraphs that promoted 
the cooperation among states, the result was a far cry from previous plans, which 
would have given the ILO the role of an international clearing house for labour 
migration.243
There was thus more than one reason why the comprehensive plans the ILO, 
promoted in order to fight unemployment internationally, never really got off 
the ground. A good deal of the blame could be given to the deteriorating inter-
national environment of the 1930s, which generally constricted the space for 
international action. With Germany, Japan, and Italy leaving the organization 
one by one, the willingness of the remaining powers to enter into international 
agreements shrank to a minimum. The retreat to economic nationalism, in turn, 
left few opportunities for programmes that promoted the kind of cooperation 
across national boundaries that the ILO had in mind with regard to migration 
and public works.
 Facing Alternative Internationalisms: Fascist Italy, 
Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union
The ILO’s project of socio-economic reform to counter the effects of the global 
economic crises assumed a heightened sense of urgency because of the growing 
strength and appeal of totalitarian regimes. The Organization’s relations with 
Italian Fascism and Soviet Communism had long been marked by ambiguity. 
Both surely were competitors and were essentially diametrically opposed to the 
social liberal model represented by the ILO.244 Nevertheless, some of the features 
242 Gatrell, The Making of the Modern Refugee, 77.
243 Rosental, “Géopolitique et État-providence”; Böhning, “The ILO and Contemporary Inter-
national Economic Migration”.
244 Recent historiographical literature has warned against the narrow focus on liberal inter-
nationalism as the only true expression of internationalist thought. The authors point instead 
to the multiple origins (socialist vs. liberal) and to the multifaceted character of internation-
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of these regimes – the corporatist organization of industrial relations or Soviet 
economic planification – seemed to provide answers to the pressing problems of 
the time – answers that attracted interest and even admiration beyond the politi-
cal and ideological dividing lines. At the historical juncture of the 1930s, however, 
and in the wake of the Great Depression when liberal democracy seemed on the 
defensive everywhere, Italian Fascism (and German National Socialism) posed a 
serious and potentially deadly threat to the ILO’s philosophy and policy. At the 
same time, Soviet Communism challenged the ILO from a different direction, as it 
divided the labour movement along ideological lines. It was crucial that, against 
this backdrop, the ILO found an ally in the United States under President Roo-
sevelt. The entry of the United States not only gave the ILO the necessary dip-
lomatic support to survive in an increasingly hostile international environment. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal policies helped as a source of inspiration and a blueprint 
for the ILO’s programme of social and economic intervention under liberal dem-
ocratic auspices.
Italy, as one of the ILO’s founding members and countries of “major indus-
trial importance” in the Governing Body early on, began to pose a problem for 
the Organization, as it gradually turned from a liberal democratic into a full-
fledged dictatorial regime after Benito Mussolini’s “March on Rome” in October 
1922. Despite of its ultra-nationalist overtones, the Fascist regime, from the start, 
showed a strong interest in international networks. Mussolini’s regime, in fact, 
went to great lengths within the League of Nations to promote its alternative 
“third way” vision of modernity, between liberal democracy and communism.245 
The ILO became a prime venue for the strategy of “Fascist internationalism”: to 
gain legitimacy through international cooperation and to transform international 
institutions from the inside along the lines of its own ideas. Italy fully embraced 
the idea of ILO standard-setting and was among the countries with the most 
ratification of ILO Conventions (21), second only to Belgium. The Fascist regime 
even took a lead in the adoption of the 40-hour week Convention of 1935 (No. 47), 
which was widely seen as a landmark success for the Workers’ group. In the wake 
of the world economic crisis after 1930, Italy also became an ally in the effort to 
expand the ILO’s competences in such fields as migration and public works. In 
the latter case, in particular, the position taken by the liberal democracies – with 
alism during the interwar period, in particular, when various “internationalisms”  – liberal, 
 socialist-communist, but also a genuinely fascist brand – existed in parallel and in competition 
with each other. See Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, “Rethinking the History of International-
ism”, in Internationalisms: A Twentieth Century History, ed. Sluga and Clavin, 3–14.
245 Madeleine Herren, “Fascist Internationalism”, in Internationalisms: A Twentieth Century 
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the notable exception of the United States – often seemed lukewarm in compari-
son to the demonstrative projects realized under strictly authoritarian terms and 
militaristic premises in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.246
A further indicator for the friendly approach the Fascist regime took for most 
of the period towards the ILO was the selection of delegates to the ILC, especially 
of Angelo Cabrini and Giuseppe de Michelis, who were promoting the regime’s 
“third way” approach but were also experts with a degree of independence and 
long-standing links to the ILO from the time before Fascism.247 The same was true 
for the well-known statistician, demographer, and sociologist Corrado Gini, the 
inventor of the “Gini index”.248
Thomas had a somewhat ambiguous attitude towards the Fascist regime. 
Personally, he despised Fascism’s violent and anti-democratic features, but he 
shared with many of his contemporaries a fascination for the corporatist organi-
zation of the Italian world of work. Once stripped of its coercive nature, which he 
initially perceived as a children’s disease, Thomas saw corporatism as reconcila-
ble with and even potentially invigorating to the tripartite principle. Even though 
his optimism about the possibility to eventually democratize the regime rapidly 
diminished in his later years, he kept up a dialogue with Rome. His attitude was 
perfectly in line with the treatment of Mussolini’s government by the majority of 
the ILO’s mostly liberal democratic member States. Far from being treated as a 
pariah, Italy enjoyed wide recognition, reflected among other indicators by the 
fact that an Italian government delegate was elected president of the ILC in 1933.249
Less surprisingly, the stiffest resistance to a “normalization” of the Fascist 
regime came from the Workers’ side. At the ILC in 1923, the credentials of the 
Italian Workers’ delegate were challenged for the first time. In the unanimous 
view of the other Workers’ delegates, Edmondo Rossoni, who belonged to one 
of the Fascist corporatist organizations that included both workers and employ-
ers, did not represent a genuine workers’ organization. This move was, however, 
rejected by the vote of the great majority of governments and employers – a proce-
dure that would be repeated at each session of the ILC until 1935. During the same 
time, Italian Workers’ delegates found themselves excluded from the Workers’ 
group and all conference committees, but their right to participate and represent 
Italian Workers was nevertheless upheld. As the Fascist regime at home steadily 
246 Gallo, “Dictatorship and International Organizations: The ILO as a Test Ground for Fas-
cism”, 158–160.
247 Ibid., 160–162.
248 Corrado Gini served as a member of the Committee on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations for over a decade.
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narrowed the space of the trade unions to act freely, and violence against them 
increased, the situation led to a great deal of frustration among the IFTU and 
its representatives in the Workers’ group. This situation only worsened after the 
attempt to put a convention dealing with freedom of association on the agenda 
of the ILC in 1927–1928 had failed. While the Workers’ group initially intended 
to define the principle of freedom of association in such unequivocal terms that 
would make it possible to attack the Fascist regime for its suppression of trade 
union activities, the ensuing debate highlighted the absence of a consensus on 
this question even among liberal democratic states.250 A lasting legacy of the 
debate was the publication of a comprehensive five-volume report on the state of 
freedom of association across the world. The material had been compiled by the 
ILO during the late 1920s and would serve as a resource once the discussions were 
reinitiated after the Second World War.251
Pragmatism on the part of the ILO and major democratic states was only one 
reason, albeit probably the most important one, of why the Fascist regime met 
with relatively little open resistance in the ILO during the first 15 years of Mus-
solini’s ventennio. In some of its features, Fascism seemed to provide an attrac-
tive alternative to liberal solutions. This was certainly true for corporatism, but it 
applied also to other social policy areas. A case in point was the field of leisure 
time policy. Here, the Fascist regime had created a widely appreciated national 
recreational organization, the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro, which would later 
become the blueprint for the Nazi counterpart, Kraft durch Freude. While it was 
clearly part and parcel of an indisputably Fascist programme of popular mobili-
zation for a coming war, Italy used the dopolavoro as an instrument for national 
image building and the promotion of its “third way” approach. As recent research 
has shown, leisure time policy could work as an “icebreaker” for Fascist interna-
tionalism in the field of social policy, because it rested on the same “productivist” 
assumptions that Italy had in common with its liberal democratic competitors, 
which, in turn, were largely influenced by American ideas. Both approaches con-
ceptualized leisure time as a period of regeneration and thus primarily as a pre-
condition for productivity. Even if the Fascist model clashed with social reformist 
concepts pursued by the ILO or, for that matter, with the French Popular Front gov-
ernment, there was still enough common ground to make it seem like an option, 
for the very reason that it favoured collective over individualistic aspects.252
250 A summary of the debate can be found in Valticos, International Labour Law, 60.
251 Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 75–80; ILO, Freedom of Association, 
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Although similar on the surface, the case of Nazi Germany differed from the 
Italian one in some important respects. Despite its weakened position within the 
post-Versailles order, Germany had occupied an important position within the ILO 
since its admission in 1919. When the National Socialists assumed power in 1933, 
however, they showed little interest in good relations with the ILO. They regarded 
the Organization, just like the League of Nations, as representative of the despised 
“Versailles system” that they sought to destroy.253 In parallel, the wholesale elim-
ination of democratic institutions and the crushing of trade union organizations 
during the first months of the Nazi terror made it clear enough that the relations 
between the ILO and Germany were heading for troubled waters. The ILC in June 
1933 proved these predictions to be true. It saw violent verbal clashes between 
the representatives of the new regime and other delegates. Robert Ley, head of 
the Nazi corporative organization Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF), which had come 
to replace independent trade unions, used the forum to launch fierce attacks on 
various other delegations. He met with staunch resistance from Worker’s repre-
sentatives like Leon Jouhaux of France, who, in turn, denounced the anti-Jewish 
measures and the persecution of trade unionists by the new regime.254
Only a short time after the Conference, the Nazi regime declared its intention 
to leave both the League and the ILO. In 1934, the ILO office in Berlin, too, had to 
close, when the German employees of the Office were obliged to pledge allegiance 
to the Nazi regime. The International Labour Office first reacted with caution to 
the new situation and, during the following years, was motivated by the basic aim 
of avoiding a total breakdown of relationships with Nazi Germany. After the shut-
down of the Berlin office, it still maintained contact through the Christian trade 
unionist Wilhelm Claussen, who acted as a correspondent to Geneva in Germany. 
In order to enter into an agreement with the German state, the ILO, however, 
had to accept that Claussen produce proof of his “Aryan descent” and pledge his 
253 Sandrine Kott, Competing Internationalisms: “The Third Reich and the International La-
bour Organization”, in Nazism across Borders. The Social Policies of the Third Reich and their 
Global Appeal, ed. Sandrine Kott and Kiran Klaus Patel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 
29–52.
254 The IFTU considered the German social-democratic politician Wilhelm Leuschner, an oppo-
nent of the Nazi regime, to be the legitimate trade union representative. Although he was present 
at the Conference, Leuschner abstained from public statements. Before the Conference could 
pronounce itself on the credentials of Robert Ley, the German government decided to withdraw 
from the Conference. See Reiner Tosstorff, “Leuschner Vs. Ley. Der gescheiterte nationalsozialis-
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loyalty to National Socialism. The ILO also had to agree to receive all future infor-
mation on social policy in Germany through Joseph Goebbels’ Ministry of Propa-
ganda. In 1934, Walter Reichhold, a staff member of the Berlin office at the time of 
the Nazi takeover and an early supporter of the regime (he had replaced a picture 
of Albert Thomas with one of Hitler in 1933), was transferred to the ILO’s Geneva 
headquarters on the recommendation of the German government.
If the aim to maintain contacts with one of the major industrialized coun-
tries and a leader in social policy measures was a strong motive for the ILO’s 
cautious diplomatic policy vis-à-vis the Nazi regime, there was certainly also a 
genuine interest in some of the policies pursued by the Nazi regime, in particular 
with regard to public work schemes and other programmes initiated to reduce 
unemployment in the German Reich. However, the German side decided exclu-
sively where, and to what degree, it would seek cooperation or share informa-
tion with Geneva. Leisure time policy was one area where the Nazi regime used 
the ILO platform for the international promotion of its social policy, in  particular 
its Kraft durch Freude organization, which was in competition not only with 
the  liberal-democratic approach but also with the Italian Fascist dopolavoro 
described above.255
With the eventual withdrawal of Italy from the League in 1937 and the con-
tours of an alternative Fascist–National Socialist internationalism becoming 
clearer, Germany lost what little interest it had ever had in the cooperation with 
the ILO. Even before the Second World War, the DAF started preparations – as 
part of a larger programme of the internationalization of Nazi social policies in 
support of German hegemony – for a new agency that would replace the ILO alto-
gether as the leading international social policy organization. These plans mate-
rialized during the war, when the Nazis not only launched a Central Office for 
International Labour (Zentralamt für internationale Arbeitsgestaltung) but also 
started publishing its own journal, the Neue Internationale Rundschau der Arbeit, 
which was intended to take the place of the German version of the ILO’s Interna-
tional Labour Review.256
While the ILO’s dealings with Italian Fascism were, at least in the beginning, 
marked by ambiguity, the relationship with the Soviet Union started from open 
hostility. From its very foundation, many of the ILO’s supporters saw the Organi-
zation’s commitment to class cooperation as the best available alternative to the 
threat presented by the Bolshevik Revolution. The Soviet leadership, in turn, did 
not tire from portraying the ILO and the IFTU, which dominated the workers’ 
255 Liebscher, Freude und Arbeit, 351–549.
256 Kott, “Dynamiques de l’internationalisation”, 82.
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groups, as stooges of capitalism and traitors of the working class.257 At the same 
time, the IFTU faced the opposition internationally of the Moscow-oriented Red 
International of Labour Unions.258 The ILO, nevertheless, took an early interest 
in the situation in Soviet Russia, and a special Russian Section, set up in 1920, 
collected information on Soviet Russian social life.259 Its purpose was to prepare 
a mission of investigation, which the Soviet authorities refused to admit.260 First 
contacts with the Soviet authorities were established in 1924. In the latter part of 
the 1920s, when diplomatic relationships between the West and the Soviet Union 
entered a period of normalization, the ILO stepped up its endeavours. Invita-
tions were issued to Soviet representatives to take part as observers in technical 
meetings and in the ILC. Although a staunch opponent of the Bolshevik exper-
iment, Albert Thomas shared with many of his contemporaries a fascination of 
the rapid industrialization process and the dynamic social development in the 
Soviet Union. In 1928, he visited Moscow on an official mission (as the first part of 
his trip to the Far East), where he met government officials, visited social institu-
tions, and gathered information on the Russian cooperative movement.261 There 
would, however, be no follow-up, and ideas for a further rapprochement, like the 
opening of an ILO office in Moscow, ultimately came to naught. Thomas faced 
criticism in his own organization for being, in the words of a Portuguese govern-
ment delegate, “too friendly disposed toward the Soviet [sic]”, a country “which 
desires to destroy society as we understand it”.262 Soviet resentment against the 
ILO was fuelled by these kinds of attacks. They intensified during the debate on 
the (colonial) forced labour Convention in 1929 and 1930, when some of the colo-
nial powers tried to deflect attention from their coercive practices by pointing 
to the systematic use of forced labour for political purposes in the Soviet Union. 
At the same time, the Great Depression seemed to confirm Moscow in its view 
257 Harold Karan Jacobson, “The USSR and ILO”, International Organization 14, no. 3 (1957), 
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that capitalism was doomed, and the Soviet government saw little need to enter 
into cooperation with the representative of a dying system. Thomas answered his 
critics in the ILO by pointing to the “important economic developments in Soviet 
Russia” and made the case for reaching out to the Soviet Union, because Euro-
pean countries “may be faced in the near future with dangerous competition from 
Russia”, which had, in fact, emerged relatively unscathed from the economic 
crisis of 1929.263
The relationship, however, remained tense, even after the Soviet Union 
joined the ILO in 1934. This step was motivated less by a change of mind on the 
part of the Soviet leadership concerning the usefulness of the Organization, but 
it was rather a consequence of Stalin’s change of tactics in the face of the Fascist 
advance in Europe and Japan’s expansion in China.264 In 1935, Georgi Dimitrov, 
head of the Communist International (Comintern), issued a new directive, which 
suggested that Communist parties should enter into broad alliances (“popular 
fronts”) with all national anti-fascist political forces. In parallel, the Soviet Union 
joined the League of Nations in order to develop this strategy on the international 
level. As a consequence, it automatically became a member of the ILO, where, as 
a country of “chief industrial importance”, it was immediately given a seat in the 
Governing Body.
Soviet membership, however, did not mean full cooperation. In fact, in the 
1930s, the Soviet Union only rarely participated in the sessions of the Conference 
and the Governing Body, and it did not ratify any ILO conventions or follow up 
on any recommendations. After 1937, when the Spanish Civil War and other inter-
national developments quickly caused popular front policies to fade, the Soviet 
leadership lost what little interest it might have had in the ILO and ceased its 
participation altogether. The expulsion of the Soviet Union from the League of 
Nations, following the country’s attack on Finland in late November 1939, con-
firmed the end of the short rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the ILO. 
Soviet Union – which was by then tied to Nazi Germany through the August 1939 
Non-Aggression Pact –was declared vacant. The full consequences of this episode 
would resonate only a few years later, when the ILO would face the hostility of the 
Soviet Union, which, since 1941, was fighting the war against Nazi Germany as 
one of the major Allied powers.265
The participation of the Soviet Union in the ILO, short-lived though it would 
prove to be, still raised some fundamental questions about the ILO’s nature and 
263 ILC, 14th Session (1930), Record of Proceedings, 214.
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composition. As one Dutch representative of the Christian trade unions explained 
the problem in 1937: “The provision for tripartite representation will be useless if 
it is sufficient for Governments simply to consult organisations which are part of 
their own machinery or which are subject to their own instructions or influence. 
It is useless to have tripartite representation which, in fact, is simply a triple rep-
resentation of a Government.”266 In what seemed like a mirror image of the year-
long debates on the Fascist workers’ representatives, it was now the Employers’ 
group that challenged the credentials of the Soviet Employers’ delegate. Since, 
under the Communist system, the state acted as the sole employer, and trade 
unions were to implement the policies of the Communist Party, the Soviet Union, 
in fact, sent four Government representatives to the Conference. The question of 
credentials was settled in favour of the Soviet Union, but the discussion was only 
a mild prelude to what was to become one of the most heated confrontations on 
the overall character of the Organization in the Cold War era. Given the highly 
volatile international context of 1937 and the centrifugal forces working against 
the Organization, many felt that the ILO could not afford to alienate any more 
members. Thus, the workers, with the exception of the Christian trade unions, 
did not object to the Soviet Workers’ delegates but rather welcomed them to their 
group. They also harshly criticized the employers’ attitude, because they had 
never objected to the credentials of the Fascist delegates.267
 The “Americanization” of the ILO: The Entry of the 
United States
In the increasingly hostile environment that the ILO encountered during the 1930s, 
the entry of the United States acted as a counterweight that can hardly be overes-
timated. The active role which the world’s most important industrial power finally 
decided to play gave a new impetus to the ILO that went far beyond the diplomatic 
level. The Organization drew from the New Deal not only inspiration but proof for the 
need to broaden its scope of activities to include the influencing of economic policy.
Throughout the 1920s, the absence of the world’s largest industrial power was 
painful for many reasons, since it compromised the value of ILO standard-setting 
from the point of view of all industrial powers competing with US businesses. 
This alone was enough reason for Thomas, who held the US model of social and 
266 ILO, Record of Proceedings, International Labour Conference, 23rd Session 1937 (Geneva: 
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economic organization in high esteem, to keep the door open for the United States 
to participate in the Organization’s work even as a non-member. In order to main-
tain the dialogue with the American administration and with representatives 
of capital and labour, the ILO had opened a branch office in Washington, D.C., 
as early as 1920. Despite of the fact that he did not speak any English, Thomas 
also toured the United States from December 1922 to January 1923 and kept close 
contacts with ILO sympathizers like James Shotwell. The establishment of the 
International Management Institute (mentioned in the previous chapter) was yet 
another way in which Thomas sought to continue the exchange of information 
across the Atlantic. However, in the face of stiffening isolationist tendencies in 
the United States during the 1920s, courting the Americans was not an easy task 
for an essentially francophone socialist. While the State Department turned down 
all invitations to send observers to ILCs, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), 
too, quickly resorted to its previous ambivalent position. After Samuel Gompers’ 
initial endorsement of the ILO, the AFL soon reverted to its apprehensive view of 
the “statist” and “socialist” nature of the Organization, a notion that was widely 
shared by American business leaders. Since the AFL had left the IFTU, only loose 
connections existed to the members of the ILO’s Workers’ group.268 Despite all 
attempts, there was, on the whole, little progress in ILO–US relations until the 
early 1930s. It would ultimately take the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as pres-
ident in 1932 to bring about a decisive turn.269
Roosevelt’s election at the height of the economic crisis would prove to be a 
gift to the ILO. In hindsight, it is not an exaggeration to say that it was probably 
the single most important reason for the ILO’s survival in the following decade. 
In 1930, a high-ranking ILO delegation that included both Albert Thomas and 
Harold Butler met with Roosevelt, then Governor of the State of New York. He 
had just begun to launch public works schemes in his state and was looking into 
unemployment insurance as a means to counter the effects of the Depression. He 
thus took a great interest in the concepts developed by the ILO. When he became 
president two years later, Roosevelt almost instantly initiated a process of rap-
prochement with the ILO which eventually led to the entry of the United States as 
a member in 1934.270
The interest of the Roosevelt administration in the ILO throughout the coming 
years went through various stages. During the early years, it saw the ILO first and fore-
most all as a valuable source of information to support its ambitious programme of 
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economic and social reforms commonly known as the New Deal. Beyond this aspect, 
many New Dealers saw ILO standards as a means of containing the potentially nega-
tive effects that domestic social reforms could cause for the United States in interna-
tional economic competition. For social reformers like Frances Perkins, Roosevelt’s 
Secretary of Labor and one of the staunchest supporters of the ILO and US member-
ship for many years, the Organization provided a forum for the internationalization of 
New Deal policies.271 This argument caused even proponents of trade liberalization, 
such as Secretary of State Cordell Hull, to join the ranks of ILO supporters. Women’s 
rights activists like Frieda Miller, who later served as the US government delegate to 
the ILC for many years, perceived the Organization as an opportunity to carry the pro-
gressive domestic agendas of the New Dealers onto the international scene.272
In the years after 1935, the ILO and the United States entered into an almost 
symbiotic relationship. ILO experts advised the New Deal administration on a 
range of problems, from social insurance and employment services to public 
works. In return, the ILO received much-needed political support at a time when 
it increasingly lost ground in Europe.
Harold Butler was aware of this fact, and he deliberately sought to build a 
close association between the Organization and the United States. From the early 
1920s onwards, he had been a central figure when it came to maintaining contacts 
with the Americans. His personal connections with Roosevelt, which dated back 
to the Washington Conference of 1919, and his good relationship with Frances 
Perkins were key elements of the process that led to the entry of the United Sates 
in 1934.273 The turn to the United States under Butler’s leadership also translated 
into the recruitment of Americans to senior positions in the ILO, reflecting to a 
large degree the reorientation which the Office underwent during this time. From 
the New Deal, the ILO took inspiration in implementing an ever-closer concep-
tual combination of economic and social policy. A prime example was the recruit-
ment, in 1935, of Lewis Lorwin, a political economist, who became economic 
advisor to the ILO’s Director. Lorwin personified the ILO’s orientation towards 
economic planning, and he represented a new type of ILO official distinguished 
by technocratic expertise and an orientation towards Keynesian economics.274
271 On the global dimension of the New Deal see Kiran Klaus Patel, The New Deal. A Global 
History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).
272 Ibid.; on Frieda Miller’s role, see also Jensen, “US New Deal Policy Experts and the ILO, 
1948–1954”, in Globalizing Social Rights, ed. Kott and Droux, 172–189.
273 He had a first meeting with the new president as early as November 1933.
274 Plata-Stenger, “Une voie sociale pour le développement”, 144–147. See also Lorwin’s book 
Lewis Lorwin, The International Labor Movement: History, Policies, Outlook (New York: Harper 
and Bros., 1953).
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The most important and certainly the most consequential among the Amer-
ican recruitments of the time was John Gilbert Winant, who was appointed 
 Assistant-Director by Butler in 1934. After returning to the United States soon there-
after at Roosevelt’s request, he came back to Geneva as a US government delegate, 
then took up his Assistant-Director again, and was elected as the first American 
Director of the ILO in late 1938. Winant was a Republican, but he had been one of 
the most important allies of Roosevelt’s New Deal policies. As a former governor 
of New Hampshire, he had served as the first chairman of the newly established 
US Social Security Board from August 1935 until February 1937. Winant’s time at 
the helm of the ILO lasted only three years, but it would be mostly remembered for 
his role in leading the Organization into exile in Montreal and thus clearly on the 
side of the Allies during the Second World War.
In addition to providing new and different personnel, the United States’ 
entry was a caesura with long-term consequences in yet another regard. Since 
United States became a member of the ILO but still remained outside the 
League of Nations, the special relationship which the ILO enjoyed with the US 
government constituted one more step in the growing estrangement between 
the ILO and the League. A resolution issued by the Selection Committee of the 
1934 ILC on the occasion of the American entry had sealed the League issue 
for the time being, as it explicitly confirmed that membership in the ILO “shall 
not involve any obligation under the Covenant of the League of Nations”. This 
move would bear unintended fruit during the war, when any connection to the 
“failed” and rapidly fading League could have further endangered the ILO’s 
existence.275
 The ILO Laboratory – Latin America and the First Technical 
Assistance Missions
At the same time that the United States joined the Organization, the ILO took 
steps towards a geographical expansion and regionalization of its work. Not sur-
prisingly, the prime location of this process was Latin America. The motivation 
behind this move, which was accompanied by the establishment of a Special 
Section within the Office dedicated to the problems of non-European countries, 
275 For the text of the resolution see ILO, Record of Proceedings, International Labour Confer-
ence, 18th Session 1934 (Geneva: ILO, 1934), 463. The emancipation from the League became 
clearly visible, when in 1934 the numbering of articles of the ILO Constitution was disconnected 
from that of the Treaty of Versailles. See ILO, Constitution and Standing Orders of the International 
Labour Organisation (Geneva, 1934).
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was threefold. First of all, Butler was sensitive to a growing discontent among the 
non-European members of the ILO, which felt that their countries were underrep-
resented in the ILO’s political structure and that their interests received too little 
attention in the Organization’s general programme of work. The demands for 
better representation also expressed the more assertive role that  non-European 
actors took during the period.276 Secondly, by responding to these voices, Butler 
hoped to gain a new constituency that would help the ILO to counter the centrif-
ugal forces that were working on the Organization in an evermore unstable inter-
national environment that was marked by political and economic nationalism. 
Finally, the quest for geographical expansion was not isolated from the wider 
context of the ILO’s shift towards the western hemisphere marked by the entry of 
the United States.277
To move the Organization closer to Latin America was not an easy task, 
however. Many countries of the region doubted whether the ILO was sufficiently 
equipped to serve their needs. Pan-Americanism was a serious competitor, and 
there were several initiatives in place to build alternative structures and arenas 
to discuss labour and social issues at a purely regional level.278 The underlying 
question was whether ILO standards, tailored as they were to the situation in 
industrialized countries, would fit the needs of the situation in Latin America. 
Countries like Chile, Uruguay, or Argentina had developed a degree of industriali-
zation, and their trade unions were organized in similar ways as those in Europe. 
Social insurance schemes were in place in some of these countries, while, in 
other parts of the continent, an overwhelming majority of the population earned 
its living through small-scale agriculture.279
276 Marc Matera and Susan Kingsley Kent, The Global 1930s: The International Decade (London: 
Routledge, 2017).
277 Plata-Stenger, “Europe, the ILO and the Wider World (1919–1954)”; Ferreras, “Europe- 
Geneva-America: The First International Conference of American States Members of the Interna-
tional Labour Organization”.
278 Wehrli, The ILO and Latin America, 11; Norberto Osvaldo Ferreras, “La construcción de 
una Communitas del Trabajo: las relaciones de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) 
y América del Sur durante la década de 1930”, Dimensões, Revista da Universidade Federal do 
Espírito Santo, vol. 29, 2010, 3–21.
279 Here, the ILO built on existing contacts with established networks, both through its recruit-
ment of Latin Americans to the Office and a number of correspondents and contacts positioned 
in strategically important countries of the region, such as Mexico, Argentina, and Chile. See Yan-
nick Wehrli and Fabián Herrera León, “Le BIT et l’Amérique latine durant l’entre-deux-guerres: 
Problèmes et enjeux”, in L’Organisation internationale du Travail, ed. Lespinet-Moret and Viet, 
157–166.
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After a number of missions to Latin America by high-ranking ILO officials, 
which aimed above all at inducing Latin American governments to ratify ILO Con-
ventions, Butler accepted a proposal by the Chilean government in 1935 to hold a 
conference of the ILO’s American member States in Santiago de Chile in the fol-
lowing year. In the Organization, there was a good deal of scepticism about such 
a gathering, which, as some feared, could easily lead to an erosion of importance 
of ILO Conventions and strengthen notions of regional labour standards instead.
As it turned out, the Regional Conference in Santiago was a success, with 
repercussions that exceeded the geographically limited nature of the meeting. 
As the first ILO Regional Conference, it created an entirely new framework for 
community-building within the ILO. Regional Conferences gained a steady place 
in the ILO’s calendar and, before long, spread to Asia and Africa. They devel-
oped into venues that would confirm the universal scope of the ILO’s work, while 
allowing enough space for the discussion of problems that were specific to the 
particular region. In this latter sense, they also became a kind of safety valve for 
more localized concerns among the ILO’s member States, a space where these 
concerns could be voiced without directly putting into question the ILO’s labour 
standards. In Latin America, in particular, where pan-Americanism at this time 
posed a powerful challenge to the ILO’s claims for universality, Regional Confer-
ences worked as an insurance against the potential split of the organization along 
continental lines.280
The Santiago Conference discussed social insurance schemes, minimum age 
regulations, women’s work, and the reduction of working hours in the textile 
industry. The agenda also included debates on international labour migration, 
which was an important topic for many Latin American countries. The Confer-
ence addressed specific regional issues, such as agriculture and the abolition of 
the truck system (based, for instance, on the payment of wages in kind), in certain 
industries like mining and for indigenous labour. The gathering gave Latin Amer-
ican countries, furthermore, an opportunity to voice their demands with the ILO. 
They asked for better representation in the Governing Body, the recruitment of 
more Latin Americans to the ILO’s staff, and the publication of ILO documents in 
Spanish and Portuguese. In addition, groups that were part of the broader reform-
ist milieu in Latin America used the conference to connect their agendas with the 
ILO’s. One example was the area of nutrition, which occupied many governments 
and reformers in Latin America. They showed a keen interest in the ILO’s work 
280 Wehrli, “The ILO and Latin America”, 11. Véronique Plata-Stenger, “‘To Raise Awareness of 
Difficulties and to Assert Their Opinion’. The International Labour Office and the Regionalization 
of International Cooperation in the 1930ies”, in New Histories of Latin America at the League of 
Nations, ed. Alan McPherson (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2015), 97–113.
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with regard to living standards and wage policies.281 Last but not least, the first 
two Regional Conferences of the Americas in Santiago de Chile and Havana (1939) 
did much to strengthen the ILO’s regional network. It brought the Organization 
closer to the workers’ movement, which, in turn, gained a greater sense of unity 
through cooperation within the ILO.282
Notwithstanding all fears and predictions, the two Regional Conferences did 
not raise the question of regional standards. To the relief of the ILO, they served 
to confirm the universal nature of the ILO’s Conventions, while, at the same time, 
reminding the Organization of the limits of normative action more generally. One 
of the most significant outcomes of these first step towards regionalization was 
the encouragement it gave to ILO to develop new, more practical means of pro-
moting its Conventions.
A method increasingly used during the 1930s to prepare the further dissemina-
tion of ILO standards was sending “technical assistance” missions to South- Eastern 
Europe in the beginning of the 1930s (Greece and Romania), China (1931), Egypt 
(1932), Cuba (1934), and, following the Santiago Conference in 1936, to various 
Latin American countries (Venezuela and Brazil). Those missions reflected both 
the geographical expansion of the ILO’s work and the broader shift in the ILO’s 
programme, paying more attention to economically “backward” countries and 
emphasizing the relationship between economic planning and social legislation.283
The purpose of most of these early missions was to help governments to imple-
ment specified social legislation and, in particular, social insurance schemes 
intended to support industrialization. This was certainly the case in Latin America. 
Populist governments that were pursuing ambitious projects in this regard – like 
the ones led by Getulio Vargas in Brazil or Lazaro Cardenas in Mexico  – were 
looking to the ILO, because they thought that social insurance would help them 
to build strategic alliances with segments of the trade union movement that 
organized the often relatively small group of industrial workers. In other cases, 
ILO experts were called upon to help with the creation of institutions like labour 
inspectorates (China) or the Department of Labour itself (Cuba and Egypt).284
281 Corinne Pernet, “Developing Nutritional Standards and Food Policy: Latin American 
 Reformers between the ILO, the League of Nations Health Organization, and the Pan-American 
Sanitary Bureau”, in Globalizing Social Rights, ed. Kott and Droux, 249–261.
282 Patricio Herrera González, “El pacto por la unidad obrera continental: sus antecedentes en 
Chile y México, 1936”, Estudios de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea de México 46 (Dec. 2013): 
87–119.
283 Plata-Stenger, “Une voie sociale pour le développement”, 257–312.
284 Seekings, “The ILO and Welfare Reform in South Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
1919–1950”.
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The early missions were mostly led by ILO officials, sometimes supported by 
external experts. The group of people sent on missions constituted a very peculiar 
hybrid form of experts-fonctionnaires,285 whose technical and professional exper-
tise was generally accompanied by a strong commitment to the ILO’s ideas and 
methods of work, for which they acted as virtual conveyor belts. In some cases, 
as in Egypt, the Director himself or other high officials participated in a mission, 
which gave it a quasi-diplomatic undertone.286
In parallel, these first ventures into technical assistance also paved the way 
for new and more comprehensive ways of thinking about social problems in the 
European colonial territories. In the shadow of the forced labour debate, the ILO 
began to associate itself with an increasing body of reformist thinking on colonial 
social policy. A major impulse for this course of action came from the economic 
crisis, since the Great Depression hit export-oriented areas within the colonial 
world particularly hard. Social unrest and strikes, which affected strategically 
important functions of the colonial economy, broke out in several places, from 
the British Caribbean to the Dutch East Indies. They became the motivation for 
the measures taken by the French Popular Front government (1936–1938), as well 
as by the British government in its Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. 
The measures adopted moved in the direction of an active colonial development 
policy and, for the first time, admitted financial responsibility for the welfare of 
all the people of the Empire.287 To be sure, these initiatives were modest in scale 
and thoroughly paternalistic in outlook. However, taken together, they provided 
a platform which, soon afterwards, enabled the ILO to become a driving force for 
a change of attitude and for targeted actions in addressing the social problems of 
colonial territories.288
For most of the 1930s, the ILO’s Native Labour Section tried to sustain this 
official change of attitude with its own activities. While its initial task consisted 
mainly of supporting the struggle against forced labour, it began to gradually 
collect data and produce surveys on African social affairs in general, in order 
to be prepared to support an eventual reform of colonial social policy.289 Thus, 
the ILO was part of a changing international perception of the colonies’ social 
and economic problems, which came to be analysed increasingly in a global(iz-
ing) framework. In this light, industrialization and the implementation of social 
285 Plata-Stenger, “Une voie sociale pour le développement”, 313–406.
286 Ibid.
287 Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and Brit-
ish Africa (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 58–65.
288 ILO, Social Policy in Dependent Territories, 32–42.
289 Zimmermann, “Special Circumstances”, 242–244.
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policy measures, accompanied by projects to enhance the efficiency of agricul-
ture, were increasingly seen as necessary means to elevate the colonial territories 
out of their “backward” state. In addition to social and political considerations, 
these measures were also seen as a way to better integrate the colonies into the 
world economy and thus, ultimately, to make them more profitable. This cautious 
but clear change is, accordingly, part of the early history of international develop-
ment and of what has been labelled as the internationalization of colonial poli-
cies. These efforts would bear full fruit in the post-Second World War world under 
the auspices of the United Nations. Seen that way, the ILO’s activities also open a 
perspective on the high degree of continuity in terms of imperial conceptions of 
colonial and post-colonial Africa and Asia that has been reflected in the work of 
international organizations across the watershed of 1945.290
290 Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel, and Corinna R. Unger, “Introduction: International Organiza-
tions, Global Development, and the Making of the Contemporary World”, in International Or-
ganizations and Development, 1945–1990, ed. Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel, and Corinna R. Unger, 
1–22 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Klaas Dykmann, “Only with the Best Intentions: 
International Organizations as Global Civilizers”, Comparativ 23, no. 4/5 (2014): 21–46.
I suggest that tonight you should each take this declaration and put in front of each paragraph 
the two words “I believe”. If when you have done that, you feel that you believe what it says, 
vote for it. If you don’t I ask you in the name of conscience, to stand up here and tell us where 
you differ, and we will try to come to terms with each other. We don’t want any half-hearted 
people in this movement.
Sir John Forbes Watson, Employers’ delegate, British Empire, 1944291
291 ILO, Record of Proceedings, International Labour Conference 26th Session 1944 (Montreal: 
ILO, 1944), 96.
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The 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia stands out as a turning point in the history 
of the International Labour Organization (ILO). After the painful experiences 
of the immediate past – the social and political upheaval caused by the Great 
Depression, the rise of Fascism and Nazism, and the world’s descent into war – 
the Declaration embodied the hopes for and the will to renewal of the liberal 
democracies gathered under the Organization’s auspices. Its central demand, 
derived from the lessons of the past, was as simple as it was radical. The value 
of all future ILO policies should be measured exclusively in the light of whether 
they contributed to the realization of an overriding social objective designed to 
serve all people. Most importantly, “all policies” explicitly included the areas 
of the economy, finance, and trade and linked the national to the international 
dimension.292 The ILO, equipped with such an extended mandate, would act as 
the guardian of this general social objective. What was more, the Declaration’s 
claim to be valid for “all men irrespective of race, creed or sex” made it a key 
document for the groundswell of support for international human rights, and 
its main points were taken up a few years later by the United Nations Charter 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.293
The Declaration of Philadelphia became one of the blueprints for the estab-
lishment of the welfare state in the post-war years, because it successfully com-
bined the ideas of the New Deal and the concepts of European social reformers, 
such as William Beveridge of Great Britain. At the same time, its appeal extended 
beyond Europe and the North Atlantic, since it gave the less industrialized parts 
of the world, and, at that time, particularly Latin America, a voice to raise their 
demands for “economic security” in an international context.
In hindsight, the Philadelphia Conference turned out to be a “second 
founding” of the ILO. This was, however, in no way foreseeable, and only 
one of many possible outcomes of the ILO’s wartime experience. For longer 
periods, it had not even been the most probable one. More than once during 
the war, the very survival of the ILO was called into question. The Declaration 
of Philadelphia eventually provided the ideological and programmatic plat-
292 Alain Supiot, The Spirit of Philadelphia: Social Justice vs. the Total Market, trans. Saskia 
Brown (London and New York: Verso, 2012).
293 Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization; Kott, “Fighting the War or Prepar-
ing for Peace? The ILO During the Second World War”; Geert van Goethem, “Phelan’s War: The 
International Labour Organization in Limbo (1941–1948)”, in ILO Histories, ed. Van Daele et al., 
313–340.
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form upon which the ILO could secure its place in the post-war order, as the 
result of factors that its leadership and its most devoted supporters could only 
partly control.
From Geneva to Montreal
With the start of the Second World War, dark clouds gathered over the ILO’s head-
quarters in Geneva. When France signed a ceasefire in June 1940 that turned large 
areas of its territory over to German occupation, neutral Switzerland found itself 
surrounded on all sides by the Axis powers. The international organizations that 
had remained in Geneva thus became a political burden in the eyes of the Swiss 
government. Staying in the country was not a particularly attractive option for the 
ILO’s leaders, either. For John Winant and most of his colleagues, leaving Switzer-
land seemed to be the only option for the ILO if it wanted to continue to act freely. 
Figure 5: ILO Director-General Edward Phelan signing the Declaration of Philadelphia with 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, at the White House, 1944.
From Geneva to Montreal   113
Staying on would inevitably have meant severe limitations on travel and commu-
nication for ILO employees. Indeed, ever since Germany’s Anschluss of Austria 
1938, there had been plans and simulations in place for relocating, in an emer-
gency, the ILO’s headquarters to neighbouring France. At the beginning of 1940, 
and following an agreement with the French government, the ILO’s archives had 
already been transferred to Vichy.294
After the fall of France, however, this was no longer an option. Winant now 
reached out to the US government. To his surprise and disappointment, his approach 
was met with rejection. Given the widely held neutralist position, both by Congress 
and the American public at large, Secretary of State Cordell Hull considered it impos-
sible to host the ILO, since this could be interpreted as openly taking sides in the 
European conflict. After a short debate, London was ruled out as an alternative due 
to its exposed position in the war. In the end, the Canadian Prime Minister, William 
Mackenzie King, offered the ILO temporary accommodation in his country. In private 
conversations with Winant, Mackenzie King issued an invitation to the Organization 
to transfer its headquarters to the premises of McGill University in Montreal.
Relocating the International Labour Office to Canada, and to Montreal in par-
ticular, held many advantages. As part of the British Commonwealth, Canada, 
too, was officially at war, but it was distant enough from the conflict to be a safe 
choice. Because of its bilingualism, and as a booming centre of the Canadian war 
industry, Montreal was an attractive location for the Organization. Furthermore, 
McGill University had one of the best economics libraries in the world, which was 
an important criterion for the ILO under Winant.295
In July 1940, Winant, using a previously agreed code, sent an encrypted tel-
egram from the United States to his deputy, Edward Phelan, instructing him to 
begin immediate preparations for the Organization’s relocation overseas. Some 
difficult decisions had to be taken, since only a small staff could accompany 
Winant to Montreal. While a handful of staff remained in Geneva, with the Organ-
ization’s French press officer Marius Viple taking care of the ILO’s property and 
staying in contact with the remaining League of Nations staff,296 the great major-
294 Ironically enough, the building that housed the archives, the Pavillon Sévigné, became only 
a few months later the residence of the French collaboration government under Marshal Pétain. 
See Edward Phelan, “Some Reminiscences of the International Labour Organization”, in Edward 
Phelan and the ILO. The Life and Views of an International Social Actor, ed. ILO (Geneva ILO, 2009 
(1954 Studies: an Irish Quarterly Review, Vol. 43, No. 171), 241–270).
295 Edward Phelan, “The ILO sets up its Wartime Centre in Canada”, in Edward Phelan and the 
ILO. The Life and Views of an International Social Actor, ed. ILO (Geneva ILO, 2009 (1955 Studies: 
an Irish Quarterly Review, Vol. 44, No. 174), 152–170).
296 Phelan, “Some Reminiscences of the International Labour Organization”.
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ity had to be laid off. All in all, about 40 members of the ILO’s staff travelled 
secretly through French and Spanish territories to Lisbon. From the Portuguese 
capital – where thousands of people fleeing persecution and war were desper-
ately waiting for passage to a safe haven overseas – the group eventually boarded 
the steam liner Excambion, leaving Europe for an uncertain future.
Figure 6: Group of ILO staff in Lisbon, waiting to board a ship to Canada, 1940.
The conditions under which the ILO was expected to start working in Montreal 
came as a shock to many of the new arrivals. The rooms McGill University was ini-
tially able to offer were basic in comparison to the spacious offices of the Geneva 
headquarters. Phelan’s memoirs contain a vivid description of the huge open 
space which the Organization’s skeleton staff had been allocated  – a “disused 
chapel” with high windows, a gallery, and rows upon rows of plain wooden tables. 
As Phelan points out, in this one big room, with its “faintly ecclesiastical air”, 
“roneotypists, typists, accountants, statisticians, editors, translators, experts 
and all the rest were camping out sheltered by four bare walls and a roof”.297 
As time went by, additional rooms were found and conditions improved. More 
importantly, however, the ILO had retained its freedom of action. Butler’s and 
297 Phelan, “The ILO Sets up Its Wartime Centre in Canada”, 259.
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Winant’s strategy to move the ILO closer to the Americas now paid off, helping 
to pave the way for the Organization’s survival. From its base in Montreal, the 
ILO was quickly able to retake the initiative. Because of his excellent contacts 
with the Roosevelt administration, Winant himself played a decisive role, and 
this allowed the ILO to reinvent itself. Winant made sure that the technical assis-
tance missions to Latin America continued uninterrupted despite the Organiza-
tion’s limited budget.298 This capacity to act, coupled with Winant’s conviction of 
the ILO’s potential role as a “spearhead of social and economic freedom” in dark 
times and an instrument to internationalize New Deal-style politics, significantly 
contributed to its survival.299 They also outweighed flaws of Winant’s leadership 
style, which was described by many as distant and erratic, sometimes bordering 
on a refusal to communicate even with his closest associates.300
298 Jensen, “From Geneva to the Americas”, 228.
299 Quoted in ibid., 228.
300 Phelan, “The ILO Sets up Its Wartime Centre in Canada”, 265.
Figure 7: Morrice Hall, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, 1941.
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In view of this, Winant’s surprise decision, in February 1941, to leave his post 
with immediate effect to become the US ambassador to Great Britain, was met 
all round with dismay and consternation. His resignation threatened, during a 
critical phase of consolidation, to leave a vacuum. For all practical purposes, 
Edward Phelan, the Deputy Director, had been managing the Organization in 
Montreal, but in the circumstances he could not obtain the necessary legitimacy, 
which only a regular election by the Governing Body could have granted. Phelan, 
whether justified or not, had the reputation of being a bureaucrat, and he lacked 
Winant’s charisma. As an Irishman, and thus a citizen of a neutral nation, he was 
also subject to some scepticism as to whether he was the right choice to head an 
organization that was moving more and more openly into the anti-Hitler camp. 
The US government and in particular the chairman of the Governing Body, John 
Carter Goodrich, were initially lukewarm in their support of Phelan. On the other 
hand, Phelan, as Secretary of the Labour Section of the British delegation at the 
Paris Peace Conference, had been instrumental in establishing the ILO in the first 
place.301 Part of the ILO’s leadership since its very beginnings, he embodied more 
than anyone else continuity. This was certainly no small asset in a time of crisis 
and turmoil. Within a few months, Phelan was able to overcome the resentments 
of his critics. He won the support of the most important groups in the ILO, includ-
ing the US government and the trade unions. Eventually, the Emergency Com-
mittee, which had been established to take the place of the Governing Body in 
wartime, decided to appoint Phelan as Acting Director,302 thus conferring on him 
the appropriate authority to head the Organization for the time being.
New York, 1941
Upon their arrival in Montreal, Winant and Phelan agreed that the ILO could not 
simply continue its activities in exile. To survive the war, it had to convince its 
member States of its continuous usefulness, in order to make its voice heard once 
the post-war planning could actually begin. It was particularly with this latter 
aim in mind that, in the spring of 1941, all efforts went into the preparation of 
an extraordinary meeting of the ILO, the first since the outbreak of war. In the 
summer, Phelan secured an invitation from the US Secretary of Labor Frances 
Perkins, who suggested in the name of President Roosevelt that a conference be 
301 ILO, ed., Edward Phelan and the ILO, 19.
302 Phelan retained this status until 1946 when he was awarded the rank of Director-General 
until his retirement in 1948 in appreciation of his services to the ILO during wartime.
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 convened in the United States. New York was chosen as the most accessible place. 
Feverish preparations began.
When the Conference began at the end of October 1941 at the premises of 
Columbia University’s Butler Library, the ILO could celebrate a first success. 
Despite all transportation restrictions due to the war, over a hundred dele-
gates and a further hundred advisers from 35 countries had made the perilous 
journey – a clear sign of the significance which many of the participants attached 
to the Conference. The high rank of many delegates underlined this fact. For the 
United States, Frances Perkins herself and Assistant Secretary of State Adolph 
Berle led the delegation, while Great Britain sent Clement Atlee, second in line 
in Winston Churchill’s war cabinet. Other prominent participants included the 
former Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, the former President of the 
Norwegian Parliament Carl J. Hambro, and Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, who 
later became a co-founding father of the European Economic Community. The 
Latin US contingent, which accounted for 13 of the 35 delegations in New York, 
also arrived with ministers and other high-ranking officials, including the 
33-year-old Chilean Health Minister Salvador Allende.
In his Conference report, “The I.L.O. and Reconstruction”, Phelan set out a 
programme of action which intended to secure a place for the Organization in the 
international order after the end of the war. It committed the ILO in clear terms 
to the cause of liberal democracy and called for its inclusion at an early stage in 
post-war planning. It invited governments to provide the ILO with a broad social 
mandate that would include in its remit economic and financial policy. The report 
suggested that such a mandate would reflect the growing acceptance that, after 
the war, policies should be guided by an overriding social objective. Governments 
everywhere should no longer be interested just in the conditions of work and the 
protection of the workers. They should embrace the notion of “economic secu-
rity” and the “better organisation of the life of the community as a whole, in the 
interest of the community as a whole”.303
The report drew its inspiration from many sources. It built heavily both on 
Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms speech of January 1941 and on the Atlantic Charter 
of August 1941, in which Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister, Winston 
 Churchill, had laid out a range of common goals for the period following an 
Allied victory. The Atlantic Charter’s promise of a peace “which will afford the 
assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from 
303 ILO, “The I.L.O. and Reconstruction. Report by the Acting Director of the International 
Labor Office to the Conference of the International Labor Organization” (Montreal: ILO, 1941), 
88–89, 97ff.
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fear and want” and in which “the fullest collaboration between all nations in 
the economic field” would be brought about “with the object of securing for all 
improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security” became 
also the underlying theme of “The I.L.O. and Reconstruction”.304 A joint declara-
tion by the Commonwealth nations and the European governments-in-exile that 
endorsed the Atlantic Charter was quoted as well.
Substantial space was dedicated to the social policies of many Latin Ameri-
can governments, as they could provide further proof that the “economic security 
of the citizen must be a central point of policy and [of] how completely it has been 
accepted by those responsible for the government of the peoples of the world”.305 
The report was rounded off by references to statements ranging from the interna-
tional trade union movement to the Catholic Church, all seemingly confirming 
that a new spirit had emerged during the war.
The social policy measures of the Axis powers did not go unmentioned, either. 
The report made it clear how big the challenge was that the liberal democracies 
were facing in this field. The memories of the Depression years and the failure of 
democratic governments to forcefully counter its devastating social effects still 
haunted the Conference participants in New York. Social policy, the report noted, 
would be “ultimately at the core of the issues which the war will decide”. The 
ILO pleaded for a positive vision as an alternative to the gloomy prospects of a 
Nazi-ruled Europe. It acknowledged the social measures taken by Nazi Germany 
but reminded the members of the ILO that the goal to which they were bound 
was broader and brighter still – “economic security for all citizens, achieved in 
a manner which respects individual dignity and liberty”. Economic security, in 
the view of the ILO, would never be an end in itself. It was the “precondition of a 
fuller, richer, and, above all, a freer life” and thus in direct contrast to the condi-
tions of the Nazi “slave State” based on racist premises.306
“The ILO and Reconstruction” already contained concrete post-war meas-
ures. Predictably, among the future concerns, unemployment featured promi-
nently. With the experiences of the First World War in mind, securing employ-
ment was seen as the single most important problem looming after the end of the 
war. It was regarded the major threat to political and social stability that had to be 
avoided at all costs. Vocational training, social insurance, wage policy, minimum 
living wages, better nutrition, housing, recreation, and improved conditions 
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a (relatively feeble) nod to the women’s movement, and the call for increased 
employer–worker collaboration on economic and social issues appealed to the 
trade unions. At the very end of the list of elements defining the “social mandate” 
which the ILO was seeking, we find international public works policy and the 
organization of migration  – the core components of the programme for which 
the ILO had made an unsuccessful claim in the 1930s in the struggle to mitigate 
the consequences of the Great Depression.
The almost unanimous support the ILO received from the Conference for its 
post-war programme was due, at least in part, to the unusual circumstances of the 
Conference itself. Many of those present in New York were united by a common 
interest in making the Conference a success and in strengthening the ILO.307 This 
was surely true for the American hosts themselves. Since the beginning of the war 
in Europe, Roosevelt had been leading the country, both rhetorically and prac-
tically, towards an ever-closer collaboration with the anti-Hitler Coalition. Both 
the Atlantic Charter and the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941, which permitted the 
United States to supply arms to Great Britain (and later the Soviet Union), clearly 
pointed in this direction. Despite these steps, at the time the Conference started, 
just a few weeks before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, a significant part of 
the American public still opposed the direct involvement of the country in the 
European conflict. Against this backdrop, a conference on American territory pro-
vided an opportunity to promote greater US commitment to the Allied war effort. 
It also presented an occasion for the President, in particular, to win the support 
of the American trade unions to the prospect of war, which was regarded as an 
extremely important step for the transition to a war economy with its heavy impli-
cations for both production and labour relations. More generally, the Conference 
was seen as another propaganda platform to demonstrate the success and uni-
versal appeal of the social and democratic model embodied by the New Deal.308
In this context, John Carter Goodrich described the Conference in his opening 
speech as an “act of faith” born out of the belief that “social justice and social 
security and basic elements of economic democracy” formed the “essence of the 
conflict” and were “the very stuff for which free men fight”.309 The position of the 
United States was a clear signal to the other governments to come out in support 
307 Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 161–170.
308 Kott, “Fighting the War or Preparing for Peace? The ILO During the Second World War”, 
365–367; Jensen, “From Geneva to the Americas”; For the broader project of an internationaliza-
tion of the New Deal see Patel, New Deal; Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: Ameri-
ca’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
309 ILO, Record of Proceedings, International Labour Conference, 1941, New York and Washing-
ton, D.C. (Montreal: ILO, 1941), 2.
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of the ILO – particularly to Great Britain, for which an ILO Conference had been 
low on the list of priorities given the more pressing concern of German air raids. 
The same was true for the group of London-based governments-in-exile that had 
come to New York: Free France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, and Norway. 
For them, the Conference was an important opportunity to support the United 
States in its commitment to the joint fight against the Axis powers. For these gov-
ernments, it was a question of life or death. The Norwegian government delegate 
and former labour leader Olav Hindahl echoed these feelings, when he supported 
the Report’s claim that “without complete Allied victory over the Nazi aggres-
sors, the ideals for which the International Labour Organization and its Labour 
Office stand cannot be reached”. An Allied victory was for all representatives of 
Nazi-occupied countries the “absolute condition for the proper solution of all 
other problems confronting us in our efforts to create a better future”.310 A wealth 
of expressions of solidarity with recently occupied Greece, which had also sent a 
delegation, highlighted the urgent need for action.
Similar considerations motivated the trade union representatives present in 
New York.311 Those who had gone into exile or underground to escape persecu-
tion in Europe, whose organizations had been shattered under German occupa-
tion, and whose colleagues had been murdered or sent to concentration camps 
felt strongly that it was time for the United States to enter the war. The British 
and American trade unions, on the other hand, were already thinking beyond 
the immediate circumstances of the day and saw the ILO as a means to secure the 
participation of labour in post-war planning. The Workers’ group called emphat-
ically on the Government representatives to provide Phelan with the necessary 
mandate and, on the basis of the Atlantic Charter, to “resolve that the ILO, with 
technical advisers selected on the tripartite principle, shall partake in the coming 
peace conference”.312
Should any doubts have remained about the seriousness of the ILO’s com-
mitment to the Allied camp, they quickly evaporated in the course of the Confer-
ence. One particular question of great symbolic significance in this respect was 
that of the French representation to the ILO. Following the defeat of France in 
1940, the country’s seat had formally passed to Marshal Petain’s Vichy collabo-
ration regime, which, tolerated by Nazi Germany, governed the unoccupied part 
of France and most of France’s colonial possessions. Nothing about this status 
310 ILC, New York and Washington, D.C. (1941), Record of Proceedings, 49.
311 Bernard Delpal, “Le refuge américain de l’OIT (1940–1946). De l’esprit de Genève à l’esprit 
de Philadelphie, place du syndicalisme dans la stratégie de reconstruction”, in L’Organisation 
internationale du Travail, ed. Lespinet-Moret and Viet, 107–120.
312 Ibid., 86.
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had changed following the ILO’s move to Montreal, partly because it affected 
the ILO’s financial interests, since the Organization was not keen on dispensing 
with the French contribution. Marius Viple, the ILO’s head press officer who had 
remained in Geneva, had maintained, with Phelan’s approval, official contacts 
with the Vichy government despite the latter’s increasingly repressive labour and 
social policies modelled on those of Fascist Italy. This course had drawn criticism 
from many sides. Adrien Tixier, in particular, the French Assistant-Director of the 
ILO, had long pleaded for the Organization to cut ties with the Vichy regime and 
to assign the French seat to the Free France government-in-exile under General 
Charles de Gaulle. Tixier himself had close ties with Free French representatives, 
such as René Cassin and De Gaulle’s Minister of Labour Henri Hauck.
In New York, the question of French representation became the subject of a 
showdown. Both the Vichy regime and Free France had sent delegates, but the 
first group quickly found itself isolated and exposed to sharp condemnation on 
the part of various government and workers’ representatives. When the French 
seat was eventually transferred to De Gaulle’s government-in-exile a few months 
later, it just officially confirmed a state of affairs that had existed de facto since 
the Conference. Thus, by the end of 1941, even the last formal limitation on the 
ILO’s support for the Allies had been removed.313
Latin America also played a key role in New York. In fact, for the second time 
since the 1930s, Latin America became an essential pillar in the Organization’s 
survival. The United States had courted its southern neighbours intensively 
before the Conference, eager to keep them in the Allied camp. The Latin American 
countries, in turn, had their own motives for supporting the ILO. Mexico, Brazil, 
and Chile were all on the course to industrialization and hoped to gain the United 
States’ commitment to a regionally coordinated policy of economic security. In 
their eyes, the ILO would provide a suitable platform for this. As in the 1930s, 
when the Roosevelt administration had been open to such agreements as part 
of its Good Neighbor policy, the Latin Americans were seeking the ILO’s help in 
securing the international harmonization of social security policies. The Chilean 
delegation rightly pointed out that “the welfare of the working class of America 
depends chiefly on the economic conditions existing in our countries”. To Latin 
American countries, what however mattered were “trade and economic relations 
satisfactory to both parties”.314 They supported the ILO because they hoped it 
would strengthen their position internationally, and because they regarded the 
313 Jaci Leigh Eisenberg, “Laquelle était la vraie France? France and the ILO during the Second 
World War”, in ILO Histories, ed. Van Daele et al., 341–364.
314 ILC, New York and Washington, D.C. (1941), Record of Proceedings, 91.
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Organization as the best forum to achieve internationally coordinated social and 
economic policies, with the overriding aim of economic security.
Against this background, it did not come as a surprise that the Conference 
concluded with the adoption of several resolutions. As Carter Goodrich pointed 
out solemnly, it was the ILO’s “duty and responsibility to give authoritative 
expression to the social objective, both in the decisions on reconstruction and 
in the creation of the permanent framework of international order”.315 The ILO 
deserved a new and extended mandate not only because it represented govern-
ments, industry, and labour but also because it had “the confidence of the free 
peoples, and more than that, of men of free spirit everywhere.”316 For the sym-
bolic final act of the Conference, President Roosevelt invited the participants 
to hold their last session in the White House, thus signalling both his personal 
respect and US support for the ILO, calling it a “parliament for man’s justice” 
and a cornerstone in a future “stable international system of social justice for all 
peoples everywhere”.317
The ILO’s first Conference since the beginning of the war went well beyond 
merely proving that the Organization was not dead or fading away. It succeeded 
in securing a mandate that acknowledged many of the ideas of the 1930s linked 
to the goal of “economic security”. At the same time, Phelan’s report on “The 
ILO and Reconstruction” provided a concrete social policy vision to complement 
the general promises of the Atlantic Charter. For a short and historic moment, 
then, the Organization found itself in New York at the forefront of international 
post-war planning. The euphoria surrounding this success was not to last long, 
however. Just a few months after the United States had joined the war in Decem-
ber 1941, disillusionment kicked in as post-war planning became more concrete, 
and the ILO found itself again facing the threat of being sidelined.
Post-war Planning
At the end of 1941, the US State Department created a new Division of Special 
Research, led by Leo Pasvolsky, later dubbed the “father of the United Nations”. 
When the Division began to set out ideas for the future architecture of interna-
tional organizations, the ILO played a reasonably prominent role. The initial ideas 
that were circulated granted the ILO responsibility not just for social policy but 
315 Conference of the ILO, New York and Washington D.C. (1941), Record of Proceedings, 136.
316 Ibid.
317 Ibid., 156, 158. See for the background Jensen, “From Geneva to the Americas”, 229–230.
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also for the entire economic dimension of the reconstruction programme. This 
would have transferred to the Organization practically all the economic functions 
previously carried out by the League of Nations. However, after the United States 
had entered the war, diplomatic and military concerns soon pushed these consid-
erations to the background, and the ILO quickly began to lose ground.318
On the first two days of 1942, representatives from 26 countries gathered in 
Washington, D.C., to sign what would later become the Declaration of the United 
Nations. The signatories agreed to join forces in the fight against the Axis powers 
and, on the basis of the principles set out in the Atlantic Charter, to work together 
on a joint system of international security, which would take effect once the war 
had ended. The Declaration made the Soviet Union a partner on an equal footing 
with the United States and Great Britain, and both of them had an interest in 
actively involving their new partner in all post-war planning. In Montreal, this 
news must have set off some alarm bells, since the attitude of the Soviet Union 
towards the ILO was openly hostile. The Soviet Union, which had never been very 
active since its joining in 1934, had left the ILO after its expulsion from the League 
of Nations following its attack on Finland in the fall of 1939. In the following years, 
Moscow would use every opportunity to question the ILO’s legitimacy as a repre-
sentative of workers’ interests.319 Instead, it aimed at establishing a unified inter-
national of trade unions which, it hoped, would eventually replace the ILO alto-
gether. This approach would also have the side effect of driving a wedge between 
the major Western trade unions. The British Trades Union Congress (TUC), acting 
to some degree in the name of British foreign policy, was open to trade union 
unity, while the AFL fought it tooth and nail. As a result, labour, one of the ILO’s 
most important advocates, did not speak with one voice when the Organization 
needed its support.320
In the United States, the ILO’s main supporters in the Department of Labour 
were losing ground to the foreign policy makers in the State Department. It 
became clear quite quickly that Cordell Hull, while appreciating the potential of 
the ILO as an instrument for advocating American war aims, gave priority to the 
liberalization of world trade and did not consider the ILO to be suitable for that 
purpose. He, therefore, resisted the proposals to extend the ILO’s economic and 
financial competences.321
318 Van Goethem, “Phelan’s War”, 322–324.
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The ILO continued to try, from its Montreal base, to use the momentum of the 
New York Conference to become actively involved in the post-war planning that 
its main member States had embarked upon. Its focus lay on unemployment, and 
the policy “prescriptions” that the ILO issued to its members for addressing this 
problem contained echoes of the Great Depression. Once again, the ILO argued for 
active employment policies based on international treaties in the fields of labour 
migration and public works, organized both nationally and at an international 
level. A new aspect was the focus on the expansion of vocational training, which 
was increasingly seen as a major tool in rebuilding the labour force.  Refugees, 
too, were explicitly included in the ILO’s considerations. This development was 
the result of the Organization’s collaboration with the Inter-Allied Committee 
on Post-War Requirements under Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, which established 
estimates on the needs for essential goods and transport after the war.322 Due 
to this connection, the ILO was involved, at least initially, in all the labour- and 
 employment-related aspects of the Allies’ post-war planning.
Along these lines, the ILO’s experts pursued the international promotion of 
social security, with almost missionary zeal. Oswald Stein, Deputy Director of the 
ILO and Director of its Social Security Division, maintained relations with many of 
the British and American experts who, during the war, were working on expand-
ing social security in their respective countries. William Beveridge, whose report 
on “Social Insurance and Allied Services” became the foundation of the British 
welfare state, consulted Stein regularly. He made broad use of the information the 
ILO put at his disposal, particularly with regard to social security systems in other 
countries.323 The same applied to Arthur Altmeyer, Director of Roosevelt’s Social 
Security Board, who was working at the same time as Beveridge on a similar 
report (“Security, Work, and Relief Policies”), which, however, never attained the 
prominence or the impact of its British counterpart.324
Latin America remained, for the entire duration of the war, one of the 
ILO’s main fields of activity in the area of social security. Stein and other ILO 
experts undertook a series of technical assistance missions to Mexico, Argentina, 
Uruguay, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia. In July 1943, the ILO was able to bring Bever-
idge and other renowned social security experts to a pan-American Conference 
322 Alcock, History of the International Labour Organization, 172.
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on Social Security in Montreal, which resulted in the draft of an “International 
Charter of Social Security” that called for the establishment of national social 
security systems worldwide and for international agreements to coordinate the 
measures.325
A less visible, but not less consequential, ILO field of action resulted from 
the work it had performed on colonial social policy. In September 1940, when the 
ILO had moved to Montreal, Winant had decided to attach a representative to the 
ILO’s Liaison Office in London, who would act as a commissioner for colonial 
issues. This post was occupied by Wilfrid Benson, a relatively low-ranking official 
who had been part of the ILO’s Native Labour Section throughout much of the 
interwar period. His London outpost may have seemed insignificant at the begin-
ning, but it became the intellectual powerhouse from which much of the ILO’s 
post-war colonial work originated. At the New York Conference the ILO received 
an extended mandate to draw up a programme of colonial reforms as part of the 
wider process of reconstruction.326 In early 1943, Benson published an article in 
the International Labour Review, which contained a detailed proposal for colonial 
social reforms. Its title “A People’s Peace in the Colonies” was programmatic inas-
much as it cited the famous dictum by Ernest Bevin, the British war-time Minister 
of Labour, stating that the “people’s war” that the democracies were fighting had 
to be followed by a “people’s peace”. The article thus connected the colonial sit-
uation to the general debate on post-war social policy. The article presented the 
following basic pillars of the people’s peace in the colonies: the subordination 
of all colonial policy to a superordinate social objective; a move away from the 
laissez-faire politics of the pre-war period to a commitment by the colonial state 
to active economic and social development; the safeguarding of participation by 
the indigenous populations as a contribution to social development “from the 
ground up” (with the effect of promoting trade union freedoms in the colonies); 
and the increased “internationalization” of colonial social policy, that is the 
325 Jensen, “From Geneva to the Americas”, 230–231. See for the broader debate also Martin H 
Geyer. “Social Rights and Citizenship during World War II”, in Two Cultures of Rights: The Quest 
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strengthening of the ILO’s role in defining the main direction of colonial social 
policy.327
Although its conceptual work and its practical activities in the field of 
employment policy and social security gave the ILO some recognition and, on 
occasion, visibility, close observers were concerned that the Organization did 
not appear to be playing much of a role, if any, in the negotiations on the post-
war policy pursued among the Allies. One particularly alarming signal was the 
ILO’s exclusion from the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture in 
Hot Springs, Virginia, in May 1943. The meeting focused on a number of topics – 
such as living standards, nutrition, and agricultural labour – that, according to a 
resolution passed at the New York Conference, lay within the ILO’s competence. 
When the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was 
established later in the same year, which took over some of the functions of the 
Leith-Ross Committee, the ILO was sidelined again. It gradually became clear to 
the majority of the ILO’s supporters that the Organization was at risk of losing 
all influence over post-war planning and that, if this were to happen, many of 
the initiatives already embarked upon would end up going nowhere. While the 
ILO’s expert advice and technical services continued to be sought after, at the 
diplomatic level, the Organization was fighting for its survival. When the ILO was 
excluded from a meeting of Allied foreign ministers scheduled for October 1943, 
which foresaw the establishment of the basic architecture of international organ-
izations, the writing was clearly on the wall. At a specially convened meeting of 
the Governing Body in London in December 1943, its members agreed that the 
best way to regain the initiative would be to convene a regular session of the ILC. 
This time, though, just passing new resolutions would not be good enough. What 
was needed was a bold affirmation of the ILO’s basic principles, which could 
return the Organization to the forefront of post-war planning and serve as a basis 
for claiming a broad social mandate.328
The US government declared itself once again willing to host the Confer-
ence, and this time the choice fell on Philadelphia, the deeply symbolic site of 
the American Declaration of Independence. In the run-up to the Conference, the 
Western Allies, the Workers’ group, and the employers were all in agreement that 
a new Conference would offer the ILO the perfect forum to renew its claim for 
full involvement in post-war planning. Frances Perkins recorded in her notes on 
a meeting with Winston Churchill their shared satisfaction that the new Confer-
327 Wilfrid Benson, “A People’s Peace in the Colonies”, in International Labour Review 47, no. 
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ence would, like the one two and a half years earlier in New York, be an “excel-
lent piece of psychological warfare”.329 With a view to the future profile of the 
Organization, not everyone was as receptive of the ILO’s ambitions as the Labour 
Department and the New Dealers in line with Perkins. Neither the British Foreign 
Office nor the US State Department nor the UN planners headed by Leo Pasvolsky 
wanted to have anything to do with the resolutions the ILO had adopted in New 
York. They would have preferred to use the Philadelphia Conference to restrain 
the ILO to the core activities of the pre-war period.
As the Conference drew closer, the problem of the Soviet attitude to the ILO 
became virulent again. If Philadelphia was going to be an occasion to work on 
plans for reconstruction, and if the ILO was to assume a role in the post-war order, 
it would be a major handicap if the Soviet Union was not included. Accordingly, 
the British and US governments made serious efforts to get the Soviet Union to 
come to the table. Roosevelt attempted to convince Stalin personally to send a 
delegation, and he even secured the consent of the AFL to abandon its resistance 
to the participation of Soviet Workers’ representatives. In the end, however, all 
efforts were in vain. One likely reason for the Soviets’ intransigence was their 
ongoing attempt to establish a unified trade union international, which would 
become either a counterweight to the ILO in the emerging UN system or, ideally, 
replace the ILO altogether.330
Philadelphia, 1944
Unperturbed by these diplomatic manoeuvres, the ILO staff in Montreal spent 
the first months of 1944 preparing a long memorandum on the “Future Policy, 
Programme and Status of the International Labour Organisation”.331 Building 
on the resolutions of the New York Conference, the memorandum repeated the 
ILO’s calls for a broad social (and economic) mandate. It listed a wide range 
of fields that the ILO considered to be its rightful future area of influence and 
positioned itself at the very centre of the future international system and all its 
branches. This might have seemed like risky gamble, given the precarious sit-
uation the ILO had found itself in for most of the two and a half years that has 
passed since the gathering in New York. However, from a different perspective, 
the ILO had little to lose.
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The Conference would prove that the ILO leadership had made the right deci-
sion. In light of the circumstances, the meeting turned out to be an unqualified 
success. Once again, an impressive number of delegations made their way to Phil-
adelphia. Except for the Soviet Union and a handful of other countries, almost all 
of the future UN Member States were present at the Conference, which provided 
the ILO with the legitimacy it needed for its recommendations. Most of the del-
egates supported the ILO’s claim for a broadened social mandate. An important 
factor was that labour put its weight fully behind the Organization’s claims. At the 
Conference, the British labour leader Joseph Hallsworth confirmed labour’s con-
tinuous support for the ILO and the expectations of the Workers’ group stating 
that “this Organisation cannot live, and, I predict that no other organisation that 
can be set up now can live, which denies the right of the workers to be in at the 
start of any measures which are designed to encompass this policy of peace and 
prosperity”.332
Indeed, as the ILO leadership had hoped for, the Conference quickly assumed 
the character of a “first meeting of the Peace Conference”. This also meant that 
the solemn Declaration which the ILO adopted at the end of the meeting was 
regarded as a social preamble of the future peace negotiations. In Philadelphia, 
the ILC adopted altogether 23 resolutions and seven Recommendations, with 
the first resolution dealing with the “social provisions in the peace settlement”, 
including recommendations to the United Nations for present and post-war social 
policies.333
The main outcome of the Conference was the now famous Declaration of Phil-
adelphia – a “Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International 
Labour Organisation” – that was later incorporated in the ILO’s Constitution.334 It 
was hardly surprising that the first paragraph of the Declaration of Philadelphia 
confirmed and reinforced the basic social liberal statements of the ILO’s Consti-
tution from 1919 – “labour is not a commodity” and “freedom of association and 
of expression are essential to sustained progress”.335
Next, “poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere” was 
a statement that insisted on the global vision necessary for the formulation of 
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economic and social policies and emphasized the objective of a fair economic 
order. It anticipated, by pointing out worldwide economic interdependence, an 
international discourse about the problem of development, which would emerge 
in the decades to come. Finally, the Declaration reconfirmed the ILO’s commit-
ment to tripartism and democratic decision making as the method of choice to 
fight the “war against want”.
Section II of the Declaration contained the passages that marked a real and 
radical new beginning. It stated that all policies, both on the domestic and the 
international levels, “in particular those of an economic and financial charac-
ter”, should be scrutinized in the light of an overriding social objective. This claim 
found its justification in the idea of universal human rights, which appeared in an 
international document for the first time:
All human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their 
material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, 
of economic security and equal opportunity.336
The Declaration of Philadelphia elevated the establishment of conditions in 
which these rights could be realized to a “central aim of national and interna-
tional policy”, stating that it was the ILO’s duty “to examine and consider all 
international financial and economic policies and measures in the light of this 
fundamental objective”. This was a direct reference to the resolution passed at 
the New York Conference, and the idea of universal human rights added signifi-
cant strength to this claim.337
Obviously, the human rights language of the Declaration of Philadelphia did 
not come out of nowhere. The ILO did not act in isolation, but rather as part of a 
broader movement. The Four Freedoms speech and the Atlantic Charter, which 
had already featured prominently at the New York Conference, continued to be 
important reference points, as their repeated quotations by Conference partici-
pants and the American press coverage of Philadelphia confirmed.338 In the years 
between New York and Philadelphia conferences, the ILO had actively helped 
to promote human rights as the foundation, both ideological and legal, of the 
post-war order. One of the main authors of the Declaration was the ILO’s Legal 
Adviser, Wilfred Jenks. He had close connections to the American Law Institute, a 
private organization of lawyers, which, at President Roosevelt’s suggestion, had 
been working since 1942 on the draft of a universal charter of human rights. Jenks 
336 Ibid.
337 Ibid.
338 Jensen, “From Geneva to the Americas”, 231–232.
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also kept in touch with Latin American law experts working in a similar direc-
tion, championing socio-economic rights, in particular. Philadelphia offered one 
of the first opportunities to seal these ideas in an international document.339
Section III listed what the ILO regarded as its future areas of activity. As in 
Phelan’s 1941 report on “The ILO and Reconstruction”, full employment and 
standards of living came first, followed by vocational training and wage policies. 
Another sub-section was dedicated to the recognition of the right of collective 
bargaining. It promoted the cooperation of management and labour in increasing 
productivity and the participation of both in implementing social and economic 
measures. This was followed by social security, occupational health and safety, 
protective measures targeting children and mothers, nutrition, housing, facilities 
for recreation and culture, and, finally, the “assurance of equality of educational 
and vocational opportunity”. Thus, the section not only referred to the improve-
ment of working conditions and the promotion of labour rights as the traditional 
area of ILO activity but, at the same time, largely represented the Organization’s 
new, more expansive understanding of the close link between social and eco-
nomic policies.340
Sections IV and Section V also signalled a new beginning by focusing on the 
less industrialized countries as well as on the part of the world’s population that 
was still under colonial rule. The ILO now considered it its task to “promote the 
economic and social advancement of the less developed regions of the world” 
at both the national level and, more importantly, the international level. To this 
end, the Organization committed itself to collaborating with all international 
institutions working towards the same goals in areas such as world trade, health 
policy, and education. The Latin American countries, in particular, were gratified 
to see their demands reflected in this objective.341
Few were the voices that spoke out at the Conference against the broadening 
of the ILO’s mandate. The US Workers’ delegate Robert Watt was among the few 
who warned that the ILO should refrain from “making everyone’s business” its 
concern.342 The Belgian Workers’ delegate and future Deputy Director-General of 
the ILO, Jef Rens, by contrast, confronted the opposition from some employers 
by pleading for a bold new mission of the Organization. “The role of the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation,” he proclaimed, “is now to formulate the rights of the 
masses of the workers, to make them prevail over the privileges, whatever those 
339 Hanne Hagtvedt Vik, “Taming the States: The American Law Institute and the ‘Statement of 
Essential Human Rights’”, Journal of Global History 7, no. 3 (2012): 461–482.
340 ILO, Declaration of Philadelphia.
341 Ibid.
342 ILC, 26th Session (1944), Record of Proceedings, 39.
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privileges may be, of the minority, and to have them inscribed in the laws of the 
States Members.”343
Rens might well have felt that the momentum was on his side when it came to 
the discussion of future national policies. However, debates about possible inter-
national action in support of full employment policies showed very clearly that 
much of what was listed in Section IV was primarily not more than a joint dec-
laration of intent. As part of the “Resolution Concerning Social Provisions in the 
Peace Settlement”, the Australian government had suggested the adoption of an 
international agreement that would have obliged all countries to coordinate their 
national policies with those of other countries, with the intent of seeking global 
full employment. An agreement of this nature would have established, above all, 
mechanisms to protect the efforts of developing countries to both industrialize 
and build their own systems of social security; it would have affected mainly 
the domestic employment and the economic and trade policies of industrialized 
countries. This proposal had the support of many Latin American states and some 
Commonwealth countries, such as South Africa. The US government delegation, 
however, was in the forefront of those who opposed such an agreement, which 
eventually failed to gain the necessary votes.344
Against the background of the Philadelphia Declaration’s emphasis on the 
importance of a “high and steady volume of international trade” and the “great 
contribution that the international exchange of goods and services can make to 
higher living standards and to high levels of employment”, the failure of Austral-
ia’s proposal was symbolic. Many of the Conference participants did not neces-
sarily see a contradiction between free trade and international regulation. The 
failure of the employment initiative, however, did put an early brake on the ILO’s 
ambitions of becoming the social guardian of international economic and trade 
policies.
A Declaration for “All Human Beings”?
The tensions between the universalistic approach of the Declaration and the 
immediate political practices and goals of the ILO’s members could be observed 
in other fields, too, but they became even more visible when it came to the status 
of the colonial territories. Section V, the final part of the Declaration, was dedi-
343 Ibid., 117.
344 The Australian government wanted “to see the I.L.O. play a much greater role in the future 
in international economic collaboration, and, in particular, in maintaining high levels of em-
ployment and consumption”, ibid., 30–34.
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cated entirely to colonial populations. It stated that the human rights principles 
of the Declaration should be “fully applicable to all peoples everywhere”, but it 
simultaneously made “the manner of their application” dependent on the “stage 
of social and economic development reached by each people”. The gradual appli-
cation of the Declaration’s provisions in the colonial territories was proclaimed to 
be a “matter of concern to the whole civilized world” (thus elevating the interna-
tional community, represented by the ILO, to the role of a “social policy develop-
ment trustee” in the colonies).345 But the fact remained that the universality of the 
Declaration of Philadelphia was, with regard to the colonies, implemented only 
gradually, which compromised the application of its human rights claims. The 
ambivalence of the ILO’s approach to colonial social policy was visible in other 
places, too. In what Edward Phelan termed “a parallel action” to the Philadel-
phia programme, the ILO adopted a Recommendation under the programmatic 
heading of “Social Policy in Dependent Territories”346 (which would eventually 
inspire a series of Conventions in 1947–1948).
Most of the underlying principles (such as the overriding social objective, the 
active role of the state, freedom of association, and the demand for an expansion 
of the ILO’s competencies) reflected the main sections of the Philadelphia Dec-
laration. The colonial reforms announced in Philadelphia were, in this sense, a 
real breakthrough. They elevated the colonies for the first time from the inferior 
position in the native labour code to a sphere in which universal social policy 
norms applied.
At the same time, the very fact that the colonial territories were once again 
the subject of their own specific norms showed that it was mainly their political 
status and less their socio-economic stage of development that excluded them 
from the full application of ILO standards. The colonial powers recognized that 
concessions on social matters might keep the demands for political reform at 
bay. Gentle pressure from the colonial powers’ American allies and the Workers’ 
group also played a part in convincing many of the colonial government repre-
sentatives of the propaganda value of the reforms. However, the following years 
would prove on more than one occasion that the conflict surrounding the validity 
and application of the Philadelphia principles in the colonial territories was far 
from over.347
Philadelphia brought visible changes in the treatment of women’s work, 
too. The principle of equal rights was strengthened in the second article of the 
345 ILO, Declaration of Philadelphia.
346 Social Policy in Dependent Territories Recommendation, 1944 (No. 70).
347 Maul, Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization the International Labour Organiza-
tion, 1940–70, 152–184.
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Declaration, which, from its human rights perspective, emphasized equal rights 
“irrespective of race, creed or sex”. In the run-up to the meeting and during the 
Conference itself, the women’s movement had pleaded for a departure from the 
predominantly “protective approach” of the pre-war period. The massive involve-
ment of women in wartime production in many countries, even greater than 
during the First World War, had created a momentum for this demand and played 
a major part in its success. However, the tension between the protective and the 
equality approach remained a defining feature of the ILO’s treatment of women’s 
work for years to come. This was illustrated, in particular, by the ILC debates in 
1950 and 1951 concerning the Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), which 
was perfectly in line with the equality and anti-discrimination mandate of the 
Philadelphia Declaration.348
Eventually, steps were taken for the establishment of “Industrial Commit-
tees” – in order to create a new international framework for bipartite or tripartite 
discussion within leading industries (textile, building, metal works, etc.).349 The 
idea of Industrial Committees was essentially born out of the demands, partly in 
response to the war, of certain sectoral trade unions, which wanted the ILO to 
establish offices for specific branches of production. There was a general agree-
ment that these offices would help the ILO to become even more deeply con-
nected with its constituents. The Philadelphia Conference formally initiated the 
creation of tripartite Industrial Committees, but left it to the Governing Body to 
decide about their exact form, role, and scope.350
In retrospect, the war years turned out to be a phase of expansion for the ILO. 
The new human rights basis on which the work of the Organization was placed 
at the Philadelphia Conference changed both the ideological foundation and the 
scope of its activities. From another perspective, Philadelphia also marked the 
continuation of a transformation that had begun on many levels in the 1930s. 
The ILO turned from an organization whose primary focus was on the problems 
of labour and the conditions of work to an agency concerned with social life and 
policy in a much broader sense. Social security replaced social insurance as the 
central theme of social policy, as it covered ever-increasing areas in the lives of 
348 Silke Neunsinger, “The Unobtainable Magic of Numbers: Equal Remuneration, the ILO and 
the International Trade Union Movement, 1950s–1980s”, in Women’s ILO, ed. Boris, Hoehtker, 
and Zimmermann, 121–148.
349 The decision to create Industrial Committees had already been taken by the Governing Body 
at the New York Conference three years earlier, but since the Philadelphia Conference was the 
first regular ILC during the war, they came into existence only at that time.
350 Edward Weisband and Edward Singleton “ILO Industrial Committees and Sectoral Activi-
ties: An Institutional History”, Working Paper SAP 2.53/WP.100 (ILO: Geneva, 1996).
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working people. All this was pointing out to a new vision which was debated 
and eventually codified by the International Labour Conference in Philadelphia. 
What emerged from Philadelphia was a consensus based on the understanding 
of an intrinsic relationship of social and economic policies and an agreement on 
the ultimate primacy of a social objective for all policies.
Equipped with a strong mandate, the ILO now turned its attention to the eco-
nomically less advanced regions. Even colonial territories were, at least in prin-
ciple, elevated from a sphere in which different rights applied and were included 
in the universal social policy framework of the Declaration of Philadelphia. 
Although these developments were still a work-in-progress, Philadelphia laid the 
foundations that gave the ILO the image of a truly global organization – both geo-
graphically and in terms of its work programme. Before it could get to this point, 
however, the ILO would have to manage the difficult transition to the post-war 
order. The participation of the Soviet Union continued to be a major hurdle. One 
direct effect of the Soviet Union’s absence from Philadelphia was that the Confer-
ence was essentially a meeting of liberal democracies. Compared to the Charter 
of the United Nations or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the clear lan-
guage of the Declaration was much less subject to the “competing universalisms” 
of the age.351 Thus, the Declaration of Philadelphia was, in some respects, more 
of a maximum consensus than a minimum compromise.
Just a few weeks after Philadelphia, the Allies landed in Normandy and the 
war entered its final, decisive phase. In August 1944, representatives of the Allied 
powers met at Dumbarton Oaks to discuss the design of the new United Nations 
Organization. As in the aftermath of the New York Conference, the ILO had to 
realize that its role in these negotiations, if it had one at all, would be very limited. 
Only months after the boost that Philadelphia had given to the ILO, it found itself 
once again with its back against the wall.
351 Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga, “New Histories of the United Nations”. Journal of World 
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When the transition to the new world order began, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) found itself once again relegated to a back seat. Before the 
Organization could eventually join the United Nations in 1946, it was more than 
once confronted with its precarious position within the new power constella-
tion that had been established at the end of the Second World War. The open 
hostility of the Soviet Union towards the ILO and the Organization’s reliance on 
the Western bloc turned out to be both a liability and an asset, depending on 
the development of the relationship between the wartime allies. Against this 
backdrop, the beginning of the first wave of decolonization, marked by India’s 
independence in 1947, likewise was both a challenge and an opportunity to the 
Organization. On the one hand, decolonization resulted in new conflicts for the 
ILO inasmuch as it carried the potential to clash with both its focus on European 
reconstruction and its reliance on the support of the major colonial powers. On 
the other hand, by responding to the growing demands to shift its focus from 
Europe to the developing world, the ILO won new elbow room. Under the lead-
ership of the new Director-General David Morse, it kept and even sharpened its 
profile as a frontline organization of the Western camp in the looming Cold War, 
while starting a whole new set of activities.
Joining the UN Family
As the war drew to an end, the planning for the post-war architecture of interna-
tional organization became more concrete by the day. At all levels, governmen-
tal and non-governmental groups continued to work on evermore detailed plans 
for a stable peace order following the Allied victory. If the ILO increasingly took 
but a back seat in the midst of these buzzing activities, it was due, above all, to 
the growing consensus among the Allies that collective security would have to 
become the top priority for the future world organization at the heart of the new 
international system. If the peace was to last, the key to its success lay in the 
degree to which the interests of the two “superpowers” emerging from the war – 
the United States and the Soviet Union – could be accommodated to form the 
pillars of the new post-war order.352
352 Daniel Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World War II and a Forged 
Peace (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010); Paul M. Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, 
and Future of the United Nations (New York: Random House, 2006).
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This naturally put the ILO in a difficult position. Even if the euphoria of Phil-
adelphia had quickly given way to more sober assessments of the Organization’s 
prospects, few were prepared for the setbacks it suffered at two crucial meetings 
in the summer of 1944. The first blow came in July, when the Allies met in the 
tranquil atmosphere of the mountain resort of Bretton Woods in New Hampshire 
to discuss the financial and economic aspects of the post-war order. The only 
representative the ILO was able to send – and only in the role of an observer – 
was its Acting Director, Edward Phelan, who was not in the position to have any 
significant impact. While the ILO managed to be present when the heads of the 
British and American delegation, John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, 
and the delegates of 44 Allied nations thrashed out the foundations of the post-
war financial and economic order, it had no allies. The Bretton Woods agreement 
paved the way for the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which later 
became part of the World Bank Group, but there was no mention whatsoever of 
any overarching social objective or of international labour standards, let alone of 
any significant role for the ILO.353
The ILO faced a similar situation in August 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks in 
 Washington, D.C., where the negotiations on the structure of the future world 
organization took place. It was more than alarming that the Allies decided on the 
establishment of an Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which would be given 
the task of coordinating all future sub-agencies of the United Nations. The existing 
agency, the ILO, was not even mentioned in the official minutes of the Dumbar-
ton Oaks Conference. This outcome was due in large part to the influence of the 
Soviet Union, and neither the British nor the US representatives were prepared to 
confront their wartime ally on the ILO’s behalf. Their main priority was to see the 
Soviet Union involved in a future system of collective security.354
Even then, the ILO’s lowest point had not been reached. It came in San Fran-
cisco in the spring of 1945, when the United Nations was eventually founded. 
During the entire year that had passed since the Philadelphia Conference, the 
situation of the ILO had constantly deteriorated. At Yalta, in February 1945, the 
Allied powers had straightened out last issues relating to their respective spheres 
of influence. The way was now clear for the founding of a new world organiza-
tion, and a meeting was called for the following April in San Francisco. When it 
opened with the participation of 46 nations, the ILO found itself entirely shut out 
353 Eric Helleiner, Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the 
Making of the Postwar Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).
354 Georg Schild, Bretton Woods and Dumberton Oaks. American Economic and Political Post-
war Planning in the Summer of 1944 (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1995).
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of the proceedings. Phelan had sought, with growing desperation, to obtain an 
invitation to the gathering, but the closer the opening date approached, the more 
obvious it became that the US State Department did not wish the ILO to partici-
pate directly, mainly out of consideration for the Soviet Union. Moreover, the news 
of Roosevelt’s death two weeks before the start of the Conference came as a real 
shock to the ILO. The transition from Roosevelt to Harry S. Truman, who had had 
no prior relationship whatsoever to the Organization, added to the uncertainty.
The ILO could not, at this stage, count on the support of the international trade 
union movement either. Following the founding of the unified World Federation 
of Trade Unions (WFTU) in February 1945, which counted among its members the 
British TUC and most of the other European and Latin American trade unions that 
had previously belonged to the IFTU, the deep rift among the trade unions in the 
West had become obvious. The AFL bitterly resented the demise of the IFTU and 
the merger with the Soviet trade unions – particularly because it meant that the 
AFL’s rival trade union federation, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 
would be represented in the WFTU. Consequently, the AFL attempted to thwart, 
with some success, the participation of the WFTU in San Francisco. Given these 
divisions and the political and ideological difficulties within the new unified 
trade union international to find a common position on the future role of the ILO, 
no immediate help could be expected from this direction.355
It was only due to the intervention of a handful of countries, most promi-
nently among them Great Britain and certain Latin American states, that the ILO 
was at least allowed to send an unofficial five-person delegation to the San Fran-
cisco Conference for the purpose of informal consultation.356 As it turned out, 
Phelan himself could not join the delegation, as one of the Soviet Union’s last 
attempts to prevent the ILO from participating focused on his Irish nationality. 
Since Ireland had remained neutral throughout the war and was, therefore, not 
a member of the United Nations, Moscow insisted that Phelan could not attend. 
The rest of the ILO delegation’s journey to San Francisco was far from smooth, 
either, as the delegates were accommodated in a hotel located miles from the 
Conference site. Up to the last minute, it was not clear whether they would get 
355 Van Goethem, “Labor’s Second Front”, 670–680. For a broader context, see Anthony Carew, 
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invitations to the Conference at all, and they were not invited to official recep-
tions or to the formal closing session.357 During the session, the British delegation 
made a modest attempt to add to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals an amendment 
that would have placed the ILO in a special relationship with the United Nations, 
but this was immediately opposed by both the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The future of the ILO thus remained subject to further negotiations. As 
the war came to an end both in Europe and Asia, and the pillars of the new inter-
national order were being erected, the Organization faced the threat of falling 
victim to this very order. In the worst case, it would suffer the fate of the League 
of Nations, which was in the process of being wound up. Paradoxically, the ILO 
was again facing the threat of oblivion when, at the same time, many European 
governments were about to translate the principles of Philadelphia into concrete 
policies in their efforts to establish the foundations of the post-war welfare state.
What brought the ILO back from the sidelines into the centre of the debate 
and made the desired relationship with the United Nations possible was the rapid 
deterioration of the relationship between the wartime allies after San Francisco. 
The fissures in the relationship between the Western powers and the Soviet Union 
now became ever more apparent. At the Potsdam Conference in July and early 
August 1945, Truman, Churchill, and Stalin clearly diverged in their views on the 
Polish borders and a general approach to the occupation of Germany. Truman’s 
decision to employ a nuclear bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, taken at Potsdam 
and executed two weeks later, was intended to pave the way for a quick victory 
and the occupation of Japan without Soviet participation. It was yet another sign 
of discord. After Potsdam, the writing was on the wall: the alliance between the 
West and the Soviet Union was giving way to a new antagonism.
It was in this context that the first ILC on European territory since 1939 took 
place in Paris in the autumn of 1945. In Phelan’s words, it was the first interna-
tional gathering in the “atomic age”, while for the ILO it constituted “the end 
of the war period and the beginning of the post-war period”.358 Despite all the 
difficulties the ILO faced with regard to the transition into the new world order, 
the general tone at the Conference was cautiously optimistic. Frances Perkins 
transmitted to the gathering President Truman’s intention “to make clear to you 
beyond the possibility of doubt that the United States of America intends to con-
tinue whole-hearted participation in the work of the Organization”. Therefore, 
Perkins continued, it was desirable from the point of view of the US government 
357 Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 189.
358 ILO, Record of Proceedings, International Labour Conference, 27th Session 1945 (Geneva: 
ILO, 1946), 34, 182.
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that the ILO entered into a “mutually satisfactory relationship with the United 
Nations Organization”.359 This was an important signal for many of the govern-
ments present in Paris. It implied that, in cooperation with the United Nations, 
the maximum autonomy for the ILO was desirable. This position was also taken 
by a large number of European and Latin American delegations.360 As a result, 
Phelan considered the Organization strong enough to counter any proposals that 
would have degraded the ILO to a mere executive body of ECOSOC.361
During the first General Assembly meeting of the United Nations in London 
in January 1946, the Soviet Union made one final bid for a direct formal associ-
ation of the WFTU with the United Nations. However, the proposal was turned 
down by a vast majority in ECOSOC. Instead, a general framework was created 
in which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could become formally asso-
ciated with the work of the United Nations without being granted voting rights 
or any other form of direct influence. In the same session, ECOSOC decided to 
enter into direct negotiations with the ILO’s Governing Body, with the result that, 
a few months later, an agreement was signed that made the ILO a “specialized 
agency” of the United Nations.362 The ILO, by force of this agreement, would lose 
the quasi-independent status it had enjoyed vis-à-vis the League of Nations but 
kept a far-reaching financial autonomy. ECOSOC and the ILO granted each other 
the right to be invited and to speak on issues within the respective organization’s 
sphere of interest. This might have seemed a modest outcome if measured by the 
claims of the Philadelphia Declaration that the ILO was to become the central 
international agency for all social matters in the post-war order. To most observ-
ers in 1946, however, this outcome was entirely satisfactory. The ILO had survived 
and found its place in the new world order, even with a significant degree of inde-
pendence. As many ILO supporters clearly realized, this was more – even much 
more – than could have been expected during most of the two years that had 
passed since the heady days of Philadelphia.
To a large degree, it had been the looming Cold War that had prevented the 
ILO from falling victim to the new post-war order. Yet, for this very reason, its 
position continued to be an uneasy one as the ILO was not spared the effects of 
359 ILC, 27th Session (1945), Record of Proceedings, 136–137.
360 Ibid., 71–86.
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the conflict between East and West that kept on creeping into its debates. On the 
one hand, and although the Soviet Union remained outside the Organization for 
the time being, Poland and Czechoslovakia continued their membership, even 
after they had joined the Communist camp. On the other hand, the ILO – which 
had relied on the support of the Western allies for its survival – had, if anything, 
become more dependent on the continued good will of its major sponsor, the US 
government. In the context of the Cold War, as will be shown in the third section 
of this chapter, this pushed the Organization quite naturally into becoming a 
frontline organization of the Western camp.
 Indian Independence and the First “Decolonization” of the ILO
The exposed position of the ILO and its dependence on the Western allies also 
influenced the way the ILO dealt with the onset of decolonization in Asia. In 
August 1947, India’s independence became the prelude to a movement that saw 
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Burma (Myanmar) following the Indian model. Elsewhere, 
in Indonesia, Malaya, and Indochina – but also in countries outside of Asia, such 
as Algeria – in the 1940s and 1950s the colonial powers waged bloody wars to 
counter what they saw as a domino effect of uncontrolled anti-colonial national-
ism. Before long, the UN system became one of the main arenas of the ideological 
conflicts accompanying the decolonization process in which countries from the 
global South fought to establish “an entirely new conception of world order – one 
premised on the breakup of empire rather than its continuation”.363
The ILO initially remained relatively unaffected by these developments. 
Since the Soviet Union had left the ILO in 1940, it could not use the Organization 
for the anti-colonial rhetoric that it was increasingly employing at the interna-
tional level. This, in turn, allowed the colonial powers greater leeway in their 
attempts to shield themselves from what they saw as an undue “internationaliza-
tion” of their imperial affairs.364 In 1947, the ILC adopted a Convention on “social 
policy in non-metropolitan territories” that brought the colonial work begun in 
Philadelphia to a conclusion.365 Their commitment to the establishment of what 
were essentially colonial welfare states, with all policies “primarily directed to 
the well-being and development of the peoples” in the colonial territories, was 
363 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 185.
364 Maul, Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization, 86–99.
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understood by the colonial powers as a licence to fend off any demands for more 
far-reaching political concessions.
After 1947 and until the end of the 1950s, colonial affairs within the ILO 
were handled exclusively by a “Committee of Experts on Social Policy in Non- 
Metropolitan Territories”. The Committee met for a total of five sessions from 1950 
to 1957 and treated a wide range of social and labour policy issues. By and large, 
its findings were very much in line with the general development discourse of 
the time. As had been the case for its predecessor in the 1920s – the Committee of 
Experts on Native Labour – the composition of the panel ensured that any topics 
touching upon politically controversial issues concerning official colonial policy 
were kept in the background. Until it was eventually dissolved, the Committee 
remained a gathering of predominantly white men, most of them colonial admin-
istrators and scholars from the colonial metropolises.366
The ILO was also eager not to be too closely involved with the colonial work 
of the United Nations. For instance, the Organization was initially very hesi-
tant to respond positively to requests for collaboration with the United Nations’ 
Trusteeship Council and the new colonial commissions established by ECOSOC, 
because of concerns that the highly “politicized” debates in these bodies might 
easily spill over to the ILO. Thus, when colonial issues finally entered the ILO’s 
discussion during the early post-war years, it was due to the influence of those 
new Asian member States – above all India – that had just cut the ties of colonial 
rule. India’s position within the ILO was exceptional in more than one regard. As 
the only “colonial” member State, it had already gained solid first-hand experi-
ence of the ILO’s policies during the interwar years. Indian representatives to the 
ILC had long argued for a shift of the Organization’s focus from its Eurocentrism 
and its bias towards the problems of industrialized nations of the West to the 
problems and needs of Asian countries.367 The size and the economic potential of 
the country lent credibility to these claims. In financial terms, even before inde-
pendence, India was the ILO’s third-largest contributor, after the United States 
and Great Britain, providing 8% of the Organization’s budget.368 With Japan 
under US military administration and China torn apart by civil war, India natu-
rally assumed the leadership role for the region. What was more, its government 
showed a firm willingness to act not only as the voice of Asia but also as the 
366 Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization, 173–183.
367 Rodgers, “India, the ILO and the Quest for Social Justice”; L. N. Birla and P. P. Pillai, India 
and the ILO (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946).
368 Rodgers, “India, the ILO and the Quest for Social Justice”.
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spearhead of anti-colonialism in the international sphere. India’s declared aim 
was to “decolonize” international organizations.369
Before long, the ILO became one of the major venues for this struggle. A 
 necessary first step in this direction from an Indian perspective was seen in the 
further regionalization of the Organization. After the war, India and China had 
called repeatedly on the ILO to strengthen its “local” structures. During the inter-
war years, the ILO had entertained two contact bureaus in East Asia, in Delhi and 
in Nanjing. Beyond these small outposts, a few visits by ILO officials were the 
only means of direct contact with East Asia. A first step in devoting more atten-
tion to the problems of the Asian continent was to convene an Asian Regional 
 Conference according to the model of the American Regional Conferences in San-
tiago de Chile (1936) and Havana (1939). While this idea had already been raised 
during the tenure of Harold Butler in the 1930s, the outbreak of the Second World 
War had prevented it from being carried out. However, the ILO started to prepare 
for such a meeting as early as 1942. After a preparatory meeting in Delhi in late 
1947, the first official Asian Regional Conference took place in Nuwara Eliya 
(Ceylon) in late December 1949 and early January 1950.
A corresponding effort to reform the ILO’s organizational structures proved to 
be a much more difficult undertaking. First attempts to make the Governing Body 
reflect more accurately the geographical composition of the Organization’s mem-
bership were not successful. It maintained its predominantly Western and indus-
trialized bias, with 12 out of 32 seats occupied by European representatives, and 
additional seats reserved for 11 North and South American countries. Asia, which 
represented about half of the world’s working population, was given only five 
seats. Africa, still mainly under colonial rule, had no representation other than 
that of the white-dominated South Africa. For the time being, the industrialized 
countries remained dominant. In comparison, attempts to push the International 
Labour Office towards a geographically more balanced recruitment policy were 
slightly more successful.370
Indian representatives had long criticized what, in their view, were glaring 
geographical asymmetries in the composition of the ILO’s staff, in particular in 
the higher echelons. The problem was deep-rooted, indeed. During the entire 
period between the wars, only one representative of a non-Western nation – 
Japan  – had reached a senior post in any of the subdivisions of the League of 
Nations system. Even in the lower ranks of the ILO, a staff of about 200 people 
only included a maximum of four Indians. In addition to demanding that this 
369 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 185–187.
370 Maul, Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization, 111–118.
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number be increased significantly at all levels, China and India had together 
begun, during the war, to insist that the symbolically charged post of the Assis-
tant Director-General be filled by an official from Asia. But it would take almost 
four years after Phelan had first sounded out the Asian representatives at the 
Philadelphia Conference before the Indian staff member Raghunath Rao could 
take up this position in March 1948. In the years preceding his appointment, the 
matter had been deferred repeatedly, largely because of British resistance, which 
was based on misgivings about an Assistant Director-General with potentially 
anti-colonial leanings. Change came slowly, and it took the accelerating momen-
tum of decolonization during the 1950s before a more balanced geographical rep-
resentation at all levels of the administration gained hold in the ILO.371
The most significant contribution India and the first wave of decoloniza-
tion rendered to the ILO’s programme and structure lay in an entirely different 
field. At the first “preparatory” Asian Regional Conference in Delhi in 1947, Asian 
states argued for more than just better representation in the Organization. What 
countries like India or Burma, which had just freed themselves from colonial 
 domination, demanded was, above all, assistance in overcoming their state of 
underdevelopment. As the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated in his 
opening address to the Delhi Conference, he wanted the ILO to become a broker 
of knowledge and expertise for the developing countries, an institution that 
would organize the transfer and re-distribution of resources from the Western 
industrialized countries to the South. The appeals by Nehru and others who 
spoke in the same vein were founded both on moral and practical arguments. 
The ILO should, in their minds, help the developing countries to overcome their 
colonial past and, at the same time, respond to the growing interdependence in 
the new post-colonial world economy. In practical terms, this would imply for 
the ILO to shift its attention to building up the poorer countries’ national econo-
mies, supporting their efforts towards industrialization and rural development, 
and providing technical expertise in order to raise productivity and develop a 
modern labour force. The voices from Asia were echoed in Latin America, where 
Regional Conferences in Mexico City (1946) and Montevideo (1949) took up on 
the demands for international economic security and socio-economic rights that 
had been expressed during the pre-war period and taken up by the Philadelphia 
Declaration. Those appeals were reinforced by calls for a more practical outlook 
in the Organization’s work, which originated from an entirely different angle.372
371 Ibid.
372 Asian Regional Conference I (1947), Record of Proceedings, Rep X, 1–6.
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From Reconstruction to Development
While the ILO broadened its horizon beyond Europe and the Americas, it took 
the first steps to establish itself as an operational agency through an expansion 
of its technical assistance work. As previous chapters have shown, the ILO had 
already, during the interwar years, built expertise and sent out technical assis-
tance missions to Latin America, South-Eastern Europe, and, in some cases, 
even to Asia and Northern Africa. As a recent study on the League of Nations has 
pointed out, a “vision of development as an interventionist project of system-
atic socio- economic transformation” had already taken hold, which was also true 
for the ILO. What the post-war era experienced, then, was less of the “birth of 
development” but rather the “re-actualisation of global development policy as it 
had been formulated and practised in the prior decades”.373 If anything, the war 
had helped to strengthen the ILO’s commitment to position itself as an unique 
source of technical knowledge. The Philadelphia Declaration had mandated the 
ILO to lend its services both to the post-war reconstruction effort in Europe and 
to “promote the economic and social advancement of the less developed regions 
of the world”.374 Both parts of this mandate implicitly called for the expansion of 
the Organization’s practical activities.
Yet, it was only the particular historical context of the immediate post-war 
period that helped to translate this mandate into action. Pressure on the ILO to 
expand its operational activities – even when this meant downplaying the sig-
nificance of the Organization’s “classical” standard-setting activities – came 
from various sources. In addition to the growing demands from Asian and Latin 
American countries, a significant impulse derived from shifts in the domestic 
and foreign policy of the United States, where a Republican-dominated Congress 
began to roll back on New Deal policies. In the ILO, the changing climate was felt 
through the increasingly critical attitude of US officials towards standard-setting, 
not to speak about the openly hostile tone which representatives of US business 
adopted towards the ILO at the end of the 1940s.375
373 Frey, Kunkel, and Unger, “Introduction: International Organizations, Global Development, 
and the Making of the Contemporary World”, 7.
374 ILO, Declaration of Philadelphia.
375 Discussions on the Freedom of Association Convention, 1948 (No. 87) were a case in point. 
At the same time that the Convention was adopted by the ILC, the Taft-Hartley Act curtailed 
trade union rights in the US. See Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A Century of Ameri-
can Labor. Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2002), 115–122.
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At the same time, the beginning aid under the American Marshall Plan – 
officially the European Recovery Programme (ERP) – gave a positive boost to the 
expansion of the technical assistance functions of the ILO. In June 1947, Washing-
ton offered its European allies (including those governments in the Soviet zone 
of influence) support for reconstruction through a broad-based ERP. The Soviet 
refusal, and that of its allied countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland, led to 
the foundation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 
which was given the task of administering US aid. The United States urged the 
ILO to make its technical expertise in vocational training and its knowledge of 
statistical data on labour deficits and surpluses available to the newly created 
organization. It became clear soon afterwards that, from now on, any ILO partic-
ipation in European reconstruction would be conditional on its cooperation with 
the OEEC.376
It was against this backdrop that a long-anticipated change at the helm of the 
ILO took place. In June 1948, the Governing Body elected the 40-year-old acting 
US Secretary of Labour, David Abner Morse, as the new  Director-General of the 
International Labour Office. Before his transfer to Geneva, Morse had devoted 
almost the whole of his professional life to issues related to labour and social 
policy, first on a national and then on an international level. His work for New Deal 
agencies that were engaged with the wider field of labour law during the 1930s 
qualified him for assignments during the Second World War. During those years, 
Morse, as head of various US military departments occupied with labour affairs, 
was the main official responsible for drafting plans for the re- democratization of 
labour relations, and in particular the re-building of free trade unions in Italy and 
Germany. Like those of many other liberal New Dealers, Morse’s domestic and 
wartime experiences informed his later activities in the international arena. Upon 
his return to the United States in 1946, Morse was appointed (the first) Assistant 
Secretary of Labor for International Affairs by President Truman. In this capacity, 
Morse built on his wartime experience and became instrumental in turning the 
Department of Labour into an instrument of American foreign policy. In 1947, one 
of his main tasks had been to secure the support of the AFL and CIO, as well as 
their European allies, for the implementation of the Marshall Plan. Morse had also 
been an early advocate of extending the policies behind the Marshall Plan beyond 
Europe. He was thus involved in the debates preceding the announcement of Tru-
man’s Point IV Program in January 1949, in which this idea would become clearer. 
The main reason why the  American government pushed for Morse’s appointment 
376 On the OEEC, see in particular Mathieu Leimgruber and Matthias Schmelzer, eds., The OECD 
and the International Political Economy since 1948 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
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was undoubtedly the hope that he would be able to use his position to generate 
support for the Marshall Plan and early international development policies, both 
of which implied a massive expansion of the ILO’s technical services.377
It was in the tense atmosphere of growing Cold War animosities that Morse 
started his first months in office. The new Director-General, during his first term 
in office, did indeed stay in close touch with the State Department on a whole 
range of issues. A key element of the discussions was the way in which Morse 
could best make use of his position to overcome scepticism towards the Mar-
shall Plan and fears of US dominance that it generated. According to his own 
recollection, one of Morse’s first official actions was to organize, together with 
the US Secretary of Commerce, Averell Harriman, a meeting with Leon Jouhaux 
and the French Minister of Finances, Paul Ramadier. In this meeting, Morse and 
Harriman explained to their French counterparts the significance of the Mar-
shall Plan, from the American perspective, as a measure to counter communist 
advances in Europe.378
In late 1948, Morse gave his first programmatic speech to the Governing 
Body, in which he called for measures to first consolidate and then systematically 
expand all ILO technical activities related to “manpower”. His move was coordi-
nated with the OEEC, which, at its founding conference earlier in the year, had 
suggested a role for the ILO in European reconstruction precisely in this area, as 
well as in the international coordination of labour migration.379 By the time Morse 
addressed the Governing Body, the debate on technical assistance had already 
began to significantly widen beyond the European context. Shortly afterwards, in 
January 1949, in the inauguration speech of his second term in office, also known 
as the Four Points Speech, President Truman made the case for an expansion 
of the Marshall Plan to the non-European world. Under Point IV he pledged to 
provide the underdeveloped regions of the world with technological resources 
and expert know-how to help them increase their productivity. As in the  Marshall 
Plan, the goal of increased productivity was at the centre of the programme, 
377 All biographical information is based on my own research in the David A. Morse Papers 
(DAMP), MC097, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections (RBSC), 
Princeton University Library, and the ILO Archives in Geneva (ILOA). See also Daniel Maul, 
‘Morse, David Abner’ in IO-BIO, Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International 
Organizations, ed. Reinalda, Kille, and Eisenberg, www.ru.nl/fm/iobio.
378 The OHIM collection is kept in the Archives of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library 
& Museum, NARA, Independence, MO. Three different interviews were recorded with Morse in 
1977: on July 25, July 30, and August 3. Concerning the meeting with Jouhaux and Ramadier, 
see OHIM, 30 July, 1977, 110. Transcripts of these interviews are available online: https://www.
trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/morse.htm.
379 Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 210.
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and this provided an angle for the ILO to become directly attached to it.380 In his 
speech, Truman had expressly proposed the UN system as the channel to provide 
such technical support, as this would allow the financial burden to be shared 
and avoid the kind of political criticism in the recipient countries that could be 
expected when funds came directly from the United States.381
In the wake of Truman’s speech, Morse had made sure that the US govern-
ment was aware of the ILO’s readiness to play an active part in the implementa-
tion of the Point IV Program. As early as November 1948, on the eve of Morse’s trip 
to India for the Asian Regional Conference, he received the assurance of Secretary 
of State George Marshall that the US government rated very highly the possible 
contribution of the ILO for “aggressive social and economic action” in the struggle 
against communism.382 Shortly afterwards, the State Department supplied Morse 
with a memorandum confirming that the ILO and its so-called “Manpower Pro-
gramme” were, from an American point of view, the best suited agency to provide 
technical assistance.383 Finally, in January 1949, after Truman’s speech, Morse 
contacted the new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to remind him that the ILO 
could make a real contribution to the defensive battle against communism by 
providing help to underdeveloped regions of the world. As he pointed out, the 
ILO’s project of a programme of technical assistance for European reconstruction 
fitted “completely into the policy laid down by the president”, and he assured 
Acheson that the Organization was “available for maximum cooperation”.384
It was agreed that the ILO should initially receive one million US dollars from 
the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which was the body responsi-
ble for the distribution of funds under the Marshall Plan, for a model project in 
the field of vocational training. This procedure caused some uneasiness, both 
among representatives of the trade unions and among European governments. 
For example, Leon Jouhaux, chairman of the Workers’ group in the Governing 
Body, expressed concern that the Technical Assistance Programme (TAP) could 
380 Charles Maier, “The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Eco-
nomic Policy after World War II”, International Organization 31, no. 4 (1977): 607–633.
381 Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in 
Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 43–49.
382 Marshall to Morse 24 November 1948, quoted in Maul, Human Rights, Development, and 
Decolonization, 126.
383 The internal memorandum anticipated the Point IV Program and emphasized the funda-
mental importance of the role that international organizations would play in it. The ILO was 
deemed to be the furthest ahead of all the international organizations in terms of technical assis-
tance, together with FAO and WHO.
384 David Morse to Dean Acheson 31 January 1949 quoted in Maul, Human Rights, Development, 
and Decolonization, 127.
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cause the ILO to fall under the control of the United States.385 In addition, at 
that stage, the representatives of many European trade union organizations still 
feared that this policy would further advance the disintegration of the WFTU, 
which, virtually from the beginning, had experienced a bitter controversy among 
its members about the Marshall Plan.386
By 1949, however, the WFTU started to unravel. In October 1949, the bulk of 
the non-communist trade unions broke with the WFTU and set up the Interna-
tional Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The US trade unions partici-
pated in the new international, which duly gained a similar qualified majority – 
or monopoly – position in the ILO’s Workers group as the one the IFTU had before 
the war. For David Morse, this meant that the turbulence in the Workers’ group 
during the interlude of the WFTU from 1945 to 1949 was finally over.387
The early history of the TAP was thus in more than one way closely embed-
ded in a Cold War context. There can be hardly a doubt that Morse did intend 
using technical assistance to turn the ILO into a more effective instrument for the 
Western camp and to put the Organization’s activities on the front line of the con-
flict with the Soviet Union. It was no coincidence that one of the first countries 
outside of the ERP framework that would profit from the Manpower Programme 
was Tito’s Yugoslavia, which had just broken with Stalin and become a dissident 
within the Eastern bloc.388
The looming Cold War provided the background for the discussions in a 
second area where the ILO aimed to contribute to European reconstruction: the 
regulation of international migration. Migration, obviously, was not a new field 
for the ILO. During the interwar years, the Organization had been occupied first 
with the social integration of refugees and later with promoting the interna-
tional coordination of labour migration as a means to counter the effects of the 
Great Depression. After 1945, the issue had returned to the agenda with renewed 
urgency. The demobilization of millions of soldiers aggravated existing labour 
surpluses built up in many countries during the war, and their re-integration in 
the labour market posed a significant challenge. In addition, millions of so-called 
displaced persons, who were often unable or unwilling to return to their countries 
of origin, were stuck in places where they could not find work. At the same time, 
385 OHIM, 30 July 1977, 109.
386 Anthony Carew, “A False Dawn: The World Federation of Trade Unions (1945–1949)”, in The 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ed. Carew et al., 165–187. With regard to the 
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Carew, American Labour’s Cold War Abroad, 58–64.
387 Ibid.
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From Reconstruction to Development   149
there was massive demand for skilled labour in Latin America and in countries 
like Australia, which underwent processes of economic expansion and industri-
alization. In this context, Morse renewed the ILO’s interwar claim to become the 
central international agency for both the study and regulation of migration.389 
Unlike before the war, in 1948, there were several organizations that took an inter-
est in the migration issue. Next to the ILO, the United Nations, UNESCO, the WHO, 
the FAO and the World Bank participated in the debate. There was, however, no 
coordination of the efforts of these organizations, and none of them had the ILO’s 
prior experience. Morse, accordingly, took the initiative, and the ILO began to 
set up field missions in potential emigration countries such as Italy, Germany, 
and Austria and send pilot missions to two potential recipient countries in Latin 
America (Ecuador and Bolivia).390
In the end, however, all these initiatives came to almost nothing. At the time, 
as today, migration turned out to be a highly politicized, if not toxic, issue. Some 
European nations – in particular those with a long tradition of overseas emigra-
tion, such as Italy – appreciated the role that “planned and organised emigration” 
could play as a “safety valve” to avoid large-scale unemployment, and they wel-
comed the ILO’s endeavours. A majority of governments, however, opposed the 
idea of an international body interfering with their own domestic immigration 
policies, for political as well as for economic reasons. The concern that migration 
from poor countries would lower the standards at home was common also among 
trade unions.391
With regard to refugees and displaced persons, apprehensions were particu-
larly strong from the government side. The situation was in a way quite paradox-
ical. Even though most participants in the discussion – governments,  employers, 
and trade unions – agreed that the coordination of international migration was 
a crucial factor in the reconstruction of the world economy, very few were pre-
pared to compromise their national prerogatives and transfer responsibility 
and  decision-making power to an international body. While few questioned the 
technical competence of the ILO in the field, the political considerations, exac-
erbated by the deepening divide between East and West, eventually outweighed 
this aspect. At the International Migration Conference in Naples in 1951, it was 
particularly the lack of support from the United States that eventually brought 
the project down. At the height of McCarthyism, fears of communist infiltration 
loomed large and prevented American officials to enter into any binding agree-
389 Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 220–234.
390 Ibid.
391 ILO, Record of Proceedings, International Labour Conference, 33rd Session 1950 (Geneva: 
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ments with international organizations whose membership included communist 
countries (in the case of the ILO, these were Poland and Czechoslovakia). In the 
end, a provisional Migration Administration with restricted competences was 
installed at Naples, and the ILO ended up with the minor task of providing tech-
nical assistance in the field of vocational training. In hindsight, it was the last 
nail in the coffin of the ILO’s high-flying ambitions in this field. What remained 
from the ILO’s engagement with international migration was a Convention (The 
Migration for Employment Convention, No. 97), and a Recommendation (No. 86) 
with the same title, adopted by the ILC in 1949. In the end, both dealt predomi-
nantly with technical matters related to migration and the treatment of migrants 
with regard to salaries, hours of work, and training, but the ILO’s involvement 
was devoid of any aspects of international regulation of labour migration.392
Viewed from a different angle and against the backdrop of the impending 
Cold War, the failed claim to become an international agency for international 
migration provided the ILO with yet another reason to redirect its attention from 
the European scene towards the developing countries. However, the Cold War 
only provided one part of the story. Equally important was the fact that the ILO’s 
leadership decided to respond to a genuine demand and a growing number of 
voices from member States asking the Organization to pay attention to the prob-
lems of the non-European world. Discussions with various ILO correspondents 
and representatives of Latin American and Asian countries, in particular, had 
given the new Director-General an idea of both the existing need and the huge 
potential for success of technical assistance activities tailored to the requisites of 
the less developed regions of the world. The conflict between East and West also 
added a sense of urgency to these considerations, in particular in China after the 
Communist Party, in 1949, had emerged victorious from the protracted Chinese 
civil war and given the fact that a similar conflict was looming on the Korean 
peninsula.
This was the setting in which Morse proposed to the ILC in 1949 to transform 
the ILO into an agency serving the specific needs of “underdeveloped nations”. The 
Office, he declared, favoured the change because it sought “to continue to persist 
in ensuring that its work is of the utmost practical value to all State Members and 
not merely to certain groups among them”. This statement, of course, directly 
addressed the sense of neglect that wide regions of the world had felt about the 
work of the ILO in the past. Morse declared that the Organization had understood 
that there was an enormous demand for industrialization, increased production, 
and improved living standards for wide swathes of the world’s population. He 
392 The sole opposition to the Conventions came from the communist countries.
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offered support and assistance in implementing vocational training, increasing 
the productivity of labour, introducing modern methods of labour protection, and 
organizing labour relations. Morse’s promises were received with enthusiasm by 
a great number of Asian and Latin American representatives at the Conference.393
In his report to the Asian Regional Conference in Nuwara Eliya at the end of 
1949, Morse declared Asia to be the new focus of ILO activities. He later assured 
the meeting that the “cry of misery that rises from the throats of the millions of 
people of Asia” had been heard in Geneva.394 In a greeting message to the Con-
ference, Nehru praised the ILO for following up on the promises of the Decla-
ration through concrete action, and a Ceylonese Workers’ representative echoed 
the general mood, when he applauded the fact that the “ILO has at last realized 
its duties to this so far neglected continent”.395 The Cold War aspect of the ILO’s 
transformation was not ignored by the participants, but while those who were 
leaning towards the Western camp in any case welcomed the TAP as a means of 
containing the advance of Communism in Asia, other countries – such as India, 
Burma, and Indonesia –which took a neutral stand, remained largely silent on 
the issue. A Philippine representative deliberately called upon the industrialized 
nations of the West to “pour their resources into this part of their world”, thus 
establishing a security that “no force of arms can conquer”.396 In this way, the 
potential recipients used the programme’s anti-communist thrust to intensify 
their demands on the prospective donor countries.
It was against this background that the ILO, at the turn from 1949 to 1950, 
officially became an agency for development.397 In this, it did not of course act in 
isolation, as plans for a coordinated approach to development by the entire UN 
system had existed in the General Assembly and in ECOSOC even before Truman’s 
initiative. In 1948, an ECOSOC resolution had created a number of regional com-
missions devoted to the economic and social problems of developing countries. 
In March 1949, ECOSOC passed another resolution calling upon the Secretary 
General to come up with a coordinated programme for the provision of technical 
assistance to underdeveloped nations.398 Negotiations within the United Nations 
393 ILO, Record of Proceedings, Rep. I: Report of the Director General, International Labour Con-
ference, 32nd Session 1949 (Geneva: ILO, 1949), 3.
394 See, in particular, the section “The ILO and Asia” in Asian Regional Conference II (1950), 
Record of Proceedings, Rep. I: Report of the Director-General, 137–153.
395 Asian Regional Conference II (1950), Record of Proceedings, 81.
396 Ibid., 115.
397 ILO, Minutes of the Governing Body, 109th Session, Geneva 1949, 60–64.
398 The first of these institutions, created at the beginning of 1947, was the Economic Commis-
sion for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE, today known as ESCAP). It was followed just over a year 
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Figure 8: ILO Director-General David Morse with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru at the 
Fourth Asian Regional Conference, New Delhi, India, 1957.
on the design of such a programme, which included the ILO, were carried on 
through all of 1949. In 1950, the ILO became one of the executive organs of the 
new UN Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA), which subse-
quently financed the majority of TAP projects. Morse and the heads of the other 
institutions involved in EPTA (FAO, WHO, and six other UN specialized agencies) 
later by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, today known as ECLAC). ECOSOC 
Resolution 180 (VIII), 3 Apr. 1949, Technical Assistance for Economic Development.
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now met on the Technical Assistance Board (TAB) to discuss the allocation of 
funds. The TAP was thus part of the broader framework of UN development activ-
ities. From the ILO’s point of view, this had the advantage that it removed (or at 
least obscured) the strong external connection to US foreign policy aims that the 
initial turn towards technical assistance had implied. It helped to soften concerns 
within and outside the ILO that technical assistance would be synonymous with 
increased US influence on the Organization’s policies. 
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During the long era of David Morse (1948–1970), the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) underwent a profound transformation. The Cold War and 
decolonization were the two main drivers behind this process, which changed 
the ILO’s face and its internal power balance and left hardly any area of its 
work untouched. The year 1954 proved to be an important milestone in this 
regard. One year after Stalin’s death, the Soviet Union took up its member-
ship again. As a result, the ILO no longer occupied the status of a quasi-front 
organization in the Western camp.399 While this change “normalized” the ILO’s 
position within the UN system, fundamental controversies now reappeared 
directly on the agenda, including the question of the ILO’s tripartite compo-
sition. The confrontation with the alternative social model of the communist 
bloc forced the ILO to continuously examine its foundations and search for a 
workable balance between the quest for universalism and conflicting ideas of 
social organization.400
At the same time, during the “Morse era”, the ILO underwent another trans-
formation that was at least as drastic. As a result of the accelerated dissolution 
of the European colonial empires in Asia and Africa, it gained more than twice 
the number of member States within a period of two decades – from 55 coun-
tries in 1948 to 121 in 1970. This growth in membership was almost exclusively 
accounted for by former colonies.401 From the 1960s onwards, “developing coun-
tries” formed a majority of the ILO’s member States. This was a strong incentive 
for the Organization to adapt its profile, policies, and programmes to the needs 
and demands of these countries. It pushed the ILO to further expand its techni-
cal functions and to place an evermore pronounced emphasis on development. 
On another level, decolonization contributed to the further “politicization” of the 
ILO’s meetings. The struggle of the new nations against the last remnants of colo-
nial rule and racist regimes in Southern Africa hit the Organization during the 
1950s and the 1960s with full force.
The dynamics that drove the ILO during this period resulted to a large degree 
from the entanglement and overlap of Cold War and decolonization debates. 
This became most apparent in the area of standard-setting, where human rights 
399 Together with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia were ad-
mitted as independent members in accordance with the UN formula in place, which strength-
ened the position of the Eastern bloc. Morse’s negotiations with the Soviet leaders are recorded 
in ILOA MF Z 5/1/64/1, Re-admission USSR, 1954, 1961. See also Cox, “ILO–Limited Monarchy”, 
105–106.
400 Daniel Roger Maul, “The ‘Morse Years’: The ILO 1948–1970”, in ILO Histories, ed. Van Daele 
et al., 365–400.
401 Ghébali, The International Labour Organization, 119–120
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issues assumed a prominent role particularly during the 1950s. In the discus-
sions about the adoption and implementation of standards on freedom of asso-
ciation, forced labour, and discrimination, initial controversies along the East–
West divide increasingly developed into parallel debates along the conflict line 
between the industrial nations of the West and an emerging group of countries 
from the global South.
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5 The Development Turn
With the expansion of its technical assistance, the massive changes that the ILO 
underwent as a result of decolonization became very tangible. After moderate 
beginnings in the 1950s, the area that became known as “technical cooperation” 
outgrew during the 1960s and 1970s all other areas by far. At the same time, the 
ILO’s move from limited technical assistance to large-scale technical cooperation 
affected virtually all the ILO’s fields of action. By turning into an agency of techni-
cal cooperation, the ILO eventually lost its European bias. The Organization took 
on a much more global face, and its operational efforts became more and more 
directed towards the needs of less industrialized countries.
To be sure, the ILO did not pursue this transition in isolation. Just like other 
international agencies at the time, it acted as a part of the United Nations’ growing 
development machinery.402 At the same time, driven by strategic considerations, 
by its constituents and by inter-agency competition, the ILO sought to develop 
its own profile. Two major programmes serve to illustrate this point: the Andean 
Indian Programme (AIP) of the 1950s and 1960s, and the World Employment Pro-
gramme (WEP) launched on the occasion of the ILO’s 50th anniversary in 1969. 
Both programmes reflected general trends in development thinking at the time. 
Through the WEP, in particular, the ILO took a lead in this discussion and was 
instrumental for a short-lived – but nevertheless major – turn in development 
thinking towards poverty-centred approaches during the 1970s.
 Help Them Move the ILO Way – Technical Assistance  
in the 1950s
When the ILO’s technical assistance activities began to take off in the early 1950s, 
they essentially consisted of building labour force capacities by means of vocational 
training or projects aimed at raising workers’ productivity. During the 1950s, the 
working area of “human resources” accordingly occupied around 75% of all Tech-
402 Corinna R. Unger, International Development. A Post-War History (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic Publishing, 2018); Frey, Kunkel, and Unger, “Introduction: International Organiza-
tions, Global Development, and the Making of the Contemporary World”; Richard Jolly et al., UN 
Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice, United Nations Intellectual History Project 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004).
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nical Assistance Programmes (TAP).403 Vocational training schemes alone, with a 
clear direction to support developing countries’ efforts towards industrialization, 
accounted for around half of the ILO’s technical assistance activities in this period.404 
Even in the 1960s, when the ILO’s programmes underwent a substantial reform, 
and services stretched more widely to include agriculture and fields like workers’ 
education and management training, the development of “human resources”, with 
vocational training at its core, remained at the heart of technical cooperation.405
The early TAP’s heavy industrial bias can easily be explained by the general 
context of its beginnings. Originally the departure into technical assistance had 
been an extension of the 1948 Manpower Programme, tailored to the needs of 
war-torn Europe and focused on industrial training.406 The relative insignificance 
of rural development, in turn, had to do with the fact that agricultural train-
ing was the prerogative of the FAO, which was also funded through the United 
Nations’ EPTA. In general, however, the industrial focus simply reflected the pre-
vailing view of development policy. Within the “dualistic” approach of a first gen-
eration of development economists like W. Arthur Lewis, the central dynamic of 
development was a movement of underdeveloped societies from the traditional 
to the modern, or industrial, sector. Only the latter could lead to productivity and 
growth and thus to an improvement in the standard of living.407 The task of devel-
opment agencies, both national and international, was to support and accelerate 
such a modernization process. The TAP’s focus on “manpower” fits perfectly with 
the dualistic vision. The general opinion was that through training workers the 
ILO contributed significantly to industrialization and increased productivity.408
The new programmatic orientation was accompanied by substantial changes on 
the level of the International Labour Office, where staff became more diverse, both in 
terms of expertise and geographical distribution. Recruitment strategies had already 
started to change under Harold Butler in the 1930s, and this change accelerated as a 
403 The other areas were “living conditions” and “social institutions”. The latter included also 
the ILO’s activities in the field of cooperatives. On the evolution of the ILO’s Technical Assistance 
Programme, see Ghébali, The International Labour Organisation, 242–267.
404 ILO, “The Role of the ILO in the Promotion of Economic Expansion and Social Progress in 
Developing Countries” (Geneva: ILO, 1961); ILO, A Great Adventure of our Time. International 
Co-operation and the ILO (Geneva: ILO, 1962), 36.
405 The Governing Body confirmed in 1965 that all the ILO’s technical activities would fall under 
the three main headings of (1) human resources, (2) development of social institutions, and (3) 
improvement of working and living conditions.
406 See, e.g.: “The I.L.O. Manpower Programme”, International Labour Review, 59, no. 4 (April 
1949): 367–393.
407 Unger, International Development, 109.
408 Ibid., 70–71.
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result of the extended economic mandate the ILO had received in Philadelphia: econ-
omists and social scientists started to represent a much larger proportion of the ILO’s 
staff. The sheer quantity of operations in the 1950s drove another change. While the 
technical assistance missions of the interwar period had been conducted mostly by 
ILO officials, the Organization now relied to a much greater degree on the services of 
external experts. Between 1950 and 1965, the ILO sent almost 2,000 experts from a 
total of 78 nations on 3,000 expert missions to around 100 countries.409
Moreover, the geographical composition of the International Labour Office 
underwent significant change. Under Morse, senior posts were filled with nation-
als from Asian and African countries. One prominent example was Abbas Amar, a 
former Egyptian Minister of Education and of Social Affairs. He was recruited by 
Morse and occupied the post of Assistant Director-General from 1959 to 1974. Albert 
Tévoédjrè, a former Minister of Information from Dahomey (Benin), would follow 
in 1965 as the first member in the Director-General’s Office from sub- Saharan 
Africa.410 On another level, technical assistance also contributed to the further 
geographical decentralization of the ILO. Between 1949 and 1952, field offices were 
set up in Asia (Bangalore), Latin America (Sao Paulo), and, for the Middle East, 
Istanbul. In sub-Saharan Africa, which was still under colonial rule, the establish-
ment of ILO regional representation took longer. Fears among colonial officials 
that such an office would turn into a centre of “agitation” and open the door for 
an “internationalization” of colonial affairs prevented the ILO for a long time from 
gaining a foothold on the African continent. Only in 1959, on the eve of the inde-
pendence of numerous African countries, was the Organization able to open its 
first African field office in Lagos, Nigeria.411 The main task of the field offices was to 
facilitate the coordination of technical assistance in their respective regions. This 
process of dispersal continued into the 1960s, with further decentralization of the 
ILO. Between 1965 and 1968, the field offices became area offices, which were in 
turn placed under newly founded Regional Offices, assuming responsibility for all 
the ILO technical cooperation programmes and projects in a particular region.412
Finally, the new activities also affected the ILO’s budget. While the initial 
fears that technical assistance might become the gateway for American domina-
409 Ghébali, The International Labour Organisation, 256.
410 Oral History Interview with David Morse, Oral History Research Office, Columbia University 1981, 
conducted by Peter Jessup, Columbia University, in Washington, D.C., July 1980–March 1981, 122–123.
411 Maul, Puddu, and Tijani, “The International Labour Organization”. For a general overview, 
see also Nicholas Alexander Bernards, “Actors and Entanglements in Global Governance: The 
ILO in Sub-Saharan Africa” (PhD diss., McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, 2016).
412 Ghébali, The International Labour Organisation, 162; Alcock, History of the International 
Labor Organization, 239, 240.
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tion of the ILO soon dissipated, new dependencies arose in other areas. Through 
the EPTA and the so-called Special Fund – another UN source of funding set up 
in 1958 for the purpose of facilitating larger projects – the ILO now had access 
to extra-budgetary sources. At the same time, it increased the ILO’s reliance 
on the United Nations, notably on ECOSOC, which managed these funds. This 
dependency became even more pronounced when the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) was established in 1965. Under the EPTA, the funds 
available in the 1950s had generally fallen short of enabling the ILO to meet all 
the requests it received for technical assistance.413 With the establishment of the 
UNDP, this changed; funds could now be obtained for longer-term development 
programmes, which opened up entirely new opportunities for projects that could 
not be financed through the ILO’s regular budget. At the same time, however, the 
ILO lost a considerable degree of independence, as an increasing proportion of 
ILO work eluded the financial oversight of the Governing Body, which had few 
opportunities to influence the UNDP’s criteria for awarding funds.414
Dependence on UN development policy premises was a weighty, if not the sole, 
reason why the ILO was keen from the outset to put its own recognizable signature 
to its technical activities. The TAP rested on a series of basic principles and ILO- 
specific assumptions that also determined its form. For the architects of the TAP, 
it was above all necessary to counter concerns that the new field of development 
policy would push the “classical” standard-setting activities into the background 
and thus to dilute the ILO’s core identity. To dispel these widespread concerns, 
David Morse started as early as 1949 to promote an ILO-specific integrated approach 
to development. Technical assistance and ILO standards were not seen as opposing 
principles but as concepts that had a catalytic and mutually beneficial effect.415 
The operational activities on which the ILO was about to embark were, with regard 
to standard-setting, “the other half of the same coin”, as the new Director-General 
told the ILC in 1949. Their purpose was, according to Morse, to trigger and sustain a 
process of development in line with the aims of the ILO Constitution.416
413 Among the different recipients of the funds of the United Nations’ technical assistance pro-
gramme, the ILO was only fourth in line, receiving only 11% of the EPTA budget and trailing 
organizations such as UNESCO, WHO, and FAO. In absolute numbers, the ILO was given just over 
US$25 million between 1950 and 1960 under the EPTA, while the FAO received US$68 million, 
the WHO US$45 million, and UNESCO US$35 million. ILO, The Role of the ILO in the Promotion of 
Economic Growth (Geneva: ILO, 1961), 7.
414 Hugo Stokke, “Decent Work. Principles, Policies and Programmes of the International La-
bour Organisation” (PhD diss., University of Bergen, 2015), 136–144.
415 See Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 219.
416 Ibid., 259.
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Such assurances were also meant to dilute more general concerns that the 
ILO, through the TAP, might turn further into an organization primarily following 
an economic rationale. Morse’s emphasis on “productivity” initially fuelled these 
concerns.417 Wedded as the concept of productivity was to American ideas of 
economic progress, it met a fair degree of suspicion, in particular from the trade 
unions. In 1952, Morse explained that, from his point of view, raising productiv-
ity in all economic sectors was the only practicable route to development. But 
he underlined that the ILO’s approach to productivity differed from that of other 
development agencies by recognizing that increased productivity alone did not 
guarantee social progress. Morse promoted a three-pronged approach that took 
into account “the educational, the social and the technical sides” of the issue. He 
pledged that, for the ILO, promoting increased productivity would lead rapidly 
to improvements in economic and social welfare for the community in general. 
Governments, he affirmed, would consider good industrial relations and satis-
factory wages and employment policies not merely as accessory measures but as 
“integral parts of programmes to raise productivity”.418
Underlying the TAP was the basic assumption of modernization theory that 
the developing world had to repeat, in accelerated form, the development of 
industrialized countries.419 “There [is] nothing peculiar to this region”, Morse 
told a press conference on the occasion of the Asian Regional Conference in 
Delhi in 1957: “Asia and India [are] going through a process of economic expan-
sion and development that Western countries [were going] through long ago.” 
The challenges that they faced as a result of this process were “new in Asia, but 
old problems in other countries”.420 In this sense, the ILO’s international labour 
standards, its Constitution, and the principles of the Declaration of Philadelphia 
featured as tools for democratic modernization in the global South. These stand-
ards and values were interpreted and promoted in practice as a set of lessons 
which the liberal democracies of Europe and North America had learned from 
past political and economic crises, which were linked to the development of their 
417 For the debate and Morse’s reply, see ILC (1949), Record of Proceedings, 25–254, 255–264.
418 Memorandum by Morse, “Memorandum on the Report of the Director-General to the 34th 
Session of the International Labour Conference”, quoted in Maul, Human Rights, Development 
and Decolonization, 135.
419 On the political implications of modernization theory, see Michael E. Latham, Moderniza-
tion as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Moderniza-
tion Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).
420 Minutes of a press conference held by Morse in New Delhi, 12 November 1957, quoted in 
Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization, 138.
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own capitalist order in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The historic role 
of the Organization in this endeavour was described by Morse in quasi-religious 
terms: “If it does this the ILO will light a beacon which will guide men and women 
through the uncertain times which lie ahead and give to those whose hearts and 
minds are troubled, confused and afraid a positive faith by which they can work 
and live and a belief in themselves and in their future which will be proof against 
attacks from any quarter.”421
It was thus clear that entering the field of development was by no means a 
politically neutral undertaking. It gave the ILO a key role on one of the major front 
lines of the Cold War which were expanding rapidly beyond Europe to the devel-
oping world. “Change and revolution are sweeping the world today”, Morse wrote 
in 1950, and the ILO was caught up in a “struggle for the hearts and minds of 
men and women the world over”.422 Social unrest and instability caused by rapid 
modernization, Morse argued, were breeding grounds for communist agitation. 
To Morse, the core values of the Declaration of Philadelphia – which combined 
the subordination of all national and international policies to the higher aim 
of social justice for everybody with a “fundamental view of society, of morality 
and of the freedom and dignity of the individual” – were the tools to counter this 
challenge.423 The Cold War undertones of technical assistance were thus part and 
parcel of its very beginnings. After the Soviet Union resumed its membership in 
the ILO in 1954, the statements accompanying technical assistance became less 
confrontational. Yet, what remained unchanged was the persistent claim that 
the ILO represented a particular “integrated” model of development that was of 
 liberal-democratic nature at its core.
During the 1950s, ILO officials went out to promote this approach with almost 
missionary zeal. On his return from Egypt in 1953, Deputy Director-General Jef 
Rens maintained that the changes taking place there and in other countries in 
transition should spur the ILO on to assert its approach in the rapidly advancing 
process of economic development: “This part of the world and similar areas are 
moving – that’s certain”, Rens stated. “Let’s not miss the chance to help them 
move the ILO way.”424
The ways in which the Office went about promoting the “ILO way” of devel-
opment remained nevertheless – not least due to a lack of funding – fairly 
421 Memorandum by Morse, “Memorandum on the Report of the Director-General to the 34th 




424 Quoted in Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization, 139.
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small-scale and indirect. The Organization provided information, advice, and 
practical support, for instance, on how to set up a vocational training centre 
in a specific area, and how to educate local trainers and supervise the creation 
of vocational training institutions in the recipient countries. ILO experts gave 
advice on occupational health and safety as well as on the establishment of 
“healthy” labour relations, and they provided manuals teaching how to write 
standard employment contracts or formulate reasonable wage policies.425 ILO 
projects tended to be small, isolated, selective, and short-term. In Indonesia, in 
1956, an ILO expert was assigned to carrying out a study to determine various 
aspects of the workforce for the Ministry of Labour. In Pakistan, ILO experts 
were supporting staff at the ministry to conduct enquiries on employment and 
potential future demand. The ILO was assisting the establishment of vocational 
training centres in countries like (South) Vietnam, Burma, Libya, Egypt, and 
Nepal.426
The experts who were deployed to provide assistance naturally played an 
important role in the implementation of the programme. Short introductory 
seminars before their departure familiarized them with the objectives and prin-
ciples of the ILO, but it is difficult to determine to which extent these experts 
really internalized the integrated approach to development and put it into prac-
tice. The same can be said of the other method of knowledge transfer used in the 
early stages of the TAP, which was based on education. The ILO awarded study 
grants and arranged for a large number of people from developing countries – 
ranging from skilled workers to future employees in labour administrations – to 
visit industrialized countries for on-the-job training or further education. All 
these projects relied on the assumption that industrial development would 
create the workplaces where the newly acquired skills and knowledge would 
be used.
With the growing scale of activities, a great majority of experts sent to the field 
were not ILO staff but recruited from outside the Organization on the basis of an 
earlier career in the required field. This raised a plethora of new and sometimes 
politically explosive issues: from the use of former colonial officials to charges of 
425 The limited funding available to the ILO in the 1950s necessarily impacted on the efficacy 
of the Organization’s campaign. A typical example was a project in Libya, where the ILO set up a 
vocational education centre; in Iran where the ILO built a specialized vocational training centre 
for the building trade; or India where several small-scale projects aimed at raising productivity 
in selected enterprises of the textile and engineering industry. See ILO, The Role of the ILO in the 
Promotion of Economic Growth.
426 ILO, The ILO and Asia (Geneva: ILO,1962); ILO, The ILO and Africa (Geneva: ILO, 1960).
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favouring Western experts over those from Eastern communist countries to recur-
ring issues of geographical balance.427
An important step on the institutional level in this regard was the founding 
of the International Institute for Labour Studies (IILS) in 1960,428 an autonomous 
body within the Office for research and training that would focus on the socio- 
political problems faced by the developing world. In particular, it wanted to 
establish a working environment in which controversial topics such as industrial 
relations could be discussed apart from the politically charged atmosphere of the 
ILC. Its main purpose, next to research, was “educational action”. IILS courses 
were directed at “potential leaders” from the developing countries’ social sector, 
as Robert Cox, one of the Institute’s first directors, explained. The courses on 
offer covered a wide range of areas, from employment issues to industrial rela-
tions. According to the Institute’s vision, however, it served a broader purpose: 
the world’s future policy makers would go to Geneva, encounter the methods and 
principles of the ILO, and take them back to their home countries.429
In 1964, the ILO set up an International Centre for Advanced Technical and 
Vocational Training in Turin, thus increasing its range of services on the institu-
tional level.430 The courses offered at the Centre were directed first and foremost 
at skilled workers, vocational trainers, and management personnel from devel-
oping countries. The new Centre thus institutionalized an existing area of work, 
but, once again, with the added advantage that its visitors could be given a thor-
ough grounding in the goals of the ILO.431 “In the last analysis”, Morse wrote in 
this regard as early as 1959, “the most and perhaps only effective answer to com-
munism and other antidemocratic forms lies in the success of social and economic 
development complemented with education and training in all of its aspects”.432 
Viewed from another perspective, the establishment of the IILS and the Turin 
Centre were part of a broader trend towards professionalization, driven by the per-
427 For the general debate about the colonial legacy of developmental expertise, see Joseph 
Morgan Hodge, The Triumph of the Expert. Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of 
British Colonialism (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007).
428 Maryse Gaudier, “The International Institute for Labour Studies: Its Research Function, 
 Activities and Publications 1960–2001,” Geneva: ILO, 2001.
429 Memorandum by Robert Cox, “Aims and Purposes of the IILS”, 15 July 1965, quoted in Maul, 
Human Rights, Development and Decolonization, 256; See also a more comprehensive analysis of 
the IILS functions Robert Cox, “Education for Development”, International Organization 23, no. 
1 (1968): 310–331.
430 The opening was made possible by a grant from the Italian government, which offered the 
premises of the Italia 61 exhibition built on the occasion of the centenary of Italian unity in 1961.
431 Ghébali, The International Labour Organisation, 258.
432 Quoted in Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization, 223.
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ception that “more scientific” approaches were necessary to gain credibility, both 
with the public and vis-à-vis other organizations carrying out similar functions.433
Indigenous Labour and the Andean Indian Programme
While much of the ILO’s technical work way until the 1960s was of rather limited 
scope due to the lack of funding, the new working area of “indigenous labour” 
paved the way to a broader vision of modernization beyond development. Here, 
an entirely new field opened up for the ILO after 1945, including both technical 
433 Unger, International Development, 74–75.
Figure 9: Training course in car mechanics, International Training Centre of the ILO, Turin, 1960s.
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assistance and standard-setting. While the “Andean Indian Program” (1953–1962) 
provided the framework for one of the ILO’s largest development aid project of 
all times, two Conventions on indigenous populations (1957) and on indigenous 
peoples (1989) were pioneering instruments that made indigenous peoples and 
their rights, for the first time, a subject of international law.434
The original interest of the ILO for the concerns of indigenous peoples resulted 
from the opening of the Organization towards Latin America in the late 1930s. Until 
then, the term “indigenous labour” (or native labour) had almost exclusively been 
used with colonial connotations. The living conditions of indigenous peoples as cul-
turally identifiable groups within independent states had not yet caught the attention 
of the ILO. At the ILO’s first two American Regional Conferences in Santiago de Chile 
(1936) and Havana (1939), ILO officials came into contact with the  continent-wide 
political and academic movement of “indigenismo”, which promoted the “uplifting” 
and ultimately assimilation of indigenous populations with their respective national 
societies. In Santiago, the ILO had already been urged to pay special attention to the 
economic and social problems of indigenous populations. Through its subsequent 
collaboration with indigenist institutions such as the Instituto Indigenista Interamer-
icano in Mexico City, the ILO soon gained a reputation of being the “International 
Indigenist Organization”. Thus, the “Indian problem” had already become an inte-
gral part of the ILO agenda well before the Second World War. After 1945, it turned 
into a priority of the ILO’s regional work in Latin America.435
Equipped with new opportunities for socio-economic and development 
action after 1945, the ILO received a mandate from the American Regional Con-
ferences in Mexico City (1946) and Montevideo (1949) to set up an Indigenous 
Labour Programme. Deputy Director-General Jef Rens, who oversaw the ILO’s 
technical assistance activities at the Office level, and the Argentine economist and 
anthropologist David Efron became the main persons responsible for the move of 
the ILO into the area of indigenous labour. The establishment of a Committee 
of Experts on Indigenous Labour, chaired by renowned New Zealand anthropol-
ogist Ernest Beaglehole, initiated the practical phase of the indigenous labour 
programme in 1950. A report entitled “Indigenous Peoples: Living and Working 
Conditions of Aboriginal Population in Independent Countries” was the most 
important outcome of the Committee’s two meetings in La Paz (1951) and Geneva 
434 Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107) and the Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169). Luis Rodríguez-Piñero, Indigenous Peoples; Hanne Hagtvedt 
Vik, “Indigenous Internationalism”, in Internationalisms: A Twentieth Century History, ed. Sluga and 
Clavin, 315–339. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Jason Guthrie, “The ILO and the Inter-
national Technocratic Class, 1944–1966”, in Globalizing Social Rights, ed. Kott and Droux, 115–136.
435 Rodríguez-Piñero, Indigenous Peoples, 53–112.
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(1954). It included a set of guidelines for the gradual integration of indigenous 
groups into “modern” society under a broad development policy premise, as well 
as measures to attenuate this process from an anthropological point of view.436
The undisputed centrepiece of all activities was the Andean Programme (also 
known as the Andean Indian Programme, AIP), which was officially launched in 
1953. After becoming part of the EPTA, the ILO was given the lead by the ECOSOC 
to prepare the ground – together with WHO, UNESCO, FAO, and the Organization 
of American States (OAS) – for a tailor-made development project in the three 
Andean countries of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, which had a high proportion 
of indigenous populations.437 The AIP consisted of three phases. During the first 
phase, so-called action bases were set up in selected locations in all three coun-
tries that would serve as pilot projects for the expansion of the programme in 
the second phase. During the third and final phase, the programmes were to be 
transferred to the respective national governments, while, at the same time, the 
AIP was to be extended to other countries in the region.
436 For the report, see ILO, Indigenous Peoples: Living and Working Conditions of Aboriginal Pop-
ulations in Independent Countries, Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 35 (Geneva: ILO, 1953).
437 Martin Breuer, “Exploring the Technical Assistance Activities of the International Labor Or-
ganization in the Field of Indigenous Peoples: Development and Human Rights in the Andean 
Indian Program (1954–1968)”, Forum for Inter-American Research 11, no. 3 (2018): 110–123.
Figure 10: Jef Rens, Deputy Director-General of the ILO, visiting the cooperative in Huana Pasto 
Grande, Ecuador, in the framework of the Andean Indian programme (AIP).
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Under the leadership of the ILO, the AIP became a laboratory for the “inter-
national technocratic class”, which had set itself the task of leading “backward” 
and “underdeveloped societies” into the modern age by using methods of social 
engineering.438 The broad design of the programme, which included questions 
of nutrition, health, and education, in addition to employment creation and 
vocational training, reflected not only the specific competencies of the partici-
pating international institutions but also the overriding, integrated moderniza-
tion approach. The bases for action included the installation of ILO projects, such 
as vocational training centres and productivity programmes, a WHO medical 
clinic, a UNESCO-run agricultural school, and an agricultural research station 
led by the FAO. The same integrated approach reappeared in the 1957 Conven-
tion, which in its various aspects extended well beyond indigenous labour and 
included socio-medical, educational, and other aspects of comprehensive mod-
ernization.439 All action for indigenous populations was, in line with the indige-
nist spirit of the time, aimed at the integration and ultimately full assimilation of 
indigenous groups, per se defined as backward and underdeveloped. The treat-
ment of the “indigenous question” reflected the perceived roles of international 
organizations as “global civilizers” that shaped the first development policy ini-
tiatives of the UN system at large.440 There was no room for the recognition of 
cultural diversity or the autonomy of indigenous peoples. Such an understanding 
would emerge only gradually during the 1970s in the wake of a growing move-
ment towards “indigenous internationalism”. ILO discussions reflected this 
changing approach. It eventually found its expression in the Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169) of 1989, which removed all the integrationist 
undertones of the 1957 standard. At the same time, this Convention for the first 
time introduced the notion of “indigenous people” as a legal term in an interna-
tional instrument.441
The balance for the AIP was mixed, with success and failure about equally 
distributed. The programme received much praise during its initial phase and, 
as of 1957, was extended to Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, and Chile. Around 
the same time, however, it already began to lose its dynamics. With the pro-
gress of decolonization speeding up in Asia and Africa in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, the main focus of UN development work gradually shifted to these 
438 Guthrie, “The ILO and the International Technocratic Class, 1944–1966”, 115.
439 Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107).
440 Dykmann, “Only with the Best Intentions: International Organizations as Global Civilizers”.
441 Hagtvedt Vik, “Indigenous Internationalism”.
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regions. In addition, the intended handover of the AIP to the national govern-
ments proved difficult. The regionally integrated aspect of the programme was 
frequently not easy to maintain in the face of economic and political instability, 
financial problems, and diverging governmental priorities. These factors explain 
why, although the AIP was one of the most ambitious projects of technical coop-
eration that the ILO has ever embarked on, it eventually fell into oblivion.442
At a different level, however, the AIP had far-reaching implications for the 
ILO. It consolidated the ILO’s reputation in the field of indigenous labour more 
generally and prepared the ground for its reputation to be one of the leading 
international institutions in the field to the present day. In retrospect, the AIP, 
as well as the resulting normative work on indigenous labour, was significant 
in an even broader sense. It helped to consolidate the position of the ILO as a 
development agency and reaffirmed the self-perception among the “develop-
ment politicians” in the Organization, who saw their mandate not limited to the 
field of vocational training. The way in which the ILO defined its scope of action 
during the AIP, reaching beyond the ILO’s traditional areas of competence into 
the broader social field, prepared the direction its development work would take 
during the 1960s.
The World Employment Programme
When the ILO started to rethink its contribution to development in the early 
1960s, it did so in an environment where international debates on the economic 
progress of the global South had already taken on an increasingly critical tone. 
The assumptions of early developmental theorists like W. Arthur Lewis that the 
growth of the “modern” economic sector would be sufficient to create employ-
ment and thus absorb labour from the “traditional sector” had proven errone-
ous. Even in countries where governments were reporting high levels of economic 
growth, the results were not enough to increase the standard of living by any 
significant degree for the majority of the population. Projections of unchecked 
population growth – and of the misery and despair it would create in growing 
urban conglomerates in Latin America, Asia, and Africa and in the drained rural 
communities alike – added to the crisis scenario.443
442 Breuer, “Exploring the Technical Assistance Activities of the International Labor Organiza-
tion in the Field of Indigenous Peoples”.
443 Unger, International Development. A Post-War History.
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Starting from these observations the ILO began to view its activities in devel-
oping countries under a new heading. From the early 1960s onwards, it promoted 
the creation of “productive employment” as the best way out of the developmen-
tal impasse. The World Employment Programme (WEP), launched in 1969 on the 
occasion of the ILO’s 50th anniversary, would become the first culmination of 
these activities.444
In 1961, the ILO published a report on its role in the promotion of economic 
growth and social progress in developing countries, which was meant to define 
its contribution to what soon would be announced as the United Nations’ first 
“development decade”.445 Its key idea was that the social aspects of development, 
thus far largely ignored, had to take centre stage, in order to save the concept 
of development itself from being discredited. From the perspective of the ILO, 
the single most important step was the creation of “productive employment” in 
developing countries and the inclusion of employment goals as a key element in 
national development plans. From then onwards, the topic remained constantly 
on the agenda. A Convention and a Recommendation on employment policy, 
both adopted in 1964, provided the normative framework for the debate on the 
shape of a future technical programme. Both standards defined the basic princi-
ples and aims of active employment policies, and they were in large parts tailored 
to the situation in the developing world.446 Subsequently, this debate was taken 
to the regional level, with the so-called Ottawa Plan, emanating from the Amer-
ican Regional Conference of 1966 in the Canadian capital, as the first in a series 
of regional employment programmes that were intended to form the pillars of a 
444 I am very grateful to Michele Sollai, Camille Bolivar, Véronique Plata-Stenger, and Dorothea 
Hoehtker, who shared with me their rich and not yet published research on the World Employ-
ment Programme: Dorothea Hoehtker and Veronique Plata-Stenger, “The Future of Work and 
Technological Change – the ILO Debate between 1919 and the Early 1980s”, unpublished working 
paper (Geneva: ILO, 2018); Michele Sollai, “Humanizing Development. The International Labour 
Organisation and the Making of the World Employment Programme (1969–1976)”, unpublished 
working paper for the ILO Century Project (Geneva: ILO, 2018); Camille Bolivar, “La genèse du 
World Employment Programme et le projet pilote en Colombie: Un réseau d’experts hétérodoxes 
pour un gouvernement réformiste”, Master’s thesis, Université de Genève, 2017.
445 ILO, The Role of the ILO in the Promotion of Economic Expansion and Social Progress in De-
veloping Countries (Geneva: ILO, 1961).
446 Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122); Employment Policy Recommendation, 1964 
(No. 122). They contained measures to be taken on both the national and international levels and 
covered areas ranging from investment and income policy, through special methods for creating 
industrial and agricultural employment, to the implementation of demographic studies. They 
also reflected the developing countries’ view that international agreements on raw materials 
prices were a precondition for the success of employment policies.
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future worldwide ILO programme.447 One year later, Morse presented his plan for 
a World Employment Programme to the ILC, to be launched on the occasion of the 
ILO’s 50th anniversary in 1969.448
The focus on employment as a means of development had several advan-
tages. Employment policies had been a key topic in the ILO from the beginning, 
especially at the time of the world economic crisis. They had been high on the 
agenda at Philadelphia. In addition, they could be easily connected to some of 
the ILO’s previous technical activities, for example the so-called manpower pro-
grammes after the war. Despite the fact that employment and manpower policies 
had so far been mostly associated with industrialized countries, they had also 
occupied a prominent position with regard to Latin America and influenced parts 
of the Andean Indian Programme.
It was even more important, however, that the focus on “productive employ-
ment” in the global South offered the ILO a way out of an increasingly uneasy 
position in which it had found itself during the development debates of the early 
1960s. Against the backdrop of a widening gap between industrialized and devel-
oping countries, some economists started to shift their attention to the biased 
and “neo-colonial” nature of the world economy, which put the developing coun-
tries deliberately and structurally at a disadvantage and made them dependent 
on others. In the analysis of dependency theorists like Hans Singer and Raul 
Prebisch, both high-ranking UN officials at the time, the international division of 
labour and the shifting terms of trade between primary producers and industri-
alized countries were continuously playing out against the developing countries. 
At the beginning of the 1960s, their arguments gained increasing currency among 
developing countries, which soon began to act as a bloc – in particular through 
the “Group of 77”, founded at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva in 1964 – and voiced their demands now more 
forcefully in all available international fora. As a result, the ILO soon faced com-
447 Under the Ottawa Plan, all the American members agreed to take concerted steps to create 
more productive employment. The plan’s authors saw this as a positive alternative to other meas-
ures, such as birth control or forced restrictions on the mobility of the population, which – for 
political, religious, or administrative reasons – would be difficult to enforce or would take longer 
to have an impact. Two years later, the Asian Regional Conference in Tokyo launched the Asian 
Manpower Plan, an adaptation of the Ottawa Plan. At its meeting in Dakar in 1967, the African 
Advisory Committee also laid the foundations for an African Jobs and Skills Programme, which 
was finally launched at the third African Regional Conference in Accra in 1969. Alcock, History of 
the International Labor Organization, 354–360.
448 ILO, Record of Proceedings, International Labour Conference, 51st Session 1967 (Geneva: 
ILO, 1967), 422–423.
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petitors, such as the recently founded United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), which threatened to move into some of its core areas of 
competence.449
The ILO also saw its hands tied with regard to any action that would concern 
the rules and structures of world trade. Resolutions by African and Asian Regional 
Conferences, which called on the ILO to broker international agreements guaran-
teeing price stability for raw materials on the world market,450 were met with little 
sympathy by governments, trade unions, and employers of the industrialized 
Western countries. Placing the focus on employment, therefore, also served the 
ILO in initially directing the attention of developing countries away from world 
trade and to the competences which the ILO potentially had in remedying inter-
nal factors of underdevelopment.
The proposal to focus on the creation of “productive employment” has to be 
seen also in the context of the entanglement between the development debate and 
the population discourse, which took on an increasingly alarmist overtone during 
the 1960s. Catastrophic projections of population growth and predictions of the 
misery that it would entail became bestsellers – such as The Population Bomb by 
American biologist Paul Ehrlich.451 Employment creation was seen as an answer 
to the threat of uncontrolled urban growth and rural poverty alike, beyond neo- 
Malthusian prescriptions, such as birth control programmes.452 This resonated 
well with member States with a strong Catholic influence, especially in Latin 
America. Accordingly, the Ottawa Plan had put special emphasis on this aspect.453
Last but not least, the WEP cannot be seen in isolation from a general trend 
towards large global campaigns, which almost all parts of the UN system fol-
lowed in the 1960s. These campaigns were encouraged by new sources of devel-
opment funding available through the UNDP, which gave a strong incentive to 
449 Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 343–346.
450 Resolution concerning the Stability of World Commodity Markets and Their Influence on 
Levels of Living and Employment, African Regional Conference (AFRC) I (1960), Record of Pro-
ceedings, Appendix VI: Resolutions and Conclusions Adopted by the Conference, 280–281; Reso-
lution concerning Measures to Promote Stable Prices of Basic Commodities in World Markets and 
other Measures for the Effective Utilisation of Resources and the Improvement of Living Stand-
ards, Asian Regional Conference V (1962), Record of Proceedings, Appendix VII, Resolutions and 
Observations Adopted by the Conference.
451 Paul R. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968).
452 Thomas Robertson, The Malthusian Moment: Global Population Growth and the Birth of 
American Environmentalism, Studies in Modern Science, Technology, and the Environment (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012).
453 For an overview, see Alison Bashford, “Population, Geopolitics, and International Organi-
zations in the Mid-Twentieth Century”, Journal of World History 19, no. 3 (2008): 327–348.
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international agencies to both launch large size programmes and get involved 
more directly in the developing countries’ planning processes. Campaign-style 
programmes were also in line with new techniques tested by international agen-
cies to reach out to a broader international public through cooperation with NGOs 
and academic partners. The WEP has to be seen in the context of a whole series 
of similar campaigns taking off from within the United Nations system during 
the 1960s and 1970s. Examples are the FAO’s Freedom from Hunger Campaign 
Figure 11: ILO Director-General David Morse arriving to the First African Regional Conference, 
Lagos, Nigeria, 1960.
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(launched in 1960), UNESCO’s Experimental World Literacy Programme (1967), 
and the WHO’s Global Eradication of Smallpox Programme (1967).454
Once the WEP had started with developing regional employment plans, the 
actual programme was supposed to consist of a research and an implementation 
phase. In 1969, Morse put his Egyptian Deputy Director Abbas Ammar in charge 
of the programme. He then entrusted the operational planning to Hans Singer, 
who had just ended his latest United Nations assignment as Director of Research 
at UNIDO, and to Walter Galenson, an American labour economist who, since 
1968, had counselled the Director-General on the economic aspects of the WEP. 
For the research work, the ILO obtained the cooperation of the leading develop-
mental economists in those years, including W. Arthur Lewis and Jan Tinbergen. 
The key part, however, fell to the Sussex-based Institute for Development Studies 
(IDS) and its head, Dudley Seers. Their role in the context of the WEP was signifi-
cant, as it had been Seers and his colleagues who in the 1960s had formulated the 
most coherent counter-position to the growth-centred orthodoxy of Lewis and the 
first generation of developmental economists. The IDS, under Seers, went beyond 
the aim of economic growth and shifted the focus instead to poverty as the main 
obstacle of economic progress. The Institute argued in favour of social policy 
measures and redistributive action as a way to put economic development back 
on track. These positions became prominent through research conducted by the 
WEP, but, even more importantly, they had an impact through the participation 
of Seers and other IDS scholars in highly publicized pilot country missions that 
would form the heart of the WEP’s initial phase.455
The first of the pilot missions, led by Seers to Colombia in 1970, already set 
the tone for the expansive approach the WEP would take. Its final report, Towards 
Full Employment: A Programme for Colombia,456 was regarded a “major break-
through in development thinking” because of the “complete look at the problem 
of employment” in relation to a whole set of other economic and social factors 
like land tenure, income distribution, and international trade.457 The report 
argued that income inequality should be treated as a cause, and not as an effect, 
454 Frey, Kunkel, and Unger, “Introduction: International Organizations, Global Development, 
and the Making of the Contemporary World”; Kevin O’Sullivan, “A Global Nervous System: The 
Rise and Rise of European Humanitarian NGOs”, in International Organizations and Develop-
ment, ed. Frey, Kunkel, and Unger, 196–219.
455 For a summary of the research output, see Hans Singer, Research of the World Employment 
Programme: Future Priorities and Selective Assessment (Geneva: ILO, 1992).
456 Towards Full Employment: A Programme for Colombia Prepared by an Inter-Agency Team 
Organised by the ILO (Geneva: ILO, 1970).
457 Sollai, “Humanizing Development”, 13.
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of unemployment. To overcome it, a comprehensive set of measures was needed. 
These included land reform, the redistribution of wealth through taxation, and a 
foreign exchange policy that favoured the growth of export-oriented industries. 
The reduction of poverty, attention to the rural sector, and the implementation 
of redistributive measures were seen by the report as the main ways to create 
employment.458
The Colombia report received wide acknowledgement within the United 
Nations, and this paved the way for all the future WEP missions. Of the three 
missions that followed – to Sri Lanka, Iran, and Kenya – the last one, in particu-
lar, contributed to the WEP’s legacy. The Kenya mission of 1972 was conducted 
by Hans Singer together with a number of his IDS colleagues, who were accom-
panied by the new head of the WEP, the Dutch economist Louis Emmerij. It was 
carried out with the same broad conceptual approach as the Colombia mission, 
and it, too, focused on the problem of poverty as the single most important obsta-
cle to development.459
The lasting legacy of the Kenya mission was mainly due to the establish-
ment of two central terms in Singer’s report, which was published under the 
programmatic title Employment, Incomes, and Equality.460 It called for a “redis-
tribution from growth” to fund investments in order to improve productivity and 
raise the incomes of the poorest sections of the population. At the same time, 
Singer emphasized the strategic importance of the so-called informal sector of 
the economy. His report elevated the informal sector, in its many different facets, 
from its status as a simple marker for underdevelopment and stagnation to the 
central role of a dynamic – if not the most dynamic – element of developing econ-
omies.461
Together with the research conducted by the WEP in the first half of the 
1970s, the Columbia, Kenya, and Sri Lanka reports helped to establish a new 
focus in development thinking that, for the first time, centred on the problem of 
poverty. The innovative approach and the easy-to-understand central postulates 
of the reports helped to calm whatever criticisms there was of the WEP’s increas-
458 Bolivar, “La genèse du World Employment Programme”, 10–15.
459 Sollai, “Humanizing Development”, 15–20.
460 ILO, Employment, Incomes, and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment 
in Kenya (Geneva: ILO, 1972).
461 The term “informal sector” was originally introduced at the IDS by the anthropologist Keith 
Hart in 1971, but it was first used in a publication by Hans Singer. See Aaron Benanav, “The 
Origins of Informality: The ILO at the Limit of the Concept of Unemployment”, Journal of Global 
History 14, no. 1 (2019): 107–125. For an overview, see Paul E. Bangasser, The ILO and the Informal 
Sector: An Institutional History, ILO Employment Paper 2000/9 (Geneva: ILO, 2000).
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ingly expansive drive. The success of the pilot missions cast a favourable light on 
the WEP. It also helped to distract from the fact that, in almost all of its aspects, 
the programme had distanced itself from its originally planned set-up. The WEP 
had been conceived as a cross-departmental undertaking that would engage all 
sections of the International Labour Office. As it developed, it was instead run by 
a small group of staff within the ILO, with only a slight connection to the ILO’s 
daily work, and a group of outside consultants, most of which were affiliated with 
the IDS. While the ILO’s Regional Offices were supposed to play a key part in the 
implementation of the programme, the WEP had quickly turned into a highly cen-
tralized undertaking managed from the Geneva headquarters.
The same was true for the intended cooperation with other UN agencies, 
which never materialized on the ground. And finally, while it had always been a 
declared aim to include in the programme all social aspects related to the over-
arching goal of creating “productive employment”, the ILO assurances to other 
UN agencies that it would not intrude in their core areas of competence became 
obsolete after the publication of the first mission reports. The WEP existed mainly 
outside of the ILO’s regular structures, and it was financed mostly through the con-
tributions of single governments like Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden.462
The WEP drew criticism from many quarters. Some of the officials at the 
International Labour Office felt that the programme was too detached from the 
rest of the Organization’s work, and many of the ILO’s constituents shared those 
views. Trade unions resented the fact that the WEP escaped oversight by tripartite 
bodies, which the programme itself did not set up on the ground. The Employ-
ers’ and Workers’ groups were also generally critical of the focus on the informal 
economy. They were alarmed, especially after the first pilot country mission to 
Colombia had left them out of the projected activities.463 The employers and some 
governments, particularly the United States, were not too keen on the priority 
that the WEP gave to economic planning and state-directed redistribution strate-
gies. The same was true for some of the recipient countries, whose political lead-
ership all too often showed little sympathy for forceful calls for redistribution and 
land reform. Colombia, which had hosted the first pilot project, was an exception 
in this regard, since its President, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, had invited the WEP 
mission for the express purpose of winning external support and legitimacy for 
his plans for comprehensive land reform.464 In Kenya, by contrast, the govern-
ment quickly shelved the proposals of the Singer mission.465 The elite-centred 
462 Sollai, “Humanizing Development”, 21.
463 Ibid.
464 Bolivar, “La genèse du World Employment Programme”.
465 Ibid.
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approach of the WEP and a certain naiveté (or even arrogance) regarding the role 
of post-colonial elites as willing executors of the programme proposals – which 
the missions and the reports took for granted – led to a different kind of criticism 
of the WEP from the political left.466
Despite or even because of these circumstances, the WEP was (and could still 
be seen as) a success story for the ILO. This had less to do with the actual impact of 
the WEP on the employment situation in the developing countries, which would 
have been hard to measure in any case. What the WEP achieved, however, was to 
contribute significantly to a shift in the development discourse of the 1970s. Its 
concern with poverty as a prime obstacle to development also served as an inspi-
ration to the UN system in general. As an alternative to the traditional insistence 
on economic growth and the gross national product (GNP) as the prime yard-
stick of development in the global South,467 it offered the possibility of a fresh 
start under a new paradigm. Through the WEP, however short-lived its heyday 
would prove to be, the ILO took a decisive step towards gaining recognition as an 
international development agency. The WEP encouraged an impressive body of 
research by highly renowned scholars such as Amartya Sen. It left a rich research 
legacy in fields ranging from population growth, rural development, to urbani-
zation, trade, education, automation, migration, the environment, and the use of 
“appropriate technology”.468
The World Employment Conference in 1976 and its final report on “Employ-
ment, Growth, and Basic Needs: A One World Problem” was the high point of 
the WEP.469 What its authors, Louis Emmerij, and his successor as Director of 
the WEP Research Section, the Kenyan Dharam Ghai, proposed was the  creation 
of  employment by a combination of poverty reduction and redistributive meas-
ures, such as taxation or land reform. “Basic needs”, the key term of the report, 
included aspects of food security, housing, essential services in health care, 
sanitation, education, and public transport. These were seen as an essential 
precondition of employment policies. Its authors did not invent the notion of 
“basic needs”, but they greatly helped to popularize the term. Over the following 
466 Chris Gerry, “The Theoretical Basis of the World Employment Programme: A Note on Pragma-
tism, Social Democracy and Ideology”, Manpower and Employment Research 10, no. 2 (1977): 25–31.
467 For a discussion on the GNP and growth-centred paradigm in a broader perspective, see 
Matthias Schmelzer, The Hegemony of Growth: The OECD and the Making of the Economic Growth 
Paradigm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
468 Bangasser, The ILO and the Informal Sector.
469 ILO, “Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A one-World Problem”. Report by the Director- 
General of the International Labour Office. Tripartite World Conference on Employment, Income Dis-
tribution, and Social Progress and the International Division of Labour (Geneva: ILO, 1976).
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years, the United Nations, the World Bank, and several other international and 
national agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID), adopted the concept for a short while.470
However, the World Employment Conference not only marked the take-off of 
the basic needs concept. It also was the WEP’s swan song and the beginning of 
its slow decline. The oil crises of the 1970s, which hit the majority of developing 
countries much harder than the industrialized West, had by then already shat-
tered the hopes for the realization of the programme’s most ambitious goals. At 
the same time, many developing countries had all along been critical of calls for 
a “dethronement of the GNP”471 and the emphasis on basic needs. Against the 
background of discussions on the New International Economic Order (NIEO), pro-
claimed by the UN General Assembly in 1974, they feared that the WEP was steer-
ing the debate away from the most fundamental issue, the unfair global trade 
order. Many leaders of countries in the global South also were hesitant, to say the 
least, to fully embrace the redistributive aspects of the WEP for internal political 
reasons.472
In any case, when basic needs caught on in the World Bank under its Presi-
dent, Robert McNamara, and elsewhere in the UN system, a new paradigm shift 
in development thinking was already on the horizon. Despite all discussions on 
the NIEO, little had happened. Many countries, on the contrary, faced massive 
debt crises. Thus, the tide gradually began to turn, and international institutions 
became part of this development. During the 1980s, under the influence of an 
all-out attack on Keynesian economics – which seemingly had not been able to 
provide solutions for the economic crises – poverty-centred approaches to devel-
470 The term “basic needs” had been first used in the 1940s by the renowned psychologist Abra-
ham Maslow and had been picked up by the Bariloche Foundation in 1975.
471 Obviously, the WEP was not inimical to growth as such; according to Louis Emmerij, a 6% 
growth was the target. See Guy Standing, “The ILO: An Agency for Globalization?”, Development 
and Change 39, no. 3 (2008): 355–384, esp. 362. Morse had used the expression “dethronement 
of the GNP” upon leaving the post as Director-General 1970 to pinpoint the shift of emphasis. 
The citation of the Morse article is taken from: David A. Morse, “The Employment Problem in 
Developing Countries”, in Prospects for Employment Opportunities in the Nineteen Seventies. 
 Papers and Impressions of the Seventh Cambridge Conference on Development Problems 13th to 
24th  September 1970 at Jesus College, Cambridge, ed. Ronald Robinson and Peter Johnston, 5–13 
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Overseas Development Administration, Cambridge Univer-
sity Overseas Studies Committee, London, HMSO).
472 The discussions on the NIEO are covered in a broader context by Christopher R. W. Dietrich, 
Oil Revolution: Sovereign Rights and the Economic Culture of Decolonization, 1945 to 1979, Global 
and International History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
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opment gave way to structural adjustment programmes that reversed much of the 
preceding decade’s emphasis on social development.473
For the World Bank, which had from the start downplayed the role of “redis-
tribution from growth” in its version of basic needs, it was only a small step 
toward using the concept as an alternative to redistributive measures, both at 
the local and global levels.474 Rather than a means to lift up the poor, basic needs 
became a mere modicum of structural adjustment and an excuse for not address-
ing the structural causes of increasing inequality. Under the neoliberal paradigm, 
the informal economy turned from a springboard for the creation of productive 
employment to a pool of entrepreneurial energies.475 Against this backdrop, the 
WEP, once promoted as the carrier of a new concept of “development with a 
human face”,476 slowly fell into oblivion and faded out on the institutional level 
until it was wrapped up in the mid-1990s.477
473 An overview and critical assessment of the Washington Consensus and structural adjust-
ment after two decades is provided in Narcís Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Washington Con-
sensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance, The Initiative for Policy Dialogue Series 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
474 Rob Konkel, “The Monetization of Global Poverty: The Concept of Poverty in World Bank 
History, 1944–90”, Journal of Global History 9 (2014): 276–300.
475 John Toye, Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development 
Economics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993).
476 Santosh Mehrotra and Richard Jolly, eds., Development with a Human Face: Experiences in 
Social Achievement and Economic Growth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
477 Research continued throughout the 1980s, as did regional programmes, such as the Region-
al Employment Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean (PREALC), the Jobs and Skills 
Programme for Africa (JASPA), the Asian regional team for Employment Promotion (ARTEP). See 
Gerry Rodgers, ed., The Poverty Agenda and the ILO. Issues for Research and Action (Geneva: 
International Institute for Labour Studies, 1995).
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6 The Human Rights Decade
When, in 1949, David Morse spoke about standard-setting as the “other half of 
the same coin” in relation to the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) new 
activities in the field of technical cooperation, he was not talking about the whole 
International Labour Code set out in the ILO standards. What he had in mind 
were rather the basic principles of the ILO’s Constitution which had received a 
new human rights foundation with the Declaration of Philadelphia. The period 
between 1948 and 1958 became a decade when the ILO’s human rights principles 
were set out in international labour standards. During these ten years, the ILO 
adopted most of what today are regarded to be the Organization’s fundamental 
Conventions. The ILO was a major inspiration for the international human rights 
regime, which was canonized four years after Philadelphia in the UN’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). At the same time, these principles were 
immediately put to a test within the ILO itself.
The debates on human rights standards led to a veritable battle for the soul of 
the ILO. This took place in a shifting international environment conditioned first 
by the Cold War and soon thereafter the rapidly accelerating decolonization. In 
this arena, alternative visions of human rights clashed: between East and West, 
between North and South, and in many cases across these divides. Apart from 
sometimes unpredictable outcomes, what the human rights debates brought to 
the fore more than anything else was the tension between the ILO’s universal 
approach to standard-setting and the desires of an increasingly universal mem-
bership, which, at the same time, had become more diverse.478
The ILO and Human Rights after 1945
The ILO was both insider and outsider to the international human rights regime 
emerging after the Second World War. While the Declaration of Philadelphia had 
inspired the UN Charter (1945) and the UDHR (1948), the ILO still did not fit easily 
into the new UN human rights framework. The relationship of the ILO’s labour 
standards, in particular, to the human rights norms enshrined in the UDHR and, 
478 For an overview on the ILO and human rights and a discussion in the larger in context, 
see: Janelle Diller, “Social Justice, Rights and Labour” in The Oxford Handbook of International 
Human Rights Law, ed. Dinah Shelton (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013); Maul, “The Inter-
national Labour Organization and the Globalization of Human Rights, 1944–1970”; Wobbe, “Das 
Globalwerden der Menschenrechte in der ILO”.
184   6 The Human Rights Decade
later, in the two international Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) has never been clearly defined.479
There can be no doubt that the ILO’s labour standards have been part and 
parcel of the history of both the emergence and the gradual recognition of the 
concept of social and economic rights. The supervisory mechanism of the ILO’s 
standards is, furthermore, the closest that one could get to enforcing those 
rights.480 At the same time, there has been an element of tension in the ILO’s 
human rights work from the very beginning. ILO standard-setting had not been 
framed in the language of individual rights before the Philadelphia Conference. 
And even though the Declaration of Philadelphia claimed the unity and mutual 
interdependence of political, social and economic rights, the ILO has, ever since 
1944, walked a thin line when it has come to defining its exact position in inter-
national human rights debates.
The ILO has navigated between a more comprehensive approach, according 
to which all of its standards form part of its work for human rights, and a more 
restricted approach, which focuses on those Conventions that the ILO adopted 
explicitly under human rights auspices during the post-war period. Those Con-
ventions, by and large, reflected the basic principles of the Declaration of Phil-
adelphia and were later included in the fundamental Conventions defined by 
the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. They claim 
political and civil freedoms that represent preconditions or “enabling” rights for 
the realization of social and economic rights: freedom of association, the aboli-
tion of forced labour, and the elimination of discrimination in the work place. In 
contrast to these Conventions, the vast majority of international labour standards 
adopted after the Second World War, including the ones on social security (such 
as Convention No. 102 from 1952), did not contain references to human rights. 
The notable exception was the Employment Policy Convention (No. 122) of 1964, 
which explicitly referred to the UDHR in its preamble.481
Finally, the way the ILO treated human rights has to be seen also from a more 
functional point of view. It was in very particular historical contexts – in the era 
479 Roger Normand and Sahra Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Univer-
sal Justice (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008); Johannes Morsink, The  Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
 Pennsylvania Press, 1999).
480 On the relationship of labour and human rights and the ILO’s human rights beginnings, see 
Diller, “Social Justice, Rights and Labour”; Wobbe, “Das Globalwerden der Menschenrechte in 
der ILO”.
481 “Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that ‘everyone has 
the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to 
protection against unemployment’ …”. Employment Policy Convention 1964 (No. 122).
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during and after the Second World War and (as will be shown later on) in the 
post–Cold War period of the 1990s – that the Organization jumped on the band-
wagon of human rights in order to assert its role in the international debate on 
the topic.
Beyond these general considerations, the outcome of the debates and the 
form of the conventions adopted in the ILO’s “human rights decade” between 
1948 and 1958 were highly contingent on the specific political environment in 
which these debates took place. Particularly during the early years, the ILO’s 
situation was complicated by its position within the Cold War constellation. An 
important problem was the strained relationship with ECOSOC, which generated 
a good number of the initiatives for human rights action in the ILO. The Soviet 
Union, which was not a member of the ILO at the time, tried to use ECOSOC and 
its commissions to restrict the ILO’s activities wherever it could. These tensions 
eased when the Soviet Union was readmitted to the ILO in 1954, but the ILO itself 
now became more exposed to the Cold War tensions. Yet, in practice, the posi-
tions of the Soviet Union and its allies tended to vary. During ILO debates, Soviet 
delegations were on the defensive on such human rights topics as forced labour 
and freedom of association, but they were keen on issues that allowed them to 
promote their own concept of economic and social rights. This was particularly 
true with regard to racial discrimination and women’s rights, where the socialist 
countries could denounce Western democracies and benefit from allying them-
selves with countries from the global South.482
Viewed from the other side of the East-West divide, discussions inside the ILO 
were shaped by the attitude of the US government, which, for various reasons, 
became more cautious with regard to human rights debates. During the war, the 
United States of President Roosevelt had been instrumental in creating a new 
human rights basis for the ILO’s work.483 At the same time, Washington had 
always put the brakes on efforts to codify economic and social rights beyond mere 
declarations of intent.484 In the wake of the conservative turn in US domestic 
482 Jennifer Amos, “Embracing and Contesting: The Soviet Union and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, 1948–1958”, in Human Rights in the Twentieth Century, ed. Hoffmann, 147–165; 
Mark B. Smith, “Social Rights in the Soviet Dictatorship: The Constitutional Right to Welfare from 
Stalin to Brezhnev”, Humanity 3, no. 3 (2012): 385–406.
483 On US human rights policy and the United Nations in general, see Rowland Brucken, A 
Most Uncertain Crusade: The United States, the United Nations, and Human Rights, 1941–1953 
(DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2013); Mark Philip Bradley, The World Reima-
gined. Americans and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2016.)
484 Daniel J. Whelan and Matthew Donnelly, “The West, Economic and Social Rights, and the 
Global Human Rights Regime: Setting the Record Straight”, Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 4 
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 politics after the end of the war, the United States further hardened its traditional 
position to avoid international obligations that encroached on national jurisdic-
tion.485 In addition, the experience of being attacked by the newly established 
bloc of communist countries on issues like racial discrimination in its Southern 
states made the United States lose much of its remaining interest in the ILO’s 
human rights work in the 1950s.486
While the Cold War influenced the debates on human rights within the ILO, it 
reflected the diplomatic struggles accompanying the dissolution of the European 
colonial empires in a similar way. In this arena, too, human rights language was 
used liberally by nationalist movements and new ILO member States that emerged 
from colonial rule. This latter group brought their own perspectives and aspira-
tions to the human rights debates. Countries such as India or Egypt used inter-
national institutions primarily as fora to promote the right to self- determination 
and the struggle against such racist regimes as the apartheid state of South Africa. 
National liberation movements like the Algerian Front de libération nationale 
(FLN) sought legitimacy and recognition for their fight from the margins, some-
times with considerable success.487 Like other international organizations, the 
ILO inevitably became an arena for these struggles.
One aspect of human rights policies is often ignored: in this early period, 
human rights discourses originating from countries in the global South were not 
exclusively about the right to self-determination. Many of these countries took 
a keen interest in social and economic rights from the start. Their position was 
shaped by perceptions of the nature of colonialism, which they attacked as a 
system that denied both political and social rights to its subjects. These voices 
added to those from the Latin American countries, which were the most outspo-
ken proponents of the inclusion of social and economic rights in the UN’s human 
rights instruments during the war. However, the concept of social and economic 
(2007). With regard to the discussions on social and economic rights within the drafting commit-
tee of the UDHR, see Kathryn Sikkink, Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America 
(Ithaca, N.Y.; London: Cornell University Press, 2004).
485 On the debates regarding the constitutional hurdles to American human rights policy, see 
Hanne Hagtvedt Vik, “How Constitutional Concerns Framed the US Contribution to the Inter-
national Human Rights Regime from Its Inception, 1947–1953”, International History Review 34, 
no. 4 (2012): 908–949.
486 Carol Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for 
Human Rights, 1944–1955 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
487 Matthew James Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the 
Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Fabian Klose, Human 
Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence: The Wars of Independence in Kenya and Algeria, Penn-
sylvania Studies in Human Rights (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).
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rights as individual human rights, promoted, among others, by Hernan Santa 
Cruz, the Chilean member of the human rights commission preparing the UDHR, 
was tied to the idea of international economic security that had been promi-
nently discussed at the ILO’s American Regional Conferences before the war.488 
In other words: the realization of those rights depended on the willingness of 
the rich countries to enter into international agreements to re-organize the world 
economy in a way that would first enable poorer countries to create the condi-
tions for welfare programmes for their own populations. In the post-war era, this 
discourse was easily translatable into demands on the industrialized countries to 
help post-colonial nations to build up their economies. It was in this sense that 
development and human rights discourses were intertwined from the start. Social 
rights, other than in the debates of recent decades, were initially understood and 
promoted as rights of the individual, rather than those of the state.489
The use of human rights language by different actors with widely varying 
agendas created an environment full of tensions for debates in the ILO. The polit-
ically explosive nature of these discussions raised the question of how far the 
Organization could proceed under the human rights banner. But governments, 
employers, and trade unions alike were not content with somehow neutralizing 
the ILO on these issues. In addition, the ILO itself had good reasons to embrace 
the human rights concept. The claim for a comprehensive social mandate of the 
Declaration of Philadelphia was based on human rights principles. Both the ILO’s 
involvement in economic policies and the expansion into the field of develop-
ment ultimately drew their ideological legitimacy from their connection to the 
human rights project. More importantly, and more practically, this gave the ILO 
a much needed tool to bridge the growing diversity among its membership. Both 
with regard to the Cold War and decolonization, human rights offered a way out 
of an impasse in which the ILO, with its standard-setting activities, seemed to 
have gotten stuck in the early 1950s. There was growing concern that the type of 
labour standards the ILO had adopted thus far appealed to a shrinking part of 
its membership and constituents. This was true not only for the group of devel-
oping countries and the socialist states. Even among the Western democracies, 
 standard-setting was met with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The 1952 Social 
Security Convention (No. 102) was a case in point. Intended as a kind of codifica-
488 Roland Burke, “Some Rights Are More Equal Than Others: The Third World and the Trans-
formation of Economic and Social Rights”, Humanity 3, no. 3 (2012): 427–448.
489 Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, Pennsyl-
vania Studies in Human Rights (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Jan 
Eckel, “Human Rights and Decolonization: New Perspectives and Open Questions”, Humanity 1, 
no. 1 (2010): 111–135 .
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tion of various post-war projects to create welfare states, the Convention included 
a complete list of all different aspects of social security, defining minimum stand-
ards with regard to medical care, sickness, unemployment, old age, maternity, 
and several other items. While it made no specific recommendations about the 
mode of financing social security schemes (through contributions or taxation), 
the Convention still contained a commitment to universal coverage. This was one 
of the reasons why it drew bitter antagonism from the Employers, who all voted 
against it, with the US representatives agitating vehemently against “socialized 
medicine”.490 Most Government and the Workers’ representatives, on the contrary, 
supported the Convention, including those from developing countries, who were 
offered a set of options and flexibility clauses that would allow them to adopt it as 
an ideal for future implementation. The debates, however, showed little enthusi-
asm for the Convention, and ratifications were coming in very slowly.491
For David Morse, the debates served as a further confirmation that the ILO had 
to shift its attention away from its normative functions, in particular when it came 
to its approach regarding the developing world. Next, the orientation towards 
technical cooperation seemed to draw more legitimacy from the principles and 
general objectives stated in the Declaration of Philadelphia under human rights 
auspices than from the provisions of ILO standards in their entirety. Morse pro-
moted a “fundamental view of society, of morality and of the freedom and dignity 
of the individual”, based on the principles enshrined in the Declaration of Phila-
delphia. At the same time, he made it implicitly clear that the body of standards 
adopted by the ILO did not have the same universal scope. The subtext was that 
the ILO’s principal aim with regard to developing countries was no longer the rat-
ification of labour standards but the promotion of principles which could guide 
those countries on their path towards modernization.492
Freedom of Association
It was no coincidence that the Freedom of Association Convention (No. 87) of 
1948 and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98) of 
1949 became the first international labour standards that were explicitly debated 
under human rights auspices. They occupied a special position within the spec-
trum of ILO standards because of their dual nature. There was an understanding 
490 ILO, Record of Proceedings, International Labour Conference, 35th Session 1952 (Geneva: 
ILO, 1953), 409.
491 For example, by the Netherlands and Chile. See ILC (1952), Record of Proceedings, 308, 317.
492 Morse quoted in Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization, 136.
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that they enshrined, above all, the rights of trade unions. They were also seen as 
individually enabling rights, meaning as an essential precondition for the reali-
zation of workers’ social and economic rights in open market economies. For this 
very reason, they had a more general meaning – as basic principles on which the 
ILO rested, and which represented the essentially liberal democratic character of 
the Organization. This partly explained why the question of freedom of associa-
tion and its implications for the ILO’s tripartite structure would unleash a particu-
larly bitter struggle along the East-West divide. In the same sense, it became one 
of the main fields of controversy in the process of decolonization, in which the 
ILO promoted freedom of association as a means to secure democratic participa-
tion and a key principle to facilitate sound economic and social development.493
The debate itself, however, was much older, because freedom of association 
had been among the founding principles of the International Labour Organiza-
tion. The ILO Constitution of 1919 had declared freedom of association “for all 
lawful purposes” an essential means of improving the situation of workers every-
where and thus securing “universal and lasting peace”. In the 1920s the Inter-
national Labour Office conducted a broad inquiry on freedom of association. Its 
results were published between 1927 and 1930 and thereby left a legacy to build 
upon.494 Even a first Convention on the topic was adopted in 1921, which granted 
rural workers the “same rights of association and combination as to industrial 
workers”.495 However, there was no further legal action during the interwar years. 
The Workers’ group, which had initially fought for a Convention, stopped pushing 
for it when it realized that there was not sufficient support, against the opposition 
of employers and most governments, for an instrument that would include the 
“right to strike”. The political climate of the 1930s and the rise of authoritarian 
regimes eliminated the prospects of such an initiative.496
The Second World War gave a fresh impetus to the debate. Within the Allied 
countries, trade unions gained wider recognition for their participation in the war 
effort. As early as 1941, at the ILO’s first wartime Conference in New York, the 
question of freedom of association was taken up again, and the path was cleared 
for the introduction of a convention.497 The Declaration of Philadelphia confirmed 
493 Rodgers et al., The ILO and the Quest for Social Justice, 45–50.
494 ILO, Freedom of Association, 5 vols. (Geneva: ILO, Studies and Reports, Series A, 28–32, 
1927–1930).
495 Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention, 1921 (No. 11).
496 ILO, Freedom of Association.
497 A committee on collaboration between public authorities, employers’ and workers’ organi-
zations had been established by the Conference. The Conference adopted a resolution submitted 
by Latin American workers, which declared that “real collaboration is possible only within the 
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freedom of association as a key element of the “war against want” within demo-
cratic societies. Not restricting it to advanced industrial societies, the Declaration 
further proclaimed the principle to be of universal value and fully applicable to 
developing societies, inasmuch as “freedom of expression and of association are 
essential to sustained progress”.498
Redefined as both a human right and a precondition for the realization of 
social rights more generally, freedom of association seemed to be predestined to 
become subject to an early convention after World War II. The Cold War compli-
cated the discussion, as the Soviet Union and the communist-leaning unions of 
the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) first attempted to place the ques-
tion on the agenda of ECOSOC. Their major argument against leaving the issue 
to the ILO was that, as a tripartite organization, it would give employers a say 
in the definition of what should be framed as a question of trade union rights. 
At this point, the WFTU was a unitary federation of both Eastern and Western 
trade unions, but contradictory views on the Marshall Plan had already rendered 
it inoperative. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) vigorously opposed the 
WFTU. Since the AFL, like the WFTU, had a consultative status with ECOSOC, it 
issued a counterproposal, which asked ECOSOC to mandate the ILO with produc-
ing a survey on the legal situation with regard to freedom of association as a basis 
for a future ILO Convention. The AFL’s move was not only supported by the US 
government but was, in fact, coordinated with Washington. In turn, the Truman 
administration ensured that the ILO would place the issue of freedom of associ-
ation on the agenda of the ILC in 1947. The Conference Committee that drew up a 
resolution outlining a new Convention on freedom of association was headed by 
the then US Assistant Secretary of Labor, David Morse.499
In the ensuing debate, the main line of conflict concerned the question of the 
right to join (or not to join) a trade union and the question of explicitly recognizing 
the right to strike. The workers succeeded in removing from the final version of the 
Convention a paragraph that would have included “the right not to join a union”, 
an issue for which the employers had long fought tooth and  nail. Conversely, 
framework of democratic political institutions which guarantee the freedom of association of 
workers and employers”. It affirmed that “the application of the principle of collaboration re-
quires that in law and in fact (a) the right of industrial organisations to represent workers and 
employers should be recognised by the State; (b) the workers’ and employers’ organisations 
should recognise each other’s right to represent workers and employers respectively”. Confer-
ence of the ILO, New York and Washington D.C. (1941), Record of Proceedings, 166.
498 ILO, Declaration of Philadelphia, art I (b), (d).
499 The non-Communist trade unions, which would soon leave the WFTU supported this move. 
Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 252–255.
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the right to strike was not explicitly mentioned either, but, from the context, it 
was clear that this was regarded as a natural expression of trade union rights. 
The Convention stipulated the right of workers’ and employers’ organizations to 
“organize their administration and activities and to formulate their  programmes” 
(Article 3), and acknowledges the aims of such organization as “furthering and 
defending the interests of workers or of employers” (Article 10).500 The Conven-
tion guaranteed freedom of association without mentioning any more “for all 
lawful purposes”, a passage from the Constitution that had given governments 
much leeway for effectively restricting trade union rights. An initiative pushed 
by Eastern European countries and some members of the WFTU to exclude the 
employers from the Convention was equally rejected. This rejection, carried by 
a majority of the Workers’ representatives, was a strong statement and under-
pinned both the Western orientation and the tripartite character of the ILO. It also 
stood in stark contrast to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, drafted at 
the same time as the ILO Convention, which did not mention employers’ organi-
zations and spoke exclusively about a “right to form and to join trade unions” for 
the protection of interests.501
The two Conventions adopted in 1948 and 1949 were seen to be mutually com-
plementary. While the Freedom of Association Convention (No. 87) was first and 
foremost intended for the protection of workers’ and employers’ organizations 
from state interference, the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Conven-
tion (No. 98) defined the rights of workers vis-à-vis their employers. The central 
importance given to the principle of freedom of association was further empha-
sized in 1950, when a special mechanism was put in place to oversee compliance 
with this principle, supplementing the regular supervisory procedures linked to 
the ratification of Conventions No. 87 and No. 98. In 1951, an ILO tripartite Com-
mittee on Freedom of Association (CFA) was created, whose task has been ever 
since to investigate allegations received by the UN or the ILO regarding the viola-
tion of trade union rights, whether or not the country concerned has ratified the 
two Conventions.502
Contrary to all other ILO “human rights Conventions”, the most controver-
sial debates regarding freedom of association would take place after the Conven-
tions had been adopted. The re-entry of the Soviet Union into the ILO in 1954, 
which was accompanied by the admission of Byelorussia and Ukraine and thus 
increased the votes of the communist group, once again raised questions about 
500 See Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero, and Horacio Guido, “ILO Principles concerning the 
Right to Strike”, International Labour Review 137, no. 4 (1998):441–481.
501 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 23 (4) (Paris, 1948).
502 Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 268–270.
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the meaning of the principle and its implications for the tripartite structure of 
the ILO. The communist state, according to the official doctrine, embodied the 
interests of the workers, and at the same time was the only employer. Thus, state 
socialism left no room neither for employers’ nor for workers’ associations that 
were independent of the state, nor did it provide the possibility for an individual 
to freely join such an organization. Trade unions existed mainly as institutions 
that administered significant parts of the socialist welfare state, secured social 
stability, and implemented party directives with regard to production. Freedom of 
association as defined by the ILO did not exist in the Soviet Union and its satellite 
states. They effectively sent four Government delegates to the ILC, as Western 
delegations complained over and over again.503
It was not the first occasion on which credentials of Workers’ representatives 
had been challenged in the ILO. Fascist Italy had been the main target during the 
interwar years. In the late 1940s, the legitimacy of Argentinian Workers’ delegates 
was seriously questioned. With memories of Italian fascism still alive, labour 
organizations under the Peronist regime seemed to many a legacy of fascist cor-
poratism. The Soviet case differed primarily because, after the re-admission of 
the Soviet Union and before the acceleration of decolonization, the Eastern bloc 
accounted for nearly one third of the ILO’s membership and thus seriously chal-
lenged the very hegemony of the liberal democratic principles on which the ILO 
had long rested. The debate boiled down to a fundamental question: should the 
ILO stick to its tripartite principle regardless of the cost, or was universalism of 
membership and the full inclusion of the socialist states – or, for that matter, 
all states irrespective of their political system – the more important goal? As a 
first step to contain the question on a politically less contagious level, the Gov-
erning Body, in 1955, commissioned an independent Committee on Freedom of 
Employers’ and Workers’ Organizations, headed by the renowned British inter-
national lawyer Lord Arnold McNair, to investigate the independence from gov-
ernment control of workers’ and employers’ organizations worldwide.504 In the 
views of some observers, the 1956 report of the McNair Committee came close 
503 The ICFTU, although divided on the matter, protested in 1954 against the credentials of So-
viet Workers and filed a complaint with the CFA regarding the independence of Soviet trade 
unions. The Soviet Employers’ credentials were equally challenged by the Employers’ group, but 
the ILC decided in the end not to follow up on the objections in either case. However, the ques-
tions stayed on the agenda for many years. See Valticos, International Labour Law, 31–34; Alcock, 
History of the International Labor Organization, 290–292.
504 McNair had been the president of the International Court of Justice and was a longstanding 
member of the CEACR. His two colleagues on this particular committee were the Mexican expert 
on international law and former Mexican Government representative Pedro de Alba and A.R. 
Cornelius, Judge of the Pakistan Federal Court.
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to redefining the tripartite principle, which, the report argued, was actually not 
confined to only one particular economic and social system. When it came to the 
relationship between the state, workers’ and employers’ organizations, the report 
even observed a certain convergence of the Eastern and Western socioeconomic 
systems. The massive increase in state involvement in the economy and the con-
tinuous expansion of the public sector that had taken place in Western coun-
tries after the war had changed the role of employers’ and workers’ organizations 
even in the West. For example, trade unions often got deeply involved in politics 
to raise productivity. Against this background and despite great differences in 
the degree of independence, the actual functions fulfilled by trade unions and 
employers’ organizations in socialist states and free market democracies were 
seen as becoming increasingly similar. Therefore, the report saw no valid reasons 
to exclude the Workers’ and Employers’ representatives of the Eastern bloc coun-
tries from the ILO’s sessions.505
When the report was discussed by the ILC in 1956, emotions ran high, and 
Western employers, in particular, were bitterly opposed to its conclusions. 
Eventually, however, while the conflict lingered on for another decade, a 
majority of the ILO’s members had no interest in an open break with the East 
and silently conceded the participation of Workers’ and Employers’ represent-
atives from the Soviet bloc. At this point, it was also hard to ignore that the 
international context was about to affect the practice of tripartism and the very 
principle of freedom of association. Both had been prominently affirmed in 
the  Philadelphia Declaration (Article 1) and now became part of an essentially 
global debate on the role of trade unions in state-led processes of social and 
economic  development.
Against the background of decolonization, freedom of association and tripar-
tism came to occupy a central position in the discussions with the newly inde-
pendent states of Asia and Africa on the role of ILO standards in the development 
process. Here, colonialism had often left a difficult legacy. The “colonial clause” 
and the parallel existence of a weaker “colonial” Convention that governed the 
right to freedom of association “in dependent territories” (Convention No. 84 of 
1947) allowed late colonial regimes to maintain a double standard with regard to 
trade union rights, and this often until the very eve of independence. The colonial 
Conventions differed from the regular standards in one essential way: They con-
tained different provisions concerning the political role of trade unions – a case 
in which the colonial Conventions put tight restrictions on trade unions’ activi-
505 For the McNair report, see also Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 300–303; 
Ghébali, The International Labour Organisation, 127–131.
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ties. While their policies differed, colonial powers shared a basic ambiguity about 
granting trade union freedoms within their territories. On the one hand, and at 
least with regard to Britain and France, promoting the establishment of trade 
unions as part of post-war “welfare colonialism” was seen as a means of build-
ing reliable partners whose support would be key in the realization of colonial 
development projects. On the other hand, and with “regular” political activities 
limited, these organizations were not easily confined to the kind of “apolitical” 
work that the colonial authorities had intended for them. Even before independ-
ence, trade unions and their leaders had often become involved in projects of 
anti-colonial emancipation. As a result, the reality on the ground often directly 
contradicted one of the basic ideas underlying both the “regular” and the colo-
nial Conventions, which both regarded free and democratic labour relations a 
precondition for social and economic development. Instead, the colonial legacy 
entailed a different, essentially authoritarian, concept of modernization, in which 
governments and political elites saw unrestricted labour relations as an obstacle 
to productivity and growth. They featured, if at all, as a distant target that was 
secondary to economic considerations.506
It was quite easy to draw a line from here to the findings of the McNair report. 
Viewed from this perspective, the Soviet Union represented just another authori-
tarian model of modernization – and an attractive one at that – to many countries 
of the global South.507 As a matter of fact, the McNair report confirmed this trend 
also with regard to the post-colonial situation in Asia. Here, it found widespread 
“restrictions and limitations” in the legislation regulating trade union freedoms 
for political and economic reasons. Governments generally saw the concept of 
freedom of association in the way it was anchored in the ILO standards as irrecon-
cilable with the demands of national development. Trade union activities were, 
therefore, subjected to tight state control. The state authorities wanted to have 
the last say in the organization of industrial relations, and this made the right 
to collective bargaining, in particular, unpopular and suspect among develop-
ing countries. As India’s Prime Minister Nehru pointed out in 1957, the good of 
the nation had to take precedence over certain workers’ rights, and he thought it 
“quite absurd when we are talking about increasing production […] to waste our 
energy in industrial conflict”.508
506 Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization, 108–111.
507 During the debate on freedom of association, governments such as South African had pro-
posed to extend the “colonial clause” to parts of the population of independent countries that 
was not yet “mature” enough to benefit from a freedom of association Convention.
508 Asian Regional Conference IV (1957), Record of Proceedings, 8.
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The idea that the trade union movement needed to be subordinate to national 
(economic) development interests recurred over the following years. It further 
gained strength during the 1960s, when many African countries attained inde-
pendence. Freedom of association then became one of the prime areas in which 
the consequences of the ILO’s geographical and political expansion became tan-
gible. The Organization reacted with a further strengthening of its technical func-
tions. With regard to standard-setting, the experience of the debates on freedom 
of association and tripartism drove the development of a new “promotional” or 
“educational” approach introduced by David Morse in his human rights report 
of 1958 (on the occasion of the ten year anniversary of both the UDHR and the 
Freedom of Association Convention). A first consequence of this approach was 
the launching technical assistance programmes in the area of labour relations, 
followed by workers’ education and management training schemes. All these 
programmes were directed almost exclusively at developing countries and were 
intended to encourage democratic models of modernization and industrial rela-
tions. The latter were strongly influenced by US experts as this new field of activ-
ity began to emerge in the 1960s.509
Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining have remained 
on the agenda of the ILO ever since, and they have continued to be – because 
of their intrinsic link to the tripartite principle – in the very centre of the battles 
about the ILO’s identity. The function and position of trade unions in the devel-
opment process is still a controversial issue (and has become even more so with 
the growing weight of China). Meanwhile, new dimensions have been added 
to the debate in the context of globalization, where trade union rights have to 
be defended against the power of multinational enterprises, in  extra-territorial 
special economic zones, and within complex, and largely non-transparent, 
global supply chains.510
509 Workers’ education had been a key element within the ILO’s programme from the early 
1950s onwards and a way to frame the question of trade union rights in a technical and “apolit-
ical” way inspired mainly by US models. There is hardly any research on this key field of action. 
For the general background and the implementation in Latin America, see Gabriela Scodeller, 
“Educar in derechos laborales: politicas y acciones desplegadas por la OIT en América Latina du-
rante los anos 1950–1970”, in Una historia regional de la OIT, ed. Caruso and Stagnaro, 213–254.
510 See for a discussion of freedom of association and the position of trade unions against the 
background of a globalizing economy the contributions in Yossi Dahan, Hanna Lerner, and Faina 
Milman-Sivan, eds., Global Justice and International Labour Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2016).
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Equal Remuneration for Men and Women
Two years after the instruments on freedom of association were adopted, the ILO 
passed in 1951 another Convention on a topic – related to the work of women – 
that had been on the Organization’s larger agenda from the very beginning. The 
Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), for the first time, moved beyond the 
protective approach that had so far characterized the ILO’s policies. Legal equal-
ity feminists saw the Convention as a confirmation that the pendulum was about 
to swing in their direction.511 However, both the debate and its result reflected 
ongoing tensions about women’s position in the world of work.
The roots of the Equal Remuneration Convention can be traced back to the 
1919 Constitution, and especially the debate of the 1930s.512 By that time, legal 
equality had not only gained some ground among women’s organizations but 
also made inroads into the thinking of the ILO. Against the backdrop of the war 
economy’s demand on women, as well as their mobilization for reconstruction, 
this trend gathered momentum. In 1939, the ILO’s Second American Regional 
Conference in Havana had passed resolutions that proclaimed women’s right to 
representation, their right to equal pay, and the right of married women to work. 
Five years later, the Philadelphia Declaration had elevated the question of equal 
treatment of both men and women to the level of a human rights issue.513
A major reason why it took another seven years for a Convention to be adopted 
was the circumstance that the question of gender equality, too, became entangled 
in Cold War controversies. For the Soviet Union and its allies, the question of 
equal pay was intrinsically linked to the broader question of equal social and eco-
nomic rights for women and men as a precondition for the realization of political 
rights. Western countries, on the contrary, tried to restrict the debate to the exten-
sion of individual rights to women. Because of the antagonism of the Eastern bloc 
countries towards the ILO, the Organization found itself in an awkward posi-
tion. In 1946, the United Nations had established a Commission on the Status of 
Women (CSW) under ECOSOC. While the Commission focused on political and 
civil rights, it clearly considered that women’s economic rights were also part of 
its mandate. During the early post-war years, the ILO had reason to be wary of 
competition by the CSW. From the Commission’s ranks, the ILO received criticism 
for not fully renouncing its protective labour standards. As a consequence, the 
511 About the different aspects of the debate on women’s labour, see the contributions in Boris, 
Hoehtker, and Zimmermann, eds., Women’s ILO.
512 See the sub-chapter on “Women”, Part I, Chapter 1.
513 Eileen Boris, “Equality’s Cold War: The ILO and the Un Commission on the Status of Women, 
1946–1970s”, in Women’s ILO, ed. Boris, Hoehtker, and Zimmermann, 97–120.
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WFTU, Poland, and the Soviet Union, tried to move in 1949 the question of equal 
pay from the mandate of the ILO to that of ECOSOC. This attempt reflected the 
unsuccessful effort some years earlier to transfer freedom of association issues 
to ECOSOC.514
Western women’s activists, such as Frieda S. Miller of the United States,515 
played an important role in convincing governments to aim for an ILO Convention 
on equal pay. She served as reporter for the Drafting Committee of the Equal Remu-
neration Convention in 1951. Many Western governments, like the US administra-
tion, agreed to normative action. They did not want to be criticized for standing in 
the way of women’s rights. In addition, they sought to lend their support to the ILO 
and did not want to see its portfolio reduced vis-à-vis the United Nations. Despite 
all the progress made, however, and notwithstanding the far-reaching agreement 
on the principle, the adoption of a Convention was by no means an easy task. In 
514 Neunsinger, “The Unobtainable Magic of Numbers”, in ibid., 121–148.
515 Jensen, “US New Deal Policy Experts and the ILO, 1948–1954”, 172–189.
Figure 12: Worker members of the Committee on Equal Remuneration: Adrian Vermeulen 
(Netherlands), Beatrice Ann Godwin and Florence Hancock (both from the United Kingdom) at 
the 33rd Session of the ILC, 1950.
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addition to the Employers’ group, the United States and Great Britain were among 
the many governments that would have preferred a mere Recommendation to a 
Convention. The different opinions clearly came to the fore in the report prepared 
for the 1950 ILC. While socialist countries were in favour of a strong Convention, 
some Western countries voiced their reservation regarding such an instrument, 
drawing on a mix of cultural and practical arguments. The United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands pointed out that the “higher costs of production connected with 
the natural characteristics of women cannot be entirely ignored”. The Swiss gov-
ernment bluntly stated, that the “structure of the country, its way of thinking and 
the conditions peculiar to it are opposed to the principle of remuneration for men 
and women for work of equal value”. It questioned whether such an instrument 
was “really in the best interests of women”, as it would ultimately reduce their 
employment opportunities.516 Finland and Sweden, which had strong collective 
bargaining mechanisms in place, initially also argued against a Convention. They 
regarded equal pay essentially as a part of the larger complex of wage policy, 
and the state was not supposed to interfere in negotiations between trade unions 
and employers.517 Beyond economic arguments, claims of the higher costs of pro-
duction of women’s work (due to maternity, etc.) were most common among the 
opponents of equal pay. Some countries from the global South had their own con-
cerns. India, for instance, preferred a Recommendation, pointing to the practical 
problems arising from the lack of a proper wage fixing machinery that was based 
on job contents in major parts of its economy. Consequently, this would make it 
near impossible to implement the principle of equal pay.518
In the second ILC debate in 1951, the front lines remained largely unchanged. 
Socialist countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia argued for a strong Conven-
tion with clear provisions for legal implementation. By contrast, a majority of 
Workers’ delegates and some governments – among them Germany, France, the 
Latin American countries – now favoured the combination of a Convention con-
taining general principles and a practical Recommendation along the lines of the 
draft documents which the Office had prepared for the Conference. Employers 
and other governments, among them the United Kingdom, Italy, Australia, India, 
South Africa and the Scandinavian countries, favoured a recommendation and 
516 ILO, Record of Proceedings, Report V (2): Summary of positions in countries who answered 
the 1949 general survey, International Labour Conference, 33rd Session 1950 (Geneva: ILO, 1951), 
6, 61.
517 ILC 33 (1950) Rep. V (2), 69.
518 It also pleaded for gradual application of any type of regulation in the matter, asking for 
exemptions for “family undertakings, domestic work, unorganised industries, and employments 
where the output of women was as a rule less than that of men”. Ibid., 32.
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abstained from the final vote on the Convention. The United States, although 
leaning towards a Convention, finally voted for a dual instrument. In the end, the 
Convention was adopted by a vote of 105 to 33 (mostly employers voted against 
it), with 40 abstentions.519 This was a relatively small margin, in particular if com-
pared to other human rights standards of the ILO. The apprehensions were clearly 
reflected by the rather complex formulation of Article 2 of the Convention, which 
asks all members “by means appropriate to the methods in operation for deter-
mining rates of remuneration” to promote and, “in so far as is consistent with 
such methods”, to ensure the application “to all workers of the principle of equal 
remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value”.520
Even with the new Convention, gender equality in the workplace remained 
more of a distant goal.521 The Equal Remuneration Convention, while regarded as 
a major step forward by legal equality activists in the West, did not spell an end to 
the debate on women’s place in the world of work. Yet, its impact was felt in the 
coming years, when it provided a yardstick for discussions on the national level. 
Within the Organization, the debate continued. The pendulum on the interna-
tional level had swung decisively to the side of legal equality, but in the ILO, a set 
of women-only protective standards continued to coexist alongside the new Con-
vention.522 From the 1950s onward, the debate gradually shifted from the situa-
tion in the industrialized world to the situation of women in developing countries. 
The latter had initially been treated as a separate issue. Technical cooperation 
programmes directed at women in the non-industrialized parts of the world had 
sought by default to integrate women in the general development process of their 
respective countries. By doing so, they had often unintentionally concealed the 
particularly precarious status of women in many countries of the global South. 
Women were carrying the burden of “reproduction” by taking care of the family, 
and sustaining the household; they were also at the heart of the rural subsist-
ence agriculture and what would later come to be called the “informal economy”. 
During the 1970s, women’s organizations from the global South increasingly 
challenged the modernization paradigm, but they were also critical of the blind 
spots within Western feminist activism. When the ILO “discovered” the informal 
519 ILO, Record of Proceedings, International Labour Conference, 34th Session 1951 (Geneva: 
ILO, 1952), 447–448.
520 Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100), Art. 2.
521 A more detailed account of the debates on Convention No. 100 and the role of international 
women’s organizations will be provided in Eileen Boris, Making the Woman Worker: Precarious 
Labor and the Fight for Global Standards, 1919–2019 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
522 Eloisa Betti, “Unexpected Alliances: Italian Women’s Struggles for Equal Pay, 1940s–1960s”, 
in Women’s ILO, ed. Boris, Hoehtker, and Zimmermann, 276–299.
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economy in the 1970s, some of the research conducted under the auspices of the 
World Employment Programme took account of the pivotal position that women 
occupied in rural development.523 In its technical cooperation programmes, the 
ILO began to put more emphasis on women in developing countries. However, it 
would take another twenty to thirty years before discussions started to focus on 
the additional strain that globalization put on women in the global South. This 
eventually led to new standards, which, also gender neutral in design, addressed 
more specifically the situation of women working in the informal economy, such 
as Convention No. 177 of 1996, which dealt with home based workers and the 
Domestic Workers’ Convention No. 189 of 2011. They both expressed a heightened 
awareness for the plight of women, who often were at a double disadvantage in a 
globalizing world.524
The Total Abolition of Forced Labour
The debate on forced labour took off in the ILO in parallel to the discussions on 
freedom of association and equal pay, but it developed a different dynamic. As 
in the case of freedom of association, the topic had been discussed during the 
interwar years. In contrast, to the former, however, the abolition of forced labour 
had been subject to international labour standards directed primarily at colo-
nial territories, with the Forced Labour Convention of 1930 (No. 29) as its center-
piece.525 When the topic was put back on the ILO agenda immediately after the 
end of World War II, the traditional colonial aspects were overshadowed by fresh 
memories of the Nazi regime’s massive use of forced labour as a tool of economic 
exploitation, political punishment, and means of extermination. From there, 
attention immediately turned to the system of labour camps established in the 
Soviet Union to deal with perceived political opponents. Against this backdrop, 
the problem was reframed as a human rights issue, and the debate shifted to the 
forms of forced labour employed in the Gulags for both political and economic 
purposes. The debate thus started from anti-totalitarian premises, but it quickly 
became a battlefield of the East-West-Conflict, with the Socialist countries ending 
523 Sollai, “Humanizing Development”, 26; Singer, Research of the World Employment Pro-
gramme.
524 Boris, Hoehtker, and Zimmermann, “Introduction”, Women’s ILO, 1–23.
525 Daughton, “ILO Expertise and Colonial Violence”; Rodríguez-Piñero, Indigenous Peoples, 
Postcolonialism, and International Law; Daniel Maul, “The International Labour Organization 
and the Struggle against Forced Labour from 1919 to the Present”, Labor History 48 no. 4 (2007): 
477–550.
The Total Abolition of Forced Labour   201
up on the defensive. However, the new Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 
(No. 105), adopted in 1957, reflected a much broader understanding of the problem 
than originally intended by the Western initiators of the new instrument.526
In November 1947, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) called upon 
ECOSOC to commission the ILO with a comprehensive study of new-style forced 
labour systems in UN member States. The AFL’s petition had been composed 
and submitted with the support and approval of the US government, and it was 
directly aimed at the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. After heated 
debates in the UN, where the Soviets tried without success to block the topic from 
being transferred to the ILO, the Governing Body voted in 1949 to set up a joint 
UN-ILO committee to investigate forced labour. The communist countries reacted 
to their defeat by changing strategy. They launched counterattacks by highlight-
ing the forms of labour coercion resulting from the capitalist economy in the West 
and, at the same time, attempting to redirect the attention to the persisting forms 
of colonial forced labour.527
This, then, was the point of departure, when, in 1951, the UN and the ILO 
created a committee of three internationally renowned human rights advo-
cates under the leadership of the Indian diplomat and international lawyer 
Ramaswami Mudaliar. Mudaliar personified a degree of continuity with the 
forced labour debate of the 1920s, since he had been a member of the Confer-
ence Committee in charge of drafting Convention No. 29. The Committee’s orig-
inal mandate largely reflected the efforts of the Western countries to restrict the 
inquiry to forms of coercion prevalent in the Eastern bloc countries. It was specif-
ically called to examine the existence of “systems of forced or ‘corrective’ labour, 
which are employed as a means of political coercion or punishment for holding 
or expressing political views, and which are on such a scale as to constitute an 
important element in the economy of a given country”.528 The Committee’s work 
was supported by a wealth of primary source material and testimonies provided 
by private pressure groups, such as the American-based International League 
for  the Rights of Man and the  originally French Commission contre le régime 
526 Sandrine Kott, “The Forced Labor Issue between Human and Social Rights, 1947–1957”, 
 Humanity 3, no. 3 (2012): 321–335.
527 The American initiatives were initially not welcomed by the colonial powers, because they 
feared being exposed to criticism for some of their own practices. France, in particular, rejected 
the proposal until the very end. The State Department complained as late as 1951 that the French 
envoy in ECOSOC was “making every effort to undermine US position on forced labor”. Quoted 
in Maul, Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization, 205.
528 Maul, “The ILO and the Struggle against Forced Labour”, 485–486. On the work of the 
 Mudaliar Committee, see also Kott, “The Forced Labor Issue”, 326–327.
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concentrationnaire, the latter representing the survivors of Nazi and Stalinist 
camps.529 The Mudaliar Committee, however, partly ignored the restrictions and 
expanded its mandate beyond the limits that were politically and economically 
motivated. Instead, it looked also into cases where only one of the two criteria 
was fulfilled, which allowed for a more complete picture of the forced labour sit-
uation. In its final report in 1953, the Committee found systems of forced labour 
that were simultaneously politically and economically motivated in all Eastern 
bloc countries. Among the countries where politically or economically motivated 
systems existed, South Africa came out on top, but two colonial powers, Portugal 
and Belgium, were also listed.530
On the basis of the Mudaliar report, the Governing Body gave the go-ahead 
for a new Convention in 1954, and a new committee, this time without UN partic-
ipation, was set up under Paul Ruegger, the Swiss president of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. Its final report, delivered in 1955, basically confirmed 
the findings of its predecessor. The Ruegger report found indications that systems 
of forced labour with a political and/or economic background existed in thirteen 
states, including all ten socialist members of the ILO, the People’s Republic of 
China,531 the Portuguese Overseas Territories and the Union of South Africa.532
On the basis of the Ruegger report, the ILO drafted a new Convention aimed 
at bringing about the complete abolition of forced labour. The new standard 
banned forced labour as (a) a means of political coercion and political education 
and (b) a method of mobilizing and using labour for purposes of economic devel-
opment. On the initiative of the Workers’ group, the Convention was eventually 
extended to include a ban on forced and compulsory labour as a means of labour 
discipline, of punishment for participation in strikes, or as a means of racial, 
social, national, or religious discrimination. The latter point was also a reference 
to the discussions on a Convention against discrimination, which took place at 
the same time (see below).533 The discussion was overshadowed by a last-minute 
attempt of the Soviet Union to turn the tables on the Western powers. The Eastern 
bloc countries signalled for the first time their support for a Convention, but, at 
529 The International League for the Rights of Man was founded in 1942 by Roger Baldwin and 
European emigrants like the French physiologist Henri Laugier, who later became Assistant 
 Secretary-General of the UN. Kott, “The Forced Labour Issue”, 327.
530 Maul, “The ILO and the Struggle against Forced Labour”, 486–487.
531 On this particular subject, a wealth of incriminating material was provided by the National-
ist government of Taiwan, which then occupied the seat of China in the ILO.
532 Maul, “The ILO and the Struggle against Forced Labour”, 487, n. 46.
533 See, Record of Proceedings, Report VI: Forced Labour, International Labour Conference, 
39th Session 1956 (Geneva: ILO, 1956), 721–726.
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the same time, they invited the ILC delegates to make the debate on forced labour 
into a tribunal against colonialism. However, this manoeuvre, in the end, fell flat, 
as only a few countries were ready to let Moscow win a propaganda battle, only a 
few months after the Soviet crushing of the 1956 Hungarian uprising. At the same 
time, it did not go unnoticed that the position of the Western powers was weak-
ened by the attitude of the US government, which had announced just before the 
start of the Conference that it would not ratify the future Convention. Although 
this position was in line with the general US attitude towards the ratification of 
ILO standards, few had imagined that the US government would actually go so far 
as to state up front its disavowal of a Convention that it had significantly helped 
to bring about in the first place.534
By the time the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (No.105) was finally 
adopted, the global situation had started to change. With de-Stalinization, Soviet 
camps were less in the focus of the debate which started to centre more on other 
places, where forced labour for political and economic purposes existed. The 
Mudaliar Committee had found that the modern phenomenon of using forced 
labour as a means of economic development was a general trend independent of 
political systems.
Although the report was not primarily targeted at developing countries, it 
is easy to draw a line to the situation in many newly independent states. In Asia 
and Africa, in the early 1960s, voices grew in strength that wanted to make the 
acceptance of ILO Conventions conditional. They should not the superior goal of 
national development. In this context, the use of coercive measures for develop-
mental purposes became one of the prime fields of controversy.
In a telling way, in 1962, a conflict emerged when the ILO published a report 
of its Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommen-
dations (CEACR) on the situation regarding the application of the Forced Labour 
Convention of 1957. The report contained an outright attack on a group of mainly 
sub-Saharan African countries, where, according to the report, some forms of 
forced and compulsory labour had survived the transition to independence.535 
Some governments had even set up new forms of coercive labour for purposes 
of development. The report singled out in particular so-called “youth labour ser-
534 Maul, “The ILO and the Struggle against Forced Labour”, 487–489.
535 According to the Committee’s report, forms of forced labour were to be found all over the 
world, in independent countries and colonial territories alike. Labour services under the auspic-
es of the military were particularly frequent in West and East Africa. See ILO, Record of Proceed-
ings, Report III (Part IV): Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations, International Labour Conference, 46th Session 1962 (Geneva: ILO, 1962).
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vices”, where the “recruits” generally worked on public infrastructure projects.536 
The states concerned reacted with deep indignation to the findings. Part of the 
bitterness of the reactions could be explained by the fact that African countries 
now stood accused of a “classically colonial crime”. This was further aggravated 
when Portugal, which itself had been accused of using wide-scale forced labour 
in its African territories in a complaint lodged in 1961, was largely acquitted of 
those accusations by an ILO Commission of Inquiry.537
In the debates, however, countries that had emerged from colonial rule also 
made a more general point. They emphasized the basic vocational training that 
youth services provided and stressed the absolute necessity of the work carried 
out under its auspices. In their defence, they argued that their present state of 
underdevelopment constituted an emergency situation, comparable to a state of 
war. This justified the mobilization of all forces for a common goal. As a govern-
ment representative from the Ivory Coast put it, the developing countries were 
involved in a battle for economic independence that was just as serious as any 
military struggle. The young people prepared to shed blood for their country had 
to be given a chance “to defend the real independence of the country, by which I 
mean its economic independence”.538
In this highly politically charged context, the debate on the African youth 
labour services lingered on until the beginning of the 1970s, when a new 
Recommendation on youth services and training was adopted, containing a 
compromise formula that settled the matter in a way that calmed down the 
debate.539
536 The model for these youth labour services, as the CEACR collectively termed them, was an 
institution that had been established at the beginning of the 1950s in Israel; indeed, the help of 
Israeli experts had been enlisted in setting up most of the labour services in Africa.
537 As an immediate reaction, Portugal filed a forced labour complaint only a few months later 
against Liberia, which was found guilty by an ILO Commission of Inquiry in 1962 of violating 
both Forced Labour Conventions it had ratified in 1931 and 1962. The Portuguese case is well 
covered by José Pedro Monteiro, “ ‘One of Those Too-Rare Examples’: The International Labour 
Organization, the Colonial Question and Forced Labour (1961–1963)”, in Internationalism, Impe-
rialism and the Formation of the Contemporary World. The Past of the Present, ed. Miguel Bandei-
ra Jerónimo and Pedro José Monteiro (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 221–251.
538 Quoted from Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization, 265.
539 Special Youth Schemes Recommendation, 1970 (No. 136).
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Discrimination in Employment and Occupation
Decolonization and the Cold War also provided the background for a Convention 
to ban discrimination in employment and occupation (No. 111), adopted in 1958. 
Although other forms of discrimination (for instance, based on sex and religion) 
came also under scrutiny, the abolishment of unequal treatment because of race 
was at the centre of the discussions.540 The dynamics of the debate differed signif-
icantly from those previously held on freedom of association and forced labour. 
Apart from the highly symbolic value that African and Asian countries attached 
to the issue, it initially provided the Eastern bloc countries also with an oppor-
tunity to disparage the West because of the domestic situation in some Western 
countries and in European colonial territories. It is noteworthy that the struggle 
against racial discrimination forced the international trade union movement to 
take a stand across the dividing lines of the Cold War. The ensuing debate ulti-
mately led to the adoption of one of the most coherent and concise international 
human rights instruments, which became an important step leading a decade 
later to the UN’s International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1969).541
As with forced labour and freedom of association, the problem was by no 
means a new one. The unsuccessful Japanese attempts to establish racial equal-
ity as a founding principle of the League of Nations had been the first in a series 
of efforts to eradicate discrimination on grounds of ethnicity and skin colour in 
both national and international law. As was the case with forced labour during 
the Second World War, the atrocities committed in the name of racist ideologies 
fuelled the debates after 1945. To eradicate racism was also the declared aim 
of countries that had emerged from colonial rule. In the United Nations, newly 
independent India led an early attack in 1947 on the South African government’s 
 policies of racial discrimination.542 The previous year, the General Assembly, at 
its very first session, had already passed a resolution condemning discrimina-
tion on racial and religious grounds and calling upon the new UN family to fight 
against it in all its forms. During the immediate post-war period, in particular, 
UNESCO spearheaded international efforts to counter the continuing legitimacy 
of racial discrimination and segregation.543
540 Sex and religion were also among the categories that the authors of the 1958 Convention 
would list among the areas in which discriminatory practices should be abolished.
541 Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988).
542 Ibid.
543 Amrith and Sluga, “New Histories of the United Nations”, 257–260.
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The voices calling for action against racial discrimination became louder at 
the ILCs after 1945, too, but the ILO was comparatively slow to react. The Decla-
ration of Philadelphia had predictably been unambiguous about racial discrimi-
nation, speaking in its rights part about “all human beings, irrespective of race, 
creed or sex”. The reasons why it took the ILO more than a decade to get a Con-
vention on its way was due mainly to the politically controversial nature of the 
question itself. During much of the period in question, the countries that had to 
fear most from a debate on the issue were those which largely dominated the ILO.
This was clearly the case for the United States, where the African-American 
population in many Southern states still lived with discriminatory “Jim Crow” 
legislation. It had become a diplomatic embarrassment, which the Soviet Union 
early on sought to exploit in all international fora.544 It was equally true for such 
countries as South Africa, which became the preferred target of anti-racist activi-
ties in the UN, in particular after 1948, when the election of the Nationalist Party 
marked the official onset of the apartheid era. The majority of the colonial powers 
was not eager to see their discriminatory policies scrutinized. Many of them still 
permitted the existence of “colour bars” that were anchored in law and admin-
istrative practice and denied particular groups access to education, certain pro-
fessions, promotion, equal pay, or equal social services. In fact, a considerable 
number of countries had reason to be concerned about a debate on this issue. 
Immigration policies that excluded groups of people of colour were at the heart 
of government policies in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, and indigenous 
populations were subject to discrimination here as well as in a range of Latin 
American countries.545
In the light of the resistance from many of the ILO’s original members and 
supporters to whom the Organization owed its very survival during the post-war 
years, it remained wary of taking the initiative on the issue of discrimination. 
It was only in 1954, with the Soviet Union re-joining the Organization, that the 
discussion gained momentum. In the same year, the debates surrounding the 
 Convention concerning the Abolition of Penal Sanctions for Breaches of Con-
tract of Employment by Indigenous Workers (No. 104), eventually adopted in 
1955, put a spotlight on existing forms of discrimination under colonial rule. The 
Penal Sanctions Convention was the last standard directed at indigenous workers 
in colonial territories. In essence, the debate centred on the question whether 
breaches of employment contracts by an employee (e.g. the refusal to work or 
unilateral termination), which, in most independent countries, were dealt with in 
544 Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize.
545 Lauren, Power and Prejudice, 169–171.
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the civil courts, could be punished by penal sanctions in the colonies. As early as 
1939, the ILC had already adopted a Convention calling for the “progressive abo-
lition” of such sanctions, and the Social Policy in Non-Metropolitan Territories 
Convention of 1947 had again called for putting an end to them. However, a report 
of the ILO’s Expert Committee on Social Policy in Non-Metropolitan Territories, 
published in 1951 revealed that penal sanctions continued to be used excessively 
throughout colonial Africa by most colonial powers and by the South African 
apartheid regime.546 In 1954, when the matter was brought up by the ILC, the 
Belgian government representative William Van Remoortel declared that penal 
sanctions were an indispensable part of the “educational work” provided by the 
colonial powers to “native populations”. They were a means to help them to over-
come their “primitive conditions” by “putting them to constructive work”.547 The 
ensuing debate showed that this attitude no longer represented the views of a 
majority of ILO members. The discussion quickly turned into a symbolic struggle 
against racial discrimination, and the original plan for a Recommendation was 
replaced by much more far-reaching proposals. In the end, a new Convention that 
aimed for the complete and immediate abolition of penal sanctions was adopted 
by an overwhelming majority of 169 votes to one (that of South Africa).548
This set the stage for further action. In the same year, ECOSOC called upon 
the ILO to examine in detail the various forms of discrimination that existed in 
“employment and occupation” and to investigate the possibility of introducing 
new means to tackle them. The pressure on the Western nations to give up their 
opposition to the ILO handling the issue was mounting, and eventually it was 
agreed that discrimination would be addressed by means of a new Convention. 
The discussions preceding the adoption of a new standard put the dynamics of 
the human rights discourse on full display. It also brought about coalitions that, 
at least to some extent, transcended the dividing lines of the Cold War.
A first draft Convention, which the Office had prepared for the ILC in 1957, 
mainly called for “educational” action to tackle racial discrimination at the work-
place. It took account of the resistance of many Western states to anything that 
would commit them to taking concrete policy measures. This attitude, however, 
was soon overtaken by events. African and Asian Member states, increasingly 
numerous and by then energized by the Bandung Conference of African-Asian 
solidarity in 1955, had taken an uncompromising stand on the issue of racial dis-
546 In the Belgian Congo, for instance, there had been around 40,000 criminal convictions for 
breaches of employment contracts or breaches of discipline at work in 1949 alone, but penal 
sanctions were in use also in Portuguese and British territories in Africa.
547 Quoted in Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization, 196.
548 Ibid., 192–196.
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crimination.549 As the debate proceeded, this new “non-aligned” force gained the 
support of not only the Socialist bloc but also the great majority of the Workers’ 
group. For the ICFTU, the issue provided an opportunity to demonstrate its cred-
ibility to Workers’ representatives from the global South.550 In the drafting com-
mittee, the workers pushed for an inclusion of a set of political and legal steps to 
enforce the principles of the Convention. The final draft took account of most of 
the demands made by the advocates of a strong Convention.
When the ILC convened in 1958, the US government was fighting a losing 
battle. It drew angry criticism when it announced that it would abstain from voting 
the final Convention. The colonial powers were subject to a historical defeat on 
the issue. Government representatives of Czechoslovakia and the Workers’ group 
separately proposed an amendment that would oblige the signatories to extend 
without reservations the provisions of the Convention to their colonial territo-
ries. In opposing the amendment, the colonial powers argued that it would be 
incompatible with Article 35 of the ILO Constitution, which covered the separate 
application of Conventions in non-metropolitan territories. Alas, this contention 
only served to put an even brighter spotlight on the untenable position of the 
colonial powers. By invoking the infamous “colonial clause”, they were challeng-
ing the very human rights nature of the question. The outcome was a clear victory 
for both the Afro-Asian and the Eastern bloc delegations, which unanimously 
supported the amendment. The Convention prohibited discrimination “on the 
basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social 
origin” and was, according to its wording, fully applicable to the colonies.551 It 
was indeed a triumph for the Afro-Asian countries. Unlike the issues of forced 
labour and freedom of association, the topic of racial discrimination gained even 
further impetus in the coming decades. Next to the right to self-determination, it 
was by far the most important human rights question for the growing group of 
newly independent countries.
If the movement did not lose momentum, it was also due to its finding a 
focus in the South African apartheid regime which, at the beginning of the 1960s, 
seemed determined to consolidate and even expand its racist policies. Events like 
the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960, when the police opened fire on a crowd 
of unarmed black demonstrators, and mass imprisonments of African opposition 
549 On South-South solidarity and the Non-Aligned Movement as new forces in international pol-
itics, see Jürgen Dinkel, The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927–1992) 
(Leiden: Brill, 2019).
550 Anthony Carew, “Conflict within the ICFTU. Anti-Communism and Anti-Colonialism in the 
1950s”, International Review of Social History 41, no. 2 (1996): 147–181.
551 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111).
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leaders further cemented the regime’s status as the stronghold of institutional-
ized racism. The Afro-Asian countries used their growing numerical strength in 
the UN to condemn South Africa, and they called for excluding it from all interna-
tional organizations, including the ILO.
The ILO became a special target, which is easily explained by the fact that a 
highly racialized labour regime was at the core of apartheid. This became even 
more obvious at the beginning of the 1960s with the creation of ‘homelands’, 
territories set aside for various black ethnic groups and primarily intended to 
provide South Africa’s industry with cheap black labour. Even on earlier occa-
sions, ILO bodies like the Mudaliar Committee on Forced Labour, the Committee 
on Freedom of Association, and the CEACR had repeatedly condemned the social 
practices of the apartheid regime.552 In 1960, a new level of conflict was reached, 
when the Nigerian Labour Minister Joseph Modupe Johnson, as the spokesperson 
of a group of African and Asian countries, submitted a resolution to the ILC which 
called upon South Africa to voluntarily leave the ILO.553 South Africa’s Western 
allies, the United States and the United Kingdom among them, initially resisted 
this move for economic and also geopolitical reasons. In their perspective, the 
regime in Pretoria was an anti-communist bulwark in Southern Africa.
In 1963, the newly strengthened group of African nations resumed their fight 
to remove South Africa from the ILO. The ILO was put to a test of strength, when 
they tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to deny the South African Employers’ delegate 
the right to speak. They then organized a walk-out, which was supported by the 
Eastern bloc and many Asian and Latin American delegations. This put the ILO in 
an extremely difficult position, and, for a moment, even the future of the Organ-
ization itself seemed to hang in the balance. As a Liberian government delegate 
stated, “We have a rat in the house”, and he asked rhetorically: “Shall we burn 
the house in order to get rid of the rat”?554 In an improvised and highly emotional 
speech, David Morse condemned racial discrimination as the “enemy of the civi-
lized world community” and “a challenge to world peace”, but he still appealed 
to the African nations to stick to the Constitution of the ILO and “fight this enemy 
552 Summarized in Ghébali, The International Labour Organization, 83–84.
553 The resolution also called upon the Governing Body to advise South Africa to leave the Or-
ganization. See the Resolution Calling for the Withdrawal of the Union of South Africa from Mem-
bership of the ILO, on the Grounds of the “Apartheid” (Racial Discrimination) Policy Practised 
by the Union Government, in ILO, Record of Proceedings, Appendix IV: Report of the Resolutions 
Committee, International Labour Conference, 45th Session 1961 (Geneva: ILO, 1961), 696–697.
554 Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization, 239.
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[…] with methods which strengthen the foundations of world order”.555 He even-
tually succeeded in bringing all delegations back to the Conference.
South Africa could not be expelled, as the ILO Constitution had no provi-
sion for it. In the end, South Africa itself announced that it would put on hold 
its membership, thus effectively ending its cooperation with the Organization, 
undoubtedly in the hope that this would, to a certain extent, leave the country in 
peace. But soon afterwards, the ILO started to take additional steps against apart-
heid. In 1964, the ILC adopted a “Declaration Concerning the Policy of Apartheid 
of the Republic of South Africa”, accompanied by a “Programme of Action for the 
Elimination of Apartheid in the Field of Labour”. The Declaration denounced the 
South African government in human rights terms, declaring that its violation of 
ILO principles could no longer be considered an internal affair of the country. It 
also recommended amending the Constitution of the ILO to allow members that 
had been condemned by the United Nations for policies of racial discrimination 
to be barred from all ILO bodies except the Conference. When the Governing Body 
approved this plan by a large majority, South Africa declared that it was leaving 
the ILO. Pretoria’s departure was greeted mostly with relief, and it gave the ILC 
an opportunity in the years to come to sharpen the anti-discriminatory profile of 
the ILO by regularly denouncing in the strongest possible terms South Africa’s 
“degrading, criminal and inhuman policies”. In 1965, the Director-General began 
to submit special annual reports to the Conference detailing whatever progress 
had been made in the struggle against apartheid. Over the years, the ILO contin-
uously stepped up its anti-apartheid activities, including the set-up of a special 
technical assistance programme for liberation movements, which mainly benefit-
ted the Southern African groups in exile. The reports on both, progress made and 
assistance to liberation movements, were discussed regularly by a special com-
mittee of the Conference. This continued until the first democratic elections were 
held in South Africa in 1994 and, as a result, the country returned to the ILO.556
The late 1960s offered the opportunity to draw a balance of the ILO’s record 
as a human rights agency. In 1968, the Organization published a report on “The 
ILO and Human Rights”, as part of the UN’s commemorations of 20 years of the 
Universal Declaration and a contribution to the UN’s International Year of Human 
Rights. In 1969, the ILO celebrated its 50th anniversary and the 25 years of the 
Declaration of Philadelphia, which had added the human rights dimension to its 
work. In the same year, the ILO was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. On this occa-
555 ILO, Record of Proceedings, International Labour Conference, 47th Session 1963 (Geneva: 
ILO, 1963), 168–172.
556 On the ILO’s participation in the international struggle against apartheid, see Rodgers et al., 
The ILO and the Quest for Social Justice, 50–57.
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sion the Norwegian Nobel Committee paid tribute to the Organization’s achieve-
ments. In his own Nobel lecture Morse referred explicitly to the ILO’s work for 
“basic human rights”.557
Despite these accolades, there was no way of concealing the fact that ten-
sions lingered on during the ILO’s “human rights decade”. Earlier conflicts about 
tripartite representation had lost much of their vitriol, at least in Europe, where 
the Cold War had moved in the second half of the 1960s towards détente and a 
phase of East-West dialogue. But the discontent felt by some – and in particular 
by the trade unions of the United States – about the coexistence and accommo-
dations that had been developing, was thinly veiled and would soon erupt again.
The contradictory views on how to achieve an adequate balance between 
political and social rights that had marked the post-colonial debates on freedom 
of association and forced labour continued to be played out within the ILO’s 
meeting halls. In international fora, the “Third World”, now acting as the Group 
of 77 (G77), as it was referred to since the first UNCTAD Conference in 1964, 
was increasingly weighing in on human rights debates.558 The struggle for self- 
determination and the fight against racial discrimination were permanent ral-
lying points under human rights premises for countries from the global South, 
with the continued practice of apartheid and Portugal’s die-hard colonialism as 
prime targets. Additionally, from 1967 onwards, Israel’s occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza in the wake of the Six-Day War became another rallying point for 
human rights mobilization for countries of the global South.
At the same time, a discourse in which developing countries promoted the 
primacy of social and economic over political and civil rights was gaining ever 
more strength. At an international human rights conference convened by the UN 
in Teheran in 1968, the trend became very clear. Asian and African countries, 
which frequently pursued the modernization of their societies by authoritarian 
means, collided head-on with the Western conceptions of individual human 
rights.559 The increasingly worsening economic situation of post-colonial states 
was marked by underdevelopment and structural disadvantages. According to 
these countries, this “state of emergency” warranted the subordination of indi-
vidual freedoms to the common goal of development. While, in this rhetoric, 
social and economic rights took precedence over political rights, the promotion of 
557 International Labour Organization, Nobel lecture, “ILO and the Social Infrastructure of 
Peace”, Nobel Peace Prize appreciation, 1969.
558 Steven L. B. Jensen, The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, 
and the Reconstruction of Global Values, Human Rights in History (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2017).
559 Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, 92–111.
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the former came with a re-interpretation of those rights concerning the question 
of who was entitled to them. Social and economic rights were now increasingly 
promoted as being first and foremost the rights of states, and not of individual 
citizens.560 Within this paternalistic vision of modernization, those rights became 
part of the quest for a “right to development”, to be attained and granted not 
through national legislation, but rather on the international level, in the fight 
for what would soon be called the New International Economic Order (NIEO).561
These discussions had a direct consequence for the human rights policy of 
the ILO. The claims of the developing countries could not be ignored, not only 
because of the shifting majorities within the ILC but also because frictions about 
the role of ILO standards for development ran right through the International 
Labour Office. In 1963, the Director-General had convened a working group to 
discuss the ways in which the ILO’s forced labour standards could be made more 
compatible with the demands of economic and social development. The ensuing 
discussion quickly went beyond the field of forced labour and resulted in a much 
more general debate, which saw a “labour standards faction” within the Office 
set against a “development faction”. While the former believed that the ILO, as 
the only development agency in the UN system concerned with social affairs, 
could not subordinate its standard work to economic considerations, the latter 
sought to make the implementation of standards dependant on economic factors 
such as productivity. They supported, therefore, a gradual implementation, 
even of human rights standards, where necessary. The underlying conflict was if 
authoritarian models of development could be acceptable as long as the ultimate 
goal remained a social one, or whether ILO standards were just one of the means 
rather than the goal of the development process.562
The conflicts resonated in David Morse’s report to the ILC in 1968, in which 
he defended the integrated approach to development, where human rights stand-
ards were not only ideals to be reached but means to an end. Morse reaffirmed the 
universal value of the four basic principles of the Declaration of  Philadelphia – 
freedom, equality, economic security, and dignity. At the same time, he acknowl-
edged that, “while certain rights, such as the right to work, the right to condi-
tions of work and life compatible with human dignity or the right or  equality of 
560 For alternative views, see Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third 
World, A New Press People’s History (New York: New Press, 2007); Jensen, The Making of Inter-
national Human Rights.
561 On the NIEO, see Dietrich, Oil Revolution.
562 During the 1970s and against the backdrop of the debate on forced labour, the Office pro-
duced various memoranda on the African Youth Labour Services. Maul, Human Rights, Develop-
ment and Decolonization, 268–272.
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opportunity are essentially goals to be reached, others like freedom of associ-
ation or the right to collective bargaining are not only objectives but  represent 
means of action that can render great service to the cause of all the rights and 
freedoms that concern us”.563 Twenty-five years after the Declaration of Phila-
delphia had first introduced them into the orbit of the ILO, some basic insecu-
rity clearly still existed about whether, and to what degree, the ILO was actually 
“doing human rights”. 
563 ILO, Record of Proceedings, Report of the Director General (Part I): Thee I.L.O and Human 
Rights, International Labour Conference, 52nd Session 1968 (Geneva: ILO, 1968), 13.
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When David Morse left the International Labour Organization (ILO) after 22 years 
as Director-General in May 1970, an era that had transformed the Organization 
ended. The two men who succeeded him in office, Wilfred Jenks and Francis 
Blanchard, were different in temperament and leadership style, but both, in their 
own specific ways, embodied continuity. When the Englishman Jenks became 
Director-General in 1970, he looked back on four decades of experience in the 
ILO. He had joined the Organization in 1931. From the 1940s onwards, he had 
occupied high-ranking posts, as Legal Adviser during the war period; as Assistant 
Director-General; and, finally, as Morse’s Principal Deputy. From an early point 
in his career, he had been well connected to the broader field of international 
organizations. He had been part of the ILO delegation at the Bretton Woods Con-
ference and present at the foundation of the United Nations. Joining the ILO as a 
student of the eminent law scholar Hersch Lauterpacht at Cambridge University, 
Jenks gained a reputation outside of the ILO through his many publications in the 
field of international law. He played a key part in drafting the Declaration of Phil-
adelphia and worked on international commissions in the run-up to the UDHR of 
1948. A staunch believer in the steady progress of international law, Jenks, more 
than any other leading official in the ILO’s history, stood for the idea that the 
ILO’s social mandate rested on a human rights foundation.564 However, Jenks did 
not have an opportunity to make a lasting imprint as Director-General, since he 
died suddenly after only three years in office.565
Jenks’ French successor, Francis Blanchard, came into office with nearly a 
quarter of a century of experience in the ILO. He had joined the Office in 1951, at 
the age of 35, and had moved up quickly to become Assistant Director-General 
in 1956 and Deputy Director–General in 1968. While Blanchard might have had 
less of Jenks’ intellectual ambition and idealism, he, too, represented the ILO’s 
traditions, but from a different angle. His perspective was shaped primarily by 
the technocratic orientation, which the ILO had taken under David Morse’s direc-
torship. Like Jenks a lawyer by education, Blanchard had worked for the Interna-
tional Refugee Organization (IRO) immediately after the Second World War before 
becoming a member of the ILO’s Manpower Division, which he headed from 1956 
onwards. He had been heavily involved in the Organization’s transformation into 
564 Jaci Leigh Eisenberg, “Jenks, Clarence Wilfred”, in IO Bio: Biographical Dictionary of 
 Secretaries-General of International Organizations, ed. Reinalda, Kille, and Eisenberg, www.
ru.nl/fm/iobio; Jaci Leigh Eisenberg, “Butler, Harold Beresford”, in ibid.
565 Blanchard had been Jenks’ competitor for the post of Director-General in 1970, after Morse’s 
departure. Jenks carried the day by only two votes, in the narrowest of competitions in the ILO’s 
history of Director-General elections. But he had little time to prove his capacity to navigate the 
ILO through what would turn out to be a difficult period of transformation.
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a development agency, and was responsible for technical cooperation and the 
ILO’s field services.566
Blanchard’s term lasted from 1973 to 1989, and it would turn out to be a period 
of many different, often countervailing tendencies for which the ILO served as a 
sounding board and a litmus test. It was a period in which the Cold War pro-
gressed into détente, disarmament, and some degree of cooperation. The Final 
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in Helsinki in July 
1975, constituted the centrepiece of an apparently stabilized and pacified bipolar 
order in Europe. At the same time, for the ILO, the 1970s became a time of serious 
institutional turmoil, triggered by the brief withdrawal of the United States from 
the Organization from 1977 to 1981. 
The period was rich with political changes in many parts of the world: While 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict intensified, democratic governments were toppled 
in Latin America, where military dictatorships seized power in the 1970s. In other 
regions, democratic transition processes got under way, as in Southern Europe, 
where longstanding authoritarian regimes collapsed. In Eastern Europe, the 
demise of state socialism eventually culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991. Around the same time, 
the last remnants of colonial rule in Africa ended with the fall of the apartheid 
regime in South Africa. From Spain and Portugal to Chile and Argentina, from 
South Africa to Poland, the ILO was taking part in these transition processes. 
Against this background, new human rights discourses that accompanied these 
developments found their way into the ILO, where they put to the test some of the 
standards and mechanisms the Organization had established during its “human 
rights decade” in the immediate post–Second World War era.
Economically, the 1970s were a period of crisis and reorientation as well. 
Blanchard took over from Jenks in the context of the first oil crisis of 1973, which, 
in hindsight, was the beginning of the end of the “golden age” of post-war growth 
and prosperity. In the wake of the economic downturn and the rise of unem-
ployment, the ILO felt the repercussions of the paradigm change in economic 
thinking. When Keynesianism lost its decades-long supremacy in economic dis-
course to supply-side economics, this change deeply affected the ILO. It eventu-
ally impacted also the ILO’s development policies. While it seemed to be on top 
of the debate during the mid-1970s – with the World Employment Conference of 
1976 launching the basic needs concept – it faced marginalization only a decade 
566 There is no biography of Blanchard. For further information, see his memoirs: Francis 
Blanchard, L’Organisation internationale du Travail: De la guerre froide à un nouvel ordre mondial 
(Paris: Seuil, 2004). A concise account of Blanchard’s time at the ILO is contained in Carol Riege-
lmann Lubin’s unpublished manuscript, “Book on ILO”, (2002), 165–201.
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later, when structural adjustment was imposed by the international financial 
institutions to address the debt crises in which many developing countries found 
themselves.
Against this highly volatile backdrop, the ILO was still able to launch new 
initiatives with regard to one of its traditional field of activity, the improvement of 
conditions at work. The early 1970s saw the beginning of a debate on the “human-
ization of labour” which was institutionalized by the ILO in the International Pro-
gramme for the Improvement of Working Conditions and Environment (PIACT) 
starting in 1976. It opened a space for new topics on the ILO’s agenda, including 
environmental issues, and integrated for the first time the informal economy, 
in parallel to the discussions of the World Employment Programme. Its innova-
tive set-up and its broad scope, which included industrialized and developing 
countries, gave new impulses to the debate on working conditions worldwide 
that went beyond the programme as such and the difficulties it faced at a time 
of serious financial constraints resulting from the US withdrawal from the ILO.
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New Questions of Universality – The US Withdrawal
In May 1970, after only three weeks in office, Jenks announced that he would 
appoint a representative of the Belorussian Soviet Republic, Pavel Astapenko, as 
Assistant Director-General. Thus, for the first time, a national from an Eastern bloc 
country became a member of the Director-General’s senior management team. 
The main weight that this appointment carried was symbolic. While it seemed a 
long overdue step in the eyes of one of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union, it 
contributed to the withdrawal of the other world power, the United States, in 1977.
Although a key factor leading to the American exit, Jenks’ decision to nomi-
nate a Soviet national for a top position in the ILO was part of a longer and more 
complex story. To a certain degree, it was the expression of a “normalization” 
of the participation of the Eastern bloc in the ILO at this time. On a technical 
level, such normalization had already taken place at an earlier stage.567 In the 
fields of development collaboration and knowledge transfer, in particular, coop-
eration between the two ideological camps had become rather commonplace. 
On the political level, however, this process was somewhat slower. David Morse 
remained convinced that the underlying aim of the Soviet Union was to sabotage 
and ultimately split the United Nations system.568 When the Soviet Union had first 
expressed its wish for a senior post in the ILO in 1960, he had accordingly refused 
to comply and successfully managed to fend off all further attempts until the end 
of his last term in office. With the spirit of détente increasingly shaping inter-
national politics in Europe in the 1970s, the situation began to ease. From then 
onwards, the Soviet demands played a secondary role compared to the growing 
estrangement of the major US labour union, the AFL-CIO,569 which was opposed 
to the slightest concession to the Eastern bloc. This, more than anything else, 
complicated matters for Morse. Furthermore, this alienation was part of an even 
longer story of the often complicated relationship between the ILO and the United 
States during the Morse years.570 It was witnessed by the increasingly hostile atti-
tude the US Employers’ representatives displayed from the 1950s on towards the 
Organization, which they denounced as socialist. This became also visible in the 
human rights discussions of the 1950s. For this very reason, Morse always placed 
567 For a longer-term perspective, see Kott, “OIT, justice sociale et mondes communistes”.
568 On Morse and the Cold War tensions of this era see, Maul, “David Morse”, 2–3.
569 The AFL and its former rival CIO had merged in 1955 to form the AFL-CIO.
570 Maul, “David Morse”, 3.
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great emphasis on ILO-US relations and tried to strengthen them through the 
ILO’s recruitment policy and its Washington office.571 During the initial part of 
his tenure, he could count on the constant and reliable support of the AFL-CIO. 
This changed, however, in the early 1960s, when the AFL-CIO leadership under 
its president, George Meany, became increasingly critical of Morse. In the eyes 
of Meany, a staunch and uncompromising anti-communist, Morse was “soft on 
communism”.572 This impression, which was based on Morse’s position in the 
bitter struggles over Soviet representation in the framework of the ILO’s tripartite 
structure at the end of the 1950s, was confirmed by Morse’s handling of the first 
Soviet demands for a high-ranking position in 1960. Morse had tied his refusal 
to comply with the Soviet request with the announcement that he would not 
stand again for re-election as Director-General in 1962. When Morse changed his 
mind shortly afterwards, the circumstances of his “retreat from retreat” were the 
last straw for the AFL-CIO, which had already committed its support to Morse’s 
deputy, Jef Rens, and now felt sidelined.573
During the late 1960s, when many Western European trade unions displayed 
more openness for some degree of cooperation with the East, the AFL-CIO’s posi-
tion was hardening even more. In 1966, the US Workers’ delegation walked out 
from the ILC after a Polish Government representative had been elected President 
of the Conference. In the same year, the Workers’ group elected into the Govern-
ing Body for the first time the Soviet Workers’ delegate.574 A growing alienation 
between the AFL-CIO and the Europeans ultimately led to the American trade 
unions’ withdrawal from the ICFTU in 1968.575 Their increasing isolation, lack of 
faith in the ILO as an ally in the Cold War during the last years of Morse’s mandate, 
and the failed expectation that Jenks, elected as Director-General in 1970, would 
bring the  ILO “back on track” characterized the situation in which events 
unfolded. The United States perceived Jenk’s nomination of Pavel Astapenko as a 
betrayal, in particular, since they had supported Jenks against Blanchard for the 
very reason that they believed him to be less likely to give in to Soviet pressure.576
571 Eisenberg, “Butler, Harold Beresford”. On the US-ILO relationship in the post-war era, par-
ticularly for the early period, see Jensen, “US New Deal Policy Experts and the ILO, 1948–1954”. 
On labour standards, see Lorenz, Defining Global Justice.
572 See Maul, “David Morse”.
573 Morse took the decision to stay on after an intervention from the administration of President 
John F. Kennedy and Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg; DAMP.
574 Carew, American Labour’s Cold War Abroad, 268–269, n. 104.
575 Carew, “Conflict within the ICFTU”. The AFL-CIO returned to the ICFTU in 1982, after Mea-
ny’s death.
576 Francis Maupain, “A Former Legal Adviser as ILO Executive Head: The ‘Immanent Force of Law’, 
Its Role and Vicissitudes in the Context of a Changing International System”, unpublished article.
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Not only the Americans were taken by surprise by Astapenko’s nomination, 
and Jenks’ motives remain to some degree unclear. What is certain – according to 
people close to Jenks at the time – is that his almost religious belief in the mission 
of international organizations and in “due process” would have left him with no 
doubt that he was perfectly entitled to appoint whomever he wished to appoint 
to senior positions in the ILO. He also might have underestimated the political 
repercussions and might have lacked – as many claimed – the diplomatic skills 
necessary to handle this highly delicate issue. But whatever motivated Jenks, he 
was not the only one who thought that the Eastern bloc countries were underrep-
resented in senior positions at the ILO, and their claims for representation and 
inclusion were to some extent justified.577
During the late 1960s, some Western European governments had already 
tried to accommodate Soviet claims in this regard. During the ensuing years, more 
attempts would follow.578 The changing attitudes had worried many in the United 
States who felt that their country might be losing ground on the international 
level. The lost war in Vietnam and the inglorious end of the Nixon administration 
contributed to a growing perception that the American ability to exert control or, 
seen from a more critical perspective, some kind of “hegemony”579 over interna-
tional organizations was eroding, which, in turn, translated into increasing dis-
content. In this situation, it took little to tip the balance in favour of those who 
argued for an American exit from international agencies. In hindsight, this move 
has to be interpreted less as a sign of strength than an expression of a growing 
feeling of weakness and isolation.
The ultimate pretext to leave the ILO, however, came from a different side. For 
years, the US government had taken issue with what it perceived as the growing 
politicization of the ILO (and even more so of other institutions like UNESCO), 
carried out by a more and more assertive group of countries from the global 
South.580 At the centre of their concerns was the conflict over the Israeli occu-
pation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip after the 1967 Arab- 
Israeli war. Arab states supported by Eastern bloc countries and a majority of the 
577 Eisenberg, “Jenks, Clarence Wilfred”.
578 In 1973, a Soviet national was designated for the chairmanship of the Governing Body for 
the first time. Both the AFL-CIO and the American government protested. Instead, with the sup-
port of the majority of both workers and employers but against the vote of most West European 
governments, they secured the election of a Mexican government representative. Lubin, “Book 
on ILO”, 158.
579 Cox, “Labor and Hegemony”.
580 Mark F. Imber, The USA, ILO, UNESCO and IAEA: Politicization and Withdrawal in the Spe-
cialized Agencies (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989).
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G77 increasingly used their majority in international organizations to put Israel in 
the dock on every possible occasion. In 1973, a resolution that condemned Israel 
for its treatment of Arab workers in the occupied territories failed by only a slim 
margin. Seeking to secure due process  – and also to send a political signal to 
Washington – Jenks criticized the draft resolution of the Arab states for demand-
ing the condemnation of Israel even before an official ILO inquiry had taken place 
on the ground.581
The following year, the Arab countries were more successful. Against the 
nearly unanimous resistance of Western governments, Employers and a good 
part of the Workers’ group, a resolution condemning the “Policy of Discrimi-
nation, Racism and Violation of Trade Union Freedoms and Rights Practised 
by the Israeli Authorities in Palestine and the other occupied Arab territories” 
was adopted by the ILC.582 In 1975, when the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) achieved observer status in the ILO, some Western delegations, including 
those of the United States and West Germany left the conference hall in protest. 
Immediately after the end of the 1975 ILC, the AFL-CIO asked the US government 
to announce its intention to withdraw from ILO membership. In November 1975, 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sent a letter to the ILO in which he proclaimed 
the US intention to withdraw within the regular two-years-time period. He gave 
four reasons for this step: (1) The erosion of the tripartite principle and the pres-
ence of a growing bloc of Workers’ and Employers’ delegates “wholly under the 
domination of government”; (2) the “appallingly selective concern” in the pur-
suance of human rights in the ILO; (3) the “utter disregard” which the ILC had 
repeatedly shown for “due process” when it came to the passing of resolutions 
against Israel without a prior inquiry having taken place; and (4) undue polit-
icization of the ILO inasmuch as it had become “increasingly and excessively 
involved in political issues which are quite beyond the competent mandate of 
the Organization”. There was a glimmer of hope in the letter from the ILO’s point 
of view, however, since it contained an announcement to work out proposals for 
changes in the Organization’s conduct, which would allow the United States to 
stay on as a member.583
The following two years passed with intense lobbying of the ILO and the major 
Western powers to keep the United States within the Organization. Representa-
581 Maupain, “A Former Legal Adviser as ILO Executive Head”.
582 ILO, Record of Proceedings, International Labour Conference, 59th Session 1974 (Geneva: 
ILO, 1975), 808.
583 Imber, The USA, ILO, UNESCO and IAEA. Yves Beigbeder, “The United States’ Withdrawal 
from the International Labor Organization”, Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations 34, no. 2 
(1979): 223–240 (Kissinger notice summarized on pp. 228–229).
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tives of the European Community, the IOE, and the ICFTU all tried to convince the 
 Americans that their voice and influence was needed in order to tackle the prob-
lems listed in Kissinger’s notice. Even the Pope sought to convince Meany (a devout 
Catholic) and the incoming President, Jimmy Carter.584 In the end, none of these 
efforts paid off. On 1 November 1977, Carter announced that, in light of the fact that 
the course corrections requested by the United States had not been implemented 
in sufficient measure, US membership in the ILO would be terminated. Still Carter 
and his Secretary of Labour, Ray Marshall, who were personally sceptical about the 
step taken, left a door open by stating that the United States remained “ready to 
return whenever the ILO is again true to its proper principles and procedures”.585
It is hard to see how the ILO could have satisfied the American demands 
to a degree that would have allowed the United States to stay. All three of the 
 American core demands posed dilemmas that could hardly be solved, as they 
were part of a broader debate between widely diverging and yet legitimate inter-
ests. The questions of freedom of association and forced labour were difficult to 
tackle in the way suggested by the Americans without endangering the hard-won 
balance between universalism (of membership) and adherence to ILO princi-
ples – all the more so as these principles had come under even greater pressure 
in the course of decolonization. The same was true for the “selectiveness” in the 
application of human rights principles and the accusations of growing politiciza-
tion, since much of it simply reflected the shifting balances and priorities within 
the ILO’s growing and changing membership.
At least with regard to Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), Director- 
General Blanchard succeeded in defusing the political tensions in the ILC from 
1975 onwards. He established a mechanism according to which missions would 
be sent regularly to the occupied territories, and their findings became a fixed 
part of the Director-General’s annual report to the Conference. Another element 
of the mechanism was to provide technical assistance to the OPT.586 Blanchard 
undertook in 1979 a two week’s mission to Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Qatar, and Kuwait. 
He  succeeded in convincing the representatives of governments, trade unions, 
and employers in these countries to avoid escalation of the issue and thus help 
preserve the interest of the ILO in the resumption of US membership by accepting 
the report mechanism, which put the spotlight on the issue during the ILCs but 
584 This followed a tradition; Morse had asked Pope John XXIII to convince Meany to accept 
Soviet representation.
585 Quoted in Lubin, “Book on ILO”, 170.
586 See the account of former Assistant Director-General responsible for the Arab states (with a 
preface by Guy Ryder), Shukri Z. Al-Dajani, Encounters with Fate and Destiny: A Life in Interna-
tional Politics (London: I.B. Tauris, 2018).
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had very little impact on the ground.587 From another perspective, the US argu-
ment that the ILO was providing a forum mainly for human rights accusations 
against Western allies lost in strength in the course of the 1970s. Growing human 
rights activism in the wake of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE) from the mid-1970 onwards gave new grounds also in the ILO for 
placing a spotlight on human rights violations in the East.
The years of the United States’ factual absence (1977–1981) would put the 
ILO to a stress test. As early as 1970, as a reaction to the nomination of a Soviet 
Assistant Director-General, the United States Congress decided to withhold the 
American contributions to the ILO budget, a measure that was renewed through-
out each of the following years. The consequences for the ILO were severe: even 
though many of the ILO’s programmes, like the WEP, were funded from external 
sources, the ILO lost around 25% of its regular budget. It forced Blanchard to make 
deep cuts with regard to both operational activities and staff. The political conse-
quences in contrast were less dramatic. In the American absence, the leadership 
within the Western camp was shared among the United Kingdom, Canada, the 
Nordic countries, and others, which set up the Industrialized Market Economy 
Countries Group (IMEC) for policy coordination. Meanwhile, a rapprochement 
between the ILO and the United States got under way almost immediately after 
the American withdrawal. As early as 1978, the State Department commissioned 
a report on possible future relationships between the ILO and the United States, 
which read like a straight recommendation for re-entry. The bottom line was that 
the United States was far better off inside the Organization, where it was able 
to make its influence felt. The report also attested to the ILO’s efforts made to 
accommodate the American demands. In early 1980, President Carter issued a 
statement concluding that:
[A] majority of ILO members – governments, workers, and employers – have successfully 
joined together to return the ILO to its original purposes. Through their efforts, steps have 
been taken to strengthen the independence of employer and worker delegates, undertake 
investigation of human rights violations in a number of countries, including the Soviet 
Union, reinforce the principle of due process, and generally reduce the level of politiciza-
tion in the ILO.588
Viewed from a bird eye’s view, the American absence created a paradox, inas-
much as it compromised the ILO’s universality at the very moment when this 
587 Ibid.
588 “International Labor Organization: Statement on the U.S. Decision to Rejoin the Organi-
zation, February 13, 1980”, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 
1980–81, 3 Books (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981–1982), Book 1, 306.
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 universalism made steady progress. In the 1970s, the ILO admitted another group 
of new members, such as the former Portuguese colonies that gained independ-
ence after 1974 and Bangladesh, which split from Pakistan in 1973. The long con-
flict in Rhodesia ended with the membership of an independent Zimbabwe in 
1980. Most importantly, the People’s Republic of China was recognized as the offi-
cial representative of China, replacing Taiwan. The Governing Body’s decision 
was based on that of the United Nations in 1971 to restore the rights of the Peo-
ple’s Republic to the seat of China. But China had not been approached directly 
by the ILO and was not familiar with the Organization. As a result, its status 
remained non-active for several years. Blanchard visited China three times in the 
early eighties, and, in 1983, after the first signs of opening under the leadership 
of Deng Xiaoping, China sent a full ILC delegation for the first time.589 It was only 
in 1986–87, that China actually began to play a more assertive role in the ILO.590
 From Spain to South Africa: The ILO and the New Human Rights 
Activism
In parallel to the political struggles surrounding the temporary American exit, 
the ILO became a medium of the new human rights universalism for which the 
1970s have been described as the “breakthrough” decade.591 It was only then, the 
argument goes, that human rights really took off as a moral language in interna-
tional politics and a “last utopia”592 that allowed an ideologically disillusioned 
left to challenge their own governments and political elites while transcending 
the Cold War framework. The grassroots human rights activism of Amnesty Inter-
national (founded in 1961) and other groups was directed primarily at authoritar-
ian regimes that could be regarded as allies of the West. Their focus shifted from 
the dictatorships in Spain, Portugal, and Greece to the military juntas in Latin 
America593 and eventually to South Africa, where the consolidation of the white 
589 As a gesture of good will, based on a request of the Governing Body, the ILO cancelled 
 China’s membership debts that had accrued since 1971. On China’s entry, see; Ghébali, The Inter-
national Labour Organisation, 116–125.
590 See Ann Kent, Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security 
(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 186–189.
591 Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s, Pennsylvania 
Studies in Human Rights (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).
592 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).
593 Patrick William Kelly, Sovereign Emergencies: Latin America and the Making of Global 
Human Rights Politics, Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
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apartheid regime had galvanized a growing transnational campaign in Western 
countries.594 At the same time, an increasing number of governments from the 
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Canada and notably the US adminis-
tration under Jimmy Carter (1977–1981) declared human rights to be part of their 
foreign policy.595
In the mid-1970s, the new human rights discourse spilled over to the Eastern 
bloc. A first entry was provided by the CSCE, a meeting of 35 European coun-
tries from the East and the West as well as the United States and Canada. It took 
place in the Finnish capital of Helsinki in the summer of 1975. Promoted as a step 
to reduce Cold War tensions, the final document, known as the Helsinki Final 
Act, contained principles that were intended to guarantee peaceful co-existence 
between the two power blocs in Europe. Although the Conference was first seen 
primarily as a diplomatic success for the Soviet Union, the provisions under point 
VII on “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”, mainly ignored by 
the public at the time, would cause unexpected consequences. The monitoring 
mechanism spurred by the Helsinki accords established a network of national 
committees, loosely united across the East-West divide in an international fed-
eration. The Helsinki process encouraged the creation of a new Western human 
rights organization  – Human Rights Watch  – which started to attack the com-
munist countries for human rights violations with regard to the provisions of 
the Final Act. Even more importantly, it provided the basis for the foundation of 
Helsinki groups in Moscow and other Eastern European countries, such as the 
Czechoslovak Charter 77 movement. These groups, for their part, started to hold 
their governments accountable for their commitments and used human rights as 
an instrument to challenge Communist party rule.596
All of these discussions invariably found their way into the ILO’s meeting halls, 
where they took on specific forms. Due to the framework provided by the ILO’s tri-
partite structure and the monitoring mechanisms established for the observance 
of international labour standards, in particular with regard to freedom of associ-
ation, these debates focused mainly on trade union rights. This was the case for 
594 Håkan Thörn, Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society (Basingstoke: 
 Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
595 On human rights policies in Scandinavia, see Thorsten Borring Olesen, Helge O. Pharo, and 
Kristian Paaskesen, Saints and Sinners: Official Development Aid and Its Dynamics in a Historical 
and Comparative Perspective, Issues in Contemporary History (Oslo: Akademika Publishing, 2013).
596 Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise 
of Communism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001); Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights 
Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network, Human 
Rights in History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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Southern Europe and Latin America, and it shaped the ILO’s involvement with 
Poland in the 1980s. While the ILO’s established mechanisms, especially concern-
ing the monitoring of freedom of association, and provided unique opportuni-
ties to effectively pursue labour rights violations, this approach also came with 
certain limitations, as the Latin American situation would demonstrate.
One of the regions in which the new turn towards human rights activism 
influenced the ILO’s attitude was Southern Europe, and in particular Spain. For 
a short period after the war, the regime of General Francisco Franco, which ruled 
the country from the end of the Civil War in 1939 until the Caudillo’s death in 1975, 
had been an international outcast. The suppression of trade union rights which 
drove the biggest independent trade union of the country, the Unión General de 
Trabajadores (UGT) into exile for 36 years, was a core feature of the regime. Even 
after Spain’s readmission to the United Nations and the ILO in 1955 (against the 
background of the Cold War, in which Spain became part of the Western alli-
ance), relations remained distant. While the Office under David Morse initiated a 
process of rapprochement during the 1960s, the international trade union move-
ment rallied with an increasingly vocal human rights campaign against the dic-
tatorship. At the Conference, in the Governing Body, and particularly through the 
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), the Workers’ representatives did not 
tire attacking the Franco regime for its suppression of trade union rights.597
Around the end of the decade, the debate intensified. After passing new trade 
union laws in 1967, which confirmed the corporatist character of labour relations, 
the regime intensified its repression against any kind of trade union activism 
outside the narrowly defined boundaries of the law. As a result,  numerous com-
plaints were filed with the ILO against the Spanish government for the violation 
of the principle of freedom of association (it had not ratified at the time the cor-
responding Conventions), and the Governing Body decided in 1967 to appoint a 
study group to investigate the labour and trade union situation in Spain. Within 
the Organization, serious differences of opinion existed about how to treat the 
Spanish dictatorship. Morse’s first visit to Spain in 1965 had caused a fierce alter-
cation with the Workers’ group in the Governing Body, since Morse had addressed 
the country as “a great nation among the members of the free world”.598 In 1969, 
the Spanish government declared a state of emergency and suspended basic 
597 ILO, Interview with Manuel Simon, ILO Century Project, unpublished transcript, Geneva, 
2014.
598 See Jean-Michel Servais, International Labour Organization (ILO) (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International, 2005), 30; Sébastian Farré, “Trois experts, une visite, un rapport. 
L’Organisation international du travail et la liberté syndicale en Espagne franquiste”, in L’Organ-
isation internationale du travail, ed. Lespinet-Moret and Viet, 121–130.
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 individual freedoms. Both the ILO and the ICFTU condemned this action in no 
uncertain terms. Notwithstanding the ICFTU’s doubt about the effectiveness of 
the study group previously appointed by the Governing Body, the group decided 
to visit Spain for two weeks. It was composed of high-ranking experts, among 
them Paul Ruegger of Switzerland, a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion at The Hague and of the ILO’s CEACR, also the main author of an ILO report on 
forced labour in the mid-1950s; another expert was P.P. Spinelli of Italy, the former 
director of the UN Office in Geneva. The group talked to over 100 people, includ-
ing ministers, judicial and church authorities, members of the provincial councils 
of workers and employers, and academics. It conferred with representatives of 
management and workers’ councils and visited industrial and agricultural enter-
prises as well as social services. It also asked to talk to 12 imprisoned  unionists. 
The report of the study group stated that, in Spain, trade union rights where not 
respected and trade unionists were imprisoned and tortured. It concluded that 
the social uprisings, which had led the government to proclaim the state of emer-
gency and allowed trade union repression, had their origins in the universities.599 
The Spanish government published a distorted version of the report and drafted 
a trade union bill, ignoring the ILO’s criticism and declaring independent trade 
unions and strikes illegal. Thereafter, the situation reached a stalemate, which 
continued until Franco’s death and the subsequent demise of the dictatorship 
in 1975. In the meantime, the international trade union movement stepped up its 
campaign and used the CFA and other fora extensively to attack the Spanish gov-
ernment. In the following years Spanish workers’ protest at home and from trade 
unionists in exile grew as well, encouraged by the ILO’s condemnation of gov-
ernment policies, and especially of the imprisonment of trade unionists, which 
further undermined the legitimacy of the Franco regime.600
Somewhat similar processes took place in Portugal, where the “Carna-
tion Revolution” of 1974 ended more than 60 years of authoritarian rule, and 
in Greece, which had been ruled by a junta of colonels from 1967 to 1974. Both 
countries were repeatedly targeted by the CFA for their violation of trade union 
rights, although with limited impact on actual policies. In all these cases – and 
in the absence of means that would have forced the respective regimes to make 
any concessions – the role of the ILO was restricted to lending moral support and 
serving as an outside reference to trade unionists, especially those in exile, and 
other opposition groups. The meaning those groups attached to the ILO’s role is 
599 Pilar Ortuño Anaya, European Socialists and Spain: The Transition to Democracy, 1959–77 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
600 Ibid., 61–69.
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highlighted, for instance, by the fact that the Spanish transition government rat-
ified both the Freedom of Association Convention and the Right to Organize and 
Collective Bargaining Convention in 1977.601
While, in Southern Europe, the remnants of authoritarian rule fell around 
the middle of the 1970s, Latin America was moving in the opposite direction. In 
Chile, a military coup against the government of the Socialist president  Salvador 
Allende in 1973 was accompanied by a massive repression of the Chilean labour 
movement. A state of emergency was declared almost immediately, social 
rights were curtailed, most trade unions were immediately outlawed, and their 
members were persecuted. Together with other groups, labelled indiscriminately 
as “Marxist- Leninists”, many trade unionists were tortured and killed. Others 
were tried by military courts or driven into exile. News about the atrocities com-
mitted against anyone suspected to be an opponent of the new regime under 
General Augusto Pinochet generated an international outcry. A broad coalition 
of human rights activists in the West rallied against the Chilean dictatorship.602
Here, too, the ILO’s focus was from the beginning on the violations of 
freedom of association, which led to a series of complaints on which the CFA 
could act. Chile had not ratified Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 at the time. On the 
basis of two reports submitted to the Governing Body in 1974, the ILO decided 
to appoint a Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission. It visited Chile in 
November– December 1974 and was the only group of international observers 
formally allowed into the country during the dictatorship. In its report, the Com-
mission squarely denounced the violations of human rights in general, and trade 
union rights in particular, and condemned the incarceration, torture, and murder 
of trade unionists. It concluded that the Pinochet regime had violated the right 
of freedom of association and issued a number of recommendations that focused 
primarily on the restoration of civil and political rights.603
The regime responded with a mix of denial and dilatory statements. It made 
some smaller concessions but extended the state of emergency, and otherwise 
remained largely indifferent to the constant appeals and accusations. In the 
course of the 1970s, in the face of growing international isolation, the Pinochet 
Regime relaxed some of its oppressive measures and implemented new labour 
601 See the interviews with the Spanish trade unionists Nicolas Redondo Urbieta and Marcelino 
Camacho in N.N., “Voices for Freedom of Association”, Labour Education 112, no. 3 (1998): 37–41.
602 Kim Christiaens, Idesbald Goddeeris, and Magaly Rodríguez García, European Solidarity 
with Chile, 1970s–1980s (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2014).
603 César F. Rosado Marzán, “The Limits of Human Rights for Labour Rights. A Retrospective 
Look at the Case of Chile”, in The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim, ed. Jensen and Lichtenstein, 
206–230.
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legislation that – while reinstalling some space for legal trade union activities – 
still fell short of the ILO’s demands. In 1979, the dictatorship eased some of its 
most radical measures and lifted the ban on collective bargaining, but only at 
the enterprise level. Designed in accordance with a radical free market reform 
project which was implemented by Pinochet´s neoliberal economic advisors, his 
so-called “Chicago boys”, labour rights were limited to the individual rights of 
the worker. The reform was stripped of any notion of collective rights, and it put 
very strict limits on the right to strike. The reforms helped the regime, however, 
to reduce international pressure by appeasing some of the critics from the Carter 
administration and the American labour movement, which were satisfied by 
the restoration of some basic individual human freedoms. Most of these limited 
reforms survived the return to democracy in 1990, and they have been repeatedly 
criticized by the ILO. According to a 2009 decision of the CFA, they still violated 
Conventions No. 87 and 98, which Chile had finally ratified in 1999.604
In 1976, the discussion extended to neighbouring Argentina, where a mili-
tary junta had overthrown the government of Isabel Peron. As in Chile, from day 
one the new regime was bent on destroying the workers’ movement, arguably the 
strongest and best organized on the continent and a stronghold of Peronism. The 
biggest Argentinian trade union, the Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT), 
had joined the ICFTU in 1975. The military regime massively curbed trade union 
rights and, similar to the Chilean case, thousands of trade unionists, together 
with other targeted groups (including refugees from neighbouring countries and 
Catholic priests), were tortured, murdered or “disappeared”. As early as 1976, 
the CFA condemned the regime and demanded a return to normality and adher-
ence to ILO standards. Throughout the coming years, the ICFTU, WFTU, and the 
World Confederation of Labour (WCL)605 all helped to relentlessly keep up the 
pressure on the regime within the ILO. They joined forces with a broad spectrum 
of national, especially Western European, and international human rights organ-
izations, such as Amnesty International, which made the violation of human 
rights under the Chilean and Argentine military dictatorships a major focus of 
their activities.606
604 Wehrli, “ILO and Latin America”, 26.
605 The World Confederation of Labour (WCL) was the successor of the International Federation 
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While there were striking similarities between the two countries, the Argentine 
case differed from the Chilean in a couple of aspects. In contrast to the Pinochet 
regime, the junta in Buenos Aires was eager to show its willingness to  cooperate 
with international organizations. It denied violating Conventions No. 87 and 98, 
which Argentina had ratified in 1960 and 1956, respectively, received ILO mis-
sions of inquiry openly and tried to display a pluralistic face to the visitors. At the 
same time, it kept a strong presence in Geneva and, with a few exceptions, sent 
complete delegations to the ILC. This strategy, however, was not accompanied by 
any substantive changes – neither with regard to the restoration of trade union 
freedoms, nor concerning the general human rights situation. While the regime 
claimed that the restrictions were temporary and denied the disappearances of 
trade unionists, both continued essentially uncompromised.607
The situation in the ILO was somewhat ambiguous: while the CFA regularly 
condemned the situation in Argentina in harsh terms, the missions of enquiry 
sent to the country came sometimes close to whitewashing the practices of the 
regime. A mission led by Antonio Malintoppi, an Italian professor of law and 
personal envoy of Director-General Blanchard, in August 1978 emphasized in its 
report the cooperation of the authorities. From this report, the Governing Body 
concluded that the situation was evolving positively. In 1979, a long-promised 
new law regulating trade union activities was eventually passed. It still contained 
various loopholes for violations of freedom of association, which led to new com-
plaints to the CFA. In its report of March 1980, the Committee reiterated most of 
the criticism made by the international trade union federations and Argentinian 
workers’ organizations. A second mission by Malintoppi in December 1980 and 
the release of several trade union leaders prompted the delegation once again 
to highlight in its report the progress made towards the normalization of labour 
relations. But as late as May–June 1983, while the military regime was reeling after 
its defeat in the Falkland/Malvinas War in early 1982, the CFA was still calling for 
the harmonization of trade union legislation with ILO standards and the release 
of imprisoned trade union leaders.608
The ILO’s record with regard to the Latin American dictatorships (which also 
included those in Brazil and Uruguay, which drew less attention) was somewhat 
mixed. The Organization was acting as a sounding board for human rights accusa-
tions against the military regimes and remained one of the very few international 
forums open to dissident voices. Its capacity to influence policy on the ground, 
607 Victoria Basualdo, “The ILO and the Argentine Dictatorship (1976–1983)”, in ILO Histories, 
ed. Van Daele et al., 401–422.
608 Ibid.
232   7 New Insecurities
however, remained strictly limited. While the Chilean and Argentine cases dif-
fered with regard to the attitudes which the respective regimes showed towards 
the international community, the outcomes in terms of respect for ILO standards 
and basic human rights were essentially the same. It has even been argued that 
the Argentine junta’s decision to cooperate with the ILO, without making any sub-
stantive concessions, paid out for the regime inasmuch as it added a degree of 
legitimacy to its repressive policies.609 The Chilean case, in turn, demonstrated 
some of the weaknesses in the ILO’s human rights activism in a more general 
sense. It showed, in particular, that labour rights and human rights “do not 
always sit comfortably next to each other”.610 When the Chilean regime stopped 
its worst human rights abuses, the international pressure by the human rights 
community diminished significantly. While the ILO continued to admonish the 
violation of freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining as a pre-
condition for the full realization of workers’ rights, the attention of international 
human rights organizations shifted to other places. It was a pattern that was to 
repeat itself on future occasions.
The ILO, nevertheless, was able to offer help in the transition process after 
the demise of the respective regimes. When the Argentine junta eventually fell 
in 1983, the ILO instantly offered its help to the government of Raul Alfonsin to 
reinstall democratic labour legislation.611 In Chile, the ILO played a part through 
technical assistance in the drafting of a new Labour Code in 2001, which would 
remove some of the most severe restrictions of the Pinochet years.
While the CSCE process helped to turn human rights into a new language 
of dissidence in many countries of the Eastern bloc, it was only in Poland that it 
grew into a mass movement. And in contrast to other countries, the ILO would 
become heavily involved because of another peculiarity of the Polish situation: 
it was only here that the fight for political freedoms would become closely tied to 
the struggle for labour rights.612
609 Basualdo, “The ILO and the Argentine Dictatorship (1976–1983)”.
610 Rosado Marzán, “The Limits of Human Rights for Labour Rights”, 225.
611 The ILO dispatched a technical mission advising the government in May 1984, and, in 1985, 
Blanchard paid a visit to the country. Victoria Basualdo, however, is rather critical of the role 
of the ILO technical mission in the preparation of post-junta labour legislation, because, in her 
view, it supported those who had occupied positions of power during the military rule against 
interference by the state. Victoria Basualdo, “La OIT entre la dictadura y la democracia en la 
Argentina: aportes sobre el papel de organizaciones internacionales en la reconfiguración de 
las relaciones laborales en la primera mitad de los años 80”, Anuario del Instituto de Historia 
Argentina 17, no. 1 (2017): 1–18.
612 Idesbald Goddeeris, “The Limits of Lobbying: ILO and Solidarnosc”, in ILO Histories, ed. 
Van Daele et al., 423–442.
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In the summer of 1980, strikes broke out in several sea ports of the Baltic Sea, 
most prominently at the Lenin shipyards of Gdansk. After weeks of turmoil, the 
Polish government signed an agreement that granted workers the right to form 
independent unions. As a result, Solidarnosc (Solidarity) was born, which soon 
grew into a large movement for labour and civil rights with a membership of up to 
ten million people, more than one third of Poland’s working-age population. With 
tensions steadily growing, the communist government under General Wojciech 
Jaruzelski eventually declared martial law in December 1981 and started to crack 
down on Solidarnosc. The trade union was declared illegal and several thousand 
of its members, including the leadership around Lech Wałęsa, were arrested 
and detained. In reaction to the events, an international alliance, including the 
Catholic Church and its Polish Pope John Paul II, Western governments, and civil 
society groups came out in support of Solidarnosc.
Against this background, the ILO became a major outlet for Solidarnosc’s 
struggle for recognition. The ICFTU, the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC), and the WCL, as Solidarnosc’s main allies on the international scene, 
made sure that the topic would not be put to rest. They helped the exiled leaders 
to set up an office to coordinate their international efforts, and their insistence 
made sure, that the topic remained on the international agenda, even when over 
time the attention of some of the groups supporting Solidarnosc began to shift 
away from Poland. The ILO itself, from the late 1970s onwards, had examined – 
and sent delegations to investigate – complaints filed by the ICFTU and the WCL 
regarding the violation of freedom of association and the corresponding ILO Con-
ventions, both of which Poland had ratified in 1957.
With the banning of Solidarnosc, the ILO actively came out in support of the 
movement, and Blanchard personally travelled to Poland to convince the gov-
ernment to let Lech Wałęsa take part in the 1981 ILC as a Polish Worker’s repre-
sentative. In January 1982, the ICFTU handed over to the ILO a list of almost 700 
union leaders imprisoned in Poland. The CFA then examined the situation, and 
the Governing Body, based on the CFA’s report, openly condemned the Polish 
government, sent a fact-finding mission to Poland, and demanded the liberation 
of imprisoned Solidarnosc leaders.613
At the 68th Session of the ILC in 1982, to which Pope John Paul II was invited, 
Polish authorities were accused by Workers’ delegates of violating ILO Conven-
tions Nos. 87 and 98. However, efforts to pass a resolution that would have con-
demned Poland failed because of resistance from the Eastern bloc countries, 
which were supported by a majority of the G77, in particular the Arab states 
613 Goddeeris, “The Limits of Lobbying”.
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(which, in return, received the backing for another resolution denouncing Israel). 
In March 1983, however, the Governing Body decided to establish a Commission 
of Inquiry, which found that there was no legal basis for the ban of Solidarnosc. 
The Polish government, supported by other socialist countries reacted with great 
indignation to the Commission’s report which was submitted to the Governing 
Body in June 1984. In November of the same year, Poland submitted a notice 
announcing its intention to withdraw from the ILO within the regular two-year 
period. At this point, and despite continuing protests from the Workers’ group, the 
ILO softened its approach towards Poland in order to keep the door for member-
ship open. Martial law restrictions were progressively relaxed, and Solidarnosc 
could legally function again in 1986. Poland postponed its withdrawal and then 
actually never left.614 By that time, the pace for changes in the region was set by 
the policy of perestroika under the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. As one 
of the consequences of this change, the Workers’ representatives of the formerly 
monolithic communist bloc were no longer obliged to vote in accordance with 
614 In 1986, it extended the notice, but in 1987, it officially retracted it. Ghébali, The Internation-
al Labour Organisation, 112–113.
Figure 13: Lech Wałęsa at the 67th Session of the ILC, 1981.
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their governments’ policies in the ILO. When Poland, in 1989, became the first 
country in the Eastern bloc to end the political monopoly of the Communist party 
and Solidarnosc won the first free elections held since 1945, the discussions had 
already lost much of their political explosiveness. The symbolical end to the dis-
cussion came in 1990, when the democratically elected Prime Minister Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki spoke to the Conference. He was accompanied by Lech Wałęsa, who 
soon became the first President of post-communist Poland.
Around the same time, another conflict in which the ILO had been involved 
from a very early point in time, came to its end: In February 1990, Nelson Mandela 
was released from prison after 27 years of confinement by the South African 
apartheid regime. This was the first step in a period of transition, which ended 
with the abolishment of all features of apartheid. Mandela was elected President 
in the first free elections for all South Africans in 1994.
The transition marked an end point for the ILO’s long confrontation with 
the South African apartheid regime. Anti-apartheid action had started in earnest 
almost 30 years earlier with the adoption in 1964 of a “Programme for the elimi-
nation of apartheid in labour matters in the Republic of South Africa” as well as 
a “Declaration concerning the Policy of Apartheid”.615 From this point onwards, 
the Director-General submitted annual special reports to the ILC on this matter. 
Action against apartheid was constantly stepped up during the next decades. 
It  included calls for boycotts and the international isolation of the regime, as 
well as the material and political support for both internal opposition groups and 
South African and Nambian national liberation movements working in exile.616
ILO action against apartheid was unique in more than one aspect. It was the 
only time the Organization actively took sides in an ongoing internal  political 
conflict. It was even more remarkable, since, until way into the 1980s, South 
Africa was not without international allies and support. For geopolitical and eco-
nomic reasons, the United States and the United Kingdom maintained a certain 
degree of support for the regime in Pretoria, as did a number of other Western 
governments. If the ILO was able to act as it did, it was due to the high symbolic 
value attached to the struggle against apartheid as the major manifestation of 
institutionalized racial discrimination. The ILO’s policies were made possible 
largely because of the Workers’ group’s close alliance with the international 
 anti-apartheid  movement.617
615 See Part III, Chapter 6 (“The Human Rights Decade”), above.
616 In the broader UN context, see United Nations, The United Nations and Apartheid 1948–
1994 (New York: United Nations, Dept. of Public Information, 1994).
617 Rodgers et al., The ILO and the Quest for Social Justice, 50–57.
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Eventually, the ILO also played a role in the South African reconciliation 
process following the official end of apartheid. In 1991, an ILO Fact-Finding and 
Conciliation Commission visited South Africa, undertaking a broad inquiry into 
labour law and relations under apartheid.618 When South Africa rejoined the ILO 
in 1994, after the election of the first government headed by the African National 
Congress (ANC), the report of the Commission provided the basis for technical 
cooperation and training programmes.619
 The Humanization of Work – New Perspectives on Working 
Conditions
Not all thinking during the 1970s went into employment policies, human rights 
promotion, or the management of the “American crisis”. At the beginning of the 
decade, the ILO also breathed new life into its activities on the improvement of 
working conditions, a topic that long had been dormant in the Organization. 
In 1975, Director-General Blanchard used his annual report to the Conference – 
under the programmatic title of “Making Work More Human” – to place the issue 
at the centre of the debate. Simultaneously, the ILO launched its International 
Programme for the Improvement of Working Conditions and the Environment 
(PIACT).620 The new focus on working conditions also offered an opportunity to 
take a broader view on the manifold ways work shapes human life and on the 
widely differing meanings people attach to it. So far, ILO activities in this field 
had been preoccupied with industrial work. Blanchard now tried to introduce a 
global approach that included working conditions in developing countries and 
the “informal sector”. In this respect, PIACT was seen as complementary to the 
WEP. At the same time, the ILO saw the topic of humanizing work as a means to 
618 Its original mandate was derived from a complaint directed in 1988, still under the apart-
heid system, by the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) against the regime 
because of violations of trade union rights. When the ILO Fact-Finding Commission eventually 
took up its work, it did so on the invitation of the post-apartheid transitional government. This 
allowed for the extension of the ILO’s mandate into a comprehensive study of labour relations 
under apartheid as part of the overall reconciliation process.
619 In 1996, South Africa, in a symbolic gesture, ratified both Freedom of Association Conven-
tions, Nos. 87 and 98.
620 The acronym PIACT referred to its French title, Programme international pour l’amélioration 
des conditions et du milieu de travail. Jean de Givry, a long-serving French official with a spe-
cialization in labour relations and social institutions since the 1950s, had been one of the major 
brains behind it. See Jean de Givry, “The ILO and the Quality of Working Life. A New Internation-
al Programme: PIACT”, International Labour Review 117, no. 3 (1978): 261–271.
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raise first questions about the link between the working environment and the 
environment in general, and to respond to post-materialist trends within Western 
societies.621
With its emphasis on the “humanization of labour”, the ILO responded to a 
trend detectable in many Western societies that was marked by a growing feeling 
of discontent directed at the “over-rationalized” and inhumane nature of modern 
industrial production and its monotonous and fragmented character. Signs were 
everywhere, that the “Fordist compromise” – a compromise between manage-
ment and organized labour based on the assumption that growing productivity 
and technological progress would ultimately lead to rising wages and improved 
working and living conditions for workers – was about to reach its limits. While 
rationalization and automation, in particular, had also caused anxieties and even 
resistance on the part of the workers in earlier periods, these concerns were now 
fuelled by a broader societal movement that was critical of the blind trust in tech-
nological progress and showed a growing awareness of its negative effects on the 
natural environment.622 When the ILO took up the issue of the humanization of 
labour, it built on discussions that had occupied the major industrial countries 
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s – starting in the United States, but quickly 
spilling over to European countries like France, Great Britain, and Germany.623
Blanchard’s report on “Making Work More Human” took account of these 
debates and called for a more holistic approach to the conditions of work, includ-
ing workers’ participation, fair wages, and human rights. His focus, however, was 
on three aspects: safety and health, working time, and the organization as well as 
the content of work. The report suggested an approach that would help to realize 
“human aspirations” at work everywhere and correspond to the needs of workers 
621 So far, there is very little research about this programme. See Dorothea Hoehtker, “Die 
 Internationale Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) – Versuch einer ‘systemimmanenten’ Humanisierung”, 
unpublished conference paper for the conference “Humanisierung der Arbeit” – Aufbrüche und 
Konflikte in der Arbeitswelt des 20. Jahrhunderts, organized by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation 
and the Heinrich-Heine-University, 16/17 October 2017, Düsseldorf.
622 Hoehtker and Plata-Stenger, “The Future of Work and Technological Change”.
623 In 1972, for example, the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare published a land-
mark report on “Work in America” that carried the idea of “humanization of labour” to an official 
level. United States Department of Health Education, and Welfare, Work in America. Report of a 
Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Prepared under the Auspic-
es of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research (December 1972). For a broad overview 
of the debate in a long term perspective, see Nina Kleinöder, Stefan Müller, and Karsten Uhl, 
eds., Humanisierung der Arbeit. Aufbrüche und Konflikte in der rationalisierten Arbeitswelt des 20. 
Jahrhunderts (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2019).
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in industrialized and developing countries alike.624 Moreover, the report consti-
tuted an important juncture in the Organization’s history, because it connected 
these problems with environmental issues. Blanchard, however, was not the first 
ILO head to raise this point. Wilfred Jenks’ report to the ILC on “Technology for 
Freedom. Man in his Environment” of 1972 – which drew attention to the impact 
of technological change on the world of work – had already concluded that “on 
a global scale, present patterns of technological change are having a potentially 
disastrous effect on the relationship between man and his natural environ-
ment”.625 The references in both reports must be seen as first reactions to the 
rising concerns in the international community about the pollution and destruc-
tion of the natural environment and the limits of growth, as had become evident 
at the first UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972.626
With regard to developing countries, the discussion of working conditions 
had a different point of departure. Where formal employment was the exception 
rather than the rule, international labour standards in areas like occupational 
safety and health, wages, and social security were of little direct relevance. 
To extend the concept of humanization of labour to countries where large parts 
of the population worked in the (mostly rural) informal economy, with little or 
no access to welfare, created very different challenges, to which PIACT was sup-
posed to provide answers. While the WEP’s emphasis had been on employment 
creation and poverty reduction, PIACT was, from the beginning, a programme 
dealing with the quality of employment.
The programme struggled from the outset with significant difficulties. It was 
an integrated programme that contained elements of technical cooperation, 
research, and standard-setting. At its heart, it offered interested countries, with 
the help of so-called “regional mobile operational teams”, the possibility of defin-
ing targets to improve working conditions. It sought especially to reduce the rising 
numbers of work accidents, as a quantifiable result, and to help countries reach 
the targets that had been set. It also undertook substantial research on selected 
topics. In parallel, it promoted the ratification of existing ILO standards, especially 
624 ILO, Record of Proceedings, Report of the Director-General: Making work more human, 
 International Labour Conference, 60th Session 1975 (Geneva: ILO, 1975), 57.
625 ILO, Record of Proceedings, Report of the Director-General: Technology for Freedom. Man in 
his Environment, International Labour Conference, 57th Session 1972 (Geneva: ILO, 1972), 4. See 
also Yves Delamotte and Kenneth F. Walker, “Humanization of Work and the Quality of Working 
Life – Trends and Issues”, International Journal of Sociology 6, no. 1 (1976): 8–40.
626 There is hardly any research on the ILO’s dealing with environmental issues. In the context 
of the PIACT environmental concerns were mostly related with the workplace. The ILO signifi-
cantly expanded its activities in this area following the Brundtland Report in 1987 and the new 
focus on sustainable development.
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on safety and health, and was involved in the development of three new Conven-
tions.627 The ILO’s high ambitions for the programme were frustrated, however, 
by a lack of funding and political support as well as an increasingly “unpromis-
ing international environment”.628 When PIACT was started, substantial support 
came from the Scandinavian countries, which, like other Western European coun-
tries, showed a keen interest in new, more participatory forms of work organi-
zation in order to increase productivity and satisfaction at work. But these new 
concepts were not entirely without its critics. Trade unions often were suspicious, 
as they feared that the improvements could turn out to be just new tools to raise 
productivity, bypass the unions, and increase pressure on workers.629
The main interest of developing countries focused much more on securing 
ILO support for the concrete improvement of working conditions, which pre-
sented major health risks as a result of rapid industrialization. Information and 
training were bitterly needed, especially for small enterprises. PIACT was born 
out of “the economic optimism which made possible the emergence of working 
conditions and environment as a major policy issue”,630 but as it progressed, it 
came under increasing financial pressure, especially with the loss of US funding. 
The programme was launched in the context of the 1970s oil crises and the result-
ing economic downturn with the return of larger scale unemployment to Western 
Europe. Therefore, the programme also lost traction, because priorities began 
to drift away from the “humanization of work” agenda, following the logic of a 
trade-off between work quality and employment creation, which has always been 
a major challenge for the ILO. A period of growth and expansion had come to an 
end in the industrialized countries, while many nations of the global South were 
still engaged in basic struggles of creating jobs, regardless of their quality. In this 
respect, the ILO was caught in the dilemma of navigating between two different 
sets of expectations concerning the creation of productive employment on one 
hand, and improving its quality on the other hand.
What was left of PIACT during the 1980s came under ever-growing pressure 
as a result of the neo-liberal turn in economic policies. In industrialized countries, 
calls for the deregulation of labour markets and growing demands on workers 
627 Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration) Convention, 1977 (No. 148); Oc-
cupational Safety and Health (Dock Work) Convention, 1979 (No. 152); and Occupational Safety 
and Health Convention, 1981 (No. 155).
628 Rodgers et al., The ILO and the Quest for Social Justice, 100.
629 Delamotte and Walker, “Humanization of Work”, 30.
630 ILO, Record of Proceedings, Report VII: Evaluation of the International Programme for the 
Improvement of Working Conditions and Environment, International Labour Conference, 70th 
Session 1984 (Geneva: ILO, 1984), 12.
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for greater flexibility undermined the very foundations on which the case for the 
humanization of labour rested. In developing countries, structural adjustment 
programmes imposed by the international financial institutions forced countries 
to reduce social costs instead of building new structures for improved working 
conditions. Evaluations of PIACT in the mid-1980s already showed that, with 
regard to its major aims, the programme was mostly unsuccessful. Ratifications 
of corresponding international labour standards stayed low and the country 
programmes launched in developing countries could do little with the scarce 
resources at the programme’s command. The one area where PIACT produced 
tangible results until it was phased out in 1998–1999, was occupational safety 
and health. In a context of a worldwide economic slowdown, this formed the 
lowest common denominator among the ILO’s tripartite constituents. Occupa-
tional safety and health was an objective that was shared across the North/South 
divide and the divergent conditions in which the concept of “humanizing work” 
was experienced in industrialized and developing countries.631
631 Hoehtker, “Die Internationale Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) – Versuch einer ‘systemimmanent-
en’ Humanisierung”.
 Open Access. © 2019 International Labour Organization, published by De Gruyter and the ILO.   
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0  
International License.  
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110650723-010
8 The End of the “Philadelphia Consensus”?
When Lech Wałęsa and Nelson Mandela addressed the ILC in 1990, it might have 
seemed to some that the ILO was entering a bright new future. With the Cold War 
at its end and the liberal model prevailing, the ILO could see itself on the right 
side of history. Yet, even in this solemn moment, few within the ILO felt that way. 
On the contrary, many foresaw that the political sea changes taking place could 
mark a pyrrhic victory for the Organization. In fact, as early as the 1980s, there 
were signs everywhere that the ILO was constantly losing ground in the interna-
tional arena. It saw itself widely excluded from the debates on the newly emerg-
ing international economic governance structures which led to the founding of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. At the heart of these debates, which 
were dominated by the quest for economic liberalization under the new buzzword 
of “globalization”, was the accelerating disentanglement of economic and social 
questions, with the latter pushed to an ever more subordinate role.
Against this background, the ILO faced mounting pressure to reassert its posi-
tion. Under the leadership of a new Director-General, Michel Hansenne, it tried to 
make its voice heard in the international debate on the social dimension of glo-
balization that got under way. Hansenne’s main legacy, and the tangible result 
of his strategy to position the ILO as a “social voice” within the post–Cold War 
world, would be the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
(1998). It defined for the first time a number of core labour standards promoted as 
a minimum set of common values that were applicable to all of the ILO’s members.
Writings on the Wall
During the 1970s, the architecture of the international trading system underwent 
substantial changes. In 1971, US President Richard Nixon’s decision to cancel the 
US dollar’s international convertibility to gold laid the axe to the Bretton Woods 
system established in 1944. Within a couple of years, a system based on fixed 
exchange rates gave way to one in which currencies could float freely. In parallel, 
most Western governments lifted the restrictions on capital flows across national 
borders. Both steps jointly worked as a major boost for the internationaliza-
tion of financial markets and the extension of foreign direct investment, which 
fuelled much of the processes that are summarized today under the heading of 
“globalization”.632
632 Catherine R. Schenk, International Economic Relations since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2011).
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While unleashing an ever-increasing flow of goods and capital on an unprec-
edented scale and opening opportunities for businesses to expand, globali-
zation has, at the same time, restricted the capacity of countries to control the 
economic forces working within their own national borders. As a consequence, 
governments – some more voluntarily than others – have abdicated some of their 
means to pursue social and employment goals, under the impression of presum-
ably irrefutable demands of globalization. For the ILO, these developments and 
the debates accompanying them, spelled immediate dangers. Already during the 
late 1970s and 1980s some of the certainties – and indeed the foundations and 
premises on which the ILO’s work had rested ever since the Second World War – 
began to erode. If national governments and national trade union federations 
were losing part of their capacity to steer economic and social policies on the 
state level, the ILO would necessarily lose part of its influence, too.
The first time that some of the phenomena associated with globalization were 
debated in the ILO was with regard to multinational enterprises (MNEs). While 
not an entirely new phenomenon at the time, the power of such transnational 
corporations, which controlled increasingly complex structures transcending 
national borders and creating new international divisions of labour, was greatly 
strengthened by the liberalization of world trade after the demise of the Bretton 
Figure 14: Nelson Mandela at the 77th Session of the ILC, 1990.
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Woods system. Incidents such as the active participation of US-based MNEs in the 
Chilean putsch against President Salvador Allende in 1973 put a spotlight on the 
most problematic aspects of their growing influence. Flexible and mobile, they 
were hard to control by national jurisdictions and capable of wielding immense 
power, in particular in developing countries.633 The UN reacted with the creation 
of the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC). Between 
1975 and 1992, it tried to develop a code of conduct, torn between the demand of 
developing and socialist countries for a binding instrument and the insistence 
of Western market economies on a voluntary code of principles, asserting the 
importance of MNEs for development and growth. MNEs posed a serious problem 
also for the ILO, because their multinational nature allowed them to easily escape 
the reach of internationally adopted but nationally applied labour standards. In 
1974, in his first report to the ILC, Blanchard addressed the need to regulate mul-
tinational enterprises more effectively as one of the most pressing problems of 
the time. Early on in the debate, it turned out that a possible convention dealing 
with MNEs would not gain enough support within the ILO, especially not from the 
Employers’ group. At the World Employment Conference in 1976 the Workers and 
the G77 wanted a convention. The Employers however were in favour of a tripar-
tite declaration of principles which would have voluntary character.634
Therefore, in 1977, the Governing Body issued a “Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy”, which pro-
vided international guidelines for such entities on a broad range of issues – from 
training to recruitment, from wage policies to trade union rights – often in direct 
relationship to the ILOs existing labour standards.635 The attempt to build a broad 
consensus around the Declaration became visible in the first paragraphs, which 
emphasized the positive contribution MNEs could make with regard to “satis-
faction of basic needs”, the improvement of living conditions and welfare, and, 
in particular, the creation of employment. On the other hand, the Declaration 
633 On MNEs, see Christine Kaufmann, Globalisation and Labour Rights. The Conflict between 
Core Labour Rights and International Economic Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 155–169; 
Marieke Louis, “La diplomatie sociale des multinationales”, La vie des idées, 9 October 2018, 
https://laviedesidees.fr/La-diplomatie-sociale-des-multinationales.html.
634 Roger Blanpain, Michelle Collucci, eds., The Globalization of Labour Standards: The Soft 
Law Track (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004), 21; Chloé Maurel, “OIT et responsabilité 
sociale des sociétés transnationales depuis 1970”, in L’Organisation internationale du travail, ed. 
Lespinet-Moret and Viet, 179–192; For an overview of the contemporary debate, see Kari Tapiola, 
“Die ‘Multis’: Ein Thema für die Vereinten Nationen”, Vereinte Nationen 5 (1978): 151–154.
635 The ILO Declaration built on a similar Declaration of the Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD), including a follow-up mechanism which involved a trade 
union advisory committee (1976).
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also provided a clear rationale for some kind of international regulation of the 
activities of MNEs. The “abuse of concentrations of economic power”, MNEs’ 
potential to interfere with national policies, and their capacity to escape national 
jurisdiction were named as cases in point why this regulation was in the public 
 interest.636
Important as the Declaration was as a step forward to put MNEs on the inter-
national agenda and to get them involved in the debate, the effects were  somewhat 
limited. While it established a procedure to address disagreements regarding the 
interpretation and application of the Declaration’s single paragraphs, it excluded 
conflicts on freedom of association (which remained the domain of the CFA). 
Given that it was exactly this kind of conflicts that accounted for the bulk of com-
plaints raised from the trade unions’ side against multinationals in the years to 
come, this omission arguably reduced the impact of the Declaration.637
Towards the end of the 1970s, the debates about the globalizing economy and 
its implications entered a new phase. The background was provided by increasing 
signs of economic crisis. In Western Europe, an almost thirty-year era of economic 
growth and nearly full employment slowly came to an end. While Western European 
governments were now struggling with rising unemployment and inflation, they 
were ever more anxious to fence off increasing demands from developing coun-
tries for a reorganization of world trade. One tangible result was the first meeting 
of the so-called G6, the governments of the richest market economies at the time 
(United States, Great Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan; later the G7 
by the addition of Canada) in Rambouillet, France, in November 1975.638 Within 
international institutions, these countries tried to streamline their efforts to revive 
growth as Industrial Market Economy Countries (IMEC) and to counter demands 
from the global South for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), intended to 
strengthen the bargaining position of the primary producing countries. However, 
the latter’s hopes to repeat the success of the oil producing countries and to use 
636 ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Pol-
icy (Geneva: ILO, 1977).
637 This became apparent, in particular, in comparison with the OECD, whose 1976 Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises preceded the ILO’s MNE Declaration. Other than the ILO, 
the OECD’s Trade Union Advisory Committee, chaired by the Finnish trade unionist and later 
ILO Deputy Director-General Kari Tapiola, collected, documented, and commented regularly on 
cases of violation of trade union’s rights by multinationals. See Kari Tapiola, The Teeth of the 
ILO. The Impact of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (Geneva: 
ILO, 2018), 10–11.
638 The meeting’s primary purpose was to find a common answer to the perceived threat from 
the developing countries. See for a concise summary Harold James, Rambouillet, 15. November 
1975. Die Globalisierung der Wirtschaft (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1997).
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strategic market power would soon prove to be illusory. Differences between, on 
the one hand, the successful oil producers and the export-oriented Asian coun-
tries (“Asian tigers”) such as the Republic of Korea, which became development 
models, and, on the other hand, the bulk of developing countries with varying 
economic bases turned out to be impossible to overcome.639
It was against this generally gloomy backdrop that the “Philadelphia consen-
sus”, based on an understanding of an intrinsic relationship of social and eco-
nomic policies and the ultimate primacy of a social objective of all policies, began 
to crumble. In Western Europe and across the North Atlantic, calls for liberali-
zation and deregulation of labour markets replaced the decades-long  conviction 
that growth, high levels of employment, and income security through welfare 
spending would mutually reinforce each other. The ILO was affected by the crisis 
of Keynesianism, which now came under attack by neo-classical, monetarist, 
and  supply-side-oriented economists. Their ideas, based on a narrative of auto- 
regulated free markets as a solution to the crisis, were first put into practice in Chile 
by the Pinochet regime, and then entered the bigger stage with the election of Mar-
garet Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States.640 
Meanwhile, the international financial institutions, namely the IMF and the World 
Bank, supported by some of the UN’s regional  commissions prescribed a set of ten 
neoliberal economic policy principles, known in the 1990s as the  “Washington 
Consensus”, as a reform package to crisis-ridden developing countries.641
Before long, there were writings on the wall that the tide was turning, and 
the ILO felt the consequences. Pressure mounted from the outside, but also 
from within, given the strong inclination of employers to embrace the neolib-
eral doctrine. With regard to Western Europe, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980, 
the ILO was gradually losing its momentum. Increasingly, it was also losing 
the capacity of making its voice heard in debates on how to overcome the eco-
nomic crisis, which conventional Keynesian economic tools did not seem able 
to control. On the international as well as on the national level, the political ini-
tiative was seized increasingly by those who blamed the economic downturn on 
structural and institutional “rigidities” of the labour market, which in their view 
reduced the international competitiveness of European enterprises. It was in this 
context that the ILO was partially replaced by the Organisation for Economic 
639 Dietrich, Oil Revolution.
640 For an intellectual history of neoliberalism, its proponents, and historical context, see 
Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2018).
641 On the history of structural adjustment programmes, see Unger, International Development. 
A Post-War History, 127–152.
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 Co- operation and Development (OECD), which began to argue ever more force-
fully for economic liberalization and a flexibilization of labour markets as a way 
out of the crisis.642
While last restrictions on capital flows were abolished during the late 1980s as 
part of the European economic integration process in the run-up to the Maastricht 
Treaty, some governments started to implement labour market reforms.These 
reforms allowed employers to expand or reduce the workforce and to employ 
workers on a part-time or temporary basis more easily. They also allowed more 
flexibility with regard to working time and payment.643 In reaction to all this, the 
ILO remained largely in a defensive and observant position. The approach the 
Organization took towards labour market reforms under the auspices of “labour 
market flexibility” was essentially a pragmatic one, due, most probably, to a mix 
of realism and resignation.
By and large, the ILO played a secondary role also in the process of European 
integration that led to the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the European 
Union (EU) in 1992. However, the Organization could consider it at least a partial 
success that it had helped to successfully introduce the concept of “social dia-
logue” into the debate on the social dimension of the European single market. 
When, in 1985, Jacques Delors, then the president of the European Commission, 
met with high-ranking European trade union and employer representatives at 
a summit on social dialogue, the trade unions, in particular, regarded it as an 
important step. To them, it was a sign that their concerns regarding the social 
impact of the European market were taken seriously.644
The trend towards supply-side economics was even more pronounced with 
regard to the international development debate. At the beginning of the 1980s, 
642 Matthieu Leimgruber, “The Embattled Standard-bearer of Social Insurance and Its Chal-
lenger: The ILO, the OECD and the ‘Crisis of the Welfare State’, 1975–1985”, in Globalizing Social 
Rights, ed. Kott and Droux, 115–136.
643 See a summary of the debates in Tiziano Treu, “Labour Flexibility in Europe”, International 
Labour Review 131, no. 4–5 (1992): 497–512. For the debate on working time flexibility, see Diet-
mar Süss, “Der Sieg der grauen Herren? Flexibilisierung und Kampf um Zeit in den 1970er und 
1980er Jahren”, in Die Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart. Dimensionen des Strukturbruchs nach dem 
Boom, ed. Anselm Döring-Manteuffel, Lutz Raphael, and Thomas Schlemmer (Munich: Beck, 
2016), 109–127.
644 See Jean Lapeyre, Le dialogue social européen. Histoire d’une innovation sociale (1985–2003) 
(Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, 2017), 35–43. For a longer-term perspective on the 
role of the ILO in shaping the social dimension of European integration, see Lorenzo Mechi, 
“Du BIT à la politique sociale européenne: l’origine d’un modèle”, Mouvement social 244, no. 3 
(2013): 17–30; Mechi, “Economic Regionalism and Social Stabilization”; Guinand, Die Interna-
tionale Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) und die soziale Sicherheit in Europa (1942–1969).
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countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, in particular, were struggling 
with huge foreign debts, restricting their room for manoeuvre both domestically 
and internationally. Poverty-centred and redistributive development strategies, 
which had been at the heart of the WEP, gave way to “stabilization policies” or, 
more concretely, programmes of “structural adjustment” applied by the IMF. They 
imposed the deregulation of labour markets, privatization of major industries, 
and cuts in public spending, often triggering unemployment in parallel to the 
scaling down of social programmes. Here, too, the ILO struggled to find an answer. 
As other institutions, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), it 
tried to push the IMF to make certain exceptions and to take employment effects 
into consideration. In 1987, Blanchard called a “High Level Meeting on Structural 
Adjustment and Employment” to which he invited representatives of the interna-
tional financial and economic institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank, 
UNCTAD and the GATT, as well as the OECD, to sit down with an ILO tripartite 
delegation.645 The objective was to discuss the social costs of neoliberal policies 
in developing countries and to bring the ILO back into the picture. Blanchard’s 
efforts resulted in some concessions regarding the conditionality of IMF loans, 
but beyond this, the impact of the meeting was very limited. The message was 
clear enough: liberalization and deregulation were the answer, while social con-
siderations, if not completely disregarded, had to be treated separately and were 
ultimately relegated to a subordinate position.646
The political sea change of 1989/1990 worked as yet another catalyst for the 
new thinking. When the Soviet Union dissolved, and state socialism came to 
an end in Eastern and Central Europe, the post-communist world became an El 
Dorado for the advocates of market liberalism with no social strings attached. “Big 
Bang” economics that were applied to countries which after decades of planned 
economies were already in severe crisis. This triggered radical and often chaotic 
transition processes to market economies. The shock therapy prescribed by inter-
national financial institutions and “Chicago boys” style market radicals included 
the privatization of state enterprises and a far-reaching and abrupt liberalization 
of labour markets. In the course of this process, the economies collapsed amidst 
high unemployment rates, and state Socialist welfare systems were dismantled 
without proper replacement policies. As a result, poverty rose,  education and 
health levels declined, and inequalities increased dramatically, with traumatiz-
ing effects and long-term political consequences. Some countries of the Common-
645 Peter J. Richards, “Preserving Jobs under Economic Stabilisation Programmes: Can there be 
an Employment Target?” International Labour Review 125, no. 4, (1986): 423–433.
646 Rodgers et al., The ILO and the Quest for Social Justice, 214–215.
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wealth of Independent States (CIS), which succeeded the Soviet Union after its 
end in 1991, suffered from civil war, and most of them did not manage the tran-
sition to democratic systems as did the Eastern European states.647 Initially, the 
ILO was hardly more than a bystander in this process, although its experts and 
advisors became active in the transitioning countries from Eastern Europe to the 
 Caucasus. The major problem was that attempts to install (tripartite) collective 
bargaining mechanisms or to help in the creation of social security systems ran 
up against different concepts promoted by the international financial institutions, 
which commanded much bigger resources than the ILO. The ILO was fighting a 
losing battle everywhere, and it was rarely able or willing to speak up against 
the general trend. According to critical observers, the ILO’s self-imposed restraint 
was due to a (surely justified) concern over losing access to the sources of funding 
for its own technical assistance programmes, for which the World Bank and the 
IMF functioned as gate keepers.648
An example for the ILO’s shrinking capacity to shape the discourse even in 
fields that comprised its core competence was the discussion on pension privat-
ization, a key component of the neoliberal project. In the early 1990s, a “trans-
national coalition” including the World Bank, the OECD, and USAID promoted 
the transition to pension systems based on individual capitalization, with the 
objective of complementing or even substituting contributory pension schemes 
run by the state or such long-established social institutions as trade unions. The 
ILO, which had long been the standard bearer of the latter model, now found 
itself on shifting ground, as the World Bank and the OECD used their superior 
resources successfully to promote pension reforms along the privatization par-
adigm in Western and Eastern Europe, the successor states of the Soviet Union, 
and in Latin America. The ILO could warn and suggest corrections, but it was not 
in a position to stem the tide.649
Towards the 1998 Declaration
Half a year before the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of a new era, 
in March 1989, Michel Hansenne, a former Belgian Minister of Employment and 
647 See as an example Mitchell Orenstein, “Transitional Social Policy in the Czech Republic and 
Poland”, Czech Sociological Review 3, no. 2 (1995): 179–196.
648 Guy Standing, “The ILO: An Agency for Globalization?” Development and Change 39, no. 3 
(2008): 355-384, here 364.
649 Mitchell A. Orenstein, “Pension Privatization: The Transnational Campaign”, in Globalizing 
Social Rights, ed. Kott and Droux, 280–292.
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Labour, took over as the eighth Director-General of the ILO. Unlike his predecessors, 
Jenks and Blanchard, Hansenne brought an outsider’s perspective to the Office. 
His prior experience with the ILO was restricted to the years when he had served 
as the Belgian Government delegate to the ILC. At a time of rapid change, he took 
some time to accustom himself to the functioning of the Organization. However, 
once he had ended his “apprenticeship year”, he was ready to reform it.650
Hansenne came from a Christian Democratic political background. Econom-
ically more liberal than his predecessors, he was a believer in the benefits of free 
trade. As a Minister of Employment and Labour, he had favoured a moderate flex-
ibilization of the labour market. As Director-General, he considered it his task 
to bring the ILO more in line with what he perceived as the requirements of the 
global economy. He felt that the Organization was ill-prepared for making its voice 
heard in the context of the new emerging order of international economic gov-
ernance, which would eventually lead to the establishment of the WTO in 1995. 
More than anything else, Hansenne saw the ILO in danger of being bypassed and 
ultimately becoming irrelevant. In his view, the ILO did too much, while lacking 
a clear focus. In his recollections, written immediately after leaving office in 1999, 
he likened the ILO to a clockwork that, despite moving regularly, failed to give 
“the right time”.651
This somewhat hidden dysfunctionality was particularly pronounced in the 
area of standard-setting. Many of the standards seemed outdated and of little 
value, particularly for developing countries. Previous criticism had led as early as 
1974 to the creation of a working party to review and update the standards system. 
In 1987, it had proposed a classification of ILO standards in order to identify the 
instruments whose ratification and application should be promoted on a priority 
basis.652 After 1990, and in line with the prevailing anti-regulatory mood, gov-
ernments generally were less inclined to ratify international labour standards, 
and employers were more committed than ever to go against the ILO’s standard- 
setting ambitions.653 Hansenne’s strategy to save the ILO from falling into irrele-
vance was to focus instead on a few basic principles. Starting from this idea, the 
ground work for a “Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work”, 
650 Marieke Louis, “Hansenne, Michel”, in IO Bio: Biographical Dictionary, ed. Reinalda, Kille, 
and Eisenberg, www.ru.nl/fm/iobio.
651 Michel Hansenne, Un garde-fou pour la mondialisation. Le BIT dans l’après-guerre froide 
(Chêne-Bourg: Editions ZOE, 1999), 21.
652 Report of the Working Party on International Labour Standards, paragraph 14: ILO, Minutes 
of the Governing Body, 235th Session, Geneva 1987.
653 Ulf Edström, “International Labour Standards after the End of the Cold War”, unpublished 
working paper for the ILO Century Project (Geneva: ILO, 2015).
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eventually adopted by the ILC in 1998, would become Hansenne’s major project 
and his legacy as Director-General. Inspiration came also from post–Cold War 
human rights discourses, which emphasized liberal rights of the individual over 
social and economic rights to support political democratization and the rule of 
law.
At the 1993 Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, this new mood was all 
too visible. While most Western countries treated social and economic rights as 
non-justiciable objectives, developing countries more than ever conceived of 
those rights as enuring to the state rather than to individuals. The result was a 
trade-off between the two groups in which the developing countries accepted the 
universality of political and civil rights in return for the West’s vague commit-
ment to a “right to development”, which included social and economic rights.654 
De facto, the Vienna conference confirmed the view that only political and civil 
rights constituted “real” human rights.655 Translated into the ILO’s work, this 
could be – and in fact was – seen as a further encouragement to focus on basic 
principles rather than on international labour standards in their entirety. There 
was arguably less room than ever for a comprehensive approach to human rights 
that would include a strong social component. In contrast, a momentum seemed 
to be building up for the promotion of the basic principles and “enabling rights” 
that were necessary for the realization of social rights, such as freedom of associ-
ation, legal equality/non-discrimination, and freedom of labour/the abolition of 
coercive forms of labour.
In 1994, the ILO celebrated its 75th anniversary and half a century since the 
adoption of the Declaration of Philadelphia. That year, already fraught with his-
toric significance, would become a turning point for the ILO. At the ILC, Hansenne 
opened a discussion on the Organization’s future role, which led to the installa-
tion by the Governing Body of a “Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the 
Liberalization of International Trade”. This Working Party, open to all members, 
was given the task of reviewing national policies, liaising with other international 
institutions, and serving as a sounding board for all ideas on the ILO’s potential 
contribution to the globalization debate. In this regard, it also became an impor-
tant element in the run-up to the 1998 Declaration.
The initial idea of “fundamental labour rights”, however, had not been 
Hansenne’s but came from the trade union side. For the Workers’ group, freedom 
of association and the right to collective bargaining were by far the most impor-
654 Burke, “Some Rights Are More Equal Than Others”.
655 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, “Human Rights and History”, Past & Present 232, no. 1 (2016): 
279–310.
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tant issues at stake. The inclusion of forced labour and discrimination in the list 
of fundamental rights was partly due to the fact that these were rather “appeal-
ing” rights from a political point of view, allowing for a fairly close connection to 
general human rights discourses. This was even more the case with child labour, 
which made it to the list some time later.
In parallel to the discussions of the Vienna Conference and the preparations 
for the 1994 celebrations, the Workers’ group launched an initiative for a “world 
charter of workers’ rights”, which listed freedom of association, absence of dis-
crimination (this included the right to equal pay), and forced labour. In a resolu-
tion, the ILC confirmed the Conventions which expressed these rights, namely 
Conventions Nos. 87, 98, 100, 29 and 105, and 111 (supplemented later by Conven-
tion No. 138 on minimum age as a reference to child labour).656 The list was pre-
sented as the necessary basis from which workers could “negotiate freely, both 
individually and collectively, their conditions of work” in the context of an ever 
more rapidly progressing liberalization of international trade.657
From there the road was open for the 1998 Declaration. The process that led 
to its adoption, however, was far from straightforward.. The Declaration was in 
fact one of a number of possible outcomes arising out of a quite volatile context. 
Three main factors led to its ultimate adoption: First, the establishment of the 
WTO and the preparations for the UN’s Social Summit in Copenhagen, both 
in 1995, provided the general background against which the ILO was forced to 
define its position. Secondly, the debate on the so-called social clause – tying 
trade agreements to compliance with ILO standards (see below) – and emerging 
business initiatives advocating self-regulatory mechanisms represented alterna-
tive visions of the social regulation of globalization and provided further incen-
tives to pursue the promotion of fundamental labour rights. Third, the field of 
child labour proved a testing ground for key features of the Declaration.
The UN World Summit for Social Development (Social Summit), which took 
place in Copenhagen in March 1995, served as an important stepping stone on 
the road towards a declaration on fundamental labour rights. More than any-
thing, the Social Summit was an expression of the uneasiness and disillusion 
with the results of the liberalization of trade under the new neoliberal para-
digm. The emergence of global supply chains, which marked a new phase in 
656 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); Equal Remuneration 
Convention, 1957 (No. 100); Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 
(No. 111); Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 
(No. 105); and Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138).
657 Reynaud, The International Labour Organization and Globalization, 4.
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the international division of work and production – together with the often 
dire consequences of deregulation, structural adjustment programmes, and 
the shock therapy prescribed to the former Eastern bloc countries – raised the 
awareness of the high cost of unfettered economic “hyper-globalization”. While 
it did not yet question the prevailing free-market paradigm, the need to deal 
with the social dimension of globalization was increasingly acknowledged. The 
initiative for a world meeting to deal with the entire range of social issues came 
from the UN’s ECOSOC, and particularly from its chairman, the Chilean repre-
sentative to the United Nations, Juan Somavía, who had been given the task of 
organizing the Social Summit. Initially, the ILO’s participation in the prepara-
tion of the summit took off rather slowly. Hansenne, according to an insider’s 
recollection, had to be pushed from the Workers’ and Employers’ sides to grab 
the opportunity offered by the UN’s initiative. Resolutions adopted by the ILC 
both in 1993 and 1994 pushed the Organization to play an assertive role in the 
preparation of the Social Summit, in particular in the fields of poverty reduction 
and employment.658
When the summit eventually took place, it helped to galvanize the ILO’s con-
stituents around the idea of fundamental labour rights. Roughly twenty thousand 
people participated, among them 117 heads of state. The Social Summit produced 
a final declaration that could well be read as a wake-up call: it called, among 
other things, for poverty eradication, full employment, social integration based 
on the respect of all human rights, including equality between men and women 
and universal access to education, and the need for structural adjustment pro-
grammes to contain social development goals.659 In a way, the connection it made 
between economic and social policies only highlighted the deep imbalance in 
the treatment of both areas. The very fact that the Social Summit took place prac-
tically in parallel to the foundation of the WTO underpinned the latter’s supe-
rior position: in the same year that the WTO implemented one of the toughest 
sanction regimes on the international level, the Social Summit produced mere 
declarations of intent, without any direct consequences or clear follow-up mech-
anisms. All the power in the realm of global governance remained with the inter-
national economic and financial institutions.
658 Tapiola, The Teeth of the ILO, 23.
659 The summit, in its final agreement contained an endorsement of full, productive, and 
 freely chosen employment that was based on the wording of Employment Policy Convention, 
1964 (No. 122). It also confirmed the central role of employment in the reduction of poverty. See 
 United Nations, Report on the World Summit for Social Development, 19 April 1995, A/CONF.166/9, 
 Chapter 1, Annex 1, “Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development.
Towards the 1998 Declaration   253
For the ILO, however, the Social Summit was an important step forward. 
While it received credit, above all, for its comprehensive World Employment 
Report produced for the summit,660 it also put its official seal on the concept of 
“fundamental workers’ rights”. The “Copenhagen Declaration on Social Devel-
opment”, the summit’s final document, related directly to the resolutions of the 
1994 ILC. It asked governments to enhance the quality of work and employment 
by safeguarding and promoting respect for “basic workers’ rights, including 
the prohibition of forced labour and child labour, freedom of association and 
the right to organize and bargain collectively, equal remuneration for men and 
women for work of equal value, and non-discrimination in employment”. The 
Declaration also called on governments to fully implement the respective ILO 
Conventions and to take into account “the principles embodied in those Conven-
tions”, as a means to “achieve truly sustained economic growth and sustainable 
development”.661
The last and unquestionably most important argument for the Declaration, 
however, emanated from the heated debate of the 1990s on the so-called “social 
clause”. Its proponents intended to create a direct link between trade agreements 
and adherence to certain ILO standards. In the early 1990s, the discussion on the 
social clause intensified in view of the new order of international economic gov-
ernance centred around the WTO.
The idea of a social clause itself goes back to the immediate post–Second 
World War period and the debates on the rebuilding of world trade. Some coun-
tries had pushed for a connection between international agreements on employ-
ment policies (which never materialized) and labour standards in the wake of 
the Philadelphia Conference. Similar considerations had also accompanied the 
discussions surrounding the Havana Charter of 1948 and the attempts, ulti-
mately unsuccessful, to create an International Trade Organization (ITO).662 In 
the context of the GATT, which “provisionally” took the place of the ITO (before 
the founding of the WTO in 1995), there was no follow-up on the idea. In the 
1960s, the ICFTU had submitted the idea of a social clause to the first conference 
of UNCTAD as its contribution to the first UN “development decade”. However, it 
660 ILO, World Employment 1995. An ILO Report (Geneva: ILO, 1995).
661 UN, Report on the World Summit for Social Development, “Copenhagen Declaration”, which 
confirmed the ILO’s 1994 list in paragraph 54(b) of its action programme. Chapter III, C of the 
Declaration covered the issue of “enhanced quality of work and employment” in a comprehen-
sive way.
662 Jill Jensen, “Negotiating a World Trade and Employment Charter: The United States, the 
ILO and the Collapse of the ITO Ideal”, in The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim, ed. Jensen and 
Lichtenstein, 83-109.
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had met with significant resentment from developing countries, who saw it as a 
protectionist tool imposed by the industrialized countries.663
After lying somewhat dormant, the idea re-emerged when the first great push 
for a liberalization of trade and capital flows took place in the 1970s. While the 
paradigm shift towards full-scale liberalization was on its way, Western industrial 
countries felt a growing need to protect their own companies and workers from 
the adverse effects of global competition. At a time when developing countries 
increasingly were told that liberalization and “adjustment” of their economies 
to the requirements of the global market were the answers to their problems, the 
industrial countries supported the erection of new barriers. When the US govern-
ment, the OECD, and Western trade unions increasingly argued for social clauses 
as a way to tackle “unfair competition”, their main targets were the “Asian tigers”, 
whose export-oriented development models rested on authoritarian premises, 
cheap labour, and low social standards. But their calls sounded shallow to devel-
oping countries across the board, and they were viewed as just another attempt 
to perpetuate unequal economic power relations. This conflict was exacerbated 
by the debt crisis and “structural adjustment” constraints in the global South. 
During the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the social clause repeatedly 
appeared in the ILO debates, where the United States and other OECD and EU 
countries, as well as the ICFTU, ran up against a nearly united front of devel-
oping countries (often including their Workers’ representatives) and Employers, 
who were traditionally opposed to any measures suspected to interfere with free 
trade.664
The ILO was put in a difficult situation, since after all, the dividing lines ran 
through the Organization itself. At the beginning of the GATT’s so-called Uruguay 
Round in 1986, when the United States, in particular, pushed for the inclusion of 
a social clause, Blanchard initiated a debate on the question with Arthur Dunkel, 
Secretary-General of the GATT, but failed to achieve any results. The discussion 
then continued into Hansenne’s term. In 1994, a group of Asian countries pro-
moted a Conference resolution “calling upon the ILO to resist the introduction 
of the social clause in international trade”.665 While it failed to get enough votes, 
663 An overview in Tapiola, Teeth of the ILO, 12; Tony Royle, “The ILO’s Shift to Promotional 
Principles and the ‘Privatization’ of Labour Rights: An Analysis of Labour Standards, Voluntary 
Self-Regulation and Social Clauses”, Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 
26, no. 3 (2010): 249–271.
664 George Tsogas, “Labour Standards in International Trade Agreements: An Assessment of the 
Arguments”, The International Journal of Human Resource Management 10, no. 2 (1999): 351–375.
665 ILO, Record of Proceedings, Resolution Calling upon the ILO to Resist the Introduction of the 
Social Clause in International Trade and to Review ILO Standards, Submitted by the Government 
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the discussion reflected the irreconcilable positions on the question. The fact that 
the strongest resistance to the social clause was led by South-East Asian countries 
like Malaysia and Singapore revealed the connection of this debate to the ongoing 
controversies on human rights, as the same countries were heading the opposi-
tion – invoking “Asian values” – to what they considered neo-colonial Western 
conceptions of human rights.666
In the run-up to the GATT meeting in Marrakesh in April 1994, which was 
to end the Uruguay Round and decide on the foundation of the WTO, industrial 
countries and Western trade unions once again pushed for an inclusion of a social 
clause in the WTO’s charter. However, when the WTO eventually took up its work 
on the first day of 1995, developing countries could see with satisfaction that their 
efforts to keep the social clause off the agenda of the new organization had been 
successful. The First WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in December 1996 
put a seal on the question. Developing countries won their first victory, when they 
made sure that the ILO Director-General’s invitation to the Singapore meeting 
was withdrawn. The meeting’s final communiqué mentioned “core labour stand-
ards” and credited the ILO as the competent agency to pursue their realization. 
At the same time, the Singapore conference plainly rejected the idea of social 
clauses as a form of protectionism. International labour standards would help 
to secure social progress only if disconnected from international trade policies. 
The best way to realize social standards, the final communiqué proclaimed, was 
“economic growth and development fostered by increased trade and further lib-
eralization”. If there had been any illusions as to a new institutionalized role for 
the ILO within the emerging economic order, they were shattered by the meeting. 
Any dreams that parts of the “Philadelphia consensus” could be transposed to 
the new age clearly had to be buried. From Hansenne’s perspective, however, 
the WTO episode, sobering as it was, provided the final incentive for focusing on 
the preparation of a legal instrument that would define and promote core labour 
standards.667
If, for the international trade union movement, the social clause was the pre-
ferred way of tackling the social consequences of globalization, a different vision 
came from the opposite end of the ILO’s meeting rooms in the form of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR). Driven by brand-oriented consumer and human rights 
Delegation of Indonesia, Malaysia Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, International Labour 
Conference, 81st Session 1994 (Geneva: ILO, 1994).
666 There were notable exceptions on both sides. While the United Kingdom, for instance, ob-
jected to the social clause, some countries from the global South, like South Africa and Brazil, 
were not entirely opposed. See Tapiola, The Teeth of the ILO, 20–21.
667 Reynaud, The International Labour Organization and Globalization, 5–6.
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activists who were scandalized by the use of child labour, inhumane working con-
ditions, and the suppression of workers’ rights at the producing end of the global 
supply chains, some multinational corporations (like Nike, Nestlé, and Walmart) 
pledged adherence to self-imposed “codes of conduct”. Starting from the early 
1990s (the first codes of conducts were from the 1970s), more and more MNEs 
and brand-name businesses subscribed to self-regulation through CSR, with the 
latter becoming a regular part of companies’ public relations departments. As the 
system has been refined, CSR has created its own “tripartite” set-up: while brands 
usually design and administer their own codes of conduct and apply them to the 
manufacturers producing their goods, the third party involved consists of human 
rights organizations, which monitor the application of CSR codes, sometimes in 
direct cooperation with the brands.668
For the ILO, CSR has always posed a conundrum. On the one hand, codes 
of conduct were one possible way to strengthen the acceptance of international 
labour standards by presenting them as a yardstick for the governance of working 
conditions, trade union rights, or minimum age regulations within global supply 
chains. From a pragmatic point of view, CSR codes seemed to provide an addi-
tional tool, given the difficulties of regulation through national legislations. 
On the other hand, CSR aroused little enthusiasm within the ILO outside the 
Employers’ group. The promotion of CSR codes could hardly be separated from 
the employers’ increasingly hostile attitude towards ILO standard-setting, which 
had generally stiffened in the 1990s. Moreover, the IOE made it very clear that it 
would oppose anything that could compromise the completely voluntary charac-
ter of CSR. Any initiatives of human rights activists to push the ILO to develop a 
more binding instrument – such as a convention or a recommendation defining 
minimum standards for CSR on such issues as freedom of association or equal pay 
– met with strong resistance from the Employers.669 The Workers’ group, in turn, 
had its own reasons to be sceptical of the concept: as much as its representatives 
welcomed human rights activism in the field of working conditions (since it sup-
ported their own aims), they never perceived CSR as an end in itself but only as 
a poor substitute for the achievement of workers’ rights through binding laws.670
668 Archie B. Carroll, “A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Practices”, in 
The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility, ed. Andrew Crane et al. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 19–46.
669 Louis, “Building a Transnational Business Community”, 20.
670 On the ILO discussion, see Nelson Lichtenstein, “The ILO and the Corporate Social Respon-
sibility Regime in East and South Asia”, in The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim, ed. Jensen and 
Lichtenstein, 277–296; Royle, “The ILO’s Shift to Promotional Principles and the ‘Privatization’ 
of Labour Rights”.
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For all these reasons, the ILO reacted hesitantly to the calls that it should 
become more assertive in its embrace of CSR. Hansenne’s idea of creating an 
ILO-governed “social label”, in the hope of reviving the debate on MNEs, was 
nipped in the bud by the resistance of the Employers and many emerging coun-
tries from the global South.671 The International Labour Office, nevertheless, tried 
to embrace the concept of CSR in its own work from the latter part of the 1990s 
onwards. For instance, it created a help desk to advise companies on how to bring 
codes of conduct in line with ILO standards. In 2001, the Organization launched 
the “Better Factories Cambodia” programme, which can be seen as an attempt 
to create a model CSR environment, because it was repeated in other countries. 
By contrast, the ILO’s impact on the broader debate has remained marginal, in 
particular when it comes to MNEs.672 However, in the mid-1990s the CSR debate 
contributed to the dedication of Hansenne and many others in the ILO to develop 
a promotional approach, focusing on specific ILO standards as the primary tool 
to regulate globalization “the ILO way”.
An early opportunity to test this new approach arose in the field of child 
labour, where an old topic received new attention as it emerged as one of the 
major negative social consequences of economic globalization which triggered 
growing consumer activism. In the early 1970s, the topic had already returned 
to the agenda of the ILO, when a Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), had 
created a new framework for the existing minimum age instruments. While the 
aim of this Convention was “the total abolition of child labour” in all its forms, the 
debate was also shaped by the parallel discussions on development and the NIEO. 
The new Convention reflected these discussions inasmuch as it allowed develop-
ing countries to apply a gradual approach and to exclude certain sectors of the 
economy where work was not dangerous to the children’s health.673 In 1979, when 
the ILO examined the (low) impact of Convention No. 138, it further took account 
of the situation in the global South, where poverty created an environment that 
made it impossible, and in some cases also undesirable, to instantly abolish all 
forms of child labour. The approach would have to be to fight first against those 
forms of child labour that were highly exploitative and that exceeded the mental 
and physical abilities of children of a certain age and endangered their educa-
tional advancement.674 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) gave 
671 Louis, “Hansenne, Michel”, 4.
672 Lichtenstein, “The ILO and the Corporate Social Responsibility Regime in East and South 
Asia”.
673 G.K. Lieten, “The ILO Setting the Terms in the Child Labour Debate”, in ILO Histories, ed. 
Van Daele et al., 443–460.
674 Ibid., 448.
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further support to this approach when it put the emphasis on children’s protec-
tion from economic exploitation and “from performing any work that is likely to 
be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the 
child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development”.675
In the beginning of the 1990s, when there was a tailwind for the fight against 
child labour as a general human rights issue, the limits of the ILO’s standard- 
setting approach focussing on minimum age regulations seemed all too obvious. 
This was the point of departure for a new strategy. It took greater account of the 
concerns of developing countries, in particular, and would ultimately result in 
the 1999 Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour (No. 182). The new Con-
vention was built on a broad consensus on what should be regarded as the most 
unacceptable forms of child labour: the trafficking of children, child prostitution, 
children’s use as soldiers and for such illicit activities such as drug dealing, and 
generally work that was likely to cause grave harm to the health, safety, or morals 
of a child.676
The groundwork for the nearly complete consensus that carried the new Con-
vention had been laid already in the beginning of the 1990s with the launching of 
the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), in which 
standard-setting was only one part of a broader strategy. In 1992, Hansenne 
received significant support from the German government, which provided fifty 
million Deutschmarks to get IPEC under way. The new programme rested on two 
main pillars – technical assistance and the mobilization of public opinion. It lent 
technical support to countries in their activities against child labour and reached 
out to other humanitarian and human rights agencies working in the field, such 
as UNICEF or Save the Children, to rally public opinion around the issue. Ini-
tially, IPEC was met with some apprehension by the developing countries and 
also the Workers’ group. The former feared that new action on the issue might 
put a spotlight on the problem in their export-oriented industries, which, in turn, 
could lead to economically harmful sanctions. Their fears were fanned by the 
fact that the start of IPEC coincided with the debates on the social clause and 
with calls for boycotts of products made by children. Trade unions, for their part, 
were anxious lest the programme would turn out to be yet another attempt to 
675 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 32 (1) (New York, 1989).
676 How strong the consensus was on this issue could be seen from the fact that the Convention 
was unanimously adopted by the ILC in 1999 and instantly received ratifications from member 
States. Before long, the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) turned into one 
of the most widely accepted among all the ILO’s international labour standards. In 2019, 186 
countries had ratified Convention No. 182. Lieten, “The ILO Setting the Terms in the Child Labour 
Debate”.
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devalue international labour standards. Some workers and governments were 
also generally opposed to what they saw as a watering down of the ILO’s goal of 
a complete elimination of child labour, enshrined in the minimum age concept. 
They feared that too close a cooperation with organizations like Save the Children 
or UNICEF might compromise the clarity of the ILO’s message, given that both of 
them favoured a more general child welfare approach that did not prioritize the 
abolition of child labour as such.677
Ultimately, most of the fears were alleviated by the relative success of IPEC, by 
which the ILO gained considerable attention and the sustained support of major 
donors like the US government. However, there were two aspects that probably 
helped most to reconcile the programme’s critics with IPEC: it clearly paved the 
ground for the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (No. 182); and it helped 
to boost ratification of the 1973 Minimum Age Convention, which had stood at 
about fifty in 1990 and has since then risen to 172 (2019).678 Child labour helped 
to connect the ILO directly to the international human rights discourse concern-
ing children and to forge alliances with groups outside the Organization’s core 
constituency: for instance, the “Global March against Child Labour” network, 
which brought together a broad coalition of children’s rights organizations, trade 
unions, and UN agencies; or the “Red Card to Child Labour” campaign, launched 
in 1998 on the occasion of the football world cup, which involved cooperation 
with the international football federation, FIFA. In this sense, fighting against 
child labour has proved its value as a door opener for the ILO. At the same time, 
however, it failed to entirely silence the critics – even more so, since the success of 
child labour campaigns was not to be repeated easily with regard to other funda-
mental principles. This was true, in particular, for issues like freedom of associa-
tion or discrimination, which did not draw the same degree of across-the-board 
support as the highly emotionalized topic of child labour.679 In the meantime, 
IPEC contributed significantly to creating a momentum for fundamental labour 
rights. This connection became plainly visible when hundreds of children from 
all over the world who were among the thousands of participants in the Global 
March against Child Labour that convened in Geneva in early June 1998 mounted 
the stage during the opening of the 86th Session of the ILC that would later adopt 
the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
677 Lieten, “The ILO Setting the Terms in the Child Labour Debate”.
678 Minimum Age Convention No. 138 (1973).
679 Tapiola, The Teeth of the ILO, 17–18.
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The Declaration and Its Critics
The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work referred to a set 
of specific rights and obligations that were expressed in “Conventions recognized 
as fundamental”.680 It stipulated that all ILO member States, by the very fact of 
their membership in the Organization, were obliged to adhere to and promote 
the principles relating to the “fundamental rights” that were expressed in these 
Conventions, regardless of whether or not they had ratified them. The four cat-
egories of fundamental rights were: (a) freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of all forms of 
forced and compulsory labour; (c) the effective abolition of child labour; and (d) 
the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. The 
Declaration introduced a follow-up mechanism that included an annual review 
report and global reports, which would cover all four principles of fundamental 
rights within a four-year cycle. The ILO also received a new mandate to assist its 
member states by means of technical cooperation, which triggered a  reorientation 
680 See the list in fn. 656.
Figure 15: The Global March against Child Labour is welcomed by ILO Director-General Michel 
Hansenne at the opening session of the 1998 ILC in Geneva.
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of the ILO’s programmatic work towards an integrated approach, with the promo-
tion of “fundamental standards” at its core.
In the end, the Declaration was carried by a fairly broad consensus. The 
fact that it did not contain any new obligations for the members was not only an 
explanation but a precondition for this outcome. Member States were asked for 
their acceptance of principles only, without a direct obligation to ratify or imple-
ment the fundamental Conventions. Yet, when a vote was eventually taken (on 
the initiative of the Egyptian government), instead of adopting the Declaration by 
mere acclamation, it reached the necessary quorum only by nine votes.681 More 
than anything, this result reflected the developing countries’ continuing appre-
hensions about accepting any interference with their policies when labour rights 
potentially conflicted with trade issues or the “right to development”. Without the 
explicit statement in the Declaration that labour standards “should not be used 
for protectionist trade purposes” and the pledge that “the comparative advantage 
of any country should in no way be called into question by this Declaration and 
its follow-up”,682 it is highly doubtful that it would have been adopted at all.
Still, from the ILO’s point of view, the adoption of the Declaration was a major 
success. At a minimum, it provided a reorientation of the ILO that almost all in 
the ILO could agree to. Certain early indications that justified a positive assess-
ment. Throughout the following years, the ratification rates for ILO standards 
increased significantly, and some of the fundamental Conventions – above all, 
the Worst Form of Child Labour Convention (No. 182) and the Equal Remunera-
tion Convention (No. 100) – were at least in theory available as a legal reference in 
almost all countries of the world. Fundamental labour standards have undoubt-
edly increased the ILO’s visibility. They found their way into trade agreements 
and entrepreneurial codes of conduct and built a new point of reference in the 
public debate which was also used by other international organizations. In addi-
tion, the promotional campaigns built around the follow-up mechanism earned 
the Organization new resources from member States such as the United States. 
The campaigns helped the ILO to expand its public outreach, and its initiatives 
against child labour, forced labour and discrimination in employment and occu-
pation helped it to widen its network of connections with a range of civil society 
groups around the world.
The Declaration, however, was not welcomed by all and drew sharp criticism 
from some quarters. Most of the critics took issue with the fact that the Declara-
681 There were 273 votes in favour and 43 abstentions, which meant the quorum was only just 
reached by 9 votes.
682 ILO, The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted by the Inter-
national Labour Conference at its 86th Session, 18 June 1998, art. 5.
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tion implicitly created a hierarchy of standards. In their judgement, standards 
dealing with working conditions, the right to a safe and healthy work place, fair 
wages and a limitation of working hours, income security through health care, 
pensions, unemployment insurance, and other protections had lost in weight. 
Often, these critics made a connection between the Declaration and certain neo-
liberal tendencies in other aspects of the ILO’s work. The adoption of the Private 
Employment Agencies Convention of 1997 (No. 181) was a case in point. It com-
promised the almost eighty-year-old principle, enshrined in the Unemployment 
Convention of 1919, that public employment services were the sole legitimate 
institutions in the field. Some of the critics regarded this step as an unforgivable 
mistake in the face of what they saw as an all-out neoliberal assault. An unsuc-
cessful parallel attempt to create a Convention regulating contract labour pro-
vided additional grist to the mill for these critics.683
Inasmuch as the ILO and the supporters of the Declaration argued that all 
four fundamental principles constituted “enabling rights”, the critics pointed 
to the heavy imbalance among them. And indeed, while the fight against forced 
and child labour has found very high if not almost unanimous acceptance among 
the ILO’s constituents, freedom of association and the right to collective bargain-
ing – arguably the “enabling rights” par excellence – have enjoyed much less 
support. Less than half of the world’s population is covered by Conventions Nos. 
87 and 98, and the countries that have not ratified one or both of them include 
major economic players such as China, India, Mexico, Brazil or the United States. 
The same goes for the resources that the ILO has been able to generate for its 
promotional campaigns. While “popular” rights on the list have attracted huge 
resources – child labour alone accounted for more than three quarters of the total 
in extrabudgetary contributions from state donors during the period from 2000 
to 2011 – freedom of association has always ended up with a significantly smaller 
share. The reasons have been manifold, but it is clear enough that the political 
character of freedom of association makes it much less attractive to state donors. 
The publicity value of promoting trade unions is negligible in contrast to a cam-
paign for the eradication of child labour.684
Another point of contention concerned the monitoring of the core labour 
standards. There was criticism that the promotional and non-confrontational 
mechanisms the ILO had put in place with the Declaration further weakened the 
ILO’s already small power of sanctions. Some have attributed this outcome to the 
683 Standing, “The ILO: An Agency for Globalization?” 365–369; Royle, “The ILO’s Shift to Pro-
motional Principles and the ‘Privatization’ of Labour Rights”, 258–261.
684 Reynaud, The International Labour Organization and Globalization, 10.
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influence particularly of the United States and have thus characterized the Decla-
ration in general as a major victory for the US government. For the human rights 
law scholar Philip Alston, the Declaration offered an “ideal route” for the United 
States to escape from the dilemma of having itself ratified only two fundamental 
Conventions, on the worst forms of child labour and on forced labour (Convention 
No. 182 and Convention No. 105), while applying sanctions in its domestic legis-
lation – and seeking them at WTO level –to other countries violating core labour 
standards.685 Against this background, the more radical critics see the Declara-
tion as an expression of the ILO’s ultimate complicity in the establishment of an 
international neoliberal order and the acceptance of its own subordinate role 
with regard to the prevailing Washington Consensus.686
In response to these criticisms, the defenders of the Declaration placed most 
of their emphasis on the new procedural possibilities that its follow-up mecha-
nisms offered to the ILO with regard to monitoring the evolution of principles and 
rights and providing technical assistance to help their promotion. They argued 
that the additional opportunities provided by these mechanisms, namely to reach 
out to groups beyond the ILO’s classical constituencies, were the best hope for 
the ILO to revitalize its standard-setting activities through the mobilization of 
people directly affected on the national and transnational levels.687 The dynamics 
in connection with IPEC and, to a certain extent, the mobilization for the adop-
tion of the Domestic Workers Convention (No. 189) of 2011 seemed to prove the 
point.688 Moreover, one of the main authors of the Declaration as the ILO’s Legal 
Adviser, Francis Maupain, refused to accept the widespread criticism that the ILO 
had replaced “hard” labour standards with “soft” law principles. For Maupain, 
this contention was based on an overly simplistic view about the ILO’s presumed 
“golden age” of standard-setting after the Second World War, which, on closer 
scrutiny, would display a much more complex picture, considering that the ide-
ological confrontation of the Cold War had led to the adoption of rather sectoral 
standards that earned only few ratifications.689 There is, indeed, much to say in 
support of this argument. David Morse’s focus in the 1950s on the principles of 
685 Philip Alston, “‘Core Labour Standards’ and the Transformation of the International Labour 
Rights Regime”, European Journal of International Law 15, no. 3 (2004): 457–521.
686 Royle speaks about an “acceptance of the neo-liberal agenda”, Royle, “The ILO’s Shift to 
Promotional Principles and the ‘Privatization’ of Labour Rights”, 270.
687 For a summary of the positions, see Reynaud, The International Labour Organization and 
Globalization, 8–9.
688 On domestic work, see the Epilogue.
689 Francis Maupain, The Future of the International Labour Organization in the Global Economy 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013).
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the Declaration of Philadelphia and a few human rights standards was already 
driven by the observation that ILO standard-setting was losing its universality 
in the face of an ever more diverse membership as a result of decolonization and 
the Cold War. Given the currency which human rights enjoyed in international 
discussions of all kinds in the 1990s, it must have seemed obvious for Hansenne 
to deploy a similar strategy in reframing the ILO as a human rights agency.690
To the critics of the ILO’s “neoliberal turn” the answer is less straightforward. 
Whatever Hansenne’s primary intentions in steering the process in the direc-
tion of the Declaration might have been, and how far his inclinations towards 
free trade and labour market flexibility might have carried his actions, remains 
subject to interpretation. In hindsight, though, and with a view of the bigger 
picture, it seems both unfair, and, to a certain degree, also ahistorical, to judge 
the Declaration with a view to its content alone. In the early to mid-1990s, taking 
a firmer and more principled stand on standard-setting was probably not a realis-
tic option for the ILO. Against the background of the superior position which the 
WTO, the OECD, and the international financial institutions had acquired both 
with regard to their material means and the dominant discourse, the alternative 
might well have been the further marginalization of the Organization. In this view, 
Hansenne’s move to bring the ILO back into the debate on the social dimension 
of globalization by focusing on a limited number of core labour standards was 
possibly the only way to secure the ILO’s continuing relevance. While this is no 
small accomplishment from an organizational point of view, it still leaves open 
the question whether the ILO had the capacity – in the given historical context – 
to make an impact on the globalization debate, let alone to claim a new “social 
mandate” for itself. At least, with the 1998 Declaration, the ILO has shown its 
capacity to make its voice heard. It may not have been the renewal of a social 
mandate for the global age, but it was surely a small step towards the restoration 
of the Philadelphia consensus and the acknowledgement that, ultimately, all pol-
icies have to be evaluated with reference to an overarching social objective.
690 Normand and Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN, 316–341.
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Epilogue
Decent Work and the Social Dimension of Globalization
In early 1999, the International Labour Organization (ILO) took another turn 
when the Chilean diplomat Juan Somavía became its ninth Director-General. 
Somavía was the first Director-General from the global South, and he brought a 
fresh perspective to the ILO’s work. Yet Somavía’s views were probably shaped 
less by his origins than by the many years he had spent at the United Nations, 
where he had been particularly involved with social and economic affairs. He 
was the Permanent Representative of Chile to the UN from 1990 to 1999; had 
served as the Chairman of the UN’s Third Committee on Social, Humanitarian 
and Cultural Affairs; and had twice been the President of ECOSOC.691 His closest 
interaction with the ILO before he took office was as Chairman of the Preparatory 
Committee for the Copenhagen Social Summit in 1995. As Director-General, he 
wanted to move the ILO closer to the centre of global debates, which meant a 
closer relationship with the United Nations and a renewed emphasis on devel-
opment and the social consequences of an accelerated globalization. While 
Somavía acknowledged Hansenne’s accomplishments, and in particular the rec-
ognition the ILO had gained with the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work, he felt that the ILO still needed more focus and visibility. The 
tool which was designed to reorient and reintegrate the ILO’s activities, was the 
concept of “decent work”. This became the central and all-embracing framework 
of Somavía’s 13 years in office, and it has remained so under his successor, Guy 
Ryder.692
Somavía introduced the decent work concept in his very first speech to the 
Governing Body in March 1999 as a guiding principle, defining four strategic 
objectives to refocus the ILO’s activities. According to Somavía, these objectives 
were the essence of the ILO’s work: realizing fundamental principles and rights 
at work; creating greater opportunities for men and women to secure decent 
employment and income; enhancing and extending social protection for all; and 
strengthening tripartism and social dialogue.693 In the same speech, Somavía 
691 Somavía’s biographical data can be found on the ILO’s official website.
692 Leah Vosko, “Decent Work: The Shifting Role of the ILO and the Struggle for Global Social 
Justice”, Global Social Policy 2, no. 1 (2002): 19–46.
693 “I believe that the central purpose of the ILO today, is to promote opportunities of decent 
work for all. The four strategic objectives must converge on this overarching goal. If the ILO’s 
values are to be translated into action, rather than just a reaffirmation of belief, then the four 
strategic objectives must be mutually supportive.” Statement by Mr. Juan Somavía, Director- 
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felt that the ILO’s activities had not sufficiently embraced the increasingly het-
erogeneous realities of working life across the globe, including the large and 
growing informal economy. The decent work concept was designed as a means 
to overcome this weakness, firstly, by reclaiming a strengthened role for the ILO 
in the field of development and, secondly, by reaching out more effectively to 
all working people. Starting from Somavía’s observation that “Almost everyone 
works, but not everyone is employed”, decent work reaffirmed the ILO’s moral 
obligation and mandate to improve conditions for all working people, regardless 
of their employment status. Consequently, it has also functioned as a basis for 
and a gateway to new initiatives.
During Somavía’s first term in office, the ILO worked intensively to implement 
the decent work concept on the ground, for example through specific Decent 
Work Country Programmes, and in parallel to promote it within the Organization 
as well as in the international community. A first opportunity opened up at the 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999.694 The massive and violent pro-
tests against the meeting, which drew the attention of the international public to 
the growing counter-globalization movement, provided a dramatic backdrop that 
lent additional weight to Somavía’s message. He used the opportunity to present 
the decent work concept as a response to the inequality and unfairness globali-
zation had produced – and was continuing to produce – for too many people in 
the world.695
The next step was to establish the decent work concept in the general 
global policy debates at the United Nations that were taking place around 
the turn of the millennium. In 2002, the ILO set up a World Commission that 
was tasked with producing a comprehensive report, published in 2004 with 
the title A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All. Its real value lay 
less in its content – which was described by some observers as a “list of good 
intentions” – than in the consolidation of the decent work approach at the 
highest intergovernmental level.696 In 2007, decent work was included in the 
renewed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the United Nations, which 
General of the International Labour Office, upon taking his Oath of Office, Geneva, 22 March 
1999, https://bit.ly/2IgT6F1.
694 Somavía decided to attend the meeting on the basis of a general invitation to all organi-
zations (originally without the right to speak). It was the first time that an ILO Director-General 
took part in a WTO meeting, after Hansenne had been invited to the Singapore WTO Ministerial 
Conference in 1996 and then disinvited.
695 Reynaud, The International Labour Organization and Globalization, 12–13.
696 “Decent Work for all should be made a global goal and be pursued through coherent policies 
within the multilateral system. This would respond to a major political demand in all countries 
and demonstrate the capacity of the multilateral system to find creative solutions to this critical 
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listed “full and productive employment and decent work for all, including 
women and young people” as a target under Goal No. 1 (Eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger).697 Finally, in the context of the 2008 global financial 
and economic crisis, Somavía was once again able to push the ILO towards 
the core of international policy-making, when the Organization was asked to 
prepare a report on the impact of the crisis on jobs for the G20 Summit in Sep-
tember 2009 in Pittsburgh.698
An important codification of the decent work agenda was the Declaration 
on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, adopted by the 97th Session of the 
ILC in 2008.699 The intention of this Declaration was twofold. It proclaimed the 
universality of the decent work approach, based on its four strategic objectives: 
employment, social protection, social dialogue, and fundamental principles and 
rights at work.700 In addition, it formulated “the contemporary vision of the ILO’s 
mandate in the era of globalization”,701 thus inscribing the decent work concept 
in an important ILO instrument – together with references to the ILO’s Constitu-
tion of 1919, the Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, and the 1998 Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.702 Written on the eve of the financial 
crisis of 2008 (which broke out only three months after its adoption), the Social 
Justice Declaration addresses both the problems in a “world of growing interde-
pendence and complexity” and defines the ILO’s approach to reducing the social 
cost of these developments.
If anything, the Social Justice Declaration reflects a minimum consensus 
among the ILO’s constituents. Nevertheless, it established a scheme of “recur-
rent discussions” by the ILC, covering each of the four strategic objectives in 
turn. So far they have paved the way for several new Recommendations and a 
Protocol.703
problem.” World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globalization: 
Creating Opportunities for All (Geneva: ILO, 2004), xiii.
697 Reynaud, The International Labour Organization and Globalization, 14–15.
698 Marieke Louis, “The ILO, Social Partners and the G20: New Prospects for Social Dialogue at 
the Global Level”, Global Social Policy 16, no. 3 (2016): 235–252.
699 ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, adopted by the International La-
bour Conference at its Ninety-Seventh Session, Geneva, 10 June 2008.
700 Ibid., 2, 9, 10.
701 Ibid., 1.
702 In his Preface, Somavía defined the Social Justice Declaration with explicit reference to 
these documents as “the third major statement of principles and policies adopted by the Intena-
tional Labour Conference since the ILO’s Constitution of 1919”. Ibid.
703 The Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202) with regard to minimum 
social protection; the Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy Recommendation, 
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In October 2012, Guy Ryder,704 a British national and former general secre-
tary of the ITUC, succeeded Somavía. As Director-General he has continued to 
promote decent work in the UN system. At the early stages of Ryder’s mandate, 
decent work coupled with economic growth became Goal 8 of the 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, adopted in 2015.705
The decent work concept has received an almost equal share of praise and 
criticism. Together with its proven value in (re-)connecting the ILO to the rest of 
the “international community”, it was lauded by its supporters as a timely reac-
tion to the realities in the world of work under the conditions of globalization. 
In their view, decent work means a more inclusive approach to improving the 
conditions of working people worldwide.706 From this perspective, the concept 
represents a certain historical continuity, starting in the 1930s with the ILO’s 
participation in the broader economic debate on unemployment, and contin-
uing after the war with the broadened mandate of the Declaration of Philadel-
phia, the employment-centred approach of the WEP, and the efforts under the 
PIACT to improve working conditions in both the industrialized and developing 
countries.
On the other hand, the concept of decent work has also encountered strong 
criticism. Some of its critics have taken issue with the “vagueness” of the 
concept, in particular with regard to the term “decent”. For Guy Standing, one of 
Somavía’s collaborators at the beginning of his first term, this vagueness and the 
initial reluctance to create measurable indicators for decent work were intention-
al.707 Standing’s assessment continues to echo with other critical voices, mostly 
from the political left, who see the deliberately non-ideological or non-political 
2015 (No. 204); and, in 2014, the Supplementary Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 
(No. 29) and the Forced Labour (Supplementary Measures) Recommendation (No. 203).
704 Ryder combines a trade union background with prior experience in the ILO (from 1998 to 
2002 and again from 2010 to 2012 as the Executive Director responsible for international labour 
standards and fundamental principles and rights at work). He had been appointed General Sec-
retary of the ICFTU in 2002, managing its transition into the new unified International Trade 
Union Confederation (ITUC) in 2006.
705 According to UNResolution A/RES/70/1, 25 September 2015, Goal 8 which usually appears 
under the heading of “Decent Work and Economic Growth”, aims to “promote sustained, inclu-
sive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all”.
706 Or a “metaphor”, as in Vosko, “Decent Work. The Shifting Role of the ILO.”
707 Standing, “The ILO: An Agency for Globalization?”. In September 2008, the ILO convened 
an international Tripartite Meeting of Experts on the Measurement of Decent Work, and adopted 
a framework of Decent Work Indicators that was endorsed by the 18th International Conference 
of Labour Statisticians in December 2008.
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 character of the concept as a way to conceal its compatibility or even complic-
ity with the hegemonic neoliberal agenda. In their view, the ILO has once again 
(after the 1998 Declaration) failed to adopt a “counter-hegemonic” position, one 
which would have tackled the root causes of inhumane working conditions.708 
Whether the ILO would have been able to launch and defend such an unequivocal 
strategy given the realities of its tripartite structure, and an overall unfavourable 
context, is, however, open to question.
Social Justice for a New Century
What lessons can be learned from 100 years of ILO history? The questions posed 
at the start of this book – whose organization is the ILO, what defines it as an 
international organization, and what could or should be its contribution to the 
quest for social justice – seem to be as valid today as they were in 1919 in Paris or 
1944 in Philadelphia.
In the summer of 2011 the International Labour Conference produced 
some unusually colourful images of grassroots activists representing house-
hold workers from many different countries urging delegates to the ILC adopt a 
 “Convention concerning decent work for domestic workers”709 Their presence, 
their songs, chants, and slogans written on t-shirts and banderoles communi-
cated in a very immediate way the importance they attached to a Convention 
that for the first time extended to domestic workers labour protections with 
regard to wages, regulation of working time, weekly rest, and overall working 
conditions.710
Domestic work is a recent area of ILO activities, but it has a historical conti-
nuity with the constant expansion of the ILO’s mandate to integrate new forms 
of work and address the needs of new groups of workers. In the case of domestic 
work, roughly 53 million people (as of 2010) worldwide are now in the orbit of ILO 
standard-setting. Together with less well-known labour standards, Convention 
No. 189 is an attempt to tackle the problems of the “informal” economy, which 
has long been regarded as difficult to regulate. These standards are part of the 
708 For a summary of the discussion, see Felix Hauf, “The Paradoxes of Decent Work in Context: 
A Cultural Political Economy Perspective”, Global Labour Journal 6, no. 2 (2015): 138–155.
709 Convention on Decent Work for Domestic Workers, 2011 (No. 189).
710 Chris Bonner, Pat Horn, and Renana Jhabvala, “Informal Women Workers Open ILO Doors 
through Transnational Organizing, 1980s to 2010s”, in Women’s ILO, ed. Boris, Hoehtker, and 
Zimmermann, 176–202; Eileen Boris and Jennifer N. Fish, “‘Slaves No More’: Making Global Labor 
Standards for Domestic Workers”, Feminist Studies 40, no. 2 (2014): 411–443.
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ILO’s long history of engagement with informality, which started in the 1970s with 
the World Employment Programme.711
From yet a different point of view, domestic work is also part of the equally 
long history of struggles for representation and participation within the ILO’s 
tripartite framework. On the one hand the adoption of the Domestic Workers 
Convention can be attributed to the creative strategies pursued by a transna-
tional advocacy network and the “strategies of affect” applied by “real” domes-
tic workers present as visible and audible defenders of their cause in the ILO’s 
meeting rooms.712 On the other hand, the reason why these networks could get 
their concerns on the ILC agenda was the result of alliances built with Workers’ 
and Government groups and the connections made between domestic work and 
the ILO’s focus areas of “fair globalization” and “decent work”.713 Something 
711 Other standards which are addressing the informal economy are e.g. the Home Work Con-
vention, 1996 (No. 177); the Home Work Recommendation, 1996 (No. 184); the Domestic Workers 
Recommendation, 2011 (No. 201); and the Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy 
Recommendation, 2015 (No. 204).
712 Boris and Fish, “ ‘Slaves No More’: Making Global Labor Standards for Domestic Workers”, 437.
713 What ultimately secured the success of the Convention and helped to overcome significant 
resistance in particular from the Employers’ side and on the part of some national governments, 
Figure 16: Representatives of domestic worker organizations celebrating the adoption of the 
Domestic Worker Convention (No. 189) with ILO Director-General Juan Somavía at the 2011 ILC.
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similar had already happened with indigenous peoples’ representatives in 1989 
and NGO activists against child labour in 1999, when Conventions on their rights 
were negotiated and adopted.
This particular case indicates the capacity of the tripartite structure, despite 
resistance, to incorporate and accommodate new demands. In a broader sense 
it presents tripartism as a predictable mode of operation which allows a certain 
degree of flexibility to better adapt to changing historical circumstances, political 
constellations, structural and technological change. As the book has shown at 
various points, the tripartism that the ILO had developed during the inter-war 
years survived the authoritarian challenges of the 1930s as well as the ideological 
battles of the Cold War and the decolonization era without losing the core of its 
democratic impetus.
Tripartism, as this book has shown, has worked as an asset for the ILO at 
the national level as well, where it had to be adapted to the specific context and 
the situation of local employers’ organization and trade unions. However, coop-
eration with extended networks beyond the tripartite framework was a decisive 
part of the International Labour Office’s strategy from the beginning. Without 
ever questioning the institutional tripartite representation, the ILO has estab-
lished close working relationships with a broad set of actors ranging from the 
cooperative movement to scientific institutions such as the International Man-
agement Institute (IMI) of the interwar period, to social security institutions, to 
the Catholic Church and, in the more immediate past, to children’s and human 
rights NGOs.
At the same time, questions of representation and participation have con-
tinued to give rise to conflict and debate. The inclusion of colonial or indig-
enous workers into delegations and the ILO standard-setting process had 
initially been met with resistance. The same is true for feminists and women 
activists who were claiming not only equal rights and better conditions for 
women workers, but also better representation. Some of these struggles belong 
to the past, others continue to this day. Given the expansion of the informal 
economy and the explosion of precarious work even in countries where formal 
and protected employment has been the rule for decades, the question of how 
was owed to the support of trade unions and accordingly domestic workers organizations’ 
adaptation to the formal trade union criteria. The International Domestic Workers Network 
(IDWN), a global network of domestic workers’ organizations that was launched during the 
98th Session of the ILC in 2009, was integrated as a semi-autonomous entity into the structure 
of the International Union of Food Workers, which provided it with the necessary recognition 
and legitimacy and established contact with key people in the International Labour Office and 
in the trade unions.
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to organize workers and support their fight for jobs, rights, and better working 
conditions is as urgent as it was in the first decades of the ILO. In terms of 
direct membership, both the Workers’ group in the ILO as well as the IOE714 
represent a limited and mostly shrinking proportion of the world of work. 
Unionization rates have been on the decline during the last decades. Trade 
unions find themselves under continous pressure from calls for labour market 
flexibility. As recent debates on the right to strike have highlighted, this pres-
sure is increasingly felt within the Organization, too.715 Trade unions see many 
good reasons to resist any calls to modify the principle of tripartism that could 
recognize other bodies as mandated representatives of workers within the 
Organization, a move that would only further weaken their capacity to repre-
sent their members’ interests and conclude agreements on their behalf. From 
the trade union’s point of view (shared in principle by the Employers) this 
capacity depends on their ability to avoid further fragmentation.716 Also, their 
argument that the fluid world of NGOs lacks transparency, accountability and 
proper representation cannot easily be dismissed as an expression of vested 
interests. 
Last but not least, domestic work opens a window to present debates on 
social justice. Both in itself and as part of the wider issue of international labour 
migration, domestic work has global dimensions which connect poor, middle- 
income, and rich countries with each other. It is an indicator of global inequali-
ties but also of gender imbalances – in the light of the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of domestic workers are women.
The world today is different compared to 1919, but many of the ILO’s founding 
principles have lost nothing of their relevance. This is certainly true for the con-
stitutional maxim, “labour is not a commodity”. It encapsulates the social liberal 
consensus that has carried the ILO for a century. At its core rests the insight that the 
survival of open market economies ultimately depends on a de commodification 
714 Louis, “Building a Transnational Business Community”, 19–21. While the United States 
Council for International Business (USCIB)represents corporate giants like Google, IBM, Nestlé, 
DuPont and Coca Cola in the IOE, some powerful MNEs like Amazon are not IOE members.
715 At the 2012 Session of the ILC, the Employers’ group broke with an almost seventy-year-old 
unwritten agreement, according to which the CEACR deals with infringements on the right to 
strike as violations of the freedom of association and right to collective bargaining Conventions 
No. 87 and 98 – even though this right is not explicitly mentioned in the respective Conventions. 
Observers see this as part of a broader strategy by the employers of gaining a “freer hand” to push 
for further deregulation of international labour law and for a reform of the ILO’s supervisory 
system. Hauf, “The Paradoxes of Decent Work in Context”.
716 Ibid.
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of labour, as far as possible and feasible – through living wages and social poli-
cies that safeguard workers and their families from falling into poverty. Modern 
welfare states have been built on this premise, and the ILO’s labour standards 
both testify and add substance to this project. The maxim that “labour is not a 
commodity” has never reflected the reality of labour markets, where labour has 
de facto always been treated as a commodity. If anything, globalization and the 
imperatives it sets for working people – both real and alleged –, have exacerbated 
this. “Labour is not a commodity” in this sense stands for the conviction that its 
human and social dimension distinguishes labour from other commodities and 
implies a call for governments and business alike to respect and act upon it.
ILO activities in the field of human trafficking are a recent case in point. The 
debates surrounding the adoption of the 2014 Forced Labour Protocol targeting 
various forms of modern slavery underscored the dimensions of the most brutal 
forms of commodification of labour, with approximately 40 million people suffer-
ing under inhumane conditions in private households, agriculture, on construc-
tion sites, or as victims of sexual exploitation.717 Incidents such as the collapse of 
the Rana Plaza factory in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 2013, remind us that even when 
labour is formally free, at the dark end of global supply chains workers can be 
trapped in hazardous working conditions that resemble in many ways those that 
existed in the ILO’s early days.
Similar points can be made about one of the core messages of the Phila-
delphia Declaration of 1944, which holds that “Poverty anywhere constitutes a 
danger to prosperity everywhere”. This statement builds on the ILO’s constitu-
tional assumption that “the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions 
of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the 
conditions in their own countries”.718 Together, these assertions make the case 
for international labour standards as a means to manage the potentially hazard-
ous effects of international economic competition. To live up to these ambitious 
goals, the ILO has moved far beyond standard-setting. From its early technical 
assistance missions to the World Employment Programme, the large-scale tech-
nical cooperation programmes starting in the 1990s, and the Social Justice Dec-
laration, the ILO has taken an active part in the discussion of the international 
dimension of social justice and addressed it through assistance and development 
activities on the ground. “Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity 
everywhere” in this sense could well be read as a timely commentary on another 
717 ILO and Walk Free Foundation, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and 
Forced Marriage (Geneva: ILO, 2017), 5.
718 Preamble to the ILO’s Constitution.
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issue which has become more closely connected to the problem of poverty: inter-
national migration. The ILO’s contribution to the Global Compact on Migration of 
2018 explicitly emphasizes this connection explicitly.719 This area has been com-
plicated and aggravated by the global refugee crisis that has unfolded since 2011, 
and the ILO is encountering the same problems that have inhibited the work for 
refugees and migrant workers since its inception. With regard to labour migra-
tion, the ILO faces one of the contradictions in today’s global economy – between 
receiving countries’ claims for border control and immigration restriction on the 
one side, and their obvious demand for flexible and mobile labour forces on 
the other.720 In the current political climate, to organize a global discussion on the 
social dimension of migration and migration policies, or to address the question 
of how best to integrate migrants and refugees into the labour markets of their 
host countries, has become more difficult than ever.
Finally, social justice appears in a central message of the ILO Constitution: 
“Whereas universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based on 
social justice”.721 For the Constitution’s authors, who drafted the document with 
fresh memories of the horrors of the First World War, it must have seemed only 
natural to give this message a prominent position. This seemed even more true 
in 1944 in Philadelphia, when many thought that the failure of liberal democra-
cies to address the social consequences of the Great Depression had facilitated 
the rise of fascism that had led to the war. Most of the political leaders, trade 
unionists, and employers gathering in Philadelphia subscribed to one lesson of 
the past: that social justice was a precondition not only for peace but also for 
the stability of democratic government. The rise of neo-nationalist and right-wing 
populist movements in recent years, due in part to the very real experience of 
social inequalities both globally and within societies, bears echoes of the past 
that still resonate today.
Against this background, the major question for the ILO in its Centenary year 
is not whether it is still relevant, but rather how much momentum it can retain 
and gain back in a world that has– despite the recent return to neo- protectionist 
rhetoric – for the last decades been dominated by a widespread belief in the 
primacy of markets and the calls for deregulation and flexibilization that accom-
719 ILO, “UN Secretary-General’s report on the global compact for safe, orderly and regular mi-
gration. Inputs of the International Labour Organization” (Geneva: ILO), 6 November 2017.
720 This contradiction is pointed out by Antoine Pécoud, “What Do We Know about the Inter-
national Organization for Migration?” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44, no. 10 (2018): 
1621–1638.
721 ILO Constitution.
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pany it. The dominant discourse that sees globalization as a quasi-natural force 
leaves limited space for an organization which has always relied on the capac-
ity and willingness of states to intervene on behalf of their own citizens in order 
to limit the destructive potential of open market economies. The future success 
of the ILO depends largely on the degree to which it will be able to facilitate a 
renewed “Philadelphia consensus” in the context of globalization and to gain 
support for its vision that the objective of social cohesion and justice should 
guide all policies. A first step would be to recognize that the concept of social pro-
gress itself has changed significantly since Philadelphia. It is no longer just about 
a fair distribution of the fruits of economic growth, but increasingly also about a 
redefinition – from a social justice perspective – of what progress could mean in 
the face of the vast ecological challenges in the present and future
After decades in which international discourse on human rights has been 
largely dominated by the primacy of liberal freedoms, recent debates show a 
new awareness and sense of urgency for the inclusion of and emphasis on social 
rights.722 The ILO seems better equipped than any other organization to respond 
to these new calls to reconcile social justice with human rights, both between and 
within nations.
Climate change and environmental destruction, global migration, the digital 
revolution, and the persisting growth of the informal economy are among the 
forces which will continue to have a major impact on the world of work. It is 
changing more rapidly than ever before, although by far not in the same way and 
at the same speed for all workers. In addition, in rich and poor, industrialized 
and non-industrialized countries, outrageously inhumane working conditions 
continue to exist. These developments come with new questions of social justice 
as well as challenges to traditional notions of the term itself..
Various initiatives launched for the Centenary by Director-General Ryder, 
especially the Future of Work initiative and the Global Commission on the Future 
of Work, which submitted its report in early 2019, have addressed many of these 
problems. In June 2019 the ILC adopted a Centenary Declaration and the Violence 
and Harrassment Convention (No. 190). Whether the ILO will be able to meaning-
fully contribute to the practice of social justice in the 21st century, however, is not 
in the hands of the Organization alone. There has to be a political climate that 
favours multilateralism, and trade unions and employers’ organizations must 
have enough political support to render a significant contribution. States cannot 
722 Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018).
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be satisfied by relegating the ILO to being a mere passive social conscience of the 
world. Despite all setbacks and limitations, the last 100 years have proven one 
point – the ILO has always been an organization for difficult times. For the ILO 
to be able to act, however, its constituents have to be both willing and able to use 
the tools provided by the Organization to shape global social policy, as they have 
done on so many occasions before.
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Études. Geneva: Institut Européen de l’Université de Genève, 1996.
Guieu, Jean-Michel. “Albert Thomas et la paix. Du socialisme normalien à l’action internationale 
au BIT.” Les cahiers Irice 2, no. 2 (2008): 65–80.
Guinand, Cédric. Die Internationale Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) und die soziale Sicherheit in 
Europa (1942–1969). Bern: Peter Lang, 2003.
Guthrie, Jason. “The ILO and the International Technocratic Class, 1944–1966.” In Globalizing 
Social Rights, edited by Kott and Droux, 115–136.
Gzoyan, Edita. “The League of Nations and Armenian Refugees: The Formation of the Armenian 
Diaspora in Syria.” Central and Eastern European Review 8, no.1 (2014): 89–101.
Haas, Ernst B. Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964.
284   Bibliography
Hagtvedt Vik, Hanne. “How Constitutional Concerns Framed the US Contribution to the 
International Human Rights Regime from Its Inception, 1947–1953.” International History 
Review 34, no. 4 (2012): 887–909.
Hagtvedt Vik, Hanne. “Indigenous Internationalism.” In Internationalisms. A Twentieth Century 
History, edited by Sluga and Clavin, 315–339.
Hagtvedt Vik, Hanne. “Taming the States: The American Law Institute and the ‘Statement of 
Essential Human Rights’.” Journal of Global History 7, no. 3 (2012): 461–482.
Hansenne, Michel. Un garde-fou pour la mondialisation. Le BIT dans l’après-guerre froide. 
Chêne-Bourg: Editions ZOE, 1999.
Hauf, Felix. “The Paradoxes of Decent Work in Context: A Cultural Political Economy 
Perspective.” Global Labour Journal 6, no. 2 (2015): 138–155.
Heerma van Voss, Lex. “The International Federation of Trade Unions and the Attempt to 
Maintain the Eight-Hour Working Day 1919–1929.” In Internationalism in the Labour 
Movement, 1830–1940, edited by Frits Van Holthoon and Marcel van der Linden, 518–542. 
Leiden: Brill, 1988.
Helleiner, Eric. Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the 
Making of the Postwar Order. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
Henrÿ, Hagen. “The Contribution of the ILO to the Formation of Public International Cooperative 
Law.” In Globalizing Social Rights, edited by Kott and Droux, 98–115.
Herren, Madeleine. “Fascist Internationalism.” In Internationalisms: A Twentieth Century 
History, edited by Sluga and Clavin, 191–212.
Herren, Madeleine. “Global Corporatism after the First World War – The Indian Case.” In 
Globalizing Social Rights, edited by Kott and Droux, 137–152.
Herren, Madeleine. Hintertüren zur Macht: Internationalismus und modernisierungsorientierte 
Außenpolitik in Belgien, der Schweiz und den USA. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000.
Herrera González, Patricio. “El pacto por la unidad obrera continental: sus antecedentes en 
Chile y México, 1936.” Estudios de historia moderna y contemporánea de México 46  
(July–December 2013): 87–119.
Hidalgo-Weber, Olga. “Dimensions transnationales des politiques sociales britanniques: 
Le rôle de la Grande-Bretagne au sein de l’Organisation internationale du Travail, 
1919–1946.” PhD diss., Université de Genève, 2015.
Hidalgo-Weber, Olga. “Femmes britanniques et pratiques internationales de justice sociale 
dans la première moitié du XXe siècle.” Le Mouvement Social 263, no. 2 (2018): 77–92.
Hidalgo-Weber, Olga. La Grande-Bretagne et l’Organisation internationale du travail 
(1919–1946). Une nouvelle forme d’internationalisme. Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia-
L’Harmattan, 2017.
Hidalgo-Weber, Olga. “Social and Political Networks and the Creation of the ILO: The Role of 
British Actors.” In Globalizing Social Rights, edited by Kott and Droux, 17–31.
Hilson, Mary. The Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945. London: Reaktion Books, 2008.
Hodge, Joseph Morgan. The Triumph of the Expert. Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the 
Legacies of British Colonialism. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007.
Hoehtker, Dorothea, and Sandrine Kott, eds. À la rencontre de l’Europe au travail. Recits de 
voyages d’Albert Thomas. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne; Geneva: ILO, 2015.
Hoffmann, Stefan-Ludwig. “Human Rights and History.” Past & Present 232, no. 1 (2016): 
279–310.
Bibliography   285
Hoffmann, Stefan-Ludwig. ed. Human Rights in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010.
Hooper, Paul F. “The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Origins of Asian and Pacific Studies.” 
Pacific Affairs 61, no. 1 (1988): 98–121.
Hu, Aiqun. China’s Social Insurance in the 20th Century: A Global Historical Perspective. Leiden: 
Brill, 2015.
Huberman, Michael. Odd Couple: International Trade and Labor Standards in History. Yale 
Series in Economic and Financial History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012.
Hughes, Stephen, and Nigel Haworth. “A Shift in the Centre of Gravity: The ILO under Harold 
Butler and John G. Winant.” In ILO Histories, edited by Van Daele et al., 293–312.
Hutchinson, John F. “Rethinking the Origins of the Red Cross.” Bulletin for the History of 
Medicine 63, no. 4 (1989): 557–578.
ILO, Constitution and Standing Orders of the International Labour Organisation. Geneva: ILO, 
1934.
ILO, ed. Edward Phelan and the ILO. The Life and Views of an International Social Actor. Geneva: 
ILO, 2009.
ILO. Employment, Incomes, and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in 
Kenya. Geneva: ILO, 1972.
ILO. Freedom of Association. Studies and Reports, Series A, Nos. 28–32. 5 vols. Geneva: ILO, 
1927–1930.
ILO. Indigenous Peoples: Living and Working Conditions of Aboriginal Populations in 
Independent Countries, Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 35. Geneva: ILO, 1953.
ILO. The ILO and Africa. Geneva: ILO, 1960.
ILO. The ILO and Asia. Geneva: ILO, 1962.
ILO. “The I.L.O. Manpower Programme.” International Labour Review 59, no. 4 (April 1949): 
367–393.
ILO. The Role of the ILO in the Promotion of Economic Expansion and Social Progress in 
Developing Countries. Geneva: ILO, 1961.
ILO. The Role of the ILO in the Promotion of Economic Growth. Geneva: ILO, 1961.
ILO. Social Policy in Dependent Territories. Geneva: ILO, 1944.
ILO. “Voices for Freedom of Association.” Labour Education 112, no. 3 (1998).
ILO. World Employment 1995. An ILO Report. Geneva: ILO, 1995.
ILO and Walk Free Foundation. Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced 
Marriage. Geneva: ILO, 2017.
Imber, Mark F. The USA, ILO, UNESCO and IAEA. Politicization and Withdrawal in the Specialized 
Agencies. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989.
Jacobson, Harold Karan. “The USSR and ILO.” International Organization 14, no. 3 (1957): 
402–428.
James, Harold. Rambouillet, 15. November 1975. Die Globalisierung der Wirtschaft. Munich: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1997.
Jensen, Jill M. “From Geneva to the Americas: The International Labor Organization and 
Inter-American Social Security Standards, 1936–1948.” International Labor and 
Working-Class History 80, no. 1 (2011): 215–240.
Jensen, Jill M. “US New Deal Social Policy Experts and the ILO, 1948–1954.” In Globalizing 
Social Rights, edited by Kott and Droux, 172–189.
286   Bibliography
Jensen, Jill M, and Nelson Lichtenstein, eds. The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim. West Meets 
East. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Geneva: ILO, 2015.
Jensen, Jill M. “Negotiating a World Trade and Employment Charter: The United States, the ILO 
and the Collapse of the ITO Ideal.” In The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim, edited by 
Jensen and Lichtenstein, 83–109.
Jensen, Steven L. B. The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, 
and the Reconstruction of Global Values. Human Rights in History. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017.
Jolly, Richard, Louis Emmerij, Dharam Ghai, and Frédéric Lapeyre. UN Contributions to 
Development Thinking and Practice. United Nations Intellectual History Project Series. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004.
Josephson, Harold. James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America. Rutherford, 
NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1974.
Kaufmann, Christine. Globalisation and Labour Rights. The Conflict between Core Labour Rights 
and International Economic Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007.
Kelly, Patrick William. Sovereign Emergencies: Latin America and the Making of Global Human 
Rights Politics. Human Rights in History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Kennedy, Paul M. The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations. 
New York: Random House, 2006.
Kent, Ann. Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security. Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.
Kettunen, Pauli. “The ILO as a Forum for Developing and Demonstrating a Nordic Model.” In 
Globalizing Social Rights, edited by Kott and Droux, 210–232.
Kévonian, Dzovinar. “Enjeux de catégorisations et migrations internationales. Le Bureau 
international du Travail et les réfugiés (1925–1929).” Revue européene des migrations 
internationales 21, no. 3 (2005): 1–23.
Kévonian, Dzovinar. “Les juristes et l’Organisation internationale du Travail 1919–1939. 
Processus de légitimation et institutionnalisation des relations internationales.” Journal of 
the History of International Law 12, no. 3 (2010): 227–266.
Kévonian, Dzovinar. “La légitimation par l’expertise: le Bureau international du travail et la 
statistique international.” Les cahiers Irice 2, no. 2 (2008): 81–106.
Kleinöder, Nina, Stefan Müller, and Karsten Uhl, eds. Humanisierung der Arbeit. Aufbrüche und 
Konflikte in der rationalisierten Arbeitswelt des 20. Jahrhunderts. Bielefeld: Transcript 
Verlag (forthcoming 2019).
Klose, Fabian. Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence: The Wars of Independence in 
Kenya and Algeria. Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights. Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
Konkel, Rob. “The Monetization of Global Poverty: The Concept of Poverty in World Bank History, 
1944–90.” Journal of Global History 9, no. 2 (2014): 276–300.
Kott, Sandrine. “Constructing a European Social Model: The Fight for Social Insurance in the 
Interwar Period.” In ILO Histories, edited by Van Daele et al., 173–196.
Kott, Sandrine. “Dynamiques de l’internationalisation: L’Allemagne et l’Organisation 
internationale du Travail (1919–1940).” Critique internationale 52 (2011): 69–84.
Kott, Sandrine. “Fighting the War or Preparing for Peace? The ILO During the Second World 
War.” Journal of Modern European History 12, no. 3 (2014): 359–376.
Kott, Sandrine. “From Transnational Reformist Network to International Organization: The 
International Association for Labour Legislation and the International Labour Organization, 
Bibliography   287
1900–930s.” In Shaping the Transnational Sphere. Experts, Networks and Issues from the 
1840s to the 1930s, edited by Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck and Jakob Vogel, 239–259. 
New York: Berghahn Books, 2015.
Kott, Sandrine, ed. La justice sociale dans un monde global. L’Organisation internationale du 
Travail. Special issue of Le Mouvement Social 263, no. 2 (2018): 3–14.
Kott, Sandrine. “OIT, justice sociale et mondes communistes. Concurrences, émulations, 
convergences.” Le Mouvement Social 263, no. 2 (2018): 139–151.
Kott, Sandrine. “Towards a Social History of International Organizations: The ILO and the 
Internationalisation of Western Social Expertise (1919–1949).” In Internationalism, 
Imperialism and the Formation of the Contemporary World. The Pasts of the Present, edited 
by Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro, 35–57. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018.
Kott, Sandrine, and Joëlle Droux, eds. Globalizing Social Rights. The International Labour 
Organization and Beyond. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Geneva: ILO, 2013.
Kott, Sandrine “The Forced Labor Issue between Human and Social Rights, 1947–1957.” 
Humanity 3, no. 3 (2012): 69–84.
Kott, Sandrine. “Competing Internationalisms: The Third Reich and the International Labour 
Organization.” In Nazism across Borders. The Social Policies of the Third Reich and their 
Global Appeal, edited by Sandrine Kott and Kiran Klaus Patel, 29–52. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018.
La Hovary, Claire. “A Challenging Ménage à Trois? Tripartism in the International Labour 
Organization.” International Organizations Law Review 12, no. 1 (2015): 204–236.
Lake, Marilyn. “The ILO, Australia and the Asia-Pacific Region: New Solidarities or 
Internationalism in the National Interest?” In The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim, 
edited by Jensen and Lichtenstein, 33–54.
Lapeyre, Jean. Le dialogue social européen. Histoire d’une innovation sociale (1985–2003). 
Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, 2017.
Laqua, Daniel, ed. Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements 
between the World Wars. International Library of Twentieth Century History. London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2011.
Latham, Michael E. Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and ‘Nation Building’ 
in the Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
Lauren, Paul Gordon. Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination. 
Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988.
Lee, Eddy. “The Declaration of Philadelphia: Retrospect and Prospect.” International Labour 
Review 133, no. 4 (1994): 467–484.
Leimgruber, Matthieu. “The Embatteled Standard-bearer of Social Insurance and Its Challenger: 
The ILO, the OECD and the ‘Crisis of the Welfare State’, 1975–1985.” In Globalizing Social 
Rights, edited by Kott and Droux, 293–309.
Lee, Eddy, and Matthias Schmelzer, eds. The OECD and the International Political Economy 
since 1948. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
Lerner, Abba P. “Mr. Keynes’ ‘General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money’.” International 
Labour Review 34, no. 4 (1936): 435–454.
Lespinet-Moret, Isabelle. “Promouvoir la santé au travail comme droit social (1919–1940)?” Le 
Mouvement Social 263, no. 2 (2018): 61–76.
Lespinet-Moret, Isabelle, and Vincent Viet, eds. L’Organisation internationale du Travail: 
origine, développement, avenir. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2011.
288   Bibliography
Lichtenstein, Nelson “The ILO and the Corporate Social Responsibility Regime in East and 
South Asia.” In The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim, edited by Jensen and Lichtenstein, 
277–296.
Liebeskind Sauthier, Ingrid. “Modern Unemployment: From the Creation of the Concept to the 
International Labour Office’s First Standards.” In Globalizing Social Rights, edited by Kott 
and Droux, 67–84.
Liebscher, Daniela. Freude und Arbeit. Zur internationalen Freizeit- und Sozialpolitik des 
faschistischen Italien und des NS-Regimes. Italien in der Moderne, vol. 16. Cologne: 
SH-Verlag, 2009.
Lieten, G.K. “The ILO Setting the Terms in the Child Labour Debate.” In ILO Histories, edited by 
Van Daele et al., 443–460.
Linnik, Marianna, and Sune Skadegaard Thorsen. “ILO and CSR – Minimum Human Rights 
Standards for Croporations.” In Governance, International Law and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, edited by ILO and International Institute for Labour Studies, 105–127. 
Geneva: ILO, 2008.
Lorenz, Edward C. Defining Global Justice: The History of U.S. International Labor Standards 
Policy. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001.
Louis, Marieke. “La diplomatie sociale des multinationales.” La vie des idées, 9 October, 2018, 
www.laviedesidees.fr.
Louis, Marieke. “Hansenne, Michel.” In IO Bio: Biographical Dictionary, edited by Reinalda, 
Kille, and Eisenberg, www.ru.nl/fm/iobio.
Louis, Marieke. “The ILO, Social Partners and the G20: New Prospects for Social Dialogue at the 
Global Level?” Global Social Policy 16, no. 3 (2016): 235–252.
Louis, Marieke. “Women’s Representation at the ILO: A Hundred Years of Marginalization.” In 
Women’s ILO, edited by Boris, Hoehtker and Zimmermann, 202–225.
Maier, Charles “The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic 
Policy after World War II.” International Organization 31, no. 4 (1977): 607–633.
Massart, Sylvie. “Les voyages d’Albert Thomas, directeur du Bit (1919–1932).” Master’s thesis, 
Université Paris-I, Sorbonne, 1993.
Matera, Marc, and Susan Kingsley Kent. The Global 1930s: The International Decade. London: 
Routledge, 2017.
Maul, Daniel Roger. “‘Help Them Move the ILO Way’: The International Labour Organization and 
the Modernization Discourse in the Era of Decolonization and the Cold War.” Diplomatic 
History 33, no. 3 (2009): 387–404.
Maul, Daniel Roger. Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization: The International Labour 
Organization, 1940–70. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Geneva: ILO, 2012.
Maul, Daniel Roger. “The ILO, Asia and the Beginnings of Technical Assistance, 1945–60.” 
In The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim, edited by Jensen and Lichtenstein, 365–400.
Maul, Daniel Roger. “The International Labour Organization and the Globalization of Human 
Rights, 1944–1970.” In Human Rights in the Twentieth Century, edited by Stefan-Ludwig 
Hoffmann, 301–320. 
Maul, Daniel Roger. “The International Labour Organization and the Struggle against Forced 
Labour from 1919 to the Present.” Labor History 48, no. 4 (2007): 477–500.
Maul, Daniel Roger. “Morse, David Abner”. In IO Bio: Biographical Dictionary, edited by 
Reinalda, Kille, and Eisenberg, www.ru.nl/fm/iobio.
Maul, Daniel Roger. “The ‘Morse Years’: The ILO 1948–1970.” In ILO Histories, edited by Van 
Daele et al., 365–400.
Bibliography   289
Maul, Daniel Roger, Luca Puddu, and Hakeem Ibikunle Tijani. “The International Labour 
Organization”. In General Labour History of  Africa: Workers, Employers and Governments, 
20th–21st Centuries, edited by Stefano Bellucci and Andreas Eckert. Martlesham: James 
Currey; Geneva: ILO, 2019.
Maupain, Francis. The Future of the International Labour Organization in the Global Economy. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013.
Maurel, Chloé. “OIT et responsabilité sociale des sociétés transnationales depuis 1970.” In 
L’Organisation internationale du travail, edited by Lespinet-Moret and Viet, 179–192.
Mazower, Mark. Governing the World: The History of an Idea. New York: The Penguin Press, 2012.
Mazower, Mark. No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the 
United Nations. Lawrence Stone Lectures. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
McPherson, Alan, and Yannick Wehrli, eds. Beyond Geopolitics: New Histories of Latin America 
at the League of Nations. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2015.
Mechi, Lorenzo. “Du BIT à la politique sociale européenne: Les origines d’un modèle.” Le 
Mouvement Social 244, no. 3 (2013): 17–30.
Mechi, Lorenzo. “Economic Regionalism and Social Stabilisation: The International Labour 
Organization and Western Europe in the Early Post-War Years.” International History 
Review 35, no. 4 (2013): 844–862.
Mehrotra, Santosh, and Richard Jolly, eds. Development with a Human Face: Experiences in 
Social Achievement and Economic Growth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Monteiro, José Pedro. “‘One of Those Too-Rare Examples’: The International Labour 
Organization, the Colonial Question and Forced Labour (1961–1963).” In Internationalism, 
Imperialism and the Formation of the Contemporary World. The Past of the Present, edited 
by Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro, 221–251. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018.
Morse, David A. “The Employment Problem in Developing Countries.” In Prospects for 
Employment Opportunities in the Nineteen Seventies: Papers and Impressions of the 
Seventh Cambridge Conference on Development Problems, 13th to 24th September 1979 at 
Jesus College, Cambridge, edited by Ronald Robinson and Peter Johnston, 5–13. Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, Overseas Development Administration. Cambridge University 
Overseas Studies Committee. London: HMSO, 1971.
Morsink, Johannes. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.
Moyn, Samuel. The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2010.
Moyn, Samuel. Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2018.
Moynihan, Daniel P. “The United States and the International Labor Organisation, 1889–1934,” 
PhD diss. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, MA, 1960.
Natchkova, Nora, and Céline Schoeni. “The ILO, Feminists and Expert Networks: The Challenges 
of a Protective Policy.” In Globalizing Social Rights, edited by Kott and Droux, 49–66.
Neunsinger, Silke. “The Unobtainable Magic of Numbers: Equal Remuneration, the ILO and the 
International Trade Union Movement, 1950s–1980s.” In Women’s ILO, edited by Boris, 
Hoehtker, and Zimmermann, 121–148.
Nolan, Mary. Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Normand, Roger, and Sahra Zaidi. Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal 
Justice. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008.
290   Bibliography
Norsky, K.K. The Influence of the International Labour Organization on Principles of Social 
Policy in Non-Metropolitan Territories. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951.
O’Higgins, Paul. “‘Labour Is Not a Commodity’ – An Irish Contribution to International Labour 
Law.” Industrial Law Journal 26, no. 3 (1997): 225–234.
O’Sullivan, Kevin. “‘A Global Nervous System’: The Rise and Rise of European Humanitarian 
NGOs, 1945–1985.” In International Organizations and Development, edited by Frey, 
Kunkel, and Unger, 196–219.
Oechslin, Jean-Jacques. The International Organisation of Employers. Three-Quarters of a 
Century in the Service of the Enterprise (1920–1998). Geneva: IOE, 2001.
Okia, Opolot. Communal Labor in Colonial Kenya: The Legitimization of Coercion, 1912–1930. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
Olesen, Thorsten Borring, Helge O. Pharo, and Kristian Paaskesen, eds. Saints and Sinners: 
Official Development Aid and its Dynamics in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. 
Issues in Contemporary History. Oslo: Akademika Publishing, 2013.
Orenstein, Mitchell A. “Pension Privatization: The Transnational Campaign.” In Globalizing 
Social Rights, edited by Kott and Droux, 280–292.
Orenstein, Mitchell A. “Transitional Social Policy in the Czech Republic and Poland.” Czech 
Sociological Review 3, no. 2 (1995): 179–196.
Ortuño Anaya, Pilar. European Socialists and Spain: The Transition to Democracy, 1959–77. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
Packenham, Robert A. Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in 
Foreign Aid and Social Science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973.
Patel, Kiran Klaus. The New Deal. A Global History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016.
Pécoud, Antoine. “What Do We Know about the International Organization for Migration?” 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44, no. 10 (2018): 1621–1638.
Pedersen, Susan. “Back to the League of Nations.” American Historical Review 112, no. 4 
(2007): 1091–1117.
Pedersen, Susan. The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015.
Pernet, Corinne A. “Developing Nutritional Standards and Food Policy: Latin American 
Reformers between the ILO, the League of Nations Health Organization, and the 
Pan-American Sanitary Bureau.” In Globalizing Social Rights, edited by Kott and Droux, 
249–261.
Phelan, Edward. “The ILO Sets up its Wartime Centre in Canada.” In Edward Phelan and the ILO. 
The Life and Views of an International Social Actor, edited by ILO, 259–279. Geneva: ILO, 
2009; initially published in: Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review 44, no. 174 (1956): 151–170.
Phelan, Edward. “Some Reminiscences of the International Labour Organization.” In Edward 
Phelan and the ILO. The Life and Views of an International Social Actor, edited by ILO, 
227–257. Geneva: ILO, 2009; initially published in: Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review 43, 
no. 171 (1954): 241–270.
Piguet, Laure. “La justice sociale par les statistiques? Le cas des accidents d’attelage des 
wagons de chemins de fer (1923–1931).” Le Mouvement Social  2 (2018): 31–43.
Plata-Stenger, Véronique. “Europe, the ILO and the Wider World (1919–1954),” EGO – European 
History Online, Mainz: Leibniz-Institut für Europäische Geschichte, 2016.
Plata-Stenger, Véronique. “L’OIT et le problème du sous-développement en Asie dans l’entre-
deux-guerres.” Le Mouvement Social 263, no. 2 (2018): 109–122.
Bibliography   291
Plata-Stenger, Véronique. Social Reform, Modernization and Technical Diplomacy: The ILO 
Contribution to Development (1930–1946). Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, forthcoming 
2020.
Plata-Stenger, Véronique. “‘To Raise Awareness of Difficulties and to Assert Their Opinion’. The 
International Labour Office and the Regionalization of International Cooperation in the 
1930s.” In Beyond Geopolitics, edited by McPherson and Wehrli, 97–113.
Plata-Stenger, Véronique. “Une voie sociale pour le développement. Le Bureau international 
du Travail et les débuts de la coopération technique (1919–1949).” PhD diss. Université de 
Genève, 2016.
Plesch, Dan. America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World War II and Forged a Peace. 
London: I.B. Tauris, 2011.
Pohrt, Oliver. Die internationale Gewerkschaftsbewegung zwischen Einheitswunsch und Kaltem 
Krieg. Der Weltgewerkschaftsbund (WGB) von der Gründungsphase bis zu seiner Spaltung 
(1941–1949). Regensburg: S. Roderer Verlag, 2000.
Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1944.
Prashad, Vijay. The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World. A New Press People’s 
History. New York: New Press, 2007.
Prince, Charles. “The U.S.S.R. and International Organizations.” The American Journal of 
International Law 36, no. 3 (1942): 425–445.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980–81. 3 Books. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981–1982.
Raphael, Lutz. “Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als methodische und konzeptionelle 
Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts.” Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft 22, no. 2 (1996): 165–193.
Reinalda, Bob. “Organization Theory and the Autonomy of the International Labour 
Organization: Two Classic Studies still Going Strong.” In Autonomous Policy Making by 
International Organisations, edited by Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek, 42–61. London: 
Routledge, 1998.
Reinalda, Bob. Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day. 
London: Routledge, 2009.
Reinalda, Bob, Kent Kille, and Jaci Leigh Eisenberg, eds. IO Bio: Biographical Dictionary of 
Secretaries-General of International Organizations, Nijmegen, The Netherlands: University 
of Nijmegen, www.ru.nl/fm/iobio.
Reynaud, Emmanuel. The International Labour Organization and Globalization. Fundamental 
Rights, Decent Work and Social Justice. ILO Research Paper Series No. 21. Geneva: ILO, 
2018.
Reynaud, Emmanuel. The International Labour Organization and the Living Wage: A Historical 
Perspective. Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 90. Geneva: ILO, 2017.
Ribi Forclaz, Amalia. “A New Target for International Social Reform: The International Labour 
Organization and Working and Living Conditions in Agriculture in the Inter-War Years.” 
Contemporary European History 20, no. 3 (2011): 307–329.
Richards, Peter J. “Preserving Jobs under Economic Stabilisation Programmes: Can there be an 
Employment Target?” International Labour Review 125, no. 4 (1986): 423–433.
Robertson, Thomas. The Malthusian Moment: Global Population Growth and the Birth 
of American Environmentalism. Studies in Modern Science, Technology, and the 
Environment. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012.
292   Bibliography
Rodgers, Gerry. “Decent Work as a Development Objective.” The Indian Journal of Labour 
Economics 44, no. 1 (2001): 15–26.
Rodgers, Gerry. “India, the ILO and the Quest for Social Justice.” Economic and Political Weekly 
46, no. 10 March (2011): 45–52.
Rodgers, Gerry, ed. The Poverty Agenda and the ILO. Issues for Research and Action. Geneva: 
International Institute for Labour Studies, 1995.
Rodgers, Gerry, Eddy Lee, Lee Swepston, and Jasmien Van Daele. The ILO and the Quest for 
Social Justice, 1919–2009. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Geneva: ILO, 2009.
Rodgers, Gerry, J. Krishnamurty, and Sabyasachi Bhattacharya. “India and the ILO in Historical 
Perspective.” Economic and Politcal Weekly 46, no. 10 (5 March 2011).
Rodogno Davide, Liat Kozma, and Magaly Rodriguez, eds., The League of Nations’ Work on 
Social Issues. Visions, Endeavours and Experiments. New York: United Nations Press, 2016.
Rodríguez García, Magaly. “Conclusion: The ILO’s Impact on the World.” In ILO Histories, edited 
by Van Daele et al., 461–478.
Rodríguez-Piñero, Luis. Indigenous Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International Law: The ILO 
Regime, 1919–1989. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Rosado Marzán, César F. “The Limits of Human Rights for Labour Rights: A Retrospective Look 
at the Case of Chile.” In The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim, edited by Jensen and 
Lichtenstein, 206–230.
Rosental, Paul-André. “Géopolitique et État-providence. Le BIT et la politique mondiale des 
migrations dans l’entre-deux-guerres.” Annales.Histoire, Sciences Sociales 61, no. 1 
(2006): 99–134.
Royle, Tony. “The ILO’s Shift to Promotional Principles and the ‘Privatization’ of Labour 
Rights: An Analysis of Labour Standards, Voluntary Self-regulation and Social Clauses.” 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 26, no. 3 (2010): 
249–271.
Rupp, Leila J. Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women’s Movement. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Sanchez Bajo, Claudia. “Work and Cooperatives: A Century of ILO Interaction with the 
Cooperative Movement.” In Cooperatives and the World of Work, edited by Bruno Roelants, 
Hyungsik Eum, Simel Esim, Sonja Novkovic, and Waltteri Katamajaki. London: Routledge, 
forthcoming 2020.
Saunier, Pierre-Yves. “Borderline Work: ILO Explorations onto the Housing Scene until 1940.” In 
ILO Histories, edited by Van Daele et al., 197–220.
Schenk, Catherine R. International Economic Relations since 1945. London: Routledge, 2011.
Schild, Georg. Bretton Woods and Dumberton Oaks. American Economic and Political Postwar 
Planning in the Summer of 1944. London: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.
Schmelzer, Matthias. The Hegemony of Growth: The OECD and the Making of the Economic 
Growth Paradigm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Schot, Johan, and Vincent Lagendijk. “Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years: 
Building Europe on Motorways and Electricity Networks.” Journal of Modern European 
History 6, no. 2 (2008): 196–217.
Scodeller, Gabriela. “Educar in derechos laborales: politicas y acciones desplegadas por la 
OIT en América Latina durante los años 1950–1970.” In Una historia regional de la OIT: 
Aportes sobre regulación y legislación del trabajo latinoamericano, edited by Laura Caruso 
and Andrés Stagnaro, 213–254. La Plata: Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de 
Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, 2017.
Bibliography   293
Seekings, Jeremy. “The ILO and Welfare Reform in South Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 1919–1950.” In ILO Histories, edited by Van Daele et al., 145–172.
Serra, Narcís, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New 
Global Governance. The Initiative for Policy Dialogue Series. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008.
Servais, Jean-Michel. International Labour Organization (ILO). Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2005.
Shotwell, James T. “The International Labor Organization as an Alternative to Violent 
Revolution.” Annals of the American Academy of Polical and Social Science 166, no. 1 
(1933): 18–25.
Shotwell, James T., ed. The Origins of the International Labor Organization. 2 vols. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1934.
Sikkink, Kathryn. Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2004.
Sinclair, Guy Fiti. To Reform the World: International Organizations and the Making of Modern 
States. The History and Theory of International Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2017.
Skran, Claudena. Refugees in Interwar Europe. The Emergence of a Regime. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995.
Slobodian, Quinn. Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2018.
Sluga, Glenda. Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism. Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
Sluga, Glenda, and Patricia Clavin, eds. Internationalisms: A Twentieth Century History. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Sluga, Glenda, and Patricia Clavin. “Rethinking the History of Internationalism.” In 
Internationalisms: A Twentieth Century History, edited by Sluga and Clavin, 3–14.
Smith, Mark B. “Social Rights in the Soviet Dictatorship: The Constitutional Right to Welfare 
from Stalin to Brezhnev.” Humanity 3, no. 3 (2012): 385–406.
Snyder, Sarah B. Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History 
of the Helsinki Network. Human Rights in History. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011.
Standing, Guy. “The ILO: An Agency for Globalization?” Development and Change 39, no. 3 
(2008): 355–384.
Steiner, Zara, The Lights that Failed. European International History 1919–1933. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005.
Stegmann, Natali. “The ILO and East Central Europe. Insights into the Early Polish and 
Czechoslovak Interwar Years.” Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Studia Territorialia 17, no. 1 
(2017): 11–34.
Stricker, Yann. “‘International Migration’ between Empire and Nation. The Statistical 
Construction of an Ambiguous Global Category in the International Labour Office in the 
1920s.” Ethnicities (7 March 2019), 469–485.
Studer, Brigitte, Regina Wecker, and Gaby Sutter, eds. Die “schutzbedürftige Frau.” Zur 
Konstruktion von Geschlecht durch Mutterschaftsversicherung, Nachtarbeitsverbot und 
Sonderschutzgesetzgebung. Zurich: Chronos, 2001.
Supiot, Alain. The Spirit of Philadelphia: Social Justice vs. the Total Market. Trans. Saskia 
Brown. London: Verso, 2012.
294   Bibliography
Süss, Dietmar. “Der Sieg der grauen Herren? Flexibilisierung und der Kampf um Zeit in den 
1970er und 1980er Jahren.” In Die Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart. Dimensionen des 
Strukturbruchs nach dem Boom, edited by Anselm Döring-Manteuffel, Lutz Raphael, and 
Thomas Schlemmer, 109–127. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016.
Tapiola, Kari. “Die ‘Multis’: Ein Thema für die Vereinten Nationen.” Vereinte Nationen 5 (1978): 
151–154.
Tapiola, Kari. “The ILO System of Regular Supervision of the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations: A Lasting Paradigm.” In Protecting Labour Rights as Human 
Rights: Present and Future of International Supervision. Proceedings of the International 
Colloquium on the 80th Anniversary of the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations, Geneva, 24–25 November 2006, edited by George P. 
Politakis, 29–36. Geneva: ILO, 2006.
Tapiola, Kari. The Teeth of the ILO. The Impact of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work. Geneva: ILO, 2018.
Thébaud, Francoise. “Difficult Inroads, Unexpected Results: The Correspondence Committee 
on Women’s Work in the 1930s.” In Women’s ILO, edited by Boris, Hoehtker, and 
Zimmermann, 50–74.
Thomas, Albert. A la recontre de l’orient. Notes de voyage 1928–1929. Geneva: Societé des amis 
d’Albert Thomas, 1959.
Thomas, Daniel C. The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of 
Communism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
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